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Abstract 
This comparative study examines the impact of extreme-right parties on immigration policy 
in the UK, France and Italy between 2001 and 2009. The thesis develops a synthesis of two 
different strands of work in political science: the extreme-right parties’ literature alongside 
immigration studies. Immigration studies often refer to extreme-right parties as a factor 
behind restrictive developments on immigration policy whilst ERP literature refers often to 
immigration but tell us very little about its complexity. Past comparative research throughout 
the 1990s suggested that members of the extreme-right party family exhibit similar 
significant levels of impact across different countries. This thesis compares whether the 
British National Party, the French Front National and the Italian Lega Nord had a significant 
impact on the three dimensions of immigration politics and policy: inter-party competition; 
public attitudes; and immigration policy development in the UK, France and Italy. The thesis 
shows substantial variations in the intensity and contents of extreme-right parties’ impact 
across the selected dimensions in each country and at cross-national level.   
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
“Co-optation of radical-right issues has operated quite successfully in the British case 
(in the 1970s), somewhat less so in the German case (in the 1980s), and not at all in 
the French case (in the 1990s) (...). By altering the issue agenda, co-optation also 
alters the terms of conflict among political parties, and, potentially, the electoral 
cleavages and divisions. (...) However, the question of why and how co-optation 
‘works’ in some cases and not in other remains to be analysed” 
Schain, 2006, p. 272 
The co-option of extreme-right parties (ERP) by mainstream parties has been intermittently 
identified in both the past and more recently, but there is still a lack of understanding of this 
political process as Martin Schain highlights. This political process has also been referred as 
“clothes stealing” and was first noticed by political scientists in the UK in the late 1970s 
(Hainsworth, 1992; Schain, 2006). Margaret Thatcher’s remarks in the late 1970s on people’s 
fears of being ‘swamped’ by alien cultures were interpreted as the co-option of the main 
British ERP at the time – the National Front’s (NF) discourse on immigration policy (Bale, 
2008). In France, the Interior Minister Charles Pasqua stated in an interview to Le Monde in 
1993 that: “France was a country of immigration, but it no longer wants to be so” adding that 
his government’s objective was to move towards a “zero-immigration” policy. These 
statements were perceived either as “a message to French voters who supported the FN” 
(Hollifield, 2004, p. 199) or as evidence of “some co-optation by the Union pour la 
démocratie française (UDF) - Rassemblement pour la Republique (RPR) of FN positions on 
immigration” (Downs, 2002, p. 42).  
It is this problematic concept of co-option that inspired the development of this thesis in a 
period when the spectre of ERPs haunts Western European countries (Mudde, 2007). Co-
17 
 
option as a political process can be defined as a strategy employed by a social group or an 
institution to enhance it is own position in the political arena by the formal or informal 
incorporation of the political proposals into the decision-making process that are supported 
by a challenger group or the group itself (Saward, 1992). Co-option is therefore a purposive 
oriented action undertaken by political elites to achieve a desired outcome and presupposes a 
convergence between two political actors. In Schain’s (2006) view, it is the process whereby 
established parties can recapture voters lost to challenger parties by co-opting and re-defining 
the issues that led to the challenger group’s emergence. 
From this perspective, co-option of ERPs by mainstream parties is interpreted as a bi-
dimensional political process. Co-option is first a reflection of the challenger party’s intense 
level of impact on its domestic political system, because it involves the formal/informal 
incorporation of its proposals by a challenged party (Figure 1.1). Thus, it can be observed 
either at the inter-party competition or at the policy development level. Impact is hereby 
understood as the ability to promote a particular outcome that would not be observed in the 
absence of the agency of the challenger party (Williams, 2006; Mudde, 2007). Secondly, co-
option can be regarded as a strategy employed by mainstream parties to neutralise the former 
party’s challenge (Figure 1.1). Understanding the occurrence of co-option processes 
presupposes the initial study of the levels of impact by the challenger party on its political 
system and then a review of the factors enhancing such political processes. The agency of 
mainstream parties needs to be included amongst such potential factors, considering that 
formal or informal co-option are amongst their possible strategies towards the challenger 
party (Downs, 2001; Bale et al., 2010). 
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Figure 1.1 – Informal co-option of ERPs on immigration policy as a bi-dimensional political 
process 
 
 
 
 
 
This comparative thesis focuses on the political impact of the most prominent ERPs in the 
British, French and Italian political systems on immigration policy between 2001 and 2009. It 
is driven by the hypothesis that the British National Party (BNP), the French Front National 
(FN) and the Italian Lega Nord (LN) had a significant impact on immigration politics and 
policy during the 2000s. This research adopts a comparative small-N design with a restricted 
number of cases to enhance understanding of the ERP impact on immigration policy and 
politics within their domestic contexts. A synthesis of two strands of political research that 
have been relatively developed separately is proposed by this research: ERP literature and 
immigration studies. This thesis employs a mixed research methodology with a strong 
qualitative emphasis to evaluate ERP impact on immigration policy – the regulations and 
procedures governing the entry and residence of foreign citizens, including control of their 
employment or deportation. Integration policy – the conditions provided by host states for 
immigrants already resident in the host society were therefore excluded from the scope of 
analysis (Hammar, 1985).
1
 
                                                 
1
 Inclusion of integration policy alongside immigration policy would expand the scope of analysis beyond 
the limit of this research. Moreover, the research presupposed that the entry status of immigrants has a 
determinant influence on their integration in the host society. 
Informal co-option of ERPs on 
immigration policy 
ERP impact on domestic 
political system 
Mainstream party agency 
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1.1 – Research on the political impact of ERPs 
Systematic analysis of ERP impact within their political systems is considered to be still in its 
“infancy”, a trend that encourages limited knowledge over the observation of this political 
process (Mudde, 2007). Two sorts of justifications are found for this fault in the political 
literature. First, the impact of smaller parties has been neglected by contemporary political 
science, which concentrates mostly on mainstream parties that hold direct access to office 
positions and to the policy-making process (Williams, 2006). The conception of ERPs as 
minor parties was deeply related to their inability to have formal representation in national 
cabinets. However, even small parties have an important role in mobilising public opinion on 
particular issues and shape political identities. Minor parties’ electoral strategies are 
frequently focused on a limited set of political issues and exploit political cleavages ignored 
by mainstream parties (Copus et al., 2009).  
Small parties are important for their formative role in domestic political systems and can hold 
indirect influence over the development of policies executed by national governments 
(Schain et al., 2002). Moreover, the extent to which ERPs can still be considered minor 
parties is controversial after their electoral expansion throughout the 1990s and 2000s and 
acceptance as coalition partners in Austria, Italy, Switzerland and Denmark (Bale, 2003). 
Second, research on ERPs has expanded from the 2000s onwards but it has been 
overwhelmingly focused on the electoral fortunes of its members, particularly on explaining 
these parties’ variable levels of electoral support and breakthroughs into mainstream politics 
(Evans, 2005; Arzheimer and Carter, 2006; De Lange, 2007; John and Margetts, 2009). The 
disproportional interest in this area of research reflects the strong fluctuation among the 
electoral fortunes of ERPs across European countries (Hainsworth, 2008). This thesis 
addresses the selected ERPs’ electoral performance but as a potential factor to understand 
their impact on immigration policy.  
20 
 
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in examining ERP impact in their 
political systems, especially when present within the executive (Heinisch, 2003; Fraser, 
2010). Unsurprisingly, most of this type of analysis is associated with immigration and 
concentrates on immigration policy as the dependent variable of the ERPs’ impact because 
intense xenophobia is a distinctive ideological trait of this party family (Betz, 1994; Carter, 
2005). Whereas a limited number of authors have developed single-case study analysis of 
levels of ERPs’ impact in countries such as the UK, France, Austria and Italy (Messina, 1989, 
2011; Schain, 2006; Bouillaud, 2007; Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010); there is a lack of 
research with a comparative scope (Minkenberg, 2001; Williams, 2006; Mudde, 2007, 
Hainsworth, 2008). This shortcoming limits the broader understanding of this political 
process beyond particular domestic contexts.  
Michel Minkenberg (2001) published the first comparative study of radical right parties’ 
impact in terms of agenda-setting and policy effects. Germany, France, Italy and Austria were 
selected as case studies because of ERP representation in Parliament. The author concluded 
that radical right parties’ impact on the two dimensions had been largely irrelevant and 
confined to the cultural level (Minkenberg, 2001). Mudde (2007) and Hainsworth (2008) 
devoted single chapters of their books on radical and ERPs to survey this issue, whilst only a 
single in-depth comparative study on ERPs’ overall impact on Western European countries 
has been developed so far (Williams; 2006). In contrast to Minkenberg’s (2001) conclusions, 
Michelle Williams’ comparative research across Western Europe and, on France, Germany 
and Austria in particular, concluded that radical right parties had a salient impact on three 
levels: agenda setting, institution-shaping, and policy-making across the 1990s and the early 
2000s. Henceforth, the conclusions of comparative studies on ERPs’ impact on their political 
systems have been diametrically opposed involving either the observation of an irrelevant or 
an overwhelming impact (Schain, 1994; Minkenberg, 2001; Williams, 2006).  
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A middle ground between such approaches is explored by this thesis by providing a tripartite 
classification of levels of ERP impact on immigration politics and policy. Furthermore, this 
thesis will highlight the presence of important constraints on ERP contagion effects like the 
liberal character of European political systems, which have been so far neglected in the 
political science literature (see Chapter 4). There has been a lack of systematic analysis of 
potential causes behind the variable levels of ERP impact. This research identifies the levels 
of ERP impact and seeks to understand possible variations by comparing the validity of the 
proposed hypotheses across the three cases. Cross-national comparison of those hypotheses 
will enhance the recognition of the most relevant factors. Moreover, the comparison of 
discrete periods in the first and second half of the 2000s within each case study enables 
assessment of the role of the proposed hypotheses within domestic contexts and 
comparatively.  
This thesis employs a most similar systems research design to develop comparative case 
analyses that focus on the period between 2001 and 2009. As aforementioned, the BNP, the 
FN and the LN were selected as the most prominent members of the ERP family in the three 
countries. The thesis has two main objectives:  
1) Inspired by Schain (2002, 2006), this research seeks to identify and evaluate ERP 
impact on immigration politics and policy, which is disaggregated according to the 
following analytical dimensions: inter-party competition on immigration policy, 
public attitudes to immigration, and development of immigration policy. ERPs’ 
xenophobic frame of immigration and anti-immigration positions are interpreted as 
independent variable while their levels of impact on the three selected dimensions are 
the indicators of the dependent variable (Figure 1.2). The analysis of ERP impact on 
inter-party competition and on public attitudes is focused on first-order-ballots taking 
place in the UK, France and Italy between 2001 and 2009. The ERPs’ impact on the 
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development of immigration policy is examined during the political terms taking 
place during the same period. 
Figure 1.2 – Independent variable and indicators of dependent variable 
 
2) To understand the political processes behind the different levels of ERP impact on the 
distinct dimensions of immigration politics and policy by comparing the relevance of 
selected factors in each case and then at a cross-national level (Figure 1.3). This 
objective is attained through the assessment of the relationships between the 
explanatory factors and the selected indicators of the dependent variable. These 
factors refer to the: intensity of immigration flows, public concern with immigration; 
levels of electoral support for ERPs or the electoral threat to mainstream parties; and 
the strategies of mainstream parties towards the ERPs. The thesis seeks to identify the 
most relevant independent variables or factors behind the ERPs’ impact on 
immigration politics and policy. However, it will be unable to predict the occurrence 
or intensity of this political process because of the contingent nature of the proposed 
factors and the unpredictability of human agency, as will be shown through the 
conclusions. 
ERPs’ xenophobic frame of 
immigration 
Inter-party competition on 
immigration policy 
Public attitudes to immigration 
Development of 
immigration policy 
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Figure 1.3 – Relationships between independent variables, dependent variable, and indicators 
of dependent variable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 – Combining ERPs literature with immigration studies 
A synthesis of the ERP and immigration literatures is proposed through this thesis since these 
two strands of political science have been developed separately despite their overlapping 
interests (Koopmans and Statham, 2000). The relative separation of the ERP literature and 
immigration studies hampers the development of a broader understanding of ERP impact on 
immigration politics and policy. This thesis aims to overcome this shortcoming by providing 
a novel analytical framework and methodology to develop enhanced understanding of this 
debate.  
1.2.1 – Bringing immigration into ERP literature 
The ERP literature highlights the role of immigration as a driving factor behind these parties’ 
rising electoral support but tells us very little about the complexity of this social phenomenon 
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(Golder, 2003; Carter, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008). According to Betz (1994, p. 72), xenophobia 
and racism re-emerged in the 1980s and early 1990s supported by “changes in the 
composition of immigrant groups” and by the “increase of political refugees in the 1980s.” 
Within this perspective, ERP electoral expansion is an outcome of the native backlash against 
the background of increasing immigration, a thesis named the “ethnic backlash” (Mudde, 
2007, p. 211). Consequently, xenophobia is interpreted as a stable and an almost ‘natural 
process’ produced by immigrants’ idiosyncrasies that inevitably foster a sentiment of threat 
amongst host citizens. However, immigration studies propose the denaturalisation of 
xenophobia as a dialectical relationship between the ‘Self’ and the ‘Other’2, premised on a 
negatively evaluated ‘Other’, and probe this political process by exploring structural and 
agential factors (Brown and Miles, 2003). 
3
 
To presuppose that xenophobia is an outcome of immigrants’ “natural differences”, a 
structural regularity in nature, resembles the plebeians’ belief that the feudal lords’ privileges 
reflected the natural division of humankind during feudalism in Western Europe (Hegel, 
1977). Perceptions of immigration as a threat should be interpreted as being as contingent as 
the electoral fortunes of any ERP.
 
This research interprets immigration as an “empty symbol” 
or as a “free floating signifier” deprived of an inherent meaning (Sciortino, 2000; Laclau and 
Mouffe, 2000). As it will be seen, the politicisation of this social phenomenon is conceived as 
largely dependent on the agency of political elites rather than being a reflection of structural 
regularities, such as increased levels of immigration (Perlmutter, 1996). References to 
immigration must account for the political culture, ideology and party-system dynamics of 
                                                 
2
 Thereby, representations of the ‘Other’ are influenced by their context, e.g. the social-economic position 
of those involved in the production or reproduction of meaning of immigration (Brown and Miles, 2003)  
3
 For example, the ideological content of racism can vary according to the class position of the agents. 
During the early 20
th
 century, the arrival of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe was deemed as an 
“eugenic” degeneration of the working class by the Victorian high classes whilst sections of the London 
working class regarded Jewish immigrants as illegitimate and unfair competitors (Brown and Miles, 2003). 
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the host society rather than interpreting it as a self-evident category (Veugelers and Chiarini, 
2002).  
Another of the shortcomings that reflects the lack of interchange between the literature on 
ERPs and immigration is the misinterpretation of immigration as a uniform social 
phenomenon. Studies of immigration stress the importance of disaggregating immigration 
policy according to the types of inflows: labour migration, family reunification processes, 
asylum and irregular immigration, and policy developments should be analysed under this 
framework (Castles and Miller, 2003). Immigration policies vary according to types of 
inflows, as well as mainstream parties’ positions towards each of the types of immigration in 
contrast to the ERPs, which adopt rigid anti-immigration proposals. Therefore, the 
misinterpretation of immigration as a uniform social phenomenon can lead to erroneous 
assessments of the ERPs’ effects on the distinct dimensions of immigration policy. The next 
section examines the shortcomings identified among immigration studies.  
1.2.2 – Bringing parties back into immigration studies 
Immigration studies have increasingly concentrated on the role of a plethora of social and 
political actors on the development of immigration policies (interest groups, state 
bureaucracies, central and local government agencies, epistemological communities, etc.) 
(Freeman, 1995; Zincone, 2006; Balch, 2009). Consequently, the role of political parties 
within the policy-making process has been increasingly marginalised, a trend associated with 
the aforementioned gap between political scientists focusing either on immigration policy or 
on political parties (Bale, 2008). However, research on the UK has demonstrated that political 
elites continued to dominate the political agenda on immigration policy rather than other 
political actors (Statham and Geddes, 2006). Hence, this comparative thesis explores how 
immigration politics, e.g. – inter-party competition, intra-party politics or intra-coalition 
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dynamics – influence the development of immigration policy. This approach within political 
analysis has been labelled as “primacy to politics” (Williams, 2006; Schain, 2008a).  
Whereas party governments’ monopoly of policy-making in certain areas of public policy has 
been disputed by supranational organisations such as the European Union (EU), their 
monopoly in the management of inflows remains largely undisputed. The absence of a 
comprehensive EU immigration policy has left so far sufficient discretionary powers to 
national governments to pursue their particular interests due to the slow shift from an 
intergovernmental to a supranational approach (Geddes, 2003; Messina, 2007). Most 
immigration studies concentrate on the top-down effects of the EU integration process on 
member states’ immigration policies. By contrast, this comparative thesis focuses on the 
immigration politics and policy at domestic level in the UK, France and Italy and addresses 
the potential spill over effects of domestic pressures to the EU level from a bottom-up 
perspective.    
ERPs are commonly highlighted as a causal factor behind the restrictive developments 
observed across the immigration policies of different European countries by political 
scientists without providing enough evidence of such relationship (Mudde, 2007). This 
research provides a consistent analytical framework to identify levels of ERP impact on 
immigration policy and politics, to evaluate its effects and proposes a set of factors to 
understand this political process, as shown in Figure 1.3. Finally, another shortcoming within 
immigration studies is the lack of consistent comparative research, since most of it consists of 
a compilation of analyses of single case studies with diminished comparative scope (Geddes, 
2003; Cornelius et al., 2004). To overcome this weakness, a direct comparison of 
developments in British, French and Italian immigration policies according to types of 
inflows and policy is provided through the comparative chapters at the end of the thesis. A 
concise plan of the thesis is provided in the next section.   
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1.3 – Plan of the thesis 
To accomplish the objectives of this thesis, Chapter 2 specifies the research questions that 
drive the research and the mixed research methodology with a strong qualitative emphasis 
employed to measure and understand ERP impact on the different dimensions of immigration 
politics and policy. Chapter 3 examines the debate about the most appropriate label for the 
selected extremist parties, as well as typologies to identify and classify members of the ERP 
family. Chapter 4 provides a justification of case selection and the employment of a most 
similar systems research design. This chapter also contextualises the institutional constraints 
on ERP development in each political system, the development of the selected ERPs before 
2001, as well as recent histories of immigration and national immigration policy paradigms.  
After the establishment of the theoretical and methodological foundations that support this 
research, the empirical analysis of ERP impact on immigration politics and policy during the 
2000s looks first at the British case study. Each individual chapter on the ERPs’ impact in the 
three countries is organised into three main sections: the first explores ERP impact on inter-
party competition on immigration policy and public attitudes to immigration at first-order-
ballots; the second surveys the selected ERPs’ discourse on immigration and their 
development during the 2000s employing the conceptual framework of the structure of 
political opportunities
4
. The third and final general section, considers ERP impact on 
immigration policy. 
                                                 
4
 The concept of the structure of political opportunities is borrowed from social movement theory, a 
concept that is widely employed in ERP studies (Kitschelt, 1995; Carter, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008). 
According to Tarrow (1994, p.72), the structure of political opportunities refers to the “consistent 
dimensions of political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s 
expectations for success or failure”. These dimensions include: realignment processes (politicisation of 
new issues), dealignment processes (declining levels of party identification and political trust), mainstream 
party behaviour (degree of party convergence), the openness of the political system (electoral system and 
media access); and institutional factors (availability of mainstream allies) (Goodwin, 2007). The agency of 
ERPs’ leaders is also an important component of the structure of political opportunities. 
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Therefore, Chapter 5 surveys the BNP’s impact on immigration politics at the 2001 general 
election and on policy developments throughout Labour government’s second term . Chapter 
6 examines the British ERP’s contagion effects at the 2005 general election and during 
Labour’s third term. This research will indicate that the BNP lacked a relevant impact on the 
three selected dimensions during the 2000s notwithstanding the observation of salient 
contagion effects on the Labour government’s discourse on immigration after 2007. Chapter 
7 probes the FN’s impact on immigration politics at the 2002 presidential elections and on the 
latter development of immigration policy during President Jacques Chirac’s last term. A 
similar analysis is developed through Chapter 8 looking at the FN’s contagion effects on 
inter-party competition as well as on public attitudes at the 2007 presidential elections and on 
policy developments taking place throughout President Nicholas Sarkozy’s term up to 2009. 
Whereas the Chapter 7 suggests that the FN had a significant impact on public attitudes in 
2002 and on policy developments, the research in Chapter 8 will show that the French ERP 
had significant contagion effects on the three dimensions of immigration politics and policy 
in the second half of the 2000s.  
The research developed through Chapter 9 addresses the LN’s impact on immigration politics 
at the 2001 general election and on the subsequent policy developments between 2001 and 
2006.  Chapter 10 focuses on the LN’s impact on Italian immigration politics and policy from 
the 2008 general election up to 2009. The selection of the 2008 general election instead of the 
2006 ballot reflects the short tenure in office of Romano Prodi’s centre-left government that 
only lasted 722 days in office. Consequently, developments on immigration policy were very 
limited, especially after the collapse of a proposed reform of the immigration law (Bigot and 
Fella, 2008). This research will show that the LN had significant impact on inter-party 
competition  in 2001 but not on public attitudes to immigration. Furthermore, the LN enjoyed 
moderate contagion effects on policy developments during Berlusconi’s second term. At the 
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2008 general election, the LN’s impact on public attitudes increased to a moderate level 
coupled alongside significant contagion effects on mainstream parties’ proposals on 
immigration policy. The intensity of the LN’s contagion effects on policy developments 
expanded to a significant level between 2008 and 2009.  
Chapters 11 and 12 present the comparative syntheses of ERP impact on the distinct 
dimensions of immigration politics and policy through the first-order-ballots and terms taking 
place in the first half and second half of the 2000s. Both chapters explore the relationships 
between the levels of ERP impact on inter-party competition, public attitudes to immigration 
and policy developments with the proposed factors to understand the development of such 
political processes. The concluding chapter highlights the variable levels of the selected 
ERPs’ impact on the different dimensions of immigration politics and policy and its 
contingent character. Important variations were found on the outline of the ERPs’ impact on 
inter-party competition and policy developments in France and Italy, as well as the presence 
of important constraints on the former political processes. This thesis suggests that ERP 
impact on these two dimensions of immigration politics and policy is an outcome of the 
ERPs’ broad electoral threats alongside the agency of mainstream parties. It also suggested 
that the intensity of ERP impact on public attitudes to immigration diminished throughout the 
2000s or the occurrence of this political process was overstated in the past.  
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Chapter 2 – Methodology 
This chapter develops the methodology employed to measure the ERP impact on immigration 
politics and policy in the UK, France and Italy. It also examines the proposed hypotheses to 
understand the levels of ERP impact on the selected analytical dimensions. First, an 
exposition of ontological and epistemological considerations underlying this research is 
provided throughout the first two sections of the chapter, since this thesis adopts a political 
analysis perspective close to realism (Hay, 2002; Marsh, 2010). Secondly, the overall 
research question about the BNP, FN, and LN impact on immigration politics and policy in 
the UK, France and Italy during the 2000s is specified and disaggregated according to the 
distinct analytical dimensions: inter-party competition, public attitudes to immigration, policy 
developments. Thirdly, the chapter also develops the second aim of this thesis that seeks to 
understand the development of these political processes through the cross-national 
comparison of the relationships found between the levels of ERPs’ impact on the distinct 
dimensions and a proposed set of factors extracted from ERP literature and immigration 
studies. The linkage between the selected factors and political literature, as well as they 
influence each other, is also explored in further depth. Finally, the selected comparative 
research design and the mixed research methodology employed to attain the thesis’ objectives 
are addressed at the end of this chapter. 
2.1 – Ontology 
This thesis assumes an ontological position close to realism that presupposes the existence of 
a dichotomy between reality and appearance (Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Consequently, 
social phenomena are interpreted as deprived of an inherent meaning in spite of holding an 
independent existence beyond the limits of our understanding. Like realists, this thesis argues 
the existence of an irreducible gap between appearance and meaning or between significant 
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and signifier (Laclau and Mouffe, 2000). This gap was first exposed by Marx’s conception of 
“commodity fetishism”, when he highlighted that the market value of a commodity cannot be 
determined by its appearance or the mere sum of the value of the quantities of labour required 
for its production (Žižek, 1989). If social phenomena had an objective and inherent 
undisputed meaning, the overwhelming consensus would render any political debate 
meaningless. As Edelman (1988, p. 12) stated: “if there are no conflicts over meaning, the 
issue is not political, by definition”. 
Due to the gap between appearance and meaning, political struggle evolves over the general 
acceptance of an association of particular signifiers to particular contested social phenomena 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 2000). As Bourdieu noted: “political struggle is a cognitive struggle 
(practical or theoretical) for the power to impose the legitimate vision of the social world” 
(quoted from Wacquant, 2005, p.3). Politics is thus conceived as a battle to provide 
significance to contested social phenomenon by attaining a hegemonic position in the 
political debate (Žižek, 2000). Schattschneider (1960) considered that framing of policy 
issues was driven by strategic calculations of political actors of the mobilisation of the 
“audience” or particular sections of the electorate. Therefore, political analysis must de-
naturalise the effect of meaning and demonstrate how it results from a series of contingent 
encounters instead of perceiving it as immutable (Žižek, 1993).  
To assess the meaning of a particular social phenomenon we must look for its genesis and 
consider that its value/meaning is an outcome of intersubjective social relations between 
political actors or political processes (Žižek, 1989). From the analysis of such processes, we 
can learn how the shared meaning associated with a particular phenomenon became 
hegemonic (Laclau and Mouffe, 2000). Political processes are conceived as a contingent 
outcome of the dialectical relationship between structure and human agency, two 
incommensurable categories that influence each other (Hay, 2002). Structure refers to the 
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material context wherein social, political, and economic events develop and acquire meaning 
(Marsh, 2010). Agency considers the political action or conduct of political actors as free and 
autonomous but necessarily influenced by their ideologies that fill the inherent gap within the 
social world. As in this thesis, the role of ideas has been increasingly acknowledged by 
political analysts who explore how they shape perceptions of social reality and human 
conduct (Gofas and Hay, 2010). The next section explores the epistemological consequences 
of the preceding ontological positioning.  
2.2 – Epistemology 
Consistent with researchers who adopt a qualitative approach to political processes, this 
thesis presupposes the lack of an objective political science that can establish universal truths 
or rules that can exist independently of the bias and ideologies of social researchers (Devine, 
2010). First, the perception of social reality cannot be disentangled from the actors’ ideology. 
As social reality is characterised by a gap between its appearance and the lack of an inherent 
meaning, humans must therefore suture such gap through the mediation of ideology (Žižek, 
1989).
 5
 Second, the ability of social sciences to anticipate events by building causal laws 
based on observed regularities is severely hampered by the unpredictability of human agency 
and its inherent spontaneity (Žižek, 2006). It has been increasingly recognised by political 
scientists that the aim of drawing universal laws based on quantification of observed 
regularities has so far obtained meagre results and that negligence of the relationship between 
agency and structure has led to flawed accuracy (Sartori, 2004; Tilly and Goodin, 2006). 
Therefore, this thesis presupposes that knowledge can only be attained within the limits of 
human understanding instead of grasping reality as it is in itself, which does not diminish the 
merit of developing political analysis to understand particular political processes. Within this 
                                                 
5
 From a dialectic perspective, “form has precedence over content: the first signifier is empty, a zero-
signifier, pure ‘form’, an empty promise of meaning-to-come; it is only on a second occasion that the 
frame of this process is gradually filled with meaning” (italics in original; Žižek , 2006, p.282). 
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context, the objective of this research is to understand ERP impact on immigration politics 
and policy by identifying potential factors that increase the likelihood of the occurrence of 
such political processes. The causal relationships explored by this research are distinctive 
because of their indeterminacy, which removes any scope of predictability without 
undermining potential generalisations to similar contexts (Falleti and Lynch, 2009). 
Consequently, it presupposes a hermeneutic approach to politics rather than a deductive logic 
seeking to produce universal laws (Landman, 2008).  
2.3 – Research questions 
The primary research question is whether the LN, the BNP and the FN had a significant 
impact on immigration politics and policy in the UK, France and Italy during the 2000s. 
Political impact is understood as the ability to promote an outcome that would have not be 
observed in the absence of the selected political actor (Williams, 2006). Since ERPs are 
distinctive for their acute cultural xenophobia or racism, these parties’ impact on immigration 
politics and policy must necessarily involve the dissemination of their xenophobic frame of 
immigration or their anti-immigration proposals. Previous comparative research undertaken 
on radical right parties’ impact over the 1990s in France, Germany and Austria argued that 
ERPs forced mainstream parties to move closer to their positions, particularly during 
electoral periods; reinforced xenophobia across the electorate; and were responsible for the 
decrease of proposals to tackle racism and for increasingly restrictive immigration policies 
(Williams, 2006). This thesis will assess if the trends identified by comparative research on 
ERP impact during the 1990s can be confirmed in Italy, France and the UK during the 2000s. 
Inspired by research developed by Schain (2002, 2006) on France, as well as Williams 
(2006), ERP impact on immigration politics and policy is analysed along three separate but 
related dimensions (Figure 1.2): 
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1) Inter-party competition: according to Anthony Downs (1957), political parties are 
rational actors that frame policy alternatives and position themselves on a horizontal 
left-right scale to maximize competition for voters’ preferences. New parties exploit 
new issues neglected by mainstream parties to create their own electoral niche. In the 
face of challenger parties, established parties confront the strategic dilemma of how or 
whether to compete with the new parties (Bale, 2003). A short-term electoral 
breakthrough by an ERP can have potential consequences for the party system and 
can be followed by the established parties’ readjustment of their political agendas to 
neutralise the new challenger (Schain, 2006). ERP impact on inter-party competition 
is then conceived as the reinforcement of the restrictive character of mainstream 
parties’ positions on immigration policy and the salience of this issue in mainstream 
parties’ electoral manifestos. Consequently, this thesis examines if the selected ERPs 
reinforced the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on immigration 
policy at the first-order-ballots taking place in the UK, France and Italy during the 
2000s (Table 2.1).   
2) Public opinion: whereas the media’s role has been identified as a potential driver of 
public attitudes, particularly in the UK, the role played by political parties is often 
unacknowledged (Statham, 2002).
6
 Nevertheless, a political party can operate as an 
“opinion-maker who proposes issues, as the organiser of allegiance and support” 
across the electorate (Sartori, 2005, p. 23; Bale, 2008). Political parties seek to 
influence the overall electorate and mobilise the electorate according to particular 
issues. Moreover, ERPs have been identified as a key factor behind the growth of 
xenophobia across Western Europe (Betz, 1994; Rydgren, 2003). The ability to 
intensify concern and hostility to immigration across the electorates is interpreted as 
                                                 
6
 Research on the prominence of immigration issues in the media and electoral support for ERPs was 
developed by Art (2003) and Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart (2007).   
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an indicator of ERP impact on public attitudes to immigration. This research will 
therefore assess if the selected ERPs intensified levels of concern and hostility 
towards immigration across their national electorates at the first-order-ballots in the 
UK, France and Italy during the 2000s (Table 2.1).  
3) Development of immigration policy: political parties are responsible for the decision-
making process over public policy and the production of legislation (Sartori, 2005; 
Bale 2008). As challenger parties emerge, governments readjust legislative agendas 
and can shift policies to accommodate the new competitors’ priority issues. Party 
governments in countries that are EU member states are regarded as increasingly 
constrained by the Europeanisation process (Mair, 2007). Nevertheless, immigration 
policy remains relatively unaffected by the latter process due to the absence of a 
comprehensive supranational EU immigration policy (Geddes, 2003; Messina, 2007). 
7
 Alternatively, ERPs have been identified as critical agents behind the expansion of 
restrictive immigration policy (Schain, 1994; Sales, 2005; Williams, 2006). ERP 
impact on policy developments involves the adoption of their xenophobic and zero-
immigration proposals into the legislative framework. This comparative analysis will 
evaluate whether the selected ERPs reinforced the restrictive character of immigration 
policies during the terms taking place throughout the 2000s in the UK, France and 
Italy (Table 2.1).  
                                                 
7
 The Lisbon Treaty signed in 2009 pointed to a stronger coordination and harmonisation of immigration 
and integration policies between member-states, but the Europeanisation process has been largely 
irrelevant during the period of this study. 
Table 2.1 – Analytical synopsis 
Analytical Dimensions  Research questions 
Inter-party competition on 
immigration policy 
To what extent did the three selected ERPs reinforced the 
restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration policy at first-order-ballots during the 2000s? 
Public attitudes to 
immigration 
To what extent did the three selected ERPs intensify levels of 
concern and hostility towards immigration in their national 
electorates at first-order-ballots in the 2000s? 
Development of 
immigration policy 
To what extent did the three selected ERPs reinforce the 
restrictive character of immigration policy during the 2000s? 
Factors Hypotheses 
Levels of immigration 
Increased immigration enhances the likelihood of significant 
ERP impact  
Salience of immigration 
across public opinion 
Intense public concern over immigration increases the 
likelihood of ERP impact on inter-party competition on 
immigration policy and/or on the development of immigration 
policy 
ERPs’ electoral threats to 
mainstream parties or 
ERPs’ levels of electoral 
support  
A perceived threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots 
increases the likelihood of ERP impact on inter-party 
competition and/or on the development of immigration policy.  
Substantial levels of ERP electoral support increase the 
likelihood of ERP impact on public attitudes to immigration. 
Strategies of mainstream 
parties towards ERPs 
Engagement by mainstream parties with ERPs increases the 
likelihood of ERP impact on inter-party competition, public 
attitudes to immigration and the content of immigration policy. 
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Despite some difficulties and the potential subjectivity of the assessment, the impact of ERPs 
on each dimension of immigration policy is evaluated on a three-point scale (irrelevant; 
moderate; and significant) rather than on a zero-sum scale.
 8
 The aim is to provide a 
judgemental estimate rather than a quantitative classification, as measuring indirect impact  
is a particularly tricky issue (Mudde, 2007). Finally, significant constraints on the scope of 
ERP impact on inter-party competition and policy developments in the selected cases can be 
also found, an issue frequently neglected by ERP literature, and are developed in further 
depth in Chapter 4.   
2.4 – Understanding ERP impact on selected dimensions  
Following the identification of ERP impact on each dimension of immigration policy, the 
second objective of this research is to understand the development of such political processes 
through assessment of a proposed set of hypotheses. The proposed hypotheses to understand 
political processes refer to specific behaviour of the following explanatory factors: levels of 
immigration; salience of immigration amongst the electorate; levels of ERP electoral threat or 
support; and, the agency of mainstream parties (Table 2.1). However, when analysing the 
ERPs’ impact on public attitudes, the salience of immigration policy amongst the electorate is 
interpreted as an indicator of the dependent variable, and therefore excluded as a potential 
explaining factor. 
Comparative assessment of relationships found between the levels of ERP impact and the 
proposed hypotheses in each dimension enables identification of potential analogies between 
cases. This analysis can therefore highlight the most relevant factors behind the 
aforementioned political processes through an inductive judgment. The research of two 
discrete periods in each case also enables comparisons at the domestic level during the first 
                                                 
8
 A tripartite scale was selected for providing a middle ground between the classificatory categories. 
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and second half of the 2000s to identify potential variations. The proposed hypotheses to 
understand the ERPs’ potential impact on immigration politics and policy are examined 
below.  
2.4.1 – Inter-party competition on immigration policy 
As noted, four hypotheses are considered to understand the potential ERPs’ impact on inter-
party competition (Table 2.1): 
1 – Increased levels of immigration prior to the first-order-ballots enhance the chances of 
significant ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy. 
2 – High salience of immigration among public opinion improves the prospect of significant 
ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy. 
3 – An ERP electoral threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots increases the chances 
of significant ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy.  
4 – Mainstream parties’ engagement (either formal or informal) with ERPs enhances the 
possibility of significant ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy.  
2.4.2 – Public attitudes to immigration 
Unlike the identification of ERP impact on public attitudes to immigration, understanding 
public behaviour is a highly complex process due to the plethora of factors that can influence 
it. Despite this overall constraint on the analysis, three hypotheses are proposed to understand 
the potential ERPs’ impact on public opinion (Table 2.1):  
1 – Increased levels of immigration before first-order-ballots can lead to significant ERP 
impact on public attitudes to immigration.  
2 – Substantial levels of ERP electoral support enhance chances of significant ERP impact on 
public attitudes to immigration. 
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3 – Mainstream parties’ engagement (formal/informal) with ERPs improves chances of 
significant ERP impact on public attitudes to immigration. 
2.4.3 – Development of immigration policy 
As with the first dimension, four hypotheses are proposed to interpret ERP impact on policy 
developments (Table 2.1):  
1 – Increased levels of immigration can lead to significant ERP impact on immigration 
policy. 
2 – High salience of immigration in public opinion enhances likelihood of significant ERP 
impact on immigration policy.  
3 – An ERP electoral threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots improves prospects of 
significant ERP impact on immigration policy.  
4 – Mainstream parties’ engagement (formal/informal) with ERP improves chances of 
significant ERP impact on immigration policy. 
2.5 – Explanatory factors  
This section explores the linkage between the selected explanatory factors and political 
literature, as well as how those factors influence each other. The aforementioned factors 
include:  
a) Levels of immigration 
Increased immigration has been frequently cited as a driving factor behind the ERPs’ 
electoral expansion in the late twentieth century (Schain, 2002). The theory of ‘ethnic 
backlash’ argues that immigration necessarily increases competition for scarce resources 
within the host society generating hostility towards this social phenomenon (Mudde, 2007; 
Rydgren, 2008). Consequently, the intensity of immigration is expected to hold some degree 
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of influence on public attitudes on immigration and potential effects on the ERPs’ electoral 
fortunes. Whereas some research suggests that ERPs’ electoral expansion has been positively 
correlated to the proportion of immigrants in a country or to the rise of asylum seeking 
(Golder, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2005), other studies highlight a negative relationship 
between the two variables (Hainsworth, 2008). The behaviour of this factor is evaluated 
through assessment of the annual total number of residence permits granted to immigrants in 
Italy, the UK and France.
 9
  
b) Salience of immigration amongst public opinion 
High public concern about immigration has also been frequently identified as a driving factor 
behind ERPs’ electoral expansion (Betz, 1994; Lahav and Messina, 2006). Nevertheless, 
others point to the lack of a clear-cut relationship between levels of anxiety and electoral 
performance (Kitschelt, 1995). Therefore, the salience of immigration can also have some 
degree of influence on the levels of ERP electoral support, like the intensity of immigration. 
This factor is employed to explore whether levels of voters’ concern with immigration are 
positively related to the selected ERPs’ levels of impact on two dimensions of immigration 
politics and policy: inter-party competition and policy developments. The salience of 
immigration is evaluated through the analysis of opinion polls such as the British Electoral 
Survey (BES) in the UK, the Panel Électorale Français (PEF) in France, and the Italian 
National Election Studies (ITANES) in Italy.  
c) ERPs’ threat to mainstream parties/electoral support 
The third factor can be regarded as bi-dimensional since it refers either to the ERPs’ electoral 
threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots or to the levels of ERP electoral support. 
                                                 
9
 Unfortunately, there is no available data for annual total number of residence permits granted to 
immigrants in Italy from 2000 to 2005 (with the exception of 2002). As an alternative, the research will 
analyse the levels of immigration by looking at the evolution of the total number of foreign citizens 
resident in Italy.  
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Electoral “threat” reflects ERPs’ levels of electoral support and their influence on electoral 
competition within their domestic institutional environments. In the context of increasing 
electoral bipolarisation and of salient ERPs, centre-right mainstream parties have opted in 
some cases for cooperation with ERPs to enhance their chances of winning first-order-ballots 
like in Italy (Bale, 2003). Therefore, the electoral threat posed by ERPs is also interconnected 
with the agency of mainstream parties towards the extremist parties as it may pose an 
incentive for engagement. In short, this third factor considers the relationship between ERPs’ 
electoral threat to mainstream parties at the aforementioned ballots with their levels of impact 
on inter-party competition on immigration policy and subsequent policy developments. The 
behaviour of this factor is evaluated by the analysis of ERP electoral performance within the 
context of the structure of political opportunities open to them, included in the sections 
devoted to the analysis of each ERP’s frame of immigration and electoral results. 
Regarding ERPs’ impact on public attitudes to immigration, Schain (2002; 2006) suggested 
that ERPs’ have a greater chance to influence the national electorate in the context of a 
consolidated party organisation at national level and of electoral expansion. As these parties’ 
electoral penetration expands, their organisational networks and subsequent ability to 
mobilise the electorate is expected to increase as well. Research conducted in France during 
the 1990s concluded that the most striking observation was how the priorities of FN voters 
appeared to have influenced the behaviour of the broader electorate (Schain, 2006, p. 277). 
Mudde (2007, p. 291) highlighted that further analysis is required to assess whether electoral 
success of populist radical right parties has an impact on mass attitudes, what type of impact 
and whether it is reflected on the salience rather than the content of voters’ attitudes. Hence, 
ERPs’ electoral support and the ideological traits of its electorate are considered as a possible 
factor enhancing their impact on public attitudes to immigration, which are evaluated through 
the analysis of the aforementioned opinion polls.   
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d) Strategies of mainstream parties’ towards EPRs 
According to ERP literature, there is an interactive dynamic relationship between the 
mainstream right and ERPs that affects their political trajectories (Messina, 2007, Bale, 
2008). To classify the plethora of strategies adopted by mainstream parties’ towards ERPs, 
Downs (2001) proposed a typology divided into two main tactics: engagement or 
disengagement (Figure 2.1). Disengagement is a broad strategy that involves mainstream 
parties’ ignoring or isolating the ERP. By ignoring the ERP, mainstream parties’ seek to 
deprive the pariah party of political legitimacy, media’s coverage and publicity (Hainsworth, 
2008). Isolation of ERPs is another viable option within the disengagement main strategy that 
can be either attained by legal or political means (Downs, 2001). Political isolation can 
involve the formation of a cordon sanitaire to build a democratic bloc between mainstream 
parties to ostracise the ERP (Mudde, 2007).   
Engagement strategies by mainstream parties towards ERPs encompass two main options: 
informal co-option of their policies or formal cooperation with the extremists (Downs, 2001). 
Informal co-option or “clothes stealing” (Hainsworth, 2008) involves the accommodation of 
ERP political agenda within mainstream parties’ programmes, without being overtly 
acknowledged to minimize risk of losing public legitimacy (see Introduction; Saward, 1992). 
Mainstream parties’ formal collaboration with the ERPs can develop at three levels: electoral, 
legislative or executive (Downs, 2001). At electoral level, it concerns the performance of 
formal electoral agreements before the ballots between mainstream parties and ERPs, which 
presupposes a formal co-option process. Cooperation at legislative level refers to infrequent 
agreements between mainstream and ERPs within the legislative bodies for approval of 
particular pieces of legislation (Downs, 2001). Engagement at executive level encompasses 
the formal co-option of the ERPs into coalition governments and direct access to the policy-
making process (Saward, 1992). The strategies of mainstream parties towards ERPs are 
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examined mostly throughout the sections devoted to the analysis of the ERPs’ development. 
After the examination of the explanatory factors articulated in the hypotheses, the proposed 
methodology to attain the thesis’ objectives is developed below. 
Figure 2.1 – Strategies of mainstream parties towards ERPs  
 
Source: Downs, 2001, p. 26 
2.6 – Comparative research design  
This thesis employs a comparative research design to evaluate ERP impact on immigration 
politics and policy in the UK, France and Italy, as well as to understand the occurrence of this 
political process. Mainstream comparative politics continues to be dominated by a positivist 
approach that downgrades the role of ideas and human agency in favour of the assessment of 
predictable and deterministic objective relationships between variables (Hopkin, 2010). 
However, the observation of analogies between the behaviour of the proposed factors across 
the three case studies and the levels of ERP impact on each of the proposed analytical 
dimensions might enhance some level of generalisation without seeking to construct 
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probabilistic and determinist causal laws between dependent and explanatory variables 
(Peters, 1998).  
The proposed qualitative comparison employs a most similar systems research design that 
includes the aforementioned three cases. This research design is inspired by the comparative 
method proposed by John Stuart Mill described as the method of difference, which consists 
of “comparing instances in which a phenomenon occur with instances in other respects 
similar in which it does not” (Lipjhart, 1971, p. 687). The selected cases share important 
similarities, such as: the presence of ERPs; all are immigration countries; while are also 
liberal democracies; EU member states and their electoral systems encourage bipolar 
interparty competition, as  it is developed in further depth through Chapter 4.  
2.7 – Mixed research methodology  
The mixed research methodology developed by this thesis involves the combination of 
qualitative and quantitative methods, including discourse analysis, content analysis, analysis 
of opinion polls and systematic analysis of immigration policy, notwithstanding the thesis’ 
strong qualitative character. This approach has been criticised by some authors because of the 
methods supposed incompatibility because they arise from antagonist research paradigms 
(Teddie and Tashakkori, 2003). Nevertheless, the presupposed incommensurability between 
qualitative and quantitative methods is becoming increasingly discredited (Landman, 2008). 
The greatest divergence between the two strands of political research persists in the expected 
ability to understand events and provide meaningful explanations. This thesis adopts a 
pragmatic approach as the research methods were selected according the research questions 
on each of the analytical dimensions (Table 2.1). The objective is to respond to the expansion 
of the breadth and range of investigation presupposed by the disaggregation of the general 
research question according to the distinct dimensions of immigration politics and policy 
(Greene et al., 1989).  
45 
 
2.7.1 – Critical Discourse Analysis  
The measurement of ERP impact on inter-party competition is developed through the 
combined employment of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and content analysis. The 
combination of these methods seeks to increase the reliability of this research because 
discourse analysis has been frequently criticised for the absence of a commonly recognised 
paradigm (Devine, 2010). Whereas Williams (2006) evaluated ERP impact on inter-party 
competition by analysing data from the Comparative Manifestos Project, this thesis grants 
primacy to discourse analysis reflecting the acknowledgement that is more important to 
analyse what political elites actually say than documents that may have a more narrow 
resonance at public level (Bale, 2010).
10
 In the content of the analysis that follows, discourse 
is understood as a “communicative event in general, and a written or oral form of interaction 
or language use, in particular” (Van Dijk, 2008, p. 104). CDA is a type of analytical research 
that concentrates on discourse and addresses how relations of power,  power abuse, and 
inequality are enacted and reproduced by text and talk in the social and political context 
(Wodak and Weiss, 2003; Van Dijk, 2008).  
Consequently, CDA is a method of discourse analysis which has an explicit concern for the 
relationship between language to other elements of social processes and power. Through the 
assessment of the ERP impact on mainstream parties’ discourse on immigration, this thesis 
will look for potential relationships between political elites’ discourses on immigration and 
the conditions set by the host states on entry and settlement of foreign citizens in their 
territories, i.e. immigration policy. The objective is to demonstrate the role and relevance of 
political discourse in generating or legitimising hostility to immigration or to be more precise 
to particular types of immigration flows. The thesis is particularly interested in forms or types 
                                                 
10
 The significance of political elites’ framing of immigration and of symbolic politics has also been 
increasingly recognised by immigration studies (Sciortino, 2000; Statham, 2002; Lakkof and Ferguson, 
2006; Schain, 2008). 
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of communicative acts that potentially involve the imposition of highly restrictive or 
repressive immigration policy. The objective is not to reduce social life to discourse or 
interpret it as radically contingent, but to acknowledge the complex dialectic relationship 
between discourse and social structure (Fairclough and Chouliaraki, 1999).  
The proposed CDA concentrates on ‘interdiscursivity’ and on how particular types of 
discourses on immigration are linked to each other in different ways because a discursive 
construction of immigration can also draw from and articulate components of other frames or 
discourses (Wodak and Chilton, 2005). In terms of the analysis that follows, interdiscursivity 
can help to capture the ways in which the ideas about immigration advanced by ERPs can be 
adopted or used by mainstream parties. In this context, frames refer to cognitive 
representations defined as:  
“the conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings 
of the world and of themselves to legitimate and motivate collective action” 
(McAdam, McCarthy and Zald, 1996; quoted from Devine, 2010, p. 125). 
This thesis explores how frames employed in immigration politics and selected by political 
elites can mobilise particular sectors of the “audience” or can legitimate certain policy 
developments of a restrictive or repressive kind. This discourse analytical approach was 
selected in preference to other forms of semiotic analysis that concentrate on the internal 
construction of the text ignoring the socio-historical conditions of the production and 
reception of discourses (Bourdieu, 1991).  
It is clearly important, therefore, to define the framing of immigration by ERPs in order to 
then develop the analysis of potential cases of interdiscursivity between ERPs and 
mainstream parties. It is widely recognised that xenophobic or racist discourse can assume a 
plethora of forms and the discursive representation of immigration by ERP can occur in many 
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different ways as a vehicle to exploit grievances (Williams, 2006). Nonetheless, a common 
lowest denominator identified by Žižek (1993) across the different forms of ERPs’ discourse 
on immigration is the articulation of immigration as a driver of ethnic tensions.  As Žižek  
(1993, p. 101) noted: 
“what is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of the national Thing: the 
‘other’ wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our ‘way of life’) and/ or it has access 
to some secrete, perverse enjoyment.” 
Therefore, ERPs’ articulation of immigration as a threat to the natives’ “enjoyment” allows 
its subsequent association to a plethora of grievances ranging from natives’ access to the 
labour or housing market, social services or other limited resources, and to identity issues.
 11
 
The research identifies the form that ERP discourse on immigration can take in each domestic 
contexts (in Chapter 4 then in subsequent sections that analyse ERP development) and then 
looks for interdiscursivity between ERPs and mainstream parties on immigration.  
A further, additional contribution of this thesis is that it follows the potential effects of these 
political processes at the discursive level to non-discursive events such as public attitudes and 
the management of immigration policy. In parallel with the examination of ERP impact at 
discourse level, a general categorisation of mainstream parties’ and national governmental 
discourses on immigration according to other immigration frames including: security 
(associating immigration with national security); the labour market (linking immigration to 
labour market issues) and the foreign worker (using workers’ solidarity approaches) 
(Colombo and Sciortino, 2003; Husymans, 2006; Lakkof and Ferguson, 2006; Noiriel, 2008).  
                                                 
11
 Other potential available frame to characterise ERPs’ racist discourse on immigration are the discursive 
strategy of emphasising “the positive characteristics of Our own group and its members, and the 
(purported) negative characteristics of Others, the Outgroup (Van Dijk, 2008, p.5). Nevertheless, the 
articulation of immigration as a threat to the natives’ enjoyment seemed a more objective lowest common 
denominator to interpret the different forms of ERPs’ xenophobic or racist discourse on immigration. 
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Finally, it needs to be clarified that the units of analysis are texts (in written or oral forms) 
selected on the basis of their reference to immigration policy including: political speeches, 
parliamentary sessions or hearings, statements to the media, published articles or written texts 
in official party or government’s documents. These discourses were produced at the public 
level by political actors endowed with high levels of political capital
12
 denominated by 
positions within parties or governments. These texts fit within a single genre (fixed use of 
language associated to a particular activity) of discourse: political discourse (Chouliaraki and 
Fairclough, 1999). Comparative discourse analysis can be developed if the idiosyncrasies of 
each case and the research questions are clearly outlined (Glynos and Howarth, 2008). 
Finally, a technical note is necessary. The texts were analysed in their original languages and 
the quotes included in this thesis were translated into English by the author.  
2.7.1.1 – Content analysis  
Content analysis with a quantitative character is developed to measure the salience of 
immigration in electoral manifestos presented by the selected ERPs and mainstream parties at 
first-order-ballots in the UK, France and Italy.
13
 Since ERPs are distinctive for the acute 
salience granted to immigration policy within their electoral strategies, a significant ERP 
impact on inter-party competition is expected to involve increased salience of immigration 
policy in the established parties’ election manifestos. Thus, the ERPs and mainstream parties’ 
electoral manifestos at first-order-ballots constitute the unit of analysis of this research 
method providing a more systematised selection of texts (Devine, 2010). The contingent 
character of these documents provides a consistent indicator of the variable salience of 
                                                 
12
 Political capital is a “form of symbolic capital, credit or the innumerable operations of credit by which 
agents conform to a person the very powers they recognise on him” (Bourdieu, 1991, p.192).  
13
 Analysis of party manifestos have been widely regarded as an instrument to survey parties’ positions on 
different topics and across different countries, as the Comparative Manifestos Project illustrates (Budge et 
al, 1987; Laver et al; 2003). 
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immigration in the different parties’ electoral strategies, since the manifestos are drafted 
according to the specific context of each election (Mudde and Mair, 1998).  
The use of N-vivo supported the content analysis. This evaluates the frequency of selected 
categories of analysis (nodes) in relation to the overall text (Bazeley, 2008). The definition of 
analytical categories is of utmost importance to this method, since analytical categories must 
be mutually exclusive and complete (Coffey and Atkinson, 1996). The selected category to 
develop the content analysis is immigration policy and the analysis evaluates the frequency of 
references to this category in relation to the entire text of the electoral manifestos of ERPs 
and mainstream parties presented at the selected first-order-ballots. Graphics are produced 
with the support of N–Vivo to display research outputs and compare results.  
2.7.2 – Analysis of opinion polls  
Examination of the ERPs’ impact on public attitudes to immigration is conducted through 
analysis of opinion polls. The research will be conducted from data collected by BES at the 
British 2001 and 2005 general elections, the PEF at the French 2002 and 2007 presidential 
ballots, and the Itanes at the Italian 2001 and 2008 general elections. This method provides a 
snapshot of public attitudes to immigration and of ERPs’ contagion effects on the electorate 
rather than a long-term survey of trends amongst the British, French and Italian voters.
14
 The 
objective is to assess concern and hostility towards immigration across these electorates as an 
indicator of ERP contagion effects on public attitudes. SPSS and Microsoft Excel are used to 
present the findings with the support of graphics. 
Levels of concern with immigration are evaluated by the ranking of immigration amongst the 
voters’ priority issues at first-order-ballots, whilst the analysis of the best party to deal with 
the issue amongst the voters most concerned with immigration indicates the ERP impact on 
                                                 
14
 This type of analysis is also beyond the limits of the thesis. 
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this trend.
15
 ERP impact on patterns of hostility towards immigration is examined through the 
analysis of questions on public attitudes to immigration included in the public polls and their 
disaggregation between the general electorate and the ERPs’ core voters. Variations in the 
questions posed by the different public polls at the first-order-ballots inhibit the scope of 
direct comparisons between the three case studies. Nevertheless, a trade-off between the 
range of this comparative thesis and the reliability of the data was necessary to attain the 
proposed objectives.  
2.7.3 – Analysis of immigration policy  
The development of immigration policies and ERP impact is analysed according to research 
tools employed by immigration studies. In a seminal study, Thomas Hammar (1985) 
proposed that these policies can be classified as “strict” or “liberal” depending on: the 
conditions demanded by the host state for the admission and residence of foreign citizens 
and; legal guarantees presupposed by authorisation of residence against the vulnerability of 
arbitrary expulsion (Hammar, 1985). Consequently, the ERPs’ proposals on immigration 
policy are expected to have an absolute “strict” or restrictive character according to their 
xenophobic ideologies, which make them distinctive of mainstream parties (Carter, 2005). 
ERP impact is expected to lead to highly restrictive policy inputs and outcomes that would 
have not been observed if it was not for the agency of ERPs. Instead of being interpreted as a 
uniform policy, immigration policy must be analysed according to the different conditions for 
entry and settlement imposed on distinct types of immigration flows. The four broad types of 
immigration flows are: 1) primary or labour inflows; 2) secondary or family reunification 
inflows; 3) asylum inflows; and 4) irregular inflows (Messina, 2007).  
                                                 
15
 The ITANES polls in Italy do not include a question on the best party to deal with the voters’ most 
important issue. Henceforth, a proxy indicator is used that involves analysis of the ranking of different 
party leaders’ amongst the voters most concerned with immigration. This indicator does not presuppose a 
direct causal relationship to the party ranked as best to deal with immigration. Yet, it provides a snapshot 
on the attitudes of Italian voters most concerned with immigration towards the different party leaders.  
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Henceforth, ERPs impact on policy developments involves the transposition of their 
xenophobic and anti-immigration positions to the policy towards a singly type of immigration 
flow rather than on the four distinct categories. Where ERP impact on policy developments is 
identified at moderate or significant levels, this political process can be further classified 
either as: i) significant/non-significant at absolute level, depending on whether the impact is 
reflected on the national policy towards one or more types of immigration flows; and ii) 
proportional/disproportional at relative level, according to the ERP strong/weak position 
within the party system (Minkenberg, 2001). ERP impact on policy developments can be also 
characterised as a direct or indirect, since “participation in and influence over policy–making 
is most direct when the party controls or is a coalition partner in the national government” 
(Schain, 2006, p. 273). Throughout the assessment of ERP impact on policy developments, 
the thesis also assesses the relevance of other key theses of immigration studies that are 
developed below. 
Comparative research developed by Cornelius et al. (2004) during the 1990s identified a 
convergence process between industrialised liberal democracies informed by growing 
similarities between their immigration policies. Potential explanations for the convergence 
hypothesis encompass: parallel path development, policy emulation, regional integration, 
global events and geopolitics, and public behaviour (Cornelius et al., 2004). In parallel, the 
authors also reported the observation of gaps between policy objectives set by the national 
governments and subsequent outcomes on immigration policy that reflected unexpected 
events or resulted from inadequate policy implementation. The motives provided to 
understand the governments’ inability to close the gap between aims and outcomes include: 
flawed policies, macro-structural explanations, domestic and international political 
constraints, and ambiguous policy intentions (Cornelius et al., 2004). Policy gaps can refer 
either to a state’s failure to restrict an undesired inflow or to jumpstart a welcomed inflow 
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(Jopke, 2004). Therefore, this thesis assesses whether it was possible to identify a 
convergence between the three cases’ immigration policies and the observation of policy gaps 
on immigration policy.  
A recent analytical framework proposed to understand immigration policy involves the 
disaggregation of immigration policy according to categories of migration policy (not types 
of immigration). This proposal is based on the assumption that particular types of policy are 
associated with specific patterns of politics or that “policy determines politics” (Freeman, 
2006, p. 229). Consequently, each type of immigration policy presupposes a distinct 
distribution of benefits and costs across the host societies that are expected to be equivalent 
across countries with similar immigration experiences and economic structures (Freeman, 
2006). The thesis examines the relevance of three types of policy: 
1) Concentrated distributive policy: associated with quota systems for permanent 
residence. This policy grants goods with scarce availability such as authorisations for 
long-term settlement and produces concentrated benefits (to visa recipients and 
employers) and diffuse costs (spread across society). The limited number of groups 
that benefit from immigration favours their organisation to defend their interests and 
hold stronger influence over the policy-making process than groups who bear the 
costs of government’s policy (Freeman, 1995). These structural regularities lead to a 
client politics model where the benefited groups capture the management of inflows, 
which helps to explain continuous expansion of numbers of visas granted in countries 
as Australia, the USA and Canada (Table 2.2). Distributive policies are also expected 
to be below the radar of “contentious politics”. This type of policy is associated with 
the recruitment of highly skilled immigration (HSI), which has been sold as a cost-
free policy that produces substantial benefit for societies, whilst the free-movement 
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regime within the EU is considered similar to a quota system for permanent 
settlement.  
2) Redistributive policy: associated with temporary work schemes and the granting of 
short-term residence authorisations, which produce both concentrated benefits 
(employers and temporary visa recipients) and concentrated costs (native workers in 
the targeted labour market areas who consequently face greater competition). The 
temporary character of the residence authorisation makes them more consensual than 
permanent visa programmes and leads to interest group politics (Table 2.2). This type 
of migration policy is associated with guest-worker systems adopted to manage the 
recruitment of foreign labour, particularly to tap unskilled occupations.   
3) Regulatory policy: linked to asylum claims that spark intense politicisation and 
produce diffuse benefits (spread across society) and concentrated costs (on the 
welfare system while asylum claims are processed) leading to entrepreneurial politics 
(Table 2.2). Asylum policy prompts client groups but humanitarian organisations 
operate in a highly contentious environment alongside opposition groups, which 
diminishes their influence. The regulatory aspect of asylum claims is illustrated by the 
increasing regulations on recognition of refugee status and high refusal rates of 
asylum seekers by host states. In terms of this framework, family migration is also 
supposed to fit more closely into the regulatory category whilst European states hold 
stronger incentives and less ability to control asylum than irregular migration.  
The research explores the validity of this framework across the three cases and assesses 
whether the politicisation of particular immigration flows was related to the types of 
migration policy and the subsequent distribution of costs and benefits. Using this structural 
perspective, a convergence is expected as a result of the cases’ similar immigration 
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experiences, especially between the UK and France. The comparative syntheses will assess 
the extent to which this convergence was evident during the 2000s.    
Table 2.2 – Three types of policy and politics 
Source: Freeman, 2006, p. 230 
 
 
  
Policy type Migration type/policy  Mode of politics 
Concentrated distributive (concentrated 
benefits/diffuse costs) 
Permanent residence visas Client 
Redistributive (concentrated 
benefits/concentrated costs) 
Temporary visas for work Interest group 
Regulatory (diffuse benefits/concentrated 
costs) 
Asylum claims Entrepreneurial 
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Chapter 3 – The search for consensus: the extreme–right party family 
After a long period of political marginalisation, ERPs re-emerged on the political landscape 
of European states from the 1970s onwards. This trend has captured the interest of political 
scientists although disagreements persist about the most appropriate label to define these 
parties and their characteristics that distinguish ERPs as a distinct party family. The plethora 
of labels and typologies of rightist parties available in ERP literature reflect the divergences 
among political scientists. This chapter argues that ERPs is the best label for this distinctive 
party family for its continuity with the past, as these parties continue to present a radical 
challenge to the principle of human equality (Downs, 2001).  
Following the justification for the choice of ERP as the best label, this chapter explores 
whether it is possible to aggregate ERPs as a distinct party family. Two methods employed to 
draw the boundaries of the ERP family proposed by Mudde (2007) and Ignazi (2006) are 
explored in further depth. Like Ignazi (2006), this thesis identifies ERPs according to an 
ideological criterion based on the presence of anti-system ideological properties. Yet, the 
acute variation observed among the members of such a broad ERP family demands an 
additional and more developed typology. The last section of the chapter examines two 
possible typologies of rightist parties developed by Messina (2007) and Carter (2005). This 
thesis employs the latter typology that not only fulfils the required conditions of 
exhaustiveness and mutual exclusiveness (see also Kitschelt, 2007), but it is also the most 
suitable for the purposes of this research. 
3.1 – Debate about the best label for rightist parties 
Debate about the most appropriate terminology for defining these parties remains intense. 
This section examines the different labels available in the political science literature (Carter, 
2005). Certain authors prefer to label these parties simply as racist parties or as “anti-
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immigrant groups” (Husbands, 1981; Messina, 2007), but such designations portray these 
parties as single-issue parties in a reductionist and inaccurate form (Kitschelt, 1995). Others 
refer to “new right” parties, a concept initially introduced to describe cultural movements 
such as Nouvelle Droite in France during the 1980s (Taguieff and Tribalat, 1998). This label 
is excluded due to its ambiguity. A very common term for rightist parties is “radical right” 
(Betz, 1994; Kitschelt, 1995; Minkenberg, 2002; Schain et al., 2002). This designation was 
introduced by Bell in the early 1960s to classify the rise of neo–conservatives in the USA and 
the UK (Eatwell, 2000). Employment of this label is also ambiguous because it was initially 
applied to American conservative social movements such as McCarthyism rather than to 
political parties only (Hainsworth, 2008).  
Another alternative label frequently used is “populist” parties (Betz, 1994, 2002; Heinisch, 
2003). Betz (1994, p. 4) argues that these parties are:  
“populist in their unscrupulous use and instrumentalization of diffuse public 
sentiments of anxiety and disenchantment and their appeal to the common man and 
his allegedly superior common sense”.  
Recently, Mudde (2007, p. 23) adopted the term “radical populist right”, arguing that 
populism refers to an ideology based on the simple dichotomy of “the pure people” versus 
“the corrupt elite”. However, populism is associated with a particular political style that 
encompasses charismatic leadership and anti-establishment rhetoric rather than a distinct 
political ideology (Eatwell, 2000). This particular political style can be found in mainstream 
parties such as Berlusconi’s Forza Italia or in other political figures such as the Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, instead of being an exclusive property of rightist parties 
(Tarchi, 2003; Žižek, 2006). Populism is not an ideological property exclusive of ERPs, 
whilst the most appropriate label should point to a common core ideology rather than to the 
parties’ style, organisation or electoral tactics (Eatwell, 2000; Husbands, 2002)  
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Following this brief overview of possible labels for rightist parties, the term extreme-right 
contains several advantages and is widely used by political authors (see for example, Ignazi; 
2002; Carter, 2005; Hainsworth, 2008; Perrineau, 2009). It presupposes continuity with these 
parties’ past challenge to the fundamental principle of human equality rather than radical 
discontinuity with the past (Downs, 2001). Nevertheless, the aim is not to reduce new ERPs 
to mere unreconstructed fascist forces of the inter-war period, which would be drastically 
reductionist (Hainsworth, 2008). Reference to an extreme pole among the rightist parties is 
not defined by the socioeconomic cleavage – market driven versus state regulations – but 
based on the equality-inequality dimension (Mudde, 2007). As Bobbio (1996) suggested, 
extreme left-wing parties seek to overcome natural inequality in favour of radical political 
and economic equality through political agency whilst right-wing parties support inequality 
among humans as natural and desirable. 
Extremeness is premised on the parties’ location in the political spectrum and to rightist 
parties’ opposition to democratic and pluralist values. ERPs can be broadly traced by their 
position on the political left-right political spectrum as being simultaneously located to the 
right of moderate parties and the closest to the right edge (Ignazi, 2002; 2006). Furthermore, 
reference to extremeness reflects the “anti-system” properties contained in the ideologies of 
these parties (Carter, 2005). According to Sartori (1976), parties that challenge the 
foundational principles of liberal democracy should be characterised as anti-system. 
Therefore, ERP label is more appropriate than other proposals because it points to the spatial 
location of these parties in the left-right spectrum and to their anti-system ideological 
properties.   
3.2 – Party families and ERPs  
Before framing ERPs as a distinct party family, the conception of party family must be 
analysed since this concept is recurrently used as a “self-evident category”, when its 
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definition is not straightforward (Mair and Mudde, 1998). Three major obstacles were found 
on classifying parties according to their family identity: selecting the criteria employed to 
construct the typology, drawing parsimonious categories, and the agency of political actors 
and subsequent variations within a single party family (Eatwell, 1998). Therefore, typologies 
of party families must also be flexible enough to allow parties to shift between the proposed 
categories rather than simply being static compartmentalisations (Mudde, 2007). Drawing 
largely from Mair and Mudde’s (1998) proposal on party families, this chapter suggests the 
adoption of an ideological approach to delineate the ERP family.  
According to the former proposal (Mair and Mudde, 1998), political scientists must set a 
clear ideological criterion to formulate the boundaries of party families and classify party 
identities rather than analyse their political actions. Therefore, primacy is granted to parties’ 
ideology and their origins over other contingent factors. Nonetheless, ideology is interpreted 
under a competitive rather than institutional approach that interprets political parties as 
flexible organisations that can adapt their ideologies according to contingent shifts in the 
political market rather than being over determined by their history as institutions (Downs, 
1957). This method authorises the reclassification of parties that change their ideological 
background, as observed with New Labour in the UK or the Alleanza Nationale (AN) in Italy 
(Mudde, 2007). After reviewing the broad methods employed to construct party families, the 
method to draw an ERP family as a distinct category is now examined. 
 3.2.1 – ERPs as a party family 
The on-going debate over the appropriate label to define ERPs is underlined by competition 
over the identification of distinctive characteristics of this party family. The plurality of 
approaches to the construction of the ERP family reflect two common problems: i) the 
varieties of extremism despite the agreement over a common core doctrine; ii) variation in 
terms of levels of extremism among the selected parties besides the aforementioned difficulty 
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in drawing a clear line between mainstream parties and ERPs (Eatwell, 2000). Mudde (2007) 
proposed a minimum common ideological denominator for his label of “populist radical 
right parties” by highlighting that “nativist nationalism” is the cornerstone of these parties’ 
ideologies. Regarded as a combination of nationalism and xenophobia, “nativist nationalism” 
is conceived as: 
“an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited by members of the native group 
(the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation-state” (Mudde, 2007, p. 19).  
This narrow definition of “nativist nationalism” has the merit of travelling from the Western 
European context to the Eastern European context but it tries to conflate “racists and non-
racist arguments (including and excluding on the basis of culture and religion)” failing to 
distinguish between biological racism and cultural xenophobia.  
A broader definition of populist radical parties was then proposed by referring to three 
distinct principles: “populism, nativist nationalism and authoritarianism” (Mudde, 2007, 
p.23). Authoritarianism is regarded as the belief in a strictly ordered society and submission 
to authority (Mudde, 2007). Despite agreement on the primacy of xenophobia and racism or 
nativism to classify ERPs, populism and authoritarianism are ambiguous ideological criteria 
to construct the ERP family. As Kitschelt (2007) notes, some ERPs accept a degree of 
pluralism of rules whilst others challenge the unity of the host state as the Italian LN 
proposed in the past. The distinction between the narrow and broad definition of a rightist 
party family is considered less valuable than a single broader and inclusive definition of the 
members of the ERP family.  
A different proposal to define the ERP family was suggested by Ignazi (1992; 2006) who 
employed a spatial and ideological criterion. The first parameter is based on the validity of 
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the left-right spectrum that emerged after the French Revolution and employed in most West 
European party systems (Ignazi, 2002, 2006).
16
 ERPs must be subsequently located to the 
right of the mainstream and moderate conservative parties, indicating the ideological distance 
between them (Capoccia, 2002). ERPs are not necessarily located at an equal position in the 
political spectrum of different party systems because this process is defined by their 
interaction with the other political competitors (Carter, 2005). Since this spatial criterion only 
provides a broad selection of ERPs, it must be complemented with in-depth analysis of 
parties’ identities according to an ideological criterion (Kitschelt, 2007). 
A basic method for examining ERP ideologies is to look for overt references to a Fascist 
legacy and subsequent overt opposition to democratic values. The decreasing number of 
parties that overtly challenge the legitimacy of democracy and make overt associations with 
Fascism would have reduced the ERP family to mere neo-Fascist parties (Hainsworth, 1992; 
Betz, 1994). Additional ideological principles must be therefore deployed to identify the 
members of the ERP party family, since at least there is a widespread agreement that ERPs 
are ideologically distinct from other parties (Kitschelt, 1995; Husbands, 2002). A survey of 
the literature ascertained that there were five ideological features widely mentioned: 
nationalism, racism, xenophobia, anti-democracy and an authoritarian state (Mudde, 2000). 
Anti-democracy is a broader conception than the other four ideological traits but it is still 
regarded as a necessary property of ERPs (Eatwell, 2004). Thus, an additional dimension for 
scrutinizing the extreme-right label demands the assessment of the parties’ anti-system 
properties (Ignazi, 2002, 2006; Carter, 2005).  
The narrow definition of “anti-system” parties was initially devised by Sartori (1976) and 
identifies only those who display an “opposition of principle” or a radical opposition to the 
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 This political spectrum orders political parties in a one-dimensional horizontal space and evaluates the 
ideological distance between parties in a singular party system (Downs, 1957; Sartori, 1976). 
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foundations of the democratic regime, besides aiming to radically transform the system of 
government (Sartori, 1976, p.118). The narrow conception of anti-system party implies that:  
“the hard-core of the concept is singled out by noting that an anti–system opposition 
abides by a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within 
which it operates. According to the strict definition, then anti–system parties represent 
an extraneous ideology whose existence in a singular party system indicates a polity 
confronted with maximal ideological distance” (Sartori, 1976, p. 118). 
This definition encompasses both the ideological distance between parties and refers to the 
delegitimizing effect of party activities within their different political contexts. Anti-system 
parties do not need to oppose all the foundational principles of the democratic system to be 
regarded as anti-system, as opposition to only one of them is considered sufficient (Capoccia, 
2002, p. 20).  
Anti-system properties can be also found in ERP ideologies, but the extreme-left and right 
party families can be distinguished according to their accordance to the principle of human 
equality (Bobbio, 1996). As mentioned previously, extreme-left parties are based on radical 
egalitarian principles while ERPs are deeply anti-egalitarian and advocate the necessity of 
institutionalised social and political inequality. Therefore, ERPs’ denial of the principle of 
human equality must be regarded as an anti-system property insofar as this principle is 
considered a foundation principle of liberal democracy (Joppke, 1998; Capoccia, 2002). 
Thus, as Carter (2005, p. 17) suggests, anti-constitutional elements of right wing extremism 
refer “to a rejection of the fundamental values, procedures and institutions of the democratic 
constitutional state” and are intrinsically related to the “rejection of the principle of 
fundamental human equality”.  
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Summarising, ERPs can be broadly identified by their location on the political spectrum and 
objectively classified based on the ideological criterion by evaluating the anti-system 
properties of these parties’ ideologies (Ignazi, 2002; 2003). These anti-system properties can 
be either an overt attachment to a Fascist legacy or the profession of anti-constitutional or 
anti-democratic values, such as the denial of the principle of human equality (Kitschelt, 
2007). Thus, the boundaries of the ERP family can be accurately drawn by the ideological 
criterion, insofar as mainstream right parties do not integrate “anti-system” properties within 
their ideologies. Distinction between extreme-left parties and ERPs families can also be made 
based on the egalitarian cleavage. The next section examines different typologies of ERPs. 
3.3 – Typology of ERPs 
The combination of spatial and ideological approaches authorises a clear definition of the 
boundaries of the ERP family. However, this definition does not exhaust the diversity of 
parties found within this category (Eatwell, 2004). The question now is whether different 
types of ERPs can be classified using a single typology. There are an increasing number of 
studies that explore the diversity of ERPs and different typologies have been developed. 
However, certain proposals fail to fulfil conditions of exhaustiveness and mutual 
exclusiveness required for the formulation of objective typologies (Carter, 2005).  
Both requirements are fulfilled by the proposal formulated by Ignazi (2002, 2006), who 
suggest that ERP family should be composed of two main types: traditional and post-
industrial ERPs. The first type of parties consists of those that display an overt attachment to 
Fascist or Nazi legacies, like the British BNP during the 1990s or the former Italian MSI 
through the 1980s (Ignazi, 2002; 2003, p. 33; see Chapter 4). Post-industrial ERPs are 
considered a by-product of the conflicts inherent to post-industrial society and advocate a 
“mixture, often dazzling and fallacious, of free enterprise and social protection (limited to the 
native), of modernizing inputs and traditional reminiscences”, like the French FN (Ignazi, 
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2006, p. 34). Unlike traditional ERPs that have almost disappeared from European party 
systems, post-industrial ERPs enjoyed far greater electoral success (Ignazi, 2002; 2006) 
However, these two categories still encompass strong variations whilst the recent shortage of 
traditional ERPs in European party systems makes its employment unattractive. Additional 
typologies must therefore be examined by this thesis.  
One recent typology of anti-immigration parties found in immigration studies was developed 
by Messina (2007) aggregating political parties and social groups. According to this author, 
all anti-immigration groups created since the mid-1970s share three characteristics: overt 
hostility to immigrants; opposition to new immigration; and a great part if not all of their 
political success derives from the exploitation of social tensions produced by immigration 
(Messina, 2007, p. 64). Largely inspired by Kitschelt’s research (1995), Messina identifies 
five types of anti-immigration groups (Messina, 2007, p. 64-73):  
1. Pure anti-immigrant groups that lack formal organisation and are singly organised on 
the basis of their antagonism to immigration;  
2. Neo-fascist/neo-Nazi parties that are inspired by Fascist ideology and possess a well–
organised party structure; 
3. Opportunistic right parties whose anti-immigration posture depends on the electoral 
strategy adopted. Opposition to immigration varies according to the parties’ structure 
of opportunities instead of being driven by xenophobia. Their positioning in the 
political spectrum oscillates between the extreme and mainstream right; 
4. New radical right parties that are considered unique for the way they combine a “neo-
liberal commitment and individual economic freedom with an illiberal hostility 
towards immigrants, immigration, materialism and contemporary democracy”;  
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5. Ethnonational right parties whose attitudes to immigration depend on the political 
context. Ethnonational parties are opportunistic, single-issue formed based on a 
territorial/ethnic cleavage. 
However, this typology does not fulfil the condition of mutual exclusiveness, as there is a 
clear overlap between the categories of opportunistic right and ethnonational parties. Another 
shortcoming is the evaluation of party agency instead of exploring party ideologies and 
identities (Mair and Mudde, 1998; Ignazi, 2006). The concentration on the issue of 
immigration suggests that this typology is policy-oriented, rendering the characterisation of 
ERPs heavily contingent, and it implies that ERPs are single-issue parties (Kitschelt, 1995). 
For these reasons, Messina’s typology is considered too inconsistent for this research 
purposes.  
Another alternative and more objective typology of ERPs is provided by Carter (2005, p. 28), 
based on the evaluation of three criteria: “i) importance attached by parties to the issue of 
immigration; ii) nature of the party racist attitudes; iii) party attitudes towards democracy, 
parliamentarism and pluralism”. The first criterion refers to the importance of xenophobia 
and the party’s concern for “internal homogenization” by classifying ERPs according to the 
level of salience attributed to immigration. Henceforth, ERPs can be divided between 
“radically xenophobic” parties and those that do not devote any importance to this issue 
(Carter, 2005, p. 29). The second principle proposed by Carter (2005, p. 35) distinguishes 
ERPs depending on their adoption of traditional racism, cultural racism or absence of any 
racist ideology at all. Traditional racist parties embrace biological and eugenic conceptions of 
race that are characteristic of Nazism whilst cultural racists adopt the “ethnopluralist” version 
of the French Nouvelle Droite in the 1970s (Taguieff and Tribalat, 1998).  
The major ideological innovation was to dismiss biological racism in favour of a conception 
of “ethnopluralism”, which emphasises the necessity of preserving the uniqueness and purity 
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of the cultural identities of different ethnic groups. It presupposes the existence of 
irreconcilable cultural differences that could be dissolved through the mixing of different 
ethnic groups (Rydgren, 2003). “Ethnopluralism” underlined the thesis of “Clash of 
Civilizations” that framed modern conflicts as an outcome of the incommensurable cultural 
differences between nations of irreconcilable civilisations, especially between “Western” and 
“Islamic” civilization (Huntington, 1996). A strand of xenophobia relatively unaddressed by 
Carter (2005) refers to welfare xenophobia, which presents the welfare state as offering 
protection only for those who belong to the national community independently of their ethnic 
background. Foreigners are portrayed as illegitimate spongers of national resources and a 
threat to national citizens (Kitschelt, 1995, p. 23).  
Finally, ERPs can be identified by their attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and 
pluralism (Carter, 2005). These criteria assess whether ERPs reject democracy or at least call 
for its institutional reform by expanding or restricting liberties. A first group of ERPs opposes 
the core values that underlie liberal democratic systems and support their replacement. A 
second group displays anti-systemic properties but seeks particular reforms to push for less 
democracy, a relegation of parliamentary powers and less pluralism. A third group also 
proposes considerable reforms to political systems in favour of radical expansion of 
individual freedom and rights (Carter, 2005, p. 41). Doubts persist over the integration of this 
last group into the ERP family (Kitschelt, 2007), though it is a useful criterion to distinguish 
far-right anarchist movements inspired by the work of the American Robert Nozick (1975).  
Through the articulation of the three criteria, Carter (2005) identified five main types of 
ERPs:  
1. Neo-Nazi parties – regarded as radically xenophobic, marked by the embrace of  
traditional racism and opposition to liberal democratic systems;  
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2. Neo-fascist parties – opposing liberal democratic systems without embracing 
xenophobic ideology or racism; 
3. Authoritarian xenophobic parties – embracing cultural racism and radical 
xenophobia but advocating significant constitutional reforms in favour of a more 
authoritarian state; 
4. Neo-liberal xenophobic parties – racially xenophobic and embracing cultural 
racism, but proposing significant reform to the state according to neo–liberalism 
by defending less state intervention;  
5. Neo-liberal populist parties – which do not display xenophobic and racist attitudes 
at all, but their demands for reform of the existing regime into a minimal version 
of the state does contain anti–democratic properties (Carter, 2005, p. 51) 
This ERP typology offers many advantages since it provides a single and flexible definition 
of ERPs, fulfils the conditions of exhaustiveness and mutual exclusion, and draws accurate 
categories for this party family (Kitschelt, 2007). This proposal is also focused on party 
identities rather than on their actions or electoral strategies in light of three qualitative criteria 
(salience of xenophobia, nature of racist beliefs, and attitudes towards democracy, 
parliamentarism and pluralism). This proposal is also flexible enough either to permit 
variations in the location of ERPs within the proposed categories or to dismiss a certain party 
from this party family due to a shift of their ideological background. Henceforth, ERPs in the 
UK, France and Italy will be classified according to Carter’s (2005) typology.  
3.4 – Conclusions 
The term ‘extreme–right’ is considered the most appropriate label for ERPs because it refers 
only to political parties, indicates the ideological criteria selected to construct the boundaries 
of this party family and a salient degree of continuity with the past. ERPs continue to present 
a challenge to the foundations of liberal democracy today as they did in the past without 
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being a mere reflection of past Fascist relics. The chapter then analysed possible methods for 
constructing party families and found that the ideological criteria as proposed by Mair and 
Mudde (1998) to be the most consistent approach. The chapter’s second part provided a 
discussion of two possible ideological criteria to draw the ERP family. It was shown that 
Mudde (2007) proposed a narrow and a broad conception for his populist radical right party 
family, wherein the conception of “nativist nationalism” was considered the core ideological 
property.  
Despite the merits of this proposal, there are grounds to doubt his narrow conception of 
racism and the framing of populism and authoritarianism as an ideology rather than a political 
style exclusive of ERPs. Ignazi’s (2006) proposal identified ERPs according to their location 
in the left–right political spectrum and especially for the integration of anti-system properties 
in their ideologies. These anti-system properties can either be an overt attachment to Fascism 
or the denial of a foundational principle of liberal democracies, such as human equality.  
The disaggregation of the ERP party family into traditional and post-industrial parties was 
sufficiently robust from a theoretical perspective but it is undermined by the disappearance of 
the first category from European party systems and the excessive variation within the two 
categories. The typology of anti-immigration parties developed by Messina (2007) and 
applied to immigration studies contained theoretical shortcomings that undermined its overall 
consistency. Finally, Carter’s (2005) typology was regarded as the most consistent typology 
of ERPs by examining three ideological criteria: salience of xenophobia; nature of racist 
beliefs; and attitudes towards democracy, parliamentarism and pluralism. From the 
articulation of these three principles, five major subcategories of ERPs emerged: neo-Nazi 
parties; neo-fascist parties; authoritarian radical xenophobic parties; neo-liberal xenophobic 
parties; and neo-liberal populist parties.  
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Chapter 4 – Selection and contextualisation of case studies 
This chapter has two main objectives: i) to present a justification for both the selection of the 
UK, France and Italy as most appropriate case studies and the employment of a most similar 
systems design; ii) to explore and contextualise the most relevant divergences across key 
variables in the three cases, such as electoral systems, ERPs’ past development, and 
immigration experiences. The chapter considers possible case selection bias and then presents 
a justification for the employment of a most similar systems research design based on 
common liberal political systems, EU membership and the bipolar inter-party competition 
encouraged by the electoral systems in the three cases. As this chapter demonstrates, these 
last three characteristics present similar constraints on the impact of ERPs on immigration 
policy. Still, there are important variations found between the selected cases that must be 
contextualised before proceeding into the analysis of ERP impact on immigration policy. 
These variations are the electoral systems in the three cases, the development of the selected 
ERPs before 2000, and their divergent immigration experiences and paradigms. These three 
aspects of each case are explored in further depth throughout the remaining chapter.  
4.1 – Justification of case selection and choice for a most similar systems research design 
Justification of case selection is an issue frequently mistreated by political scientists 
undertaking comparative research using a small number of case studies (Peters, 1998). The 
UK, France and Italy were initially selected as the best countries to conduct this comparative 
research due to the presence of ERPs and the intensity of immigration, two indispensable 
characteristics necessary to conduct the analysis of ERP impact on immigration policy. 
Furthermore, the three cases present similar constraints on the potential development of the 
dependent variable: the liberal character of their states, EU membership, and bipolar patterns 
of inter-party competition encouraged by their electoral systems. Therefore, the objective of 
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the case selection was to understand ERP impact on immigration policy in political contexts 
with similar constraints on the development of this political process (Schain, 2006). 
A frequent mistake behind case selection is choosing countries according to observation of 
the dependent variable, e.g. where an ERP has had a significant impact on immigration policy 
(Peters, 1998). Consequently, the inclusion of Italy raises questions of selection bias as the 
LN was part of the coalition governments in 1994, 2001 and 2008. However, the political 
impact of the ERPs cannot be simply measured in terms of direct participation in government 
or be considered an automatic outcome of their access to the policy-making process. 
Moreover, previous research on the radical right in public office in Germany, France, Italy 
and Austria suggested that ERP impact was stronger at a cultural level than on a policy level 
(Minkenberg, 2001). Hence, the inclusion of Italy does not present problems of selection bias 
because only the research developed by this thesis can help to establish whether or not the LN 
actually had a significant impact on the three dimensions of immigration politics and policy. 
4.1.1 – Justification of choice for a most similar systems design 
A most similar systems design presupposes the presence of common and static similarities 
between the selected cases, which can then be excluded as having a potential influence on the 
dependent variable (Hopkin, 2010). In this research, these key variables are the liberal 
character of the political systems, EU membership and the bipolar inter-party competition 
encouraged by their different electoral systems. Liberal states may experience ‘unwanted’ 
immigration because, for example, judicial intervention may open ‘social and political 
spaces’ for migrants (Hollifield, 1992). By contrast, illiberal states can more easily disrespect 
the human rights of foreign citizens to attain their objectives (Schain, 2008b). 
Therefore, the capacity of liberal states to impose strict border controls can be severely 
limited by domestic factors, such as the constitutional rights extended to citizens and 
immigrants that are protected by independent judicial powers. This trend inhibits the adoption 
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of “zero-immigration policies” proposed by the ERPs and constrains their potential impact on 
policy developments. The existence of legislation that prohibits incitement of racial hatred 
also constrains overt racist rhetoric, limiting the scope of ERP impact at the discourse level. 
In addition, liberal states also have moral obligations towards particular groups of immigrants 
due to their historical ties or experiences, such as colonisation (Joppke, 1998). Effectively, 
the research will demonstrate that the liberal character of French and Italian states has posed 
important constraints on the impact of ERPs on immigration policy during the analysed 
period, especially on policy developments.  
Another important similarity between the UK, France and Italy is their EU membership, 
which also poses salient constraints on the potential impact of ERPs, particularly on policy 
developments. Membership of the EU presupposes recognition of the supranational free-
movement rights for EU citizens established in the Treaty of Rome (1957) and guaranteed by 
EU laws. Moreover, the EU is based on the fundamental principles of liberty, democracy, 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, which are overtly acknowledged in the 
Amsterdam Treaty (1999) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2000). A proposal such as 
the withdrawal from the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees is prevented by EU 
membership. Hence, ERP impact on immigration policy cannot contravene EU legislation 
without subsequent actions from bodies such as the European Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP), or European Court of Justice. Incompatibility with the fundamental 
requirements of membership could mean that a country withdraws from the EU.  
The creation of the EU single market also presupposes strong cooperation on migration and 
asylum. This can be seen from the Schengen Agreement (1985), which abolished internal 
border controls, ‘compensated’ by a stronger commitment to secure external borders controls. 
While France and Italy are full Schengen members, the UK has not joined Schengen. Similar 
variation can be found on the impact of the Europeanisation process, as the UK opted out of 
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Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty covering free movement, migration and asylum (Geddes, 
2003). Nevertheless, the national immigration policies and the impact of ERPs in the three 
cases are still constrained by EU developments, such as the EU enlargement process in 2004 
and 2008. The UK government has opted in to a wide range of EU measures on issues such 
as asylum and irregular immigration (Geddes, 2005). The latter two characteristics restrict the 
present case selection to EU countries with salient levels of immigration and with a 
significant ERP within their domestic party systems, such as the UK, France, Italy, Austria, 
the Netherlands, Germany, Denmark or Norway. 
The third and final similarity that helps to justify the present case selection is the bipolar 
patterns of inter-party or inter-coalition competition encouraged by the electoral systems 
employed by the three cases at the first-order-ballots. The British first-past-the-post electoral 
system incentivises intense bipolar competition between two dominant main parties, even if 
the UK is no longer a classic two-party system, especially after the 2010 general election 
(Farrell, 2001). In France, the two-round majoritarian formula employed in French 
presidential and legislative elections after 1958 promoted a more stable pattern of ‘bipolar 
pluralism’ within a multi-party system (Elgie, 2005). Despite several imperfections, the last 
four Italian general elections (1996, 2001, 2006, and 2008) have been characterized by 
bipolar competition in a party system characterised by centrifugal dynamics, making it a case 
of “fragmented bipolarism” (D’Alimonte, 2005; Pasquino, 2010). These electoral systems 
favour competition between two ideological blocs with significant ideological polarisation in 
the left-right political spectrum.  
Based on these factors, the selected cases allow the evaluation of ERP impact in similar 
political contexts characterised by intense bipolar competition and the existence of common 
pressures on mainstream parties to prevent the waste of votes to ERPs. According to Bale 
(2003), centre-right parties prevented the transference of votes to extremist parties by 
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cooperating with ERPs as a support party or as a coalition partner at the expense of conceding 
respectability to the anti-immigration and welfare-chauvinist agenda of ERPs (as observed in 
Italy and Austria). Thus, the intense bipolarism observed in the UK, France and Italy can 
have a salient influence on the development of ERP impact on immigration politics and 
policy providing a third justification for the selection of these countries as the most 
appropriate cases to employ a most similar systems comparative research design. Now, the 
following sections provide an overview of the British, French and Italian electoral systems, 
the development of the selected ERPs before 2000, and the immigration experiences of the 
three countries.   
4.2 – Electoral systems 
Electoral systems are the structure by which votes are cast at election for a representative 
assembly and the means by which such votes are converted into seats in parliament (Mitchell, 
2005). Electoral systems shape the party system and the nature of government (single-party 
or coalition), as plurality systems act as a disincentive to the rise of new parties while PR 
encourages fragmentation of party systems (Farrell, 2001). The argument here is that distinct 
electoral systems provide different structures of opportunities for ERPs and may influence 
their impact on immigration politics and policy. Effectively, electoral systems explain the 
difficulties ERPs face when they are seeking an electoral breakthrough but fail to explain 
variations of electoral support for such parties between different periods or across different 
countries (Carter, 2005; Mudde, 2007). Alternatively, ERPs may concentrate on second-order 
elections like EP or local elections, wherein institutional constrains are weaker (Kitschelt, 
1995), but these are not the focus of this study.  
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4.2.1 – British first-past-the-post electoral system  
The weakness of British ERPs has been frequently associated with the institutional 
constraints imposed by the first-past-the-post electoral system (Hainsworth, 2008). The 
House of Commons is the dominant chamber in the political system and its members are 
elected by a plurality of the vote in the constituency in which they are candidates (Farrell, 
2001). Consequently, only the candidate receiving the most votes obtains representation in 
the House of Commons (Lijphart, 1994). This first-past-the-post electoral system possesses a 
mechanical effect that favours the establishment of a two-party system, through high levels of 
disproportionality (Mitchell, 2005). Simultaneously, it also introduces a psychological effect 
that discourages voters from ‘wasting’ their vote on minor parties (Hainsworth, 1992). 
Nevertheless, the Westminster model is becoming a misrepresentation, as the British party 
system is no longer a two-party system, as there is a significant third party in parliament – the 
Liberal Democrats and other minor parties.
17
  
Finally, this plurality electoral system favours single-party parliamentary majorities and is 
seen as leading to ‘strong’ single-party governments (Farrell, 2001). The Westminster model 
hinders the development of smaller parties such as the BNP that has never obtained 
parliamentary representation (Mudde, 2002). Nonetheless, the recent introduction of 
proportional representation (PR) to the European Parliament (EP) and to London Mayoral 
and London Assembly elections expanded the BNP’s structure of political opportunities 
(Hainsworth, 2008).  
4.2.2 – French dual-ballot system 
Executive powers in the French Fifth Republic are shared between a directly elected 
President and a Prime Minister appointed by the President and confirmed by the National 
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 This party obtained 22.1 per cent of the vote in the 2005 general election and acquired 62 seats 
(Kavanagh and Butler, 2005). 
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Assembly. Elections to the presidency and parliament are contested on the basis of single 
member constituencies and according to a “two-ballot-majority-plurality” electoral system 
(Elgie, 2005). In presidential elections, when one of the candidates fails to obtain a majority 
in the first ballot, a second ballot will take place and is restricted to the two most successful 
candidates from the former round. In parliamentary elections, when a candidate fails to obtain 
a majority on the first ballot in a disputed constituency, a second ballot will occur that is 
restricted to parties that obtained at least 12.5 per cent of the registered electorate (Hossay, 
2002). Despite the electoral thresholds to access the second ballot, this dual-ballot system 
enhances multiparty competition due to the incentives for electoral coalitions, particularly at 
the second round (Farrell, 2001).  
The French electoral system enhances bipolar patterns of inter-party competition because of 
the incentives to the formation of alliances within the left and right blocs at the second round, 
which tend to produce coalition governments (Elgie, 2005). The dual ballot system 
discourages French voters from “wasting” their vote on minor parties (Marcus, 1995). 
Finally, this electoral system also fosters higher levels of disproportionality than in the UK, 
which favours established parties and encourages party cohesion (Ivaldi, 2005). Due to these 
institutional constraints, the French party system is commonly regarded as a “moderate 
pluralist polity” (Sartori, 1974; Andersen and Evans, 2003).  
Within this context, the FN has obtained zero or minimal parliamentary representation 
despite its strong electoral performances at the first-order-ballots, because of its exclusion 
from national coalitions (Kestel and Godmer, 2004). In response, it has retained candidates at 
decisive second-round ballots forcing triangular competition (left, right and extreme-right) 
that splits the right-wing vote (Ivaldi, 2005). Unsurprisingly, the FN’s electoral breakthrough 
at national level occurred in 1986 when parliamentary elections employed a PR system after 
President Mitterrand’s decision, motivated by his desire to split the right-wing vote 
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(Perrineau, 1998). The introduction of PR systems in second-order elections (Municipal, 
Regional and EP) also expanded the FN’s political opportunities (Marcus, 1995).  
4.2.3 – Italian “scorporo” 
Since the Constitutional compromise of 1947, Italian legislative power is shared by two 
parliamentary branches – the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate (Cotta and Verzichelli, 
2007). The President of the Council of Ministers is equally responsible to both chambers 
while  the Cabinet is appointed by the President, who holds exclusive powers to dissolve the 
legislature, force early elections, and to dismiss appointed ministers (Bull and Pasquino, 
2007). The President of the Italian Republic is appointed by a joint session of both legislative 
bodies for a seven-year mandate. Until 1993, parliamentary elections used a proportional 
system with a low legal threshold that fostered high levels of party system fragmentation 
making it a classic case of “polarised pluralism” (Sartori, 1975; Hossay, 2002). It was 
considered non-competitive due to the continuous permanent representation of Democrazia 
Cristiana (DC) in government, while the second biggest party – the Partito Comunista 
Italiano (PCI) was excluded from power because of the Cold War context. Due to lack of 
alternation in power and high levels of corruption, the party oligarchy became known as 
“partitocrazia” (rule by party; Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).  
The Italian party system collapsed after the end of the Cold War and the PCI subsequently 
disintegrated into a centre-left and an extreme-left party. The eruption of the “Tangentopoli” 
scandal between 1992 and 1993 exposed deep levels of corruption within the DC and the 
Partito Socialista Italiano (PSI) leading to a massive electoral realignment and the final 
collapse of the party system. Italian voters’ association between the electoral system with the 
political crisis led to mass support for electoral reform. Consequently, a new mixed electoral 
law (75 per cent majoritarian, 25 per cent proportional, named as “scorporo”) was established 
after a national referendum in April 1993 (Hossay, 2002). 
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Elections to the Chamber of Deputies and to the Senate were contested under mixed electoral 
laws with substantial distinctions. Members of the Chamber were elected through a dual-
ballot vote, wherein one vote appointed deputies according to single-member districts. The 
second vote elected the remaining one quarter of the deputies through a proportional method 
of nationwide dimension (Pasquino, 2007). The scorporo possessed a mechanical effect that 
penalised a party’s share of the proportional vote for each victory it obtained under the 
plurality tier. An electoral threshold of 4 per cent was imposed on access to the Chamber of 
Deputies through the proportional tier (Hossay, 2002). Members of the Senate were elected 
through a single vote because the plurality and proportional tiers are fused together, while the 
proportional method was used at a regional rather than at nationwide level (D’Alimonte, 
2005).  
The 1993 electoral law promoted bipolarity by making pre-electoral coalitions central to the 
victory of single-member seats and the party system became structured by two “catch-all” 
coalitions based on left-right blocs (Diamanti, 2007). Thus, government formation assumed 
the form of coalition governments similar to the past (D’Alimonte, 2005). Party system 
fragmentation increased as small parties that stood little chance of getting representation 
under the proportional tier could be compensated by running their own candidates in 
constituencies under the plurality tier where their coalition was likely to win. The level of 
compensation obtained by minor parties depended on their “blackmail” power within the 
coalition. The geographical electoral concentration of LN support in northern regions enabled 
it to obtain an oversized proportion of secure seats (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007). Despite 
institutional incentives to centripetal competition, centrifugal dynamics persisted at the intra-
coalition level in both government and parliament, and this had a negative impact on Cabinet 
stability (Bardi, 2007).  
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More recently, in 2005 the centre-right coalition government promoted a new institutional 
reform driven by partisan interests, which introduced a proportional law with a majority 
bonus to the winning coalition (Bull and Pasquino, 2007). Since electoral laws for the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate are distinct, the impact of the new reform is variable. 
The majority bonus preserved bipolar competition and provided a comfortable majority in the 
Chamber of Deputies to the winning coalition in 2006 elections, but only a tiny majority in 
the Senate (Pasquino, 2007). This factor underlined the Senate’s vote of no confidence to the 
centre-left coalition government led by Romano Prodi in 2007 and its subsequent resignation 
(Paolucci and Newell, 2008). 
4.3 – ERPs development until 2001 
This section analyses the development of the most prominent members of the ERP family in 
the UK, France and Italy since the 1970s. The analysis focuses on ERP development within 
their institutional contexts and explores their ideological classification according to the 
typology proposed by Carter (2005, see Chapter 3). The research on ERP development in in 
the UK, France and Italy is framed within the context of their structure of political 
opportunities and will stop in 2001. The following country chapters will continue the research 
from that point forward, including the examination of the ERP impact on immigration politics 
and policy. 
4.3.1 – The extreme-right in Britain from the 1970s 
4.3.1.1 – The rise and fall of the National Front 
The National Front (NF) was formed in 1967 after the fusion of minor ERPs – such as the 
British National Party, the League of Empire Loyalists, members of the Racial Preservation 
Society and the Greater Britain Movement (GBM). The NF was led by A. K. Chesterton until 
1970, who was a former member of Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists (Eatwell, 
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1992). The NF received indirect support from Enoch Powell, a Conservative MP, who in a 
public speech in Birmingham in April 1968 prophesied “rivers of blood” as a consequence of 
Commonwealth immigration and that “the black man will have the whip hand over the white 
man” (Smithies and Fiddick, 1969, pp. 35-43). Powell supported the voluntary repatriation of 
immigrants and the repeal of the 1965 Race Relations Act. In response, the Conservative 
leader Edward Heath dismissed him from the shadow cabinet and refused to support Powell’s 
approach to immigration (Harris, 1994). 
Powell rejected joining the NF but his speech and subsequent popular mobilisations improved 
the NF’s structure of political opportunities by: i) breaking the inter-party  consensus on 
immigration; ii) bringing this social phenomenon into the centre of the political agenda; and 
iii) opening divisions within the Conservative elites (Saggar, 1992; Durham, 1996). The 
subsequent divisions within the British centre-right created a political space for the British 
ERP, as opposition to “coloured” immigration and support for the forced repatriation of 
immigrants were NF platforms (Kitschelt, 1995; Thurlow, 2000). Nevertheless, the NF was 
unable to capitalise on Powell’s speech in electoral terms mostly because of intense intraparty 
conflicts (Sykes, 2004). Chesterton was removed from the leadership after the NF’s poor 
electoral results at the 1970 general election (Table 4.1). Two years later, John Tyndall 
assumed the NF’s leadership with the support of Martin Webster. Both were ex–members of 
the GBM (Thurlow, 1998).  
4.3.1.2 – Tyndall as NF chairman 
Under John Tyndall’s leadership, the NF’s ideology evolved at two levels: the party sent a 
Fascist message impregnated by national-socialist ideas, such as anti-Semitism and biological 
racism, to the inner core, while it emphasised racial populism and a nationalist economic 
programme at the public level (Edgar, 1977). Tyndall’s electoral tactics were dominated by 
street politics and provocative marches and two periods of electoral growth were observed
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Table 4.1 – Votes for the NF at British general elections between 1970 and 1987 
Year No. of 
candidates 
Number of votes Average of the vote in 
contested constituencies 
1970 10 6,000 3.6% 
1974 (F) 54 76,865 3.1% 
1974 (O) 90 113,843 3.1% 
1979 303 191,706 1.3% 
1983 60 27,065 1.1% 
1987 2 553 - 
Source: Messina, 2007, p. 55  
under his leadership (Layton-Henry, 1984). The first was between 1972 and 1974 after the 
Conservative government’s admission of Ugandan Asian refugees, which led some 
Conservative members to join the NF (Table 4.1; Harris, 1994). However, the NF’s poor 
results at both the 1974 general elections produced a new cleavage between Tyndall and ex-
Conservatives, such as Roy Painter and Kingsley Read, who criticised the party’s leadership 
for being damaging (Durham, 1996). Tyndall maintained his grip on the NF’s leadership 
whilst the “populists” formed another rightist party – the National Party (NP). This split 
deprived the NF of an electoral breakthrough at local level, as the NP won two seats on 
Blackburn council at the 1976 local elections (Husbands, 1994).  
The second peak in the NF’s electoral support developed between 1976 and 1977 after 
another immigration crisis following Afro-Asian arrivals. This event allowed the NF to 
regain its key issue and raised prospects of an imminent electoral breakthrough (Sykes, 
2004). However, NF electoral support plummeted at the 1979 general elections and led to the 
emergence of internal conflict once more (Table 4.1). Consequently, Tyndall was removed 
from the party leadership in 1980 and another faction – the Strasserites –  ascended within the 
NF. This group dropped links with national-socialism in favour of the Fascist movement led 
by Gregor Strasser, turning the NF into a neo-fascist ERP type (Sykes, 2004). However, the 
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NF collapsed into warring factions and chronic instability throughout the 1980s and 
disappeared into obscurity (Eatwell, 1998; Thurlow, 1998).  
Many explanations for the failure of the NF have been proposed in ERP literature: the British 
electoral system; the British civic culture; actions of anti–fascist groups, such as the Anti–
Nazi League or Rock Against Racism; intra-party disputes; and the role of the mainstream 
parties, especially the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher’s leadership (Messina, 1989; 
Husbands, 1994; Eatwell, 1998; Thurlow, 2000; Mudde, 2002). Famously, Thatcher stated in 
an interview on the World in Action programme on ITV in April 1978 that: “people are really 
rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture” 
(Hainsworth, 1992, p. 20). This event has been recurrently identified as an example of 
informal co-option of ERP discourse on immigration policy (Hainsworth, 1992; Husbands, 
1994). The window of opportunity for the NF opened by Powell was closed by Thatcher’s 
shift onto extremist grounds as she re-claimed the issue of opposition to immigration for the 
Conservatives alongside their neo-liberal economic programme (Durham, 1996; Mudde, 
2002).
18
  
4.3.1.3 – The rise of the BNP 
After abandoning the NF, Tyndall formed the New National Front in 1980, which was 
renamed BNP three years later. The BNP’s ideology under Tyndall’s leadership was 
classified as a neo-Nazi ERP on the basis of three components: i) a strong hostility towards 
liberalism and what were described as a corrupt and decadent parliamentary plutocracy; ii) 
adoption of biological racism and covert anti-Semitism, which was evident in the proposal of 
forced repatriation of “non-whites” and the denial of the Holocaust; iii) opposition to 
“international monopoly capitalism” in favour of a nationalist economic programme (Copsey, 
                                                 
18
 Kitschelt (1995, p. 254, italic in the original) argued that: “in some ways, the British Conservatives 
became the model according to which emerging new radical right parties elsewhere in Europe could learn 
to fashion their appeals”.   
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1994; Gable, 1995). Furthermore, the BNP electoral strategy resembled the tactics employed 
by the NF during the 1970s (Sykes, 2004). During the 1980s and early 1990s, the BNP 
continued to be isolated on the margins of British politics (Table 4.2; Thurlow, 1998). 
Thatcher’s leadership and her tough stances on immigration and the victory in the Falklands 
war in 1982 continued to squeeze the British ERP’s political space (Eatwell, 2004).  
Table 4.2 – Votes for the BNP at British general election, EP and London Assembly ballots 
developed between 1983 and 2000 
Year Elections type 
No. of 
Constituencies 
Contested 
Number of 
Votes 
Average of the vote in 
Contested Constituencies 
1983 general  54 
14,621 
 
0,5% 
1987 general  2 
553 
 
0,6% 
1992 general  13 7,005 1,2% 
1997 general  56 35,832 1,4% 
1999 EP
1
  – 102,644 0,9%1  
2000 
London 
Assembly 
– 47,670 2.9% 
Source: Ignazi, 2006; London Elects, 2008. 
1
 Average of the vote across Britain 
2
 Votes for London-wide Assembly Members – London totals 
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Political marginalisation appeared close to an end in September 1993 following a BNP 
victory in a council by-election in Millwall (East London) by a margin of seven votes (Gable, 
1995). A BNP campaign entitled: “Rights for Whites” was developed from 1989 onwards to 
downgrade the party’s Nazi image and seek to attract “oppressed white” workers through 
intense local canvassing (Sykes, 2004). The extension of this campaign to Tower Hamlets in 
the early 1990s coupled with the exploitation of local grievances provided legitimacy to the 
BNP’s victorious candidate – Derek Beackon (Copsey, 2004). Millwall was a relatively 
deprived area in the East End of London where the local branch of the Liberal Democrats had 
employed a platform of racial populism in previous elections. Therefore, the development of 
the BNP campaign “Rights for Whites” took ownership of opposition to immigration from 
this mainstream party (Husbands, 1994). The BNP was also helped by Labour’s portrayal of 
the local ballot as a close contest between these two parties (Eatwell, 1998).  
Consequently, the BNP enjoyed a more favourable opportunities structure in this 
constituency than at the national level. In the aftermath of this victory, Tyndall expected 
further electoral breakthroughs at the 1994 local elections but these failed to materialise and 
the BNP lost its single seat (Husbands, 1994). A direct challenge to Tyndall’s leadership by a 
neo-Nazi group named Combat-18 (which was later purged from the party ranks) followed 
the electoral setback (Gable, 1995).  In 1995, Nick Griffin, a former chairman of the NF in 
the 1980s, joined the BNP and became strongly involved in the denial of the Holocaust 
(Copsey, 2004). Four years later, he successfully removed Tyndall from the BNP’s 
leadership.  
4.3.1.3.1 – Griffin’s “modernisation” process 
During the second half of the 1990s, a cleavage opened between Tyndall and Griffin over the 
BNP’s electoral strategy rather than its ideology (Sykes, 2004). Against Tyndall’s extremism, 
Griffin proposed a ‘modernisation’ process inspired by the French FN. Tyndall was now 
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perceived as an obstacle to further party development (Eatwell, 2004). After the victory in the 
party leadership poll in September 1999, Griffin sought to develop his modernisation plan 
based on two principles:  
(i) “responsibility”, through the adoption of non-aggressive rhetoric and proposals, 
signalled by the drop of compulsory repatriation programmes in favour of 
voluntary schemes;  
(ii) “professionalism”, which required the adoption of modern campaign methods 
such as the use of the internet and family festivals in contrast to Tyndall’s street 
mobilisations (Copsey, 2007). 
Ideological reform was postponed by the new leadership because of the imminent 1999 EP 
elections that demonstrated the BNP’s electoral irrelevance (Table 4.2; John et al., 2006). At 
the London Assembly elections in 2000, the BNP presented Michael Newland as its mayoral 
candidate, and secured 2.87 per cent of the vote in the party list section of the PR ballot 
(Table 4.2). Whereas by the late 1990s, Thurlow (1998) deemed that the British ERP had 
failed to revive or grow since the mid-1980s, the British far-right’s past of endemic failure 
was to some extent overturned by the BNP in the following decade, albeit at second-order 
ballots. In contrast to the British ERPs’ weakness, the next section assesses the development 
of one of the most successful ERP in Western Europe.  
4.3.2 – The French extreme-right from the 1970s 
4.3.2.1 – The FN formation and electoral desert 
The French FN was founded in October 1972 by members of Ordre Nouveau (ON) and 
gathered together diverse far–right groups including supporters of the Vichy regime, Algérie 
française and monarchists (Shields, 2007). Jean Marie Le Pen, an ex-Poujadiste who lacked 
connections with neo-fascist groups, was appointed as party's chairman. The FN electoral 
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results were very bleak throughout the 1970s (Table 4.3) and this led to internal disarray. 
Nonetheless, Le Pen asserted his authority, and with the support of a prominent figure of 
French neo-fascists movement – François Duprat, 19 who became Le Pen’s lieutenant – he 
forced the members of the ON to exit the party (Camus, 1997). The splinter groups formed 
the Parti des Forces Nouvelles (PFN), which competed with the FN until the mid-1980s. 
Following Duprat’s death, Le Pen shaped the FN’s discourse on the basis of a neo-liberal and 
anti-statist economic programme, while at the social level the emphasis was placed on his 
opposition to immigration and to low French birth rates (Kitschelt, 1995). Under the 
influence of the French Nouvelle Droite (see Chapter 3), the FN adopted a version of 
“cultural” racism and a racist “right to difference”. The FN’s acute xenophobia was translated 
into its proposal for the repatriation of all immigrants and the annulment of all naturalisations 
conceded after 1974 (Camus, 1997). From 1985 onwards, the FN’s stance towards 
immigration was enshrined in the proposed “national preference” programme, which 
prioritized French citizens’ access to social provisions (Marcus, 1995). This ideological 
package furnished the FN with a suitable discourse to tackle future electoral contests, within 
a context of critical changes in the French party system that expanded its structure of political 
opportunities.  
The Socialist party won the 1981 presidential and legislative elections and formed a 
government coalition with the PCF but was unable to tackle unemployment and ended up 
alienating its traditional electorate. Cracks also opened in the centre-right coalition of UDF-
RPR, mostly due to personal rivalries between the party leaders Valéry Giscard D’Estaing 
and Jacques Chirac respectively (Kitschelt, 1995). Once in opposition, these centre-right 
parties also shifted their positions further to the right under the influence of Thatcherism in 
the UK and Reaganism in the USA (Ignazi, 2006). The FN’s structure of political 
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 Duprat was later killed by a car bomb attack in 1978 (Camus, 1997). 
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opportunities also benefited from the national campaign against immigration led by the PCF 
in 1981, which criticised the existence of too many immigrants in the PCF areas (Marcus, 
1995). This realignment of extreme-left discourse alongside the restrictive immigration 
policies deployed by President Giscard D’Estaing after 1974 brought immigration to the fore 
of the public agenda and benefited the FN, whose opposition to immigration was already part 
of its platform. 
Table 4.3 – Votes for the FN at presidential, parliament, regional and EP elections between 
1974 and 1999 
Year Elections  Number of votes Proportion of the total 
1974 presidential 190,921 0.75% 
1979 EP – – 
1981 presidential – – 
1981 parliamentary 90,422 0.18% 
1984 EP 2,129,668 10.95% 
1986 parliamentary 2,760,880 9.80% 
1986 regional 2,658,500 9.5% 
1988 presidential 4,351,379 14.61% 
1988 parliamentary 2,391,973 9.73% 
1989 EP 2,129,668 11.73% 
1992 regional 3,375,079 13.60% 
1993 parliamentary 3,153,088 12.68% 
1994 EP 2,050,086 10.52% 
1995 presidential 4,548,270 15.27% 
1997 parliamentary 3,774,266 15.23% 
1998 regional 3,273,549 15.0% 
1999 EP 1,005,225 5.74% 
Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2011 
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4.3.2.2 – Electoral breakthrough  
The first FN electoral breakthrough occurred in 1983 local elections in Dreux, in the 
department of Eure-et-Loire (Centre region), where the FN secretary – Jean Pierrre Stirbois 
obtained 16.7 per cent of the vote at the local ballot first round. This result led local RPR and 
UDF politicians to form an electoral coalition with the FN in the second ballot to defeat the 
left. The right-wing coalition was victorious with 55 per cent of vote leading to the 
appointment of Stirbois to the city council and to the FN electoral breakthrough at the local 
level (Camus, 1997). The electoral agreement enhanced the FN’s respectability and raised 
divisions amongst centre-right parties over future coalitions with the extreme-right. The FN 
success in Dreux reflected Stirbois’ intense local campaigning based on anti-immigration 
appeals in an inner-city area affected by increasing unemployment, which was also his home 
constituency (Marcus, 1995). The FN breakthrough into national politics occurred at the 1984 
EP elections for which PR was used (Table 4.3; Harris, 1994).  
4.3.2.3 – Electoral consolidation  
Following its electoral breakthrough at national level, the FN benefited from President 
François Mitterrand’s introduction of PR at the 1986 legislative elections (Perrineau, 1998). 
To enhance the FN’s respectability in this highly favourable context, Le Pen recruited 
members from different backgrounds including Bruno Mégret, a prominent member of the 
RPR and other former members of centre-right parties (Adler, 2001). Despite the comfortable 
victory of the UDF-RPR coalition under Chirac’s leadership, the FN obtained 9.8 per cent of 
the vote and formed a parliamentary group of 35 members (Table 4.3; Birenbaum, 1992). Co-
habitation between President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac between 1986 
and 1988 led to a certain level of political convergence between centre-left and centre-right 
French parties. To dissolve the FN’s parliamentary representation, Chirac reintroduced the 
two-ballot electoral system for the 1988 legislative elections (Harris, 1994).  
87 
 
Le Pen responded with the radicalisation of his critique of French party system, henceforth 
labelled as the “gang of four” (Ignazi, 2006). The electoral results at the 1988 presidential 
elections indicated the consolidation of the FN support at national level, as Le Pen won 14.6 
per cent of the vote (Table 4.3). The French centre-right parties could no longer ignore the 
FN’s electoral rise and an electoral agreement was struck between UDF-RPR and FN in eight 
constituencies at the 1988 legislative elections (Mayer and Perrineau, 1996). Despite the 
respectability conferred by this agreement, FN parliamentary representation fell to a single 
member.
20
 The FN setbacks mounted after the death of Stirbois in 1988 (Birenbaum, 1992). 
Following the consolidation of the FN electoral support at the 1989 EP (Table 4.3), Le Pen 
reasserted his authority within the party by radicalising his discourse with anti-Semitic 
remarks that led to further internal splits (Adler, 2001).  
4.3.2.4 – The conquest of power 
A new electoral strategy to “conquer power” was launched at the 1990 party congress when 
Le Pen presented the FN as the legitimate alternative to the corrupted party system and to the 
cohabitation between Mitterrand and Chirac (Ignazi, 2006). This coexistence provoked 
further erosion of levels of party loyalty across the electorate and the decline of overall 
confidence in the party system to the FN’s benefit. In 1991, the FN released its “50 
propositions” to govern France that maintained the “national preference” programme whilst 
the proposal for the annulment of all naturalisations granted after 1974 was abandoned to 
water down the FN’s pariah status (Camus, 1997). Opposition to immigration was now 
supported by supposed “scientific” research published in 1990 by an economist named Pierre 
Milloz (Taguieff and Tribalat, 1998). This new strategy of relative moderation was largely 
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 The FN deputy was Yann Piat, elected in the Var constituency, who was expelled from the party a year 
later. The FN parliamentary representation was later re-acquired following the election of Stirbois’s widow 
- Marie-France Stirbois, at a 1989 legislative by-election in Dreux (Marcus, 1995). 
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indebted to Mégret and his group of followers, mostly former members of the Nouvelle 
Droite, who sought to dilute the FN extremist image (Ivaldi, 2005).   
On the eve of the 1993 legislative elections, the FN released “300 measures for the 
renaissance of France” that indicated some ideological reform. To consolidate its support 
among working class voters, especially among disaffected socialists, the FN developed what 
was named as “gaucho-lepénism” (left-lepénism; Perrineau, 2000). In contrast to the old neo-
liberal approach, this new programme balanced nationalist, xenophobic and authoritarian 
references with measures to tackle unemployment, workers’ problems and the crisis of the 
welfare state (Taguieff and Tribalat, 1998). The FN was now presented as the defender of 
France against international finance, proposed a nationalist economic programme, and 
reaffirmed its opposition to supposedly corrupt and unreliable political parties (Swyngedouw 
and Ivaldi, 2001). This ideological shift justifies the FN reclassification from a neo-liberal 
xenophobic ERP to an authoritarian xenophobic ERP according to the selected typology of 
this party family.  
Electoral results in the early 1990s proved the relative success of the FN’s new strategy in the 
context of deep isolation reflecting French mainstream parties’ option for non-engagement 
with the Le Pen’s party (Table 4.3; Marcus, 1995). Despite its strong performance at the 1993 
legislative elections, the FN lost its parliamentary representation because of its incapability 
either to hold Stirbois’ seat in Dreux or to win a second ballot elsewhere (Camus, 1997). At 
the launch of his 1995 presidential campaign, Le Pen put forward a new slogan: “neither left 
nor right” and observed another peak in electoral support with more than 15 per cent of the 
vote in the first round (Swyngedouw and Ivaldi, 2001; Table 4.3).  
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4.3.2.5 – Le Pen - Mégret split 
The FN contributed to the defeat of the centre-right parties by a left wing coalition at the 
1997 general election by maintaining 133 candidates on the second ballot and splitting the 
right-wing electorate, though it only elected one deputy (Schain, 2002).
21
 This defeat opened 
a new debate within the centre-right over the FN’s inclusion in future electoral agreements. 
Eduard Balladur who competed with Chirac for the RPR’s leadership proposed a national 
commission on the FN “national preference” programme, whilst Chirac preferred to vilify the 
FN without rejecting its voters (Hainsworth, 2000). These divisions within centre-right elites 
expanded the FN structure of political opportunities and Le Pen’s party elected more regional 
councillors at the 1998 regional elections than the UDF and only a few less than the RPR 
(Table 4.3).
22
 Consequently, extreme-right cooperation was indispensable for the election of 
centre-right regional Presidents and five of those governors signed agreements with Le Pen’s 
party (Shields, 2007).  
Serious internal splits erupted within both the mainstream and the extreme-right after the 
signing of these agreements. The UDF’s and RPR’s national leaderships broke the alliances 
with the FN but three governors maintained their agreements and were later dismissed from 
their parties (Kestel and Godmer, 2004). Meanwhile, a rift between Le Pen and Mégret 
erupted over the party’s electoral strategy (Ivaldi, 2005). Whereas Mégret favoured 
agreements with centre-right candidates through the dilution of the FN’s programme in 
favour of an office-seeking strategy, Le Pen refused any dissolution of FN core ideology and 
despised accommodation with the French party system (Hainsworth and Mitchell, 2000). In 
the face of a threat to his authority, Le Pen purged Mégret’s faction from the party ranks.  
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 The FN deputy was Jean Marie Le Chevalier, elected in the Var constituency, who resigned in February 
1998 because of financial irregularities 
22
 The FN elected 275 regional councillors and the UDF only 264, whist the RPR secured 285 (Schain, 
2002, p.239). 
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Mégret went on to create a new ERP in 1999 – the Mouvement National Républicain (MNR) 
(Adler, 2001). While the FN’s main electoral strength between 1988 and 1998 had been its 
high levels of party loyalty, this asset was deeply disturbed by the internal split and support 
dropped at the 1999 EP elections (Table 4.3). This event raised doubts about the FN’s short-
term future, later dismissed following Le Pen’s success at the 2002 presidential election.  
4.3.3 – The extreme-right in Italy from the 1970s 
4.3.3.1 – From MSI to AN 
In the Italian post-war context, only the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI) recognised itself 
as right wing because this label carried a deep pariah status associated with the Fascist regime 
of Benito Mussolini (Fella and Ruzza, 2009). The MSI was founded in 1946 by survivors of 
Mussolini’s regime who sought to preserve their political tradition (Newell, 2000). The 
party’s ideology encompassed strong hostility to liberal democracy and democratic 
institutions, while its economic corporatism favoured the establishment of a strong state 
(Kitschelt, 1995). Racism lacked prominence in the party ideology and the MSI’s overt 
attachment to the Fascist legacy made it a perfect example of a neo-fascist ERP type (Carter, 
2005). From the 1950s to the 1960s, the MSI sought to be accepted as a legitimate political 
party, but this “insertionist” strategy failed at the electoral level due to the weight of anti-
Fascism in post-war Italian politics (Table 4.4; Newell, 2000).  
During the 1970s, the MSI leader Georgio Almirante attempted to undermine the DC 
hegemony in the party system and committed the MSI to street activism to oppose left 
mobilisations (Chiarini, 1995). This strategy led to the MSI’s peak in electoral support at the 
1972 general election (Table 4.4). The MSI vote was mainly in southern regions (Ignazi, 
1992). However, the increasing political violence of the 1970s and the MSI’s association with 
it led to its isolation within the party system (Ignazi, 1992). Electoral decline evident at 1976 
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Table 4.4 – Votes for the MSI/ AN in Italian general and EP elections from 1948 to 1999 
Year Elections  Proportion of the total 
1948 general 2.0% 
1953 general 5.8% 
1958 general 4.8% 
1963 general 5.1% 
1968 general 4.5% 
1972 general 8.7% 
1976 general 6.1% 
1979 general 5.3% 
1979 EP 5.4% 
1983 general 6.8% 
1984 EP 6.5% 
1987 general 5.9% 
1989 EP 5.5% 
1992 general 5.4% 
1994 EP 13.5% 
1994 general 12.5% 
1996 general 15.7% 
1999 EP 10.3% 
Source: Ministero Dell’Interno, 2010. 
general elections (Table 4.4) led to Almirante’s moderation of his political strategy through 
detachment from political violence and the acceptance of the MSI’s pariah status without 
revising its core ideology (Morini, 2007). Stronger criticism of Italian “partitocrazia” was 
another reflection of Almirante’s new strategy and the MSI obtained its second best electoral 
result ever at the 1983 general election (Kitschelt, 1995; Table 4.4).  
Nevertheless, electoral decline persisted throughout the 1980s and Gianfranco Fini succeeded 
Almirante in 1987. Fini initially pursued a strategy of continuity with the MSI’s neo-fascist 
legacy, but his leadership was briefly interrupted in favour of Pino Rauti (1990-1991) after 
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poor results at the 1989 European elections (Veugelers and Chiarini, 2002). Rauti proposed a 
“third way” and professed an anti-racist discourse but also proved unable to reverse the 
MSI’s electoral decline (Chiarini, 1995). In 1991, Fini was reinstated as party leader and 
continued to express his allegiance to the party’s Fascist heritage. At this point in time, the 
MSI’s structure of political opportunities was enhanced by three factors:  
(i) the end of the Cold War downgraded the importance of ideology in political 
debate and dissolved the pariah status associated with the label right-wing (Ignazi, 
2007);  
(ii) the ‘Tangentopoli’ scandal in 1992 exposed high levels of corruption within both 
the DC and the Italian Socialist Party. The accusations favoured  minor parties 
such as the MSI, which had been isolated by mainstream parties and were not 
involved in the system of bribes and favours (Spruce, 2007) and ;  
(iii) the electoral law reform in 1993 pushed Italy towards a majoritarian system and 
incentivised coalition building, which fostered the MSI’s coalition power due to 
its electoral entrenchment in southern regions (Morini, 2007).  
Fini reacted to these new opportunities by developing a more moderate and democratic 
image. This new strategy paid off at the 1993 local elections, where the MSI won the local 
ballot in Rome and Naples with the support of Berlusconi (Chiarini, 1995). The MSI electoral 
breakthrough was further consolidated by the emergence of Berlusconi’s right-wing coalition 
and its victory at 1994 general elections (Table 4.4). At the MSI’s January 1995 party 
congress, Fini converted the MSI into the AN whilst Rauti’s faction abandoned the party to 
form another ERP (MSI– Fiamma Tricolore). Fini employed this event to re-state the AN’s 
moderate image and to abandon extreme-right positions (Ignazi, 2007). At the ideological 
level, the AN leader now praised the values of free market and individual entrepreneurism 
and dropped the MSI’s past attachment to corporatism and a “third way” (Chiarini, 1995).  
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Xenophobia was never central to the MSI’s ideology, but opposition to immigration had been 
opportunistically employed in 1986 and 1990 (Geddes, 2008). Without dropping its strong 
authoritarianism, the AN simply referred to Italian immigration policy as being outdated and 
ineffective. The 1995 party programme condemned both racism and anti–Semitism 
(Veugelers and Chiarini, 2002). In a visit to Israel in 2003, Fini condemned Fascism as 
“absolute evil” leading to the exit of the dictator’s granddaughter Alessandra Mussolini from 
the party (Morini, 2007). Despite the absence of a clear ideological reform, the AN 
effectively ended its neo-Fascist legacy and dropped its anti-system properties for a moderate 
centre-right programme, thereby moving from the ERP family into the mainstream right 
(Mudde, 2007; Ignazi, 2007; 2009). Nonetheless, the LN would soon fill the vacant space at 
the extreme-right edge, as seen below.  
4.3.3.2 – The rise of the LN  
The LN was founded in 1991 under the leadership of Umberto Bossi, a charismatic leader 
who proved to have astute political instincts (Jori, 2009). This new party consisted of an 
aggregation of older northern regionalist leagues, such as the Lega Lombarda and Lega 
Veneta (Farrell and Levy, 1996). Its ideology evolved mostly along Italian north-south 
cleavage enshrined in the party slogan of “Roma ladrona” (thieving Rome, Cedroni, 2007). 
Italy’s division into three self-governing regional structures was initially proposed by the LN 
to liberate northern regions from Rome’s “partitocrazia” and centralised government, which 
undermined northerners’ prosperity (Diamanti, 1997). In economic terms, the LN proposed a 
neo-liberal programme inspired by Thatcherism with large-scale privatisation, the end of 
excessive state bureaucracy and fiscal reform to assist northern small businesses and workers 
(Gilbert, 1993). Racism against southern Italian co-citizens was recurrent in the LN’s 
discourse but the party was not publicly associated to the label of right wing unlike the MSI 
(Kitschelt, 1995).  
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The LN’s electoral breakthrough into mainstream politics was observed after its electoral 
success at the 1992 general elections (Table 4.5) and its victory at Milan’s local elections in 
1993. This electoral success developed at the expense of the DC vote in northern regions and 
reflected Bossi’s successful channelling of regional economic and political resentments 
against the established political system (Diamanti, 1996). The electoral breakthrough also 
benefited from the expansion of its structure of political opportunities, due to the three 
aforementioned factors: i) the end of Cold War; ii) tangentopoli and; iii) electoral reform. 
Nevertheless, the LN was unable to increase its vote at the 1994 general election (Table 4.5) 
because of the rise of another neo-liberal party also opposed to the Italian “partitocrazia” –
Forza Italia (FI) (Giordano, 2003). Following a pre-electoral agreement designed to 
minimise losses, the LN participated in Berlusconi’s first coalition government. Nonetheless, 
Bossi walked out of Berlusconi’s coalition a few months later to reassert his party’s 
antagonism towards both the political system and to assert his own political identity 
(Diamanti, 2007).  
Table 4.5 – Votes for the LN in Italian general and EP elections between 1992 and 1999 
Year Elections  Number of votes Proportion of total Seats 
1992 general  3,395,384 8.65% 55 
1994 EP 2,159,421 6.6% 6 
1994 general 3,235,248 8.4% 11 
1996 general 3,776,354 10.1% 20 
1999 EP  1,389,501 4.5% 4 
Source: Ministero Dell’Interno, 2010 
4.3.3.2.1 – “Padania’s” independence 
In 1995, the LN offered its support to the technocratic government of Lamberto Dini 
(appointed by President Oscar Scalfaro) and developed a series of secessionist events such as 
the formation of a “Parliament of the North” in Mantova (Diamanti, 1996). Continuous 
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radicalisation was observed in the run-up to the 1996 general election, when the LN dropped 
federalism for the independence of northern regions and the formation of a new nation to be 
named – Padania (Cedroni, 2007). This shift has been interpreted in multiple ways, yet two 
lines of reasoning prevail: Bossi was seeking to distinguish the LN from centre-right allies, 
and to expand the LN’s electoral support beyond its traditional constituencies (Ignazi, 2007). 
By doing this, Bossi successfully turned the 1996 general election into a referendum on 
northern autonomy and obtained the LN’s best electoral results ever (Table 4.5), becoming 
the fourth biggest party and the leading party in the northern regions (Jori, 2009).  
Claims for Padanian independence were followed by the adoption of a harder xenophobic 
stance towards non-nationals. The creation of a Padania myth by Bossi’s party was followed 
by a rejection of ‘otherness’ within the northern regions (Spruce, 2007). In 1998, a party 
pamphlet stated LN opposition to multiculturalism under the slogan of “saving the specificity 
of our people” that indicated a growing cultural xenophobia (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001, p. 
128–9). Prioritisation of access to social services by “Padanian” citizens also suggested 
growing welfare chauvinism within the party (Huysseune, 2003). Nonetheless, LN 
radicalisation failed to reverse the electoral decline evident since 1996 (Table 4.5), 
underpinned by the loss of Milan’s council in 1997 (Cedroni, 2007).  
4.3.3.2.2 – From independence to devolution  
The independence project left the LN increasingly isolated and dissipated Bossi’s influence 
within the Italian party system (Biorcio, 2002). At the March 1998 party congress, Bossi 
announced his new desire to adopt a consensual approach and proposed devolution for the 
first time in place of secession (Jori, 2009). Inspired by Tony Blair’s devolution project in the 
UK, Bossi sought to emulate a Scottish model and devolve part of the central powers 
concentrated in Rome to Northern and Southern Parliaments (Biorcio, 2002). Meanwhile, the 
party rank and file rallied against the centre-left Turco-Napolitano immigration law whilst 
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Joerg Haider
23
 participated in Bossi’s rally. Just before the 1999 EP election, Bossi also 
established relations with Slobodan Milosevic to constitute an anti-USA and anti-
globalisation front (Signore and Trocino, 2008). As the separatist claim was downgraded, 
ideological traits characteristic of ERPs were simultaneously reinforced (Fella and Ruzza, 
2009).  
Disastrous results at the 1999 EP election, where the LN share of vote dropped from 6.6 per 
cent in 1996 to 4.5 per cent in 1999, buried the Padanian independence project and the 
isolationist strategy (Table 4.5; Parenzo and Romano, 2008). In consequence, Bossi presented 
his resignation and recognised that political identity had a greater effect on electoral 
mobilisation than ethnic identity (Jori, 2009, p. 113). After being reinstated, Bossi adopted an 
overt office-seeking strategy while Berlusconi expressed his availability to cooperate in an 
agreement. This provided a vital lifeline to Bossi and expanded the LN’s structure of political 
opportunities (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). A deal was celebrated two months later, 
providing Bossi with stand-down agreements in northern constituencies and support for the 
LN’s depleted finances (Jori, 2009). Past associations of Berlusconi with the Sicilian mafia in 
Bossi’s speeches were buried in consequence of the electoral agreement. In the meantime, 
internal conflicts hit the LN in the late 1990s, after the departure of Bossi’s critic Domenico 
Comino (President of Piedmont region, who went on to form a new party in 1999; Giordano, 
2003).  
4.3.3.2.3 – Bossi ideological U–turn 
Under Berlusconi’s mediation, another deal was brokered in January 2000 between Bossi and 
the other Casa delle Libertà (CDL) coalition party leaders – Fini for the AN, and Casini for 
the Cristiani Democratici Uniti (CDU) (Passalacqua, 2009). Bossi’s office-seeking strategy 
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 The leader of the Austrian ERP Freedom Party. 
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presupposed the abandonment of the past adversarial posture to appease his coalition partners 
(Chari et al., 2004). Consequently, independence claims were dropped following Fini’s 
demand and the LN parliamentary group erased references to independence, changing their 
name to Lega Nord Padania (Passalacqua, 2009). Past support for EU integration turned into 
visceral opposition aligned with Berlusconi’s scepticism on Europe, as Bossi described 
Europe as a “technocracy of paedophiles” whilst Berlusconi praised Bossi’s “political 
instincts, courage and coherence” (Signore and Trocino, 2008, p.87). To appease Christian 
Democrats and the Vatican, the new LN included the defence of Italian families against 
marriage and adoption rights for homosexuals (Passalacqua, 2009).  
Whereas xenophobia towards southern Italians disappeared from the LN discourse after the 
new electoral agreement, the LN’s exclusionary politics focused on immigration and Islam 
(Fella and Ruzza, 2009). The “choice of immigration was ideological” according to Bossi, as 
the failure to control immigration by the left-wing parties covertly sought to “simplify the 
society” according to the dichotomy of “big business against the people” (Bossi, 2000, p. 6). 
In this way, this social phenomenon was framed by Bossi as a plot by left-wing elites 
(Huysseune, 2006). Consequently, the LN accepted immigration for labour purposes only as 
this social phenomenon was associated to the expansion of deprived and marginalised 
communities in the North (Bossi, 2000, p. 7). Identity concerns were raised in Bossi’s 
rhetoric (2000) but other members of the LN leadership were more vocal in campaigning 
against Islam. In October 2000, Roberto Calderoli organised a rally against the construction 
of a mosque in Lodi (north of Milan) involving the spreading of pig excrement on the 
proposed site (Parenzo and Romano, 2008). 
Xenophobia, devolution, family and opposition to European integration became Bossi’s 
platforms to distinguish the LN from centre-right competitors (Fella and Ruzza, 2009). 
Electoral results for the new coalition were positive at the 2000 regional elections, as the CdL 
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triumphed with the LN support, whose electoral share rose to 4.9 per cent. The LN was also 
rewarded with the leadership of the Veneto region (Signore and Trocino, 2008). A new 
agreement between Bossi and Berlusconi for the 2001 general election secured FI’s 
commitment to devolution and tackling irregular immigration in return for reassurances of 
LN support of the future CdL government (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005).  
4.3.3.2.4 – Classification of the LN as an ERP 
There has been significant debate over the classification of the LN, conceiving it either as an 
ethno-regional party (Messina, 2007) or as an opportunistic entrepreneur (Perlmutter, 1996; 
Diamanti, 1997). Nevertheless, the first categorisation implies acceptance of the “Padanian” 
myth constructed by the LN that is widely disputed (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). The 
second classification envisages the LN as a political agent that opportunistically exploits the 
political sentiments of northern regions and its subculture (Diamanti, 1996). Despite 
undeniable links to particular Italian subcultures, this classification implies that the LN would 
drop its federalist project for electoral purposes (Cento Bull and Gilbert, 2001). However, this 
project has been at the centre of LN’s ideology ever since its formation.  
Increasing opposition to immigration and growing cultural racism had been observed through 
the LN’s construction of the “Padanian” independence project since the mid-1990s (Betz, 
2002; Ignazi, 2007). These ideological properties of ERPs became cornerstones of the LN 
ideology after Bossi’s dropping of Padania’s independence project in favour of an office-
seeking strategy. In terms of economic policy, the LN continued to uphold a Thatcherite neo-
liberal programme up to 2001 but later shifted towards anti-globalisation and an anti-EU 
stance. The latter combination of ideological traits prompts the classification of LN as a 
xenophobic neo-liberal ERP from the late-1990s onwards (Carter, 2005). After the 
exhaustion of the secessionist project, the LN ended up filling the vacant space on the 
extreme-right edge vacated by the MSI/AN (Andall, 2007). 
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4.4 – Immigration in the UK, France and Italy  
This section explores the British, French and Italian national immigration paradigms and 
experiences to highlight the cases’ idiosyncrasies before assessing ERP impact on the distinct 
dimensions of immigration politics and policy. The point is not to reduce complex 
contemporary processes to legacies of the past (Solomos, 2003), but to contextualise the 
evolution of immigration to understand policy developments after 2001. Thus, a brief survey 
of structural characteristics of immigration and the development of immigration policy in 
each case is provided to understand continuities and discontinuities. The analysis is divided 
into two subsections: i) examination of their distinct national paradigms, and ii) illustration of 
the different immigration structure and policies.  
4.4.1 – UK: “zero-immigration” country? 
4.4.1.1 – “Race relations” paradigm   
In contrast to other European countries, immigration into the UK has been framed according 
to a “race relations” paradigm linking control and integration. Social Darwinism and eugenics 
were core premises of the ideology of “racial superiority” that supported the British Empire 
during the Victorian period (Saggar, 1992). In the late nineteen century, British imperialists 
were already concerned with the undesirability of immigration flows by presumed inferior 
races and the subsequent degeneration of the British working class (Solomos, 2003). 
Apprehension with the inflow of eastern European Jews persecuted in Tsarist Russia 
presaged the promulgation of the 1905 Alien Act. This legislation placed an end to the free-
movement of labour that characterised the UK throughout the nineteen-century (Holmes, 
1988).  
Migration inflows into Britain in the post-Second World War period from new and 
independent Commonwealth countries occurred in the context of a post-imperial downsizing. 
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Racial thinking re-emerged towards “coloured” immigrants in the context of: i) a deeper 
national crisis in the post-war period; ii) economic downturn and; iii) diversification of 
immigration flows into UK (Geddes, 2008). Nonetheless, racial categorisation of immigrants 
in the post-war period was performed using a covert discourse – Commonwealth immigrants 
were regarded as problematic (Solomos, 2003). By the 1960s, an inter-party consensus 
between Labour and Conservatives was established over the necessity for racialised 
immigration controls to maintain good “race relations”. Consequently, immigration controls 
became linked to integration policy (Saggar, 1992). Despite the total discrediting of any 
scientific application of the term “race”, debate over immigration management in the UK still 
encompasses considerations of consequences for “race relations”. This national approach to 
immigration was subsequently institutionalised by the Race Relations Acts of 1965, 1968, 
1976 and 2001 that forbade both direct and indirect discrimination against immigrants, as 
well as the incitement of racial hatred (Favell, 2001).  
4.4.1.2 – Immigration into UK in the post–war period  
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the British government encouraged European 
migrants to fill domestic labour market shortages. Nonetheless, most immigration flows in 
the post-war period stemmed from the 1948 British Nationality Act, which distinguished 
between British subjects and Commonwealth citizens but recognised free movement into 
Britain to all Commonwealth citizens and from Eire (Holmes, 1988). This conception of 
British citizenship reflected Britain’s imperial legacy and supported the development of 
substantial immigration from Eire and other former colonial countries from south Asia and 
the Caribbean (Hansen, 2000). However, the latter inflows were “undesired” by political 
elites and political debate subsequently evolved over possible forms to block entry by 
“coloured” migrants (Miles, 1990). The settlement of “undesirable”-“coloured” immigrants 
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became increasingly associated with social problems and politicised especially after the urban 
riots in Notting Hill, London, and Nottingham in 1958 (Saggar, 1992).  
Four years later, the Conservative government established a New Commonwealth Immigrants 
Act because the UK was becoming an overcrowded island (Geddes, 2003). The covert aim of 
this legislation was to curb further inflows of “coloured” immigrants. This was subsequently 
attacked by the Labour opposition as a betrayal of the Commonwealth. The introduction of 
the 1962 bill (Table 4.6) has been interpreted in the immigration literature either as a 
reflection of the racism entrenched at the elite level (Paul, 1997) or because of a breakdown 
in the Commonwealth imperial consensus and a responsible reaction to public hostility 
towards “coloured” immigration (Freeman, 1994; Hansen, 2000). Nevertheless, the evidence 
of strong levels of public hostility towards immigrants during the 1950s is disputed by 
research conducted by Miles (1990).  Overall, it has been accepted that restrictions on 
immigration suggested that political priorities prevailed over economic considerations 
(Messina, 2007),  
The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act effectively curbed primary immigration but the 
restrictions led to the transformation of previous temporary migration into permanent 
settlement (Messina, 2007). At the 1964 general elections, former Labour Foreign Secretary 
Patrick Gordon Walker lost the election in Smethwick, Birmingham, to a Conservative 
candidate, who used a racist campaign slogan: “if you want a nigger for a neighbour vote 
Liberal or Labour” (Hansen, 2000, p.122). Despite Labour’s victory in the general election, 
concerns arose over the party’s vulnerability if it was seen as “soft” on migration controls 
(Geddes, 2003). Instead of challenging racist discourse, Labour formed a bi-partisan 
consensus with the Conservatives based on the necessity to halt further immigration to 
allegedly promote immigrant integration. This argument’s fallacy was the overwhelming 
focus on “coloured” immigrants, which led to discrimination at points of entry
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Table 4.6 – British legislation on immigration policy between 1945 and 1999. 
Legislation Main modifications 
1948  
British 
Nationality Act 
Distinguished between British subjects who were citizens of the UK and 
its colonies from Commonwealth citizens. Recognised the right to free 
movement into British territory to all subjects of the Commonwealth 
countries. 
1962 
Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 
Distinguished between citizens of the UK and its colonies from citizens 
of Commonwealth countries, who were therefore subjected to 
immigration controls. Labour vouchers were introduced to control 
primary flows from the Commonwealth countries. 
1968 
Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act 
Introduced the concept of patriality, which specified that the free right to 
enter UK was only recognised to those citizens who had at least one 
parent or grandparent born or naturalised as British citizen. 
1971  
British 
Nationality Act 
Replaced all previous legislation. Maintained the concept of patriality. 
Converted labour vouchers into temporary work permissions. Exempted 
citizens of EC member-states from immigration controls. 
1981  
British 
Nationality Act 
Privileged the principle of ius solis and distinguished between: full 
British citizenship, British dependent territories, British Overseas 
Citizenship. The right of free movement into UK was refused to this 
latter category. 
1988 
Immigration Act 
Absolute right to family reunification by migrants who had settled in the 
country before 1973 was repealed, access to this right was made 
dependent on accommodation and financial support. Overstaying was 
made a criminal offense.  
1993  
Asylum and 
Immigration Act 
Incorporated obligations under the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees 
into UK law and introduced a right of appeal for rejected asylum seekers 
with strict time limits. All asylum seekers and dependents were to be 
fingerprinted. The Home Office was empowered to detain asylum 
seekers while their claim was being considered. 
1996  
Asylum and 
Immigration Act 
Removed welfare benefits to in-country asylum applicants. Introduced a 
“white-list” of safe countries. Asylum seekers who present their case in 
other safe countries would be returned to those nations. 
1999 
 Asylum and 
Immigration Act 
Introduced a work permit scheme to manage labour flows. Created the 
IND to support and disperse destitute asylum seekers. Removed the 
remaining welfare benefits from all asylum applicants. 
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 (Layton-Henry, 2004). Labour’s appeasement strategy was translated into the acceptance of 
a “racialised” framework for immigration controls elaborated between 1962 and 1971 
(Saggar, 1992; Favell, 2001).  
Labour bowed to the Conservative campaign instead of trying to lead the political debate on 
immigration. This strategy was interpreted as an attempt to de-politicise immigration through 
the establishment of an inter-party consensus, but its merits were doubtful (Katznelson, 
1973). Against past criticism, the Labour government led by Harold Wilson introduced the 
second Commonwealth Immigrants Act in 1968, when he was pressed both by the movement 
to the UK of British Asians from East Africa and by Powell’s public speeches (Boswell, 
2003). The 1968 legislation was designed to subject “coloured” immigrants who still had 
British passports to immigration controls (Table 4.6). Restrictions to primary and secondary 
immigration were extended by the 1971 Immigration Act under a new Conservative 
government, whilst nationals from European Community (EC) member states were exempted 
from migration controls (Table 4.6). Despite the successful restriction of inflows, the 
politicisation of immigration and race continued to develop through the 1970s (Crowley, 
1993).  
Following Thatcher’s election in 1979, tighter controls were imposed on primary and 
secondary flows from the Commonwealth. The conception of British citizenship was 
tightened by the British Nationality Act of 1981 that deprived British citizens, mostly of 
Asian origin, of their right to live in Britain (Table 4.6). Restrictions on immigration flows 
were extended through a new immigration bill introduced in 1988 by the Conservative 
government (Table 4.6). Thatcher’s restrictive immigration policy was justified as a response 
to the rise of the NF in the 1970s, but the restrictive tendency towards Commonwealth 
immigration had been evident in the preceding decade. Immigration dropped from the 
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political agenda but this did lead to the overt association between the development of certain 
types of immigration with supposed damages on “race relations” (Crowley, 1993)  
Immigration re-emerged on the political agenda in the 1990s due to a substantial rise in 
asylum seeking from 1988 onwards, although this was still below the average across Western 
European countries (Messina, 2007). The Conservative government led by John Major 
restricted access both to refugee status and to social provisions in legislation in 1993 and 
1996 (Table 4.6). In the meantime, the Labour party shadow Home Secretary – Jack Straw –  
revealed that: “We should not allow so much as a cigarette card to come between the Labour 
Party and the Tory government on immigration” (cited from Saggar, 2001, p. 761). 
Therefore, Labour’s strategy was to refrain from challenging the Conservative positions on 
immigration. This political option was maintained in the following decade (see Chapters 5 
and 6). 
Following the Labour landslide at the 1997 elections, the government led by Tony Blair 
initially adopted a liberal approach to immigration policy by ending the primary purpose rule, 
which inhibited family reunion (Sales, 2007). Nevertheless, a White paper entitled “Fairer, 
Firmer Faster” issued in 1998 emphasised government efforts to control, enforce, and 
especially to deter “bogus” asylum seekers (Layton-Williams, 2004). Consequently, the 1999 
immigration law reformed the asylum system and established a voucher system and a 
dispersal programme for asylum seekers (Table 4.6). The voucher system was justified by the 
supposed widespread abuses of the British welfare system by asylum seekers, despite the lack 
of evidence to support this presupposition (Bloch, 2000). The dispersal scheme 
accommodated asylum seekers in areas with low housing costs, which ended up nationalising 
a local issue previously delimited to London, fuelling broader national opposition to asylum 
(Messina, 2007). 
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A new narrative of ‘managed migration’ became apparent in a speech by Home Office 
minister Barbara Roche made in 2000 (Balch, 2009). Subsequently, an ‘Innovators Scheme’ 
was introduced to permit entry of highly skilled immigrants (HSI) into the UK (Flynn, 2004). 
This policy shift was driven by the growth of demand for foreign labour within the British 
labour market, particularly due to bottlenecks in key areas such as health services, teaching 
and information technology (Layton-Williams, 2004).
24
 The Labour government’s emphasis 
on modernisation of public services through its second term, especially in regard to the 
National Health Service (NHS), only exacerbated the demand for skilled labour (Rawnsley, 
2010). Lastly, the UK alongside Ireland opted out of the Title IV of the Amsterdam Treaty in 
1999 covering free movement, immigration and asylum within the EU (Geddes, 2008). The 
British government preferred to maintain their system of external controls with dominance by 
the executive branch of government than to cede powers to the EU (Geddes, 2003). The next 
section examines the French national paradigm on immigration. 
4.4.2 – France: The oldest country of immigration  
4.4.2.1 – The republican paradigm 
Immigration to France developed steadily from the nineteen century onwards due to both 
economic and demographic pressures (Ogden, 1993). Since the French Revolution of 1789 
preceded large-scale migration into France, immigration was not part of the nation’s founding 
myth that is based on the supposed ethnic homogeneity of French citizens (Hargreaves, 
1995). The revolution proclaimed universal rights of groups in the name of freedom and 
Universalism. The French immigration paradigm arises from Jacobin principles of a “one and 
indivisible republic” and of equality (Cole, 1998). This approach inhibits the use of notions 
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 Computer services and health and medical services accounted for a majority of permits issued by the 
Innovators scheme – 20 per cent and 23 per cent respectively (Home Office, 2002, p. 40). 
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like ethnicity or “race” in political debate and underlies France’s opposition to 
multiculturalism (Favell, 2001). 
A relevant legacy of French colonialism was the prominence of assimilationism, derived 
from the concept of “mission civilicatrice” (civilising mission), which presupposed French 
cultural superiority over the “less civilized” peoples and a duty to spread civilisation (Haddad 
and Balz, 2006). Simultaneously, foreigners were welcomed as settlers and even as citizens, 
as long as they accepted French Republicanism and relegated their native cultures (Wadia, 
1999). Therefore, the French immigration paradigm combines both Universalist and 
assimilation principles, which distinguishes France from its European counterparts (Geddes, 
2003). In keeping with France’s republican heritage, immigration laws introduced in 1945 
recognised immigrants’ rights to settle and to family reunion independent of their labour 
status (Table 4.7; Wadia, 1999).  
4.4.2.2 – Immigration into France in the post-war period  
Immigration into France in the aftermath of the Second World War was supported by two 
pieces of legislation published in 1945: the Nationality Code of 19 October and the ordinance 
on immigration of 2 November (Table 4.7; Gastaut, 1999). In response to demographic and 
economic pressures, the Office National de l’Immigration (ONI) was established in 1945 (De 
Wenden, 2008). Concerns over the immigrants’ origins led the ONI to establish criteria for 
“assimilable” and desirable immigrants, which was later vetoed by the Council of State 
(Wadia, 1999). Throughout the 1960s, the French state granted a laissez-faire policy to the 
private sector to hire foreign workers according to labour market demand. These workers 
would obtain a regular status once they were already settled in the country (Ogden, 1993). 
The development of large-scale immigration was indispensable to the sustainment of the 
prosperous economic period named the “Trente Glorieuses” (1945–1974).  
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Table 4.7 – French legislation on immigration policy introduced between 1945 and 1998 
Legislation Main modifications 
1945 Code of 
Nationality 
Reinforced the principle of “ius solis”; granted French nationality to 
Algerians; recognised free movement of all French citizens 
1945 Ordinance on 
Permanence of 
Immigrants  
Right to settle in France was not dependent on employment status. 
Recognised right to family reunion. Ethnic quotas were rejected. 
1972 Circulars 
‘Marcellin’– 
‘Fontanet’ 
Subordinated recruitment of foreign workers to labour market 
incorporation. Residence permits became dependent of employment 
status; halt to further regularisation schemes. Nationals of EC 
member-states were exempted from immigration controls. 
1980 ‘Bonnet’ Law 
Restricted entry and residence status; irregular entry or stay by 
immigrants is subjected to expulsion. Immigrants whose permission 
was not renewed were subjected to deportation. 
Law n° 1981-973 
Established an exceptional regularisation process; maintained halt to 
labour immigration. Reasserted the legal status of immigrants 
settled in the country. Recognized right of residence to certain 
categories of immigrants independent of employment status.  Halted 
programme of forced removals. 
Law n°  1984–622 
Granted automatically renewable residence authorisations to certain 
categories of immigrants. Dissociated right of residence from 
employment status. 
1986 ‘Pasqua’ Law 
Extended restrictions to entry and settlement in France. 
Rehabilitates the forced removals programme of the ‘Bonnet’ Law. 
Restricted access to the residence authorisation introduced in 1984. 
1988 “Joxe” Law 
Restored judicial control over forced removals. Regularised 
irregular immigrants. Re-established conditions of access to 
residence permits of 1984. Extended anti-discrimination provisions. 
1993 “Pasqua” 
Second Law 
Harmonised legislation according to the Schengen Agreement and 
Dublin Convention. Extended restrictions to entry and settlement of 
immigrants. Imposed a one-year ban on family reunion. Removes 
right to appeal on asylum; introduced  the “double peine”. Extended 
powers granted to authorities to detain and deport foreigners. 
1996 “Debrét” Law 
Renewal of residence permit became dependent on proof that the 
candidate was not a threat to public order. Imposes a two-year ban 
on access of foreign spouses to residence authorisations. 
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1998 “Chevènement” 
Law 
Established an exceptional regularisation process. Maintained 
restrictions to labour migration, but exempted HSI from migration 
controls. Liberalised access to family reunion. Renewal of long-term 
residence authorisations becomes automatic. Introduces new 
categories for asylum seekers.  
 
After the 1970s oil shocks, immigration by nationals of countries outside the EC  became 
dependent on labour market incorporation and regularisation a posteriori was suppressed by 
the ordinances Fontanet-Marcellin introduced in 1972 (Table 4.7).
25
 Whereas the majority of 
immigrants were initially from Western European states during the 1950s, the proportion of 
European immigrants declined in favour of nationals from North African countries 
(Hargreaves, 1995). Following President Giscard D’Estaing’s election in 1974, the halt to all 
labour immigration and to processes of family reunification was established (Table 4.7; Le 
Moigne and Lebon, 2002). This decision actually encouraged permanent settlement of 
immigrants and created a considerable pool of irregular migrants – the “sans papiers”, who 
saw their chances to obtain regularisation of their status suddenly cut off by the French state 
(Geddes, 2003). Nevertheless, the halt to development of family reunion was overturned by 
the Council of State in 1978 as a violation of the constitutional right of an individual to 
conduct a normal family life (Schain, 1994). This event highlighted the role of French 
judicial power in the protection of immigrants from state abuses within the context of the 
French Republican paradigm (Hollifield, 1992).  
A new immigration law was devised in 1979 by the centre-right government with the goal of 
reducing the immigrant population by 200,000 per year, through a forced repatriation 
programme (Table 4.7; Gastaut, 2000). The Bonnet law faced considerable opposition from 
                                                 
25
 There had been previous attempts by the French state to control (through irregular administrative 
procedures) immigration from Algeria after its independence in 1962, who were considered less 
“assimilable” (Gastaut, 1999). 
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the left parties, trade unions and even from the RPR (Weil, 2001). The Socialist Party (PS) 
victory at the 1981 presidential and legislative elections was followed by a policy U-turn that 
led to the regularisation of 143,000 irregular migrants and reinstated the right to family 
reunification (Table 4.7). Nonetheless, the halt to further labour inflows persisted and the 
proportion of newcomers under family reunion purposes became paramount in comparison to 
the number of entries for work related motives (Schain, 1990). Lastly, in 1983, public 
demonstrations led by immigrant associations in favour of foreigners’ rights pushed the draft 
of the Law no. 84-622 by the Socialist government (Table 4.7; Weil, 2001).  
Whereas North-African immigrants had been regarded as workers until the end of the 1970s, 
they became increasingly defined as Muslims whose settlement endangered the French 
“culture” and Republicanism from the 1980s onwards (Gastaut, 2000). This trend reflected 
the social fractures caused by the Algerian war for independence that ended in 1962 
(Wieviorka, 1993; Favell, 2001). Mitterrand’s political strategy promoted the defence of 
immigrants’ rights to politicise immigration and to reinforce the FN’s ability to split the 
right’s electorate (Weil, 2001). The UDF-RPR victory at the 1986 legislative elections was 
followed by the approval of a new immigration law, with a clear restrictive character (Table 
4.7).
26
 The Interior Minister, Charles Pasqua also unsuccessfully attempted to restrict the 
access to French nationality because of a veto from the Council of State (Hollifield, 2004). 
The government U-turn was capitalised upon by the FN, which accused the centre-right 
coalition of bowing to the immigrant lobby (Marcus, 1995). The re-election of President 
Mitterrand in 1988 and the subsequent dissolution of the National Assembly brought the left 
back to government. Mitterrand’s opposition to the “Pasqua” law led to another revision of 
immigration policy by the new Socialist Interior Minister Pierre Joxe. This had a more liberal 
character (Table 4.7; De Wenden; 2002).  
                                                 
26
 The 1986 immigration law was named after Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. 
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Immigration policy continued to be at the forefront of French politics during the 1990s. The 
overwhelming UDF-RPR coalition victory at the 1993 legislative elections was followed by 
the reinstatement of Pasqua as Interior Minister. Pasqua declared that France no longer 
wanted to be an immigration country and proposed a “zero-immigration” policy in a context 
marked by the growth of asylum-seeking (Thränhardt, 1995). This new immigration policy 
included reform of the Nationality Code, restrictions to both the entrance and settlement of 
immigrants, and limitation of access to asylum (Table 4.7; Marcus, 1995). Pasqua’s approach 
to immigration policy was interpreted as an attack on the French Republican heritage and as 
evidencing a shift by the RPR towards stricter anti-immigration policy to penetrate the FN’s 
ranks and diminish its appeal (Kitschelt, 1995; Hollifield, 2004). 
The 1993 Pasqua law was vetoed by the Constitutional Court in August 1993 because it 
violated the Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizens and the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
Pasqua fought back and proposed a constitutional amendment approved in a special joint 
session of the National Assembly and Senate in November 1993 (Geddes, 2003). Chirac’s 
victory at the 1995 presidential elections was followed by the appointment of a new centre-
right government and the Interior Minister – Jean-Louis Debré – once more sought to extend 
restrictions on immigration (Table 4.7; Hollifield, 2004). However, Debrét’s proposal faced 
large-scale left-wing mobilisations as well as objections from the Constitutional Council. It 
was withdrawn after another political shift to the left in the spring of 1997 (De Wenden, 
2002).  
The new left-wing government led by Lionel Jospin announced a new centrist approach to 
immigration based on a renewed Republican consensus (Weil, 2005). This move was 
interpreted as a response to the FN’s electoral success in the 1997 election (Schain, 2002). 
Following this new approach, the Interior Minister Jean-Pierre Chevènement implemented a 
regularisation programme that legalised 90,000 of 150,000 regularisation requests presented 
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by “sans-papiers” in 1997. A new immigration law was promulgated in 1998 that maintained 
rather than repealed the legislation drafted by preceding centre-right executives (Table 4.7), 
Yet, the new immigration law still met strong hostility from centre-right parties and the ERP 
(Hollifield, 2004). It was in this context of intense politicisation that French immigration 
policy was developed during the 1990s. The FN was regarded as an main driving force 
behind the debate on immigration policy in France during the 1980s and 1990s (Schain, 
1994; Williams, 2006). The next chapters on France evaluate to what extent this assertion 
about FN impact was observed during the 2000s.  
4.4.3 – Italy: a new country of immigration 
4.4.3.1 – The absence of an immigration paradigm 
Italy was commonly regarded as an emigration country after 25 million Italians left the 
country during the 20
th
 century (Bonifazi; 2010). Significant flows of immigrants into Italy 
were observed from the 1970s onwards and the rate of new arrivals overtook levels of 
departures of Italian citizens from the 1980s onwards (Calavita, 2004). Immigration to Italy 
developed within a country that conceived itself merely as an emigration source and was 
marked by a deep north-south cleavage (Putnam, 1993), strong regional subcultures (Levy, 
1996), and the presence of a diversity of local and regional dialects that persist (Colombo and 
Sciortino, 2004). Consequently, immigration interacted with a domestic context different 
from the UK and France, which both had a stronger sense of nationhood (Vasta, 1995). 
Within this context, the Italian approach to immigration continues to lack an official 
paradigm. Discrimination against Italian citizens on the grounds of race or religion is 
forbidden by the Constitution, which also recognizes the right to asylum.
27
 Conceptions of 
ethnicity and race have been therefore excluded from Italian political debate, as in France.  
                                                 
27
 Article 2 and article 10 of Constitution of Italian Republic. 
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Italy possesses one of the lowest fertility rates amongst OECD countries and the second 
highest rate of life expectancy, which sometimes propels a strong association between the 
management of inflows and the “demographic deficit” (Calavita, 2004; OECD, 2011). In 
parallel, Italian political elites have shown some reluctance to accept the permanent character 
of immigration (Di Pascale, 2002). Due to this vacuum, Italy has been associated with a 
southern European exceptionalism, based on weak external controls coupled with high 
tolerance of irregular flows that make this country a supposed “safe haven” for immigrants 
(King et al., 2000; Calavita, 2004). In contrast, other authors acknowledge the relevance of 
recurrent regularisation programmes, but argue that Italian immigration policy now focuses 
on external controls and a ‘stop and contain vision” identical to the policies adopted by other 
European countries (Baldwin-Edwards, 1997; Sciortino, 1999).  
4.4.3.2 – Immigration into Italy 
From the post-war period until the mid-1980s, Italian immigration policy was closely 
associated with an emigration policy designed to protect its citizens living abroad (Einaudi, 
2007). Economic growth during the 1980s and subsequent demand for foreign labour coupled 
with the EC integration process led the Italian state to regulate non-communitarian 
immigration in 1982. The new legislation imposed a halt to regularisations a posteriori within 
Italian territory and included a small amnesty for 16,000 irregular foreign workers (Table 
4.8). Four years later, the Italian government launched the first large-scale amnesty for 
irregular migrants with the approval of Law 943/86 that regularised around 120,000 
immigrants by 1988 (Reynieri, 1999).  
The 1986 immigration law increased the bureaucratic character of available legal channels to 
manage labour inflows, unlike the flexible nature of the Italian economic structure (Table 
4.8). Italy is mostly dominated by small and medium-scale enterprises, whilst 28 per cent of 
its GDP is accounted for by the underground economic sector, wherein a considerable  
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Table 4.8 – Italian legislation on immigration policy between 1945 and 2000 
Legislation Main modifications 
Act 1961: 5 
Established and distinguished between residence and labour 
authorisations, but right to residence was subordinated to employment 
status. Employers required to notify local council when hiring 
immigrant workers.  
1982 Circular of the  
Ministry of Labour 
Halted further regularisation for workers from states outside the EC. 
Included a minor amnesty for those with irregular status.  
Law nº 943/1986 
Labour authorisations were granted to candidates after fulfilment of 
three conditions: 1) an Italian employer presented a request to hire a 
non-EC worker to the Italian authorities; 2) these authorities ensured 
that it was impossible to find an available native worker, and 3) 
prospective candidates had to be registered in waiting lists in their 
country of origin. Recognized right to family reunion and instituted 
the principle of equal treatment between nationals and foreign 
citizens. 
Law n. 39/1990 or 
“Martelli” Law 
Introduced visa policy to non-EU nationals from countries of “high-
immigration” risk. Established an annual quota system alongside a 
regularisation programme for irregular immigrants. Universalised 
access to the right of asylum. Reinforced border controls. Extended 
powers of state authorities to deport immigrants. 
1995 Dini’s Decree 
Extended powers to deport immigrants. Established a regularisation 
programme for irregular immigrants.  
1998 Turco–
Napolitano Law 
Introduced possibility of sponsored immigration and a long-term 
residence authorisation. Broadened access to the right of family 
reunion. Deployed another regularisation programme for irregular 
immigrants. 
 
proportion of immigrants are economically active (Calavita, 2004). The failure to manage 
labour inflows from origin countries according to the growing domestic demand for labour 
supported the maintenance of irregular inflows into the country (Caponio, 2007). Labour 
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immigrants entered into Italy with short-term tourist visas instead of labour authorisations 
and then overstayed after their term expired with an irregular status (Colombo and Sciortino, 
2004). 
Under popular mobilisations in favour of immigrant rights, the Minister of Interior Claudio 
Martelli introduced new legislation in 1990 designed to bring Italy closer to the Schengen 
Agreement requirements (Sciortino, 1999). Despite the objective to reduce the intensity of 
immigration, about 240,000 irregular immigrants were granted a legal status through the 
general amnesty included in the new bill (Table 4.8; Zincone, 1998). Immigration policy 
came under pressure after the 1991 Albanian crisis, propelled by the deepening economic and 
political chaos in the latter country (Geddes, 2003). Reactions to this crisis were brutal, as 
refugees were assembled in football stadiums, and then deported without due process (Vasta, 
1995). This event catapulted immigration to the forefront of the political agenda (Colombo 
and Sciortino, 2003). 
Ambiguities in Italian immigration policy persisted during the mandate of Prime Minister 
Dini, who sought both to appease LN requests for stricter border controls, as well as the 
Catholic Church and left wing parties’ pressures for a regularisation programme (Sciortino, 
1999). Dini’s decree granted the regularisation of more than 234,000 irregular immigrants, 
but was not converted into law due to lack of parliamentary approval (Reynieri, 1999; 
Geddes, 2003). The distinctive feature of the Italian foreign population consists of the 
heterogeneity of nationalities (King et al., 2000).  A new Albanian crisis erupted in 1997, but 
the centre-left coalition government provided short-term protection authorisations to refugees 
and externalised border controls into Albanian international waters (Einaudi, 2007).  
Immigration law was once again reformed by Prodi’s executive in 1998, under pressures 
from the EU for greater control of irregular flows, with the draft of the Turco-Napolitano law 
(Geddes, 2003). Recognising demand for foreign labour, this new legislation reformulated the 
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1990 quota system by introducing an annual decree establishing caps on the concession of 
labour visas and by introducing the sponsored labour visa (Table 4.8).
 28
 Opposition to the 
new bill came from the LN that demanded a national referendum on the legislation, refused 
by the Constitutional Court due to Italy’s obligations towards the EU. An overall cap of 
60,000 entry authorisations was set in 1998 and 1999, which was beneath the levels of 
domestic demand for foreign labour (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004). By contrast, legislation 
proved efficient in tackling irregular inflows as illustrated by the substantial rise of 
expulsions (Barbagli, 2008). 
4.5 – Conclusions 
All the three cases are consolidated liberal democracies, EU member-states, possess 
significant ERPs, experienced large-scale immigration, and their electoral systems encourage 
bipolar inter-party competition. These common properties justify the selection of a most 
similar systems research design for attaining the purposes of this study. In parallel, these 
countries also share a certain degree of variation across the shared characteristics that 
enhance the scope of the analysis. The salient variations were identified as their distinct 
electoral systems, divergent levels of ERP electoral support, different types of government 
formation and variable positioning on the left-right spectrum, and their uneven history of 
immigration. The three subsequent sections explored the variations in the UK, French and 
Italian electoral systems, the development of the most prominent members of the ERP family, 
and these countries’ national paradigms on immigration and their uneven experiences.   
It was seen that electoral systems shape competition between political parties, the party 
system and government formation. Salient variations between the electoral systems influence 
the threats posed by ERPs. It was shown that the Westminster model inhibits multiparty 
                                                 
28
 This entry permit was valid for one year and allowed immigrants to enter in Italy without a valid work 
contract if a regular citizen ensured housing and cover of medical assistance. 
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competition while the first-past-the-post component restrains breakthroughs by minor parties, 
such as the NF or the BNP, at first-order-ballots. The French dual-ballot system encourages a 
moderate pluralist party system and coalition building. Nonetheless, the FN has been 
excluded by mainstream parties from national coalitions because of its deep pariah status and 
Le Pen’s adversarial stance. The Italian electoral system was reformed in the 1990s to reduce 
party system “polarised pluralism” without much success. In fact, the plurality tier enhanced 
the LN’s electoral entrenchment in northern regions and its profile in the Italian party system. 
The chapter then accessed the development of the most prominent members of the ERP 
family in the three case studies and variations across their ideological classifications. It is 
misleading to presuppose that the ERP ideologies are equal or that they have been static since 
their formation. The BNP was a neo-Nazi party type whilst the FN was initially classified as 
a neo-liberal ERP but later shifted to the authoritarian xenophobic type. The LN was not 
initially conceived as a member of the ERP family during the 1990s, but its continuous 
radicalisation under Bossi’s leadership, especially from the late 1990s onwards, pushed this 
party to become a neo-liberal xenophobic ERP type. There is also a strong degree of variation 
across the selected ERPs’ electoral fortunes: the BNP has a very poor electoral performance 
during the 1990s; while the FN was almost the third strongest party across the French party 
system during such period, although it remained isolated. The LN enjoyed a breakthrough 
into Italian mainstream politics in 1993 and participated in Berlusconi’s first government. 
However, the LN entered the 2000s facing electoral decline after the exhaustion of its 
secessionist project. 
Finally, the chapter examined the UK, France and Italy’s distinct national paradigms of 
immigration and their uneven experiences. The British paradigm involves racial 
categorisation of immigrants and considerations of inflows’ impact on “race relations”. 
France’s Republican legacy forbids any form of ethnic categorisation, whilst Italy lacks an 
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official paradigm because of being a new country of immigration and in consequence of the 
reluctance of Italian political elites to accept such fact. The UK was the first country to block 
labour immigration from non-EU countries during the 1960s. A similar action followed in 
France by the mid-1970s. Italy started to regulate immigration flows during the 1980s but has 
faced difficulties managing the development of regular labour inflows according to its 
domestic demand for foreign labour. By the 1990s, immigration was a highly politicised 
across the three case studies. Asylum inflows were most prominent in the British political 
agenda, whilst family reunion processes were more salient across France and irregular 
inflows dominated the Italian political debate.  
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Chapter 5 – The BNP impact on British immigration policy from 2001 to 2005 
“...Traditional tolerance is under threat. It is under threat from those who come and 
live here illegally by breaking our rules and abusing our hospitality. And, unless we 
act to tackle abuses, it could be increasingly exploited by extremists to promote their 
perverted view of race.” 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, 2005 
 
This chapter examines the BNP’s impact on immigration politics and policy in the UK 
between 2001 and 2005. During the first half of the 2000s, the BNP overturned the British 
ERP legacy of electoral failures by performing and consolidating an electoral breakthrough at 
local level. This chapter analyses the BNP’s impact on the three selected dimensions of 
immigration politics and policy: inter-party competition, public behaviour, and policy 
developments. The research will show that the BNP lacked relevant impact on these three 
dimensions and benefited from events that were in large part an outcome of the agency of 
mainstream parties.  
The first overall section of the present chapter focuses on the British 2001 general election 
and explores two main points: i) the BNP’s impact on mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration; and ii) the BNP’s contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration. As this 
thesis indicates, immigration was moderately salient during the 2001 electoral campaign, 
especially amongst the BNP and the Conservatives. However, the BNP lacked impact on 
inter-party competition on immigration at this first-order-ballot. The research on the 2001 
general election suggests that the British electorate did not consider immigration (in 
particular asylum) to be a salient issue, but significant levels of hostility to immigration were 
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still observed. This thesis will suggest that the BNP’s contagion effects on public attitudes to 
immigration were also non-significant in 2001.  
This chapter’s second overall section examines the BNP’s development within the British 
party system between 2001 and 2005 and its discourse on immigration. The British ERP’s 
electoral breakthrough at local level in 2002 was successfully consolidated throughout the 
following years but the BNP still failed to break into mainstream politics in 2004. A 
modernisation programme promoted by Griffin sought to shift the BNP’s ideology from a 
Neo-Nazi into an authoritarian xenophobic ERP type but this process was incomplete by 
2005. The third and final section evaluates the BNP’s impact on immigration policy during 
Blair’s second term. This thesis will show that the Labour government adopted a two-
pronged approach to immigration policy characterised by a laissez-faire approach towards 
HSI and intra-EU inflows coupled with a stringent policy on asylum. Against allegations 
found in immigration studies, this thesis will argue that the BNP lacked any impact on the 
development of immigration policy during Blair’s second term.  
5.1 – 2001 general election - Labour’s second landslide 
Labour’s second victory at the 2001 general election marked a new era in British politics 
after 18 years in opposition until the 1997 general election (Butler and Kavanagh, 2002). The 
election was widely perceived as a predetermined success as Labour enjoyed massive leads 
over the Conservatives from the outset (Bartle, 2003). Consequently, the electorate’s interest 
in the ballot was seriously diminished culminating in an historic low of 59 per cent turnout 
(Norris, 2001). The 2001 general election developed in a context of intensification of asylum 
seeking in the UK and increasing salience of this issue in the tabloid media. 
29
 
                                                 
29
 Research conducted for Reader’s Digest in 2000 found that The Mail reported more than 200 stories 
about asylum-seekers in ten months (Kushner, 2005, p. 258). 
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5.1.1 – BNP impact on inter-party competition  
Did the BNP reinforce the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration policy and the salience of this issue in their electoral manifestos? Immigration 
policy was moderately salient during the British 2001 electoral campaign, whilst asylum was 
the most dominant type of immigration flow in the political debate. Despite the observation 
of a mainstream inter-party consensus on curbing asylum, the research developed below 
contends that the BNP lacked any impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration 
policy. The absence of a significant electoral challenge posed by the BNP to mainstream 
parties was considered the most relevant factor behind its non-significant impact on inter-
party competition (Table 2.1).  
5.1.1.1 – BNP electoral campaign 
The 2001 general election marked the first national ballot contested by the BNP under 
Griffin’s leadership. The BNP presented candidates in 33 constituencies aiming to 
concentrate the party’s scarce resources30 and to prepare the ground for the 2002 local 
elections. Ethnic tensions in Oldham, a former industrial area riddled by economic 
deprivation, constituted an excellent opportunity for Griffin to apply his new modernisation 
strategy (Renton, 2003). Seizing the momentum, the BNP leader stood as candidate for the 
Oldham West constituency with a campaign focused on: “Equal rights for Oldham whites” 
(Copsey, 2007). This campaign highlighted crime rates of ethnic minorities against white 
citizens that were receiving wide coverage in the local media. Eruption of riots in Oldham in 
May 2001 involving the Asian youth community after weeks of provocative actions led by 
extreme-right groups such as the NF and C18 played into Griffin’s hands. “Outsourcing” 
                                                 
30
 Political parties contesting the 2001 general election were required to present 100 candidates to be 
eligible for a free national broadcast instead of the 50 candidates demanded in 1997 (Eatwell, 2004). After 
this change, the BNP did not have the incentive to match the number of candidates presented in 1997 nor 
the resources to present 100 candidates.  
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violence to the latter violent fringe groups reinforced the BNP image of relative moderation 
whilst the riots also strengthened its campaign of “rights for whites” (Eatwell, 2004). 
Demonstrating the BNP’s weakness, a very short electoral manifesto entitled “Where we 
stand” was issued just before the 2001 election (BNP, 2001). Immigration policy was highly 
salient in this document, which demanded the halt of further immigration and forced removal 
of all irregular immigrants (Figure 5.1; BNP, 2001). The forced repatriation programme of all 
ethnic minorities proposed by Tyndall was dropped in favour of a voluntary resettlement 
scheme based on cash incentives (BNP, 2001). Through this “historical switch”, Griffin 
sought to downgrade the BNP’s legacy of violence (Griffin, 2003a). Griffin had also 
recognised by May 2000 that the growing importance of asylum in the debate between 
mainstream parties benefited his party:  
“the asylum has been great for us. We have had phenomenal growth in membership. 
It’s been quite fun to watch government ministers and the Tories play the race card in 
far cruder terms than we would ever use, but pretend not to. This issue legitimises us” 
(Guardian, 2000).  
Effectively, the salience and terms of the political debate on asylum has been widely 
recognised as an important factor enhancing the BNP structure of political opportunities 
(Renton, 2005; Goodwin, 2007; Copsey, 2009). The next section examines the Conservative 
populist approach to asylum.  
5.1.1.2 – Conservatives’ “Britain is a soft touch on asylum” 
Conservative strategy under William Hague’s leadership (1997–2001) was based on a 
populist style encompassing extensive references to “common sense” and intense criticism of 
the “liberal elite” (Bale, 2010). Unable to detach the party from Thatcher’s unpopular legacy, 
Hague’s programme was a combination of neo-liberalism and authoritarian populism with an 
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emphasis on tax cuts, asylum, law and order (Bartle et al., 2002). The inability to attack the 
government’s record on public services and the economy exacerbated Hague’s emphasis on 
the latter issues (Clarke et al. 2002). This strategy was commonly interpreted as appealing to 
the party core voters but was also designed to tackle the influence of internal challengers such 
as Michael Portillo, known for his social liberalism (Collings and Seldon, 2001; Butler and 
Kavanagh, 2002). Hague’s populist style also sought to divide Labour’s voters with stronger 
authoritarian attitudes and scepticism on Europe (Bale, 2010). The continuous emphasis on 
immigration in the Conservative agenda could favour the BNP’s electoral expansion in the 
short-term.   
Under tabloid pressures to launch a campaign against ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, Hague 
delivered a speech at the Social Market Foundation in 2000 entitled: “Common sense on 
asylum” (Hague, 2000; Copsey, 2007). Britain’s long tradition of hospitality towards those 
fleeing persecution was under systematic abuse by the collapsing asylum system (Hague, 
2000). The Conservatives’ leader proposed the detention of all asylum seekers until a final 
decision of their claim revealing his highly repressive approach to asylum (Hague, 2000). At 
the 2000 local elections, the Labour government was accused of being a “soft touch” for the 
“organised asylum racketeers” who were “flooding” Britain with “bogus asylum seekers” 
(quoted from Messina, 2007, p. 115). This populist approach persisted at the Conservative 
2001 spring conference, when Hague accused the government of turning Britain into a 
“foreign land” and promised to clean up Labour’s “asylum mess” (Hague, 2001).  
Immigration policy exhibited considerable levels of salience in the Conservatives’ 2001 
electoral manifesto (Figure 5.1) and asylum was the paramount type of immigration flow 
mentioned (Conservatives, 2001). The campaign on immigration started derailing when a few 
candidates refused to sign a pledge against “playing the race card” promoted by the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), publicly supported by Hague (Saggar, 2001). Further 
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internal disarray erupted when a backbencher MP named John Townend overtly blamed 
immigration for undermining British society and fostering high crime rates (Bartle et al., 
2003). Given the party was already being accused of racism because of its authoritarian 
populism, Hague disowned the Conservative MP and removed asylum from his campaign. In 
the end, Conservative strategy backfired and the party was portrayed as a “nasty” party, 
deeply divided on the issue of immigration and asylum (Saggar, 2001; Bale, 2010). The 
eruption of the Oldham 2001 riots, as well as Conservatives’ divisions on immigration and 
Hague’s sudden retreat on asylum could have left the ground open for the BNP (Butler and 
Kavanagh, 2002).  
 
Figure 5.1 – Salience of immigration policy in British parties’ electoral manifestos at the 
2001 general election  
 
Source: BNP, 2001; Conservatives, 2001; Liberal Democrats, 2001; Labour, 2001 
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5.1.1.3 – Centre-left parties’ positions on immigration 
Immigration was practically absent from the Labour election campaign. The salience of this 
issue in the 2001 electoral manifesto was lower than in the Conservatives and the Liberal-
Democrats’ manifestos. Yet, asylum was also the most mentioned type of inflow in the 
document (Figure 5.1; Labour, 2001). The repressive approach to asylum contrasted with a 
liberal position towards highly qualified and secondary inflows (Labour, 2001). This strategy 
indicated that Blair opted to follow Straw’s metaphor31 rather than to challenge the 
Conservatives’ campaign on asylum despite Labour’s large leads in public polls (Benyon, 
2002). Finally, immigration policy was salient within the Liberal Democrats’ electoral 
manifesto with asylum also being the most prominent dimension (Figure 5.1; Liberal 
Democrats, 2001). At the national level, the Liberal Democrats adopted a more favourable 
position towards asylum than Labour by proposing an overall review of the asylum system, 
the reinstatement of refugees’ right to work, and the abolition of the voucher system (Liberal 
Democrats, 2001). Shortages of skilled workers in the economy were also mentioned 
demonstrating a convergence with Labour Party on intensifying HSI (Liberal Democrats, 
2001).  
In short, immigration policy was highly salient in the BNP electoral campaign across the 33 
contested constituencies whilst Hague led a populist campaign against ‘bogus’ asylum 
seekers since 2000. Two aspects of mainstream inter-party consensuses on immigration 
policy were evident at the 2001 general election: i) between the Conservatives and Labour on 
curbing asylum inflows; ii) between the British Labour and the Liberal Democrats on 
promoting HSI. Despite these observations, the BNP had no relevant impact on mainstream 
parties’ positions on immigration policy. This suggests that the politicisation of immigration 
                                                 
31
 In Jack Straw’s own words “We should not allow so much as a cigarette card to come between the 
Labour Party and the Tory government on immigration” (cited from Saggar, 2001, p. 761). 
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in the UK preceded any electoral breakthrough by the BNP and was the outcome of the 
Conservatives’ political strategy and their political agency in the absence of a salient ERP. As 
Griffin recognised, the BNP benefited from the salience of asylum on mainstream political 
debate. The BNP’s lack of impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy 
coincided with the negative behaviour of the four proposed hypotheses to understand the 
occurrence of this political process (Table 2.1).  
Levels of immigration into the UK decreased before the 2001 general election, mainly due to 
settlement for asylum purposes, whilst immigration was disregarded as a priority issue by the 
British electorate in 2001 (Figures 5.2; 5.3). By the 2001 general election, the BNP also 
posed a completely insignificant electoral threat to mainstream parties, illustrated by its poor 
performance in the 33 contested constituencies at the 2001 ballot (Table 4.2). Finally, 
mainstream parties’ ostracism of the BNP reinforced its pariah status and isolation at the 
fringes of the British party system. The BNP’s failure to pose a strategic dilemma to 
mainstream parties is the most relevant factor behind its lack of impact. The BNP’s electoral 
irrelevance at the 2001 election led mainstream parties to disregard this party as a possible 
challenger and precluded any sort of influence on mainstream proposals on immigration 
policy. The next section evaluates BNP impact on public attitudes to immigration.  
5.1.2 – BNP impact on public attitudes to immigration 
Did the BNP intensify levels of anxiety and hostility to immigration across the British 
electorate in 2001? Immigration was overlooked as a priority issue for the British electorate 
at the 2001 ballot despite the levels of hostility towards this social phenomenon. This 
research contends that the BNP had no impact on public attitudes to immigration and failed to 
intensify levels of anxiety and hostility. The BNP’s insignificant electoral support and 
subsequent incipient electoral organisation looked as the most important factor behind its lack 
impact on this dimension of immigration politics (Table 2.1). Consequently, the significant  
126 
 
Figure 5.2 – Grants of settlement by category of grant in the UK, excluding EEA and Swiss 
nationals between 2000 and 2009 
 
Source: Home Office, 2010 
 
Figure 5.3 – Most important issue at the British 2001 general election 
 
Source: BES, 2001 
0
50,000
100,000
150,000
200,000
250,000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Labour purposes Family reunion Asylum  total
21.7% 
14.0% 
9.9% 
7.0% 7.0% 7.0% 
6.0% 
2.0% 2.0% 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
National
health
service
Economy Education Other
social
services
Taxes EURO,
Europe
Crime Asylum
seekers
Transport
127 
 
levels of hostility to immigration across the British electorate preceded the BNP’s electoral 
breakthrough at local level in 2002.  
Asylum was ranked at the bottom of British voters’ priority issues alongside transport issues 
at the 2001 general election while the National Health Service and the economy were the top 
priorities (Figure 5.3). The few voters who ranked asylum as their top priority conceded a 47 
points advantage to the Conservatives over the Labour Party as the best party to deal with this 
issue (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 90). In contrast, only two respondents out of 3,219 in the BES 
2001 identified the BNP as the best party to deal with this issue (BES, 2001). This data 
confirms the Conservatives’ issue ownership of opposition to immigration and helps to 
understand Hague’s emphasis on this issue (Mudde, 2001). However, his strategy failed to 
resonate with voters’ priorities and doubts over its efficiency mounted as the massive lead on 
asylum was cut to a mere 15 points in the post-election survey (Clarke et al., 2004, p. 90). 
The Conservatives’ emphasis on asylum proved more effective in influencing public 
priorities in the long-term than in the short term (see Chapter 6).  
In terms of public attitudes to immigration policy, an IPSOS-MORI poll (2001) conducted in 
January 2001 revealed that a majority of respondents agreed that there were too many 
immigrants in the UK (Figure 5.4). Immigration was mostly perceived as a threat to 
employment (Figure 5.5) rather than associated with insecurity (Figure 5.6). Separate analysis 
of BNP supporters’ attitudes towards immigration is prevented by their insignificant 
representation within the BES
32
. The negative perception of immigration varied according to 
the different types of inflows with a clear majority of respondents supporting the immediate 
removal of asylum seekers in January 2001 (Figure 5.7). In contrast, an ICM (2001) poll 
conducted in May 2001 showed that 77 per cent of respondents supported immigration by 
those with valuable skills in short supply in the domestic labour market. This data suggests  
                                                 
32
 Only two respondents to the BES 2001 pre-electoral panel identified themselves with the BNP. 
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Figure 5.4 – Public perception of intensity of immigration in the UK prior to the 2001 
general election (N = 1,005) 
 
Source: IPSOS-MORI January 2001  
 
Figure 5.5 – Public Perception of immigrants as a threat to employment at the British 2001 
general election (N = 3,219) 
 
Source – BES, 2001 Pre-election 
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Figure 5.6 – Public perception of immigrants and crime rates at the British 2001 general 
election. (N = 3,219) 
 
Source – BES, 2001 Pre-election 
 
Figure 5.7 – Public perception of asylum prior to the British 2001 general election (N = 
1,005) 
 
Source – IPSOS-MORI January 2001 
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that mainstream parties’ discourse on immigration might influence the public’s perception of 
the different types of inflows, with a majority of voters indirectly sanctioning the 
Conservative populist approach on asylum and another majority supporting the development 
of HSI as proposed by Labour and the Liberal Democrats. 
Tolerance to immigration amongst the British electorate was already fragile by 2001, 
especially on asylum, but overall concern with immigration was low. Significant hostility to 
immigration presaged the BNP’s electoral breakthrough at the local level in 2002 and cannot 
be considered an outcome of this ERP’s agency. Hence, responsibility for hostility to 
immigration in 2001 lay elsewhere than the BNP raising the potential responsibility of the 
British mainstream parties in shaping public attitudes to immigration, especially the 
Conservatives’ emphasis on asylum. Moreover, correspondence between the British voters’ 
attitudes towards the different types of inflows and the inter-party consensuses observed 
during the 2001 electoral campaign reinforces the former observation on mainstream parties 
and public attitudes to immigration. The BNP’s electoral prospects in the short-term were 
enhanced by the enormous gap between its insignificant electoral support and levels of public 
hostility to immigration. Any future success would depend on its ability to overcome its 
legitimacy deficit (Goodwin, 2009).
 
 
The BNP’s lack of contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration coincided with the 
negative behaviour of the three proposed hypotheses to understand ERP impact on public 
attitudes (Table 2.1). Levels of immigration (in particular asylum) declined before the 2001 
general election (Figure 5.2), whilst the rate of BNP’s electoral support was very low. This 
trend is illustrated by the BNP’s insignificant representation in the BES 2001 and by the fact 
that it only contested 33 contested constituencies (Table 5.1). The mainstream parties’ lack of 
engagement with the British ERP also reinforced the BNP’s pariah status and denied 
exogenous support to reverse its irrelevant impact on public attitudes to immigration. Within 
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the former context, the BNP’s lack of electoral support seems the most relevant factor behind 
the BNP’s irrelevant contagion effects on this dimension of immigration politics. 
5.1.3 – Electoral results  
“Another Labour landslide” was the common depiction of the 2001 general election after 
Labour won 42 per cent of the vote against 32.7 per cent for Conservatives and 18 per cent 
for the Liberal Democrats (Norris, 2001). The Conservatives’ electoral strategy failed to 
break beyond core voters and Hague resigned from the party leadership (Bale, 2010). Labour 
obtained 64 per cent of the total seats in parliament providing a solid base for Blair’s second 
term (Berrington, 2001). The BNP secured deposits in five constituencies and won over 10 
per cent of the vote in three constituencies (Oldham East and Saddleworth, Oldham West and 
Royton, Burnley) (Wilks-Heeg, 2008). Remarkably, Griffin collected 16.4 per cent of the 
vote in Oldham West apparently benefiting from urban disturbances and a significant drop in 
Labour’s share of the vote (Copsey, 2007). Griffin thus achieved the best electoral result by 
an ERP in British history, raising the BNP electoral prospects for the 2000s. 
 
Table 5.1 – Votes for BNP at general, EP and London Assembly elections between 2001 and 
2009 
Year Elections 
Number of 
votes 
Contested 
Constituencies 
Proportion of total  
on contested 
constituencies 
2001 general 47,129 33 3.9% 
2004 EP
1
 808,201 – 4,9% 
2004 
London 
Assembly
2
 
90,365 – 4.8% 
1 Average of the vote across Britain  
2 Votes for Members of London Assembly– London totals 
Source: London Elects, 2008; Tetteh, 2009   
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5.2 – BNP development between 2001 and 2005 
This research now explores the BNP’s electoral performance according to its structure of 
political opportunities to evaluate this ERP’s electoral threat to mainstream parties before the 
2005 general election, and its discourse on immigration policy. Whereas past BNP electoral 
successes included the election of one city councillor in London in 1993, Griffin was able to 
overturn the BNP’s meagre electoral fortunes. This thesis shows that the BNP was a fast-
rising party before the 2005 general election, but failed to secure an electoral breakthrough at 
national level and to shatter British mainstream politics. Griffin’s modernisation project 
introduced innovations in this party’s xenophobic discourse on immigration and entailed a 
shift from a neo-Nazi ERP model to an authoritarian xenophobic model but this process was 
not fully accomplished by the 2005 general election. 
5.2.1 – 2002–2003 local elections 
By mid-2001, Griffin obtained increasing access to mainstream media outlets due to his 
election result in Oldham and the urban riots in Burnley, Bradford and Stoke (Renton, 2005). 
Increasing access to media benefited the BNP’s structure of political opportunities by 
expanding its visibility and contributing to the relative normalisation of its image (Koopmans 
and Muis, 2007). The 9/11 attacks in the USA intensified the BNP’s campaign against Islam 
in defence of “Western civilisation”. This event provided an opportunity for Griffin to 
downgrade the BNP’s anti-Semitism by supporting Israel’s war against Islamic terrorism and 
to try to forge links with Hindus and Sikh groups under an anti–Islamic alliance (Griffin, 
2002; Eatwell, 2004).  
A strong BNP poll in a local council by-election was registered in Burnley at the end of 2001 
(it obtained around 20 per cent of the vote in the three wards contested). Holding a similar 
background to Oldham, Burnley also provided fertile ground for the BNP with local 
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resentment being directed at supposedly positive discrimination in favour of ethnic minorities 
by the local Labour council (Rhodes, 2009). Stimulated by Le Pen’s success in France, the 
election of three BNP councillors in Burnley and another two in by-elections in Blackburn 
and Halifax marked the May 2002 local elections (Yonwin, 2004; Table 5.2). These were the 
BNP’s first electoral successes under Griffin’s leadership and endorsed his disavowal of what 
he described as the “3 hs: hard-talk, hobbyism and Hitler” in favour of increasing 
professionalism and moderated local activism (Eatwell, 2004, p. 77). Griffin’s modernisation 
project was thus producing some favourable electoral results for the BNP.  
Extreme-right electoral breakthrough at local level was confirmed at the 2003 local elections 
with the election of 13 new local councillors (adding up to 16 after the ballots), proving the 
BNP’s ability to elect councillors on a nationwide basis (Table 5.2). Apart from the more 
favourable set of political opportunities for minor parties at second order ballots, these 
successes were also indebted to four factors: i) the disappearance of mainstream parties as 
local campaigning organisations (Wilks-Heeg, 2008); ii) voting among traditional Labour 
supporters (Rhodes, 2009); iii) increasing association of terrorism with asylum seekers  
 
Table 5.2 – BNP performance at local elections between 2000 and 2004 
Year Candidates Councils Votes Seats won 
Total of 
seats 
2000 17 12 3,022 0 0 
2001 4 3 867 0 0 
2002 67 26 30,998 3 3 
2003 217 71 101,221 13 16 
2004 312 59 190,200 14 21 
Source: Tetteh, 2009 
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following the discovery of a lethal toxin in north London (Renton, 2005); iv) the success of 
the BNP’s own electoral strategy inspired by Liberal Democrats’ electioneering techniques 
involving the development of intense canvassing and grassroots organisation (Goodwin, 
2009). The BNP continued to benefit from the high salience of asylum within the British 
political debate.  
5.2.2 – BNP discourse on immigration policy 
Xenophobic discourse was a driving force behind BNP local campaigns through its 
articulation of local and national grievances including crime rates against whites, positive 
discrimination, terrorism, unemployment, housing issues, access to public services and even 
traffic congestion (John et al., 2006; Copsey, 2007). This strategy allowed the BNP to 
successfully evade accusations of racism and extremism and to simultaneously enhance local 
respectability (Rhodes, 2009). Meanwhile, Griffin’s modernisation programme entailed a 
shift from Tyndall’s biological racism to ‘cultural’ racism following the xenophobic 
discourse of Le Pen in France. In an article entitled: “Time is running out for Western 
Civilisation”, Griffin (2002) expressed his concerns that “Western ancient cultural and ethnic 
identities are being submerged in a sea of colour”. The article ended with an accusation of 
liberals’ responsibility for “rushing to finish the job by swamping our homelands” (Griffin, 
2002). The repositioning of BNP ideology towards a post-modern far-right model was not a 
surprise as similar shifts had been observed among other European ERPs throughout the 
1990s (Ignazi, 2006).  
In another article entitled “Race and Reality” published in 2003, Griffin (2003) sought to 
distance the BNP from the Conservatives’ campaign on asylum as an economic burden. 
Henceforth, Griffin (2003) deemed all types of inflows independent of their origin as a direct 
threat to British identity overlooking economic considerations. In place of past biological 
determinism, recognition of British nationality was now “first and foremost decided by 
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ethnicity” whilst members of mixed marriages or of ethnic minorities were overtly undesired 
within the party ranks (Griffin, 2003). Griffin’s emphasis on shifting BNP racism from old 
anti-Semitism to cultural racism and focusing it on Islam was designed to enhance the BNP’s 
respectability before the EP election in 2004. However, this ideological reform was far from 
complete by the 2005 general elections whilst anti-Semitism continued to pervade party ranks 
throughout the decade (Goodwin, 2009).  
5.2.3 – Elections in 2004 
Favourable results obtained by the BNP in 2002 and 2003 fuelled expectations for the 2004 
EP ballot, London Assembly election and local elections. These ballots used new PR 
electoral systems
33
 that expanded minor parties’ political opportunities (Hainsworth, 2008). 
Griffin overconfidently predicted the election of four BNP MEPs, plus representation in the 
London Assembly and a record number of local councillors. Le Pen joined the presentation of 
the 2004 EP electoral manifesto increasing BNP media coverage and showing his influence 
over Griffin’s ‘modernisation’ programme (Copsey, 2007). The BNP collected 4.9 per cent of 
the vote in the 2004 EP ballot representing a fourfold growth in relation to 1999, yet failed to 
obtain a single seat (Table 5.1). A substantial electoral expansion was also observed at the 
London Assembly election with 4.9 per cent but the BNP still missed representation by a 
margin of 5,000 votes (Cruddas et al; 2005). Finally, the BNP won a total of 14 seats in the 
2004 local elections to demonstrate the BNP’s apparent consolidation of its electoral 
breakthrough at local level (Table 5.2).  
Electoral results between 2001 and 2005 evidenced a fast-growing party but considering 
Griffin’s expectations and the favourable context, the 2004 super-election year represented 
                                                 
33
 A regional system of proportional representation was introduced for the elections to the EP while seats 
in the London Assembly were guaranteed for every party that overcome a 5 per cent threshold. Local 
elections in most places were conducted with three-members constituency – a system under which the 
BNP has won its first councillors in Burnley (Renton, 2005). 
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another false dawn after the failure to perform the expected electoral breakthrough at national 
level (Copsey, 2007). BNP performance in 2004 was hampered by several factors: i) poor 
canvassing by rank-and-file members, who relied on TV broadcasts and leaflet distribution 
ensured by the EP election (Copsey, 2007); ii) revival of anti–fascist organisations; iii) 
revival of the Conservative Party, which presented candidates in all local wards while its 
leader – Michael Howard – delivered a speech in Burnley against the BNP describing it as a 
“stain on British democracy” (Independent, 2004). In addition, the UK Independence Party 
(UKIP) posed a strong challenge to the BNP because it led a campaign on withdrawing from 
the EU and on opposition to further immigration into the UK by describing themselves as “a 
non-racist party that takes a firm line on immigration” (Renton, 2005, p.36). Financially 
supported by public figures and enjoying favourable tabloid coverage, UKIP possessed far 
more resources than the BNP and competed for a similar share of the electorate (Copsey, 
2007).  
UKIP’s strong performance at the 2004 EP ballot – over 2,5 million votes and 12 elected 
MEPs – severely undercut the BNP vote (Hainsworth, 2008). Immigration was the 
electorate’s top priority issue with 25.5 per cent at the 2004 EP exit poll. Unsurprisingly, 77 
per cent of the BNP voters had pointed out immigration as their most important issue against 
53 per cent of the UKIP’s electorate while the latter party showed a stronger ability to attract 
dissatisfied Conservative voters than the BNP (John et al., 2006, p. 8). Whereas the 
Conservatives’ campaign on asylum was splitting Labour’s core electorate and attracting 
those with authoritarian attitudes, it was apparently working to the BNP’s advantage. Griffin 
justified his unfulfilled electoral predictions by accusing UKIP of being a product of a 
mainstream party conspiracy to hamper BNP success (Renton, 2005). Facing a renewed 
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challenge for the leadership from John Tyndall and a legal action for inciting racial hatred,
 34
 
Griffin promised a major ideological reform at the 2005 general election (see Chapter 6).  
In sum, the BNP had an electoral breakthrough at local level and expanded its electoral 
support in second-order-ballots before the 2005 general election. Political debate over 
immigration, particularly asylum, was among the factors expanding the BNP’s structure of 
political opportunities through the first half of the 2000s. The BNP was a fast-growing party, 
already the most successful ERP in British history, yet it failed to make a national electoral 
breakthrough at the 2004 ballots, despite a favourable structure of political opportunities. 
Griffin’s modernisation programme entailed dropping biological racism and anti-Semitism in 
favour of cultural racism with a particular focus on Islam. Nevertheless, as already noted, the 
shift from the neo-Nazi ERP type to an authoritarian xenophobic type was not fully 
accomplished before the 2005 general election. Henceforth, the BNP was not perceived as 
either a serious electoral challenge by mainstream parties in first-order-ballots or a strategic 
dilemma beyond the local level.  
5.3 – BNP impact on immigration policy under Blair’s second term  
Did the BNP intensify the restrictive character of developments in British immigration policy 
according to its xenophobic agenda during Blair’s second term? Alternatively, did the BNP 
benefit from developments within this area instead of making significant impact? British 
immigration policy was characterised by a narrative of “managed migration” that 
encompassed a liberal approach to HSI and intra-EU inflows and a repressive character on 
asylum. This research suggests that the BNP had no relevant impact on policy developments 
observed between 2001 and 2005, a trend that was associated to the BNP’s failure to pose an 
electoral threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots (Table 2.1).  
                                                 
34
 A BBC documentary entitled The Secret Agent broadcasted on 15 July showed Griffin calling Islam a 
“wicked, vicious faith”. Griffin refused to withdraw his comments, so he and BNP member Mark Collett 
were tried for incitement to racial hatred (Miller et. al., 2010). 
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5.3.1 – 2002 White Paper: “Secure Borders, Safe Haven” 
Immigration became Blair’s number one domestic priority after 2001 (Seldon et al., 2007). 
Early concerns were indicated by Blair’s appointment of David Blunkett as the new Home 
Secretary, known for his “calculated populism”. Blunkett shared Blair’s obsessive concern to 
close ranks with the Conservatives and boasted that: “I will make Jack Straw look liberal” 
(quoted from Rawnsley, 2010, p. 282). His new job started under intense pressure with the 
rise of asylum claims and a barrage of tabloid reports about the Sangatte camp, near Calais, 
France (Layton-Henry, 2004).
35
 Initially regarded as a French problem, the Sangatte camp 
was closed down in July 2002 after negotiations between French and British authorities led to 
the deployment of British immigration officers in Calais (Shuster, 2003). In response to 
mounting criticism, Blunkett published a White Paper on immigration policy that would 
entail “radical change at home” and send a “signal to everyone that the UK is not a soft 
touch”, informally co-opting a Conservative slogan.36  
The February 2002 White Paper: “Secure Borders, Safe Haven” proposed a system that 
combined “rational controlled routes for economic migration with fair robust, procedures for 
dealing with those who claim asylum” (Home Office, 2002, p. 5). The benefits derived from 
primary immigration were widely praised by Blunkett, who favoured the liberalisation of 
channels for labour inflows. This reflected a pro-business policy and was underpinned by 
research conducted by the Cabinet Office (Balch, 2009). As Boswell noted (2003, p. 38), 
Labour strategy to present its case for ‘managed migration’ involved the ‘packaging’ of 
liberalism with highly restrictive rhetoric on forced inflows. By distinguishing inflows on the 
basis of an economic utilitarianism criteria (Weil, 2005), the Labour government ensured that 
its proposals on asylum conformed to Jack Straw’s “cigarette papers” metaphor. 
                                                 
35
Many potential asylum seekers from Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan waited in this camp for an 
opportunity to enter in the UK illegally mostly through the Channel Tunnel (Shuster, 2003). 
36
 Hansard, 29 October 2001, Column 627. 
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The Highly Skilled Immigrant Programme
37
 (HSMP) was introduced replacing the previous 
“Innovators Scheme” (Geddes, 2008). In the context of an expanding economy, the HSMP 
marked the adoption of a laissez-faire approach towards HSI by the Labour government. 
Therefore, concession of residence authorisations was linked to the labour market 
incorporation of skilled newcomers and there was a substantial expansion of HSI henceforth 
(Figure 5.8). Demand for unskilled immigrant labour was also acknowledged and diverse 
temporary schemes
38
 were deployed by similar administrative means to fill bottlenecks in the 
British labour market (Balch, 2009). Temporary residence authorisations granted to unskilled  
Figure 5.8 – Applications approved under the HSMP and Tier A of the points-system 
between 2002 and 2008 
      
Source: Salt, 2009, p. 109 
  
                                                 
37
 HSMP was a system of points based on qualification, income and achievement that permits entrance 
without a sponsor. After securing employment at a level warranted by their skill bases, further leave to 
remain is granted and immigrants’ right to family reunion is acknowledged. After a probation period of 4 
years, HSI were entitled to long-term residence permits (Messina, 2007). 
38
 Such entry routes were formed by the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Scheme, Sector Based Schemes 
Workers, and the extension of the ‘working holidaymakers’ scheme. These schemes were constituted by 
labour permits of a temporary character based on short-term contracts, which denied the right to family 
reunion or welfare benefits (Sales, 2005). 
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immigrants were dependent on duration of their work contracts and were similar to guest-
worker programmes while immigrants selected by the HSMP were entitled to long-term 
settlement. Recognition of the right to long-term residence for HSI indicated a distributive 
policy and the presence of a client politics model behind the HSMP. The option for granting 
temporary residence authorisations to unskilled inflows suggested the presence of a 
redistributive policy and an interest-group politics model (Table 2.2). 
Temporary schemes for unskilled immigrants were presented by Blunkett as a mean to tackle 
irregular inflows but immigration studies suggest that such policy can have the opposite 
outcome (Home Office, 2002, p. 9; Castles, 2006). A new bill on immigration policy 
presented in 2002 was almost entirely devoted to asylum inflows and to the forced removal of 
irregular immigrants (Table 5.3; Shuster and Solomos, 2004). Blunkett announced a new 
approach to asylum based on “induction, accommodation, removal or integration” in British 
society
39
, which generalised the detention of asylum seekers during Labour’s term (Bloch and 
Shuster, 2005). This repressive approach presupposed the criminalisation of asylum seekers, 
who were treated as an exogenous body within British society to be isolated from the public 
(Back et al., 2002; Bosworth, 2008). Labour’s policy on asylum became known as a “politics 
of deterrence” for the extensive restrictions or regulations imposed to curb the number of 
asylum-seekers (McGhee, 2005; Table 5.3). The expansion of regulations on asylum claims 
indicated a regulatory policy and the adoption of an entrepreneurial model by the Labour 
government (Table 2.2). 
  
                                                 
39
 Hansard, 7
th
 of February 2002, Column 1027. 
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Table 5.3 – Modifications to British immigration policy introduced by the 2002 Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 
Primary 
inflows 
Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular inflows 
 Probationary 
period of 
marriage 
extended 
from 1 to 2 
years 
New controls on entry. Established a 
system based on induction/ 
accommodation/ removal centres. 
Separate education for asylum seekers’ 
children. Abolished voucher system. 
Removed financial support for 
applications not presented “as soon as 
reasonably practicable”. Allowed the 
removal of refugee status where an 
applicant or dependent commits a listed 
offence. Right to work is revoked. 
Penalty for migrant-
smuggling increased to 14 
years. Extends powers for 
police to conduct searches 
for irregular migrant 
workers. Intensification of 
carriers sanctions and the 
“Authority to Carry” 
scheme  
 
Moreover, a last minute provision was included in the bill that enabled the removal of asylum 
seekers’ children from the mainstream school system and confined them in detention centres 
(Sales, 2005). Blunkett justified this action on BBC Radio 4’s Today programme by 
considering that while the parents’ asylum claim was examined, the “children will be 
educated on the site, which will be open. People will be able to come and go, but importantly 
not swamping the local school” (Guardian, 2002). This remark was widely condemned for 
the use of word “swamp” that resembled Margaret Thatcher racist comments in the late 
1970s. In parliament, the Home Secretary provided a different justification by pointing out:  
“the difficulty sometimes with families whose removal has been attempted is that 
their youngsters have become part of a school, making it virtually impossible in some 
circumstances to operate the managed system”.40  
                                                 
40
 Hansard, 24
th
 of April 2002, Column 353. 
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Therefore, the detainment of asylum seekers’ children sought to enhance rates of forced 
removals regardless of the children’s welfare. This behaviour conformed to an old logic of 
creating a non-existent problem (asylum seekers’ children overcrowding schools) to justify a 
solution to an entirely different concern (obstacles to forced removals processes) (March and 
Olsen, 1979). Furthermore, this event evidenced an interdiscursive relationship between 
Blunkett’s rhetoric and the general ERP’s frame of immigration as a threat to the host society, 
which was linked to a particular illiberal measure (see Chapter 2).
 41
 In particular, the Home 
Secretary presented the asylum seekers’ dependents as a menace to British children’s welfare 
and this was employed to legitimise the illiberal measure of locking children in detention 
centres. As Copsey noted (2007, p. 141), Blunkett’s remark increased the credibility of the 
BNP’s xenophobic discourse because of his wider political capital than any member of the 
BNP. 
As debate over the new immigration law developed in the aftermath of the French 2002 
presidential ‘earthquake’ (see p.195). The Labour Party guru Anthony Giddens claimed that 
the “third way” could beat the BNP’s xenophobia “by modernising, liberalising and being 
tough on immigration” (Giddens, 2002). Therefore, a consistent challenge to the extreme-
right’s xenophobia from Labour was precluded. Furthermore, some authors have argued that 
the BNP successes in the May 2002 local elections as well as the extreme-right success in 
continental Europe “drove New Labour into a stance of aggressive defence in relation to 
migration, and specifically asylum” (Schuster and Solomos, 2004, p. 280; Sales, 2005; 
Copsey, 2009). However, these authors pre-empt Labour’s responsibility for the shape of 
British immigration policy by overstating the BNP’s impact. Both the 2002 White Paper and 
the draft of the 2002 immigration law preceded the extreme-right successes in Britain or 
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 In the article entitled “Time is running out for Western Civilization”, Griffin argued that a popular 
backlash was expected, since “the only thing that can save us is that the liberals (...) are rushing to ‘finish 
the job’ by swamping us in our own homelands” (Griffin, 2002). 
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France. Instead, Labour’s repressive approach to asylum reflected the inter-party consensus 
to curb asylum inflows observed in the 2001 electoral campaign (Messina, 2007). A positive 
approach to HSI combined with a repressive approach to asylum was the strategy found at the 
time to neutralise the Conservatives’ challenge not the BNP.  
5.3.2 – Blair’s personal grip on immigration policy 
In the context of repeated tabloid focus on asylum and facing a Conservative challenge on 
immigration, Blair’s concerns with the issue intensified (Spencer, 2007). Unconvinced about 
the effectiveness of Blunkett’s repressive approach and concerned to prove New Labour’s 
competence over asylum, Blair started intervening directly (Seldon et al., 2007). At the EU 
summit in Seville in June 2002, Blair sought to transpose British domestic priorities to the 
EU level.  The offshore processing of asylum applications either on borders of the EU or 
closer to the countries of origin was proposed by Blair but vetoed by other EU leaders 
(Geddes, 2005).  
In February 2003, in a TV interview about which he did not consult Blunkett, Blair pledged 
to halve the number of asylum requests in the following six months (Newsnight, 2003). By 
the Labour Party conference in September 2003, the UK observed the greatest drop in asylum 
seeking observed in any EU country (Figure 5.9; Quinn, 2006). This demonstrated the British 
state’s ability to severely restrict undesired inflows despite the substantial growth in the 
number of refugees because of the conflict in Iraq from 2003 onwards (Messina, 2007). 
Unlike the government’s approach to asylum, qualification levels required to access the 
HSMP were lowered in 2003 to counter a drop in the number of applications (Figure 5.8, 
Boswell, 2003). The subsequent rise of labour inflows demonstrated the British government’s 
ability to promote policy outcomes according to its liberal labour market objectives.  
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Figure 5.9 – Asylum requests in the UK between 2000 and 2009 
 
Source – Home Office, 2009 
A second immigration law was approved by Parliament in 2004 extending the restrictions 
introduced two years earlier and providing further evidence of Blair’s focus on asylum (Table 
5.4).
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  The enactment of new legislation reinforced the descending trend of asylum seeking 
in the UK (Figure 5.9). Blair’s success in curtailing this inflow raises doubts about judicial 
constraints on the management of asylum inflows (Joppke, 1998; Gibney and Hansen, 2003). 
Furthermore, UK legislation on asylum has been charged of neglecting human rights laws 
and the provisions of the 1951 Geneva Convention (Statham, 2002; Sales, 2007; Spencer, 
2007). Nonetheless, Blair and his cabinet became increasingly concerned as the massive drop 
in asylum seeking failed to diminish the salience of immigration in public opinion, as it will 
be seen in the next chapter (Bartle, 2006).  
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 A new immigration and asylum law was announced by Blair at the Labour Party conference in 
September 2003. This would not only help genuine refugees but was the “best defence against racism 
gaining ground” (Blair, 2003). 
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Table 5.4 – Modifications to British immigration policy introduced by the 2004 Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 
Primary 
inflows 
Secondary inflows Asylum Irregular inflows 
 Marriages between non-EEA 
and UK nationals must be 
noticed at a designated 
registration centre. Non-EEA 
nationals getting married must 
hold entry clearance for the 
purpose of marriage. Home 
Office is empowered to require 
written applications and to 
charge fees. 
Creates a single tier of appeal 
for asylum seekers, the 
asylum and immigration 
court. Allows electronic 
monitoring of asylum seekers 
and refusal of support for 
asylum seekers with family 
dependents for not 
cooperating with removal 
process. 
Criminalises 
destruction of 
identification 
documents on 
entry. 
 
Further restrictive developments on immigration reflected Blair’s obsession with closing 
ground with the Conservatives, after the British state’s recognition of the right to free 
movement to the new A-8 countries in December 2002 at the Copenhagen European Council 
(Balch, 2011). By the end of 2003, the Conservatives’ leader Michael Howard43 lent his 
support to a tabloid campaign focusing on “gypsy benefit tourists” and subsequent welfare 
system abuses by newcomers from A-8 countries (Bale, 2010). This campaign illustrated a 
further interdiscursive relationship between mainstream parties’ discourse and ERPs’ frame 
of immigration as a threat to the host society (see Chapter 2). In this case, the citizens of new 
EU member-states of Roma origin were stigmatised as welfare abusers even before these 
                                                 
43
 Howard succeeded Ian Duncan Smith, whose term as the Conservatives’ leader lasted from 2001 to 
2003. The new leader was known for his past record in John Major’s government as a hard-line Home 
Secretary and a Eurosceptic. In his first public interview to The Sun, Howard stressed Europe and asylum 
plus Thatcher neoliberal tax cuts as his electoral priorities providing evidence of continuity in the 
Conservatives’ discourse rather than a rupture (Bale, 2010).  
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countries’ accession into the EU. The stigmatisation of this particular type of immigration but 
on different grounds would also be observed later on in Italy (see Chapter 10).  
Bowing to the tabloids’ and Conservatives’ campaign, Blunkett announced that citizens from 
A-8 countries would have restricted access to welfare benefits and a Worker Registration 
System would monitor their number (the restrictions on welfare access lasted for a year).
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Therefore, the employment of CDA allowed the identification of an interdiscursive 
relationship between the ERP’s frame of immigration with the tabloid and the Conservative 
campaign on “gypsy benefit tourists” and its linkage with the deployment of an illiberal 
measure towards immigration. Furthermore, this curtailment of rights possessed deep 
symbolic value and sent a message to public opinion confirming the association between 
welfare abuses and immigration (Naletto, 2010). The Labour government reinforced rather 
than challenged the perception of immigration as a threat to British society, a trend that had 
short-term repercussions on public concern with immigration (see Chapter 6).  
In 2004, events at the Home Office exacerbated Blair’s concerns in a period of low popularity 
and with Chancellor Gordon Brown pressing to succeed him as Prime Minister (Seldon et al., 
2007). The first crisis unfolded when the Shadow Home Secretary David Davis denounced a 
‘scam’ within the Home Office in April 2004 (Independent, 2004). This swindle involved a 
couple of thousand business applications from Romania and Bulgaria. The Immigration 
Minister, Beverley Hughes, resigned. This coincidence between the Home Office crisis and 
the lowest trough in the Prime Minister’s popularity, in the context of the Iraq War and the 
Hutton Inquiry started in 2003, led Blair to announce a review of the entire immigration 
system (BBC, 2007; Spencer, 2007).  
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 This scheme recorded the new member-states citizens’ employment and monitored their highly restricted 
access to social benefits (Spencer, 2007). 
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In addition, an important speech on immigration policy was delivered by Blair himself at the 
Confederation of British Industry, a few days before the A-8 countries joined the EU. In this 
speech Blair addressed the electorate by claiming that British people “accepted migration that 
is controlled and selective” but would not accept abuses of the system (Blair, 2004, p. 3). 
Recognition of the economic benefits of “controlled migration” was accompanied by 
extensive assurances as regards tackling abuse (Blair, 2004, p. 4). This emphasis continued to 
confirm the hegemonic perception of widespread abuse whilst his efforts to defuse the 
salience of immigration were undermined by a later crisis at the Home Office. Inflows of 
unskilled workers from non-EU countries were controlled by strict quotas and would be 
further reduced with EU expansion (2004, p. 5).  
In contrast, inflows from new member-states were entirely welcomed by Blair, who argued 
that: “there are half a million vacancies in our job market and our strong and growing 
economy needs migration to fill these vacancies” (Blair, 2004, p.9). This was the core 
message to his business audience, providing evidence of Labour's liberal approach to intra-
European migration. Consequently, the government option to recognise free-movement to 
citizens of A-8 countries was directly legitimised by the British Prime Minister. The granted 
right to long-term settlement to the citizens of A-8 countries conforms to the outline of a 
distributive policy that indicates the presence of a client politics model. The maintenance of 
the option for a guest-worker system for unskilled labour from non-EU countries suggests the 
continuous presence of the interest group model mentioned earlier (Table 2.2).  
5.3.3 – Second White Paper: “Controlling our borders: Making migration work for 
Britain” 
By December 2004, Blunkett’s resignation fuelled the government’s perceived vulnerability 
on immigration after another scandal at the Home Office involving alleged abuse of his 
position concerning the concession of a work permit (Geddes, 2005). Charles Clarke was 
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appointed as Home Secretary. He presented a new White Paper designed to maintain public 
confidence in the immigration and asylum system (Sales, 2007). Publication of a new white 
paper a few months before the 2005 general election suggested the subordination of 
immigration policy to Blair’s strategy for re-election. A senior member of Labour’s campaign 
recognised that a pillar of the 2005 electoral strategy was:  
“reassurance on immigration, asylum and crime. We sought to neutralise these issues 
by dealing with them systematically through the five year plans and counterattacking 
the Tories” (Gould, 2007, p. 21).  
Thus, Blair’s concerns were caused by the Conservatives’ challenge on immigration rather 
than by BNP electoral successes at the local level.  
The new five-year strategy contained a foreword by the Prime Minister demonstrating his 
personal focus on immigration. According to Blair’s foreword, “race relations” were “a quiet 
success story” in the UK, but “British traditional tolerance is under threat (...) from those who 
come and live here illegally by breaking our rules and abusing our hospitality” (Blair, 2005a, 
p. 5). Hostile attitudes to immigration were thus legitimised by the Prime Minister, justified 
by immigrants’ alleged misconduct that reinforced the perception of widespread abuse. If 
such abuses were not tackled, Blair argued that the extremists could promote their “perverted 
view of race” (Blair, 2005, p. 5). Apart from such broad references to extremism, the BNP 
was never directly mentioned in association with immigration policy by the government 
during Blair’s second term (Eatwell, 2010).  
Whereas the 2002 White Paper contained an appraisal of immigration’s economic benefits, 
the 2005 document indicated the subordination of inflows to national interests only (Sales, 
2007). Consequently, long-term settlement would only be recognised to those immigrants 
who brought benefits to the UK (Blair, 2005). The document presented another two-pronged 
149 
 
approach to the management of immigration with the introduction of a points-system to 
streamline the plethora of entry channels and the deployment of biometric controls to tackle 
‘widespread’ abuse by immigrants (Clarke, 2005; Spencer, 2007). Once more, Labour’s 
liberal approach to labour inflows was packaged alongside a restrictive approach with highly 
symbolic security measures, included in the Italian 2002 Bossi-Fini law (see p. 267). 
Additionally, a new asylum model was announced granting refugee status on a temporary 
instead of a permanent basis to deter further asylum inflows by increasing immigrants’ 
vulnerability of arbitrary expulsion (Clarke, 2005). The continuous expansion of regulations 
on asylum seeking and on refugee status indicated the continuous presence of an 
entrepreneurial model on asylum (Table 2.2). 
Besides providing HSI in a context of growing shortages in the domestic labour market and 
an expanding economy, Blair acknowledged the Labour government’s vested interest in 
promoting HSI:  
“Our vital public services depend upon skilled staff from overseas. Far from being a 
burden on these services, our expanding NHS, for example, would have difficulty 
meeting the needs of patients without foreign-born nurses and doctors” (Blair, 2005a, 
p. 5)  
Besides framing HSI as a cost-free policy producing diffuse costs, Blair positioned the UK 
state among the concentrated groups directly benefiting from immigration, which organise in 
defence of their interests (Freeman, 1995; 2006). The overall costs of Labour’s investment in 
public services, especially the NHS, could soar up if a bottleneck of skilled labour was found 
in the labour market (Borjas, 2006). Henceforth, Labour’s vested interest on promoting HSI 
to attain its own political objectives helps to understand the laissez-faire approach and the 
client politics model on HSI.  
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A Labour backbench MP and former adviser to Number 10, Jon Cruddas, noticed: 
 “the government triangulates around immigration and colludes in the demonization 
of the migrant whilst relying on the self same people to rebuild our public and private 
services and make our labour markets flexible” (Cruddas, 2005, p. 23). 
In time, Blair’s unwillingness to challenge the tabloids and Conservative campaigns against 
immigration coupled with his emphasis on tackling abuses in the immigration system 
reinforced the demonization of immigrants. Promotion of labour inflows in a context of 
hegemonic perception of widespread abuse by immigrants could provide fertile ground to the 
BNP’s xenophobic discourse (Cruddas, 2005). Despite increasingly stringent immigration 
policy during Blair’s second term in office, the BNP had no impact on policy developments. 
The stringent approach to asylum by the Labour government and the mounting perception of 
immigration as a threat were more an outcome of mainstream party agency than a reflection 
of BNP electoral breakthrough at the local level. This observation diverges from the growth 
of levels of immigration and coincides with the negative behaviour of the remaining factors 
proposed to understand ERP impact on policy developments (Table 2.1).  
Increased levels of immigration during Labour’s second term failed to reverse the BNP’s 
irrelevance on immigration policy (Figure 5.2). Immigration policy was not a priority for the 
British electorate at the 2001 general election, though issue salience increased as Labour’s 
second term progressed (Figure 5.3). The BNP’s failure to secure an electoral breakthrough at 
national level before the 2005 general election also precluded any salient threat to 
mainstream parties at first-order-ballots (Table 5.1). Finally, ostracism of the BNP deprived 
Griffin of exogenous support to enhance the BNP’s impact on immigration policy. Overall, it 
is the BNP’s insignificant electoral challenge to mainstream parties that seems the most 
relevant factor behind its lack of impact on immigration policy during Labour’s second term. 
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5.4 – Conclusions 
Immigration policy was moderately salient at the 2001 electoral campaign, mostly due to the 
Conservative leader’s populist campaign on asylum until a few weeks before the ballot. Two 
mainstream inter-party consensuses were observed on curbing asylum inflows and promoting 
HSI. Notwithstanding the Conservatives’ populism on asylum, the BNP lacked a relevant 
impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy at the 2001 general election. 
The BNP’s failure to pose an electoral threat to mainstream parties in the context of declining 
levels of immigration, low public concern with immigration and mainstream parties’ isolation 
of the BNP was regarded as the most relevant factor behind the BNP’s lack of impact on 
inter-party competition on immigration policy at the 2001 general election. Effectively, 
Hague’s emphasis on asylum presaged rather than responded to a British ERP’s electoral 
breakthrough.  
The British electorate at the 2001 general election overwhelmingly overlooked immigration 
(in particular asylum) as an important issue. However, hostility to immigration (mostly 
perceived as a threat to employment) was significant across the electorate, mostly perceived 
as a threat to employment. Interesting variations were found across public attitudes to distinct 
types of inflows four months prior to the 2001 general election, as HSI were welcomed whilst 
asylum inflows highly undesired. Despite these trends, the BNP has no relevant contagion 
effects on British public attitudes to immigration in 2001. Within the context of decreasing 
levels of immigration and mainstream parties’ non-engagement with the British ERP, the 
BNP’s insignificant electoral support was considered the most important factor to understand 
its lack of impact on this dimension. The coincidence between British voters’ positive 
perception of HSI and the negative perception of asylum alongside the salient levels of 
hostility to immigration presaged any BNP’s electoral breakthrough and cannot be considered 
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an outcome of this ERP’s agency. These trends enhance the profile of British mainstream 
parties in shaping public attitudes to immigration in the context of a non-relevant ERP.  
Electoral support for the BNP expanded between 2001 and 2005. After scoring the best result 
ever for a British ERP at a general election in 2001, the BNP achieved an electoral 
breakthrough at the local level in Burnley in the following year. Electoral successes at the 
local level were further consolidated at the 2003 and 2004 local elections. Beside the BNP’s 
encouraging structure of political opportunities at local elections, political debate over 
immigration was among the identified factors propelling BNP successes suggesting that this 
ERP benefited from mainstream politics on this topic. In spite of a favourable structure of 
political opportunities at the 2004 ballots, the BNP increased its electoral support but failed to 
attain the expected breakthrough either in the EP election or in the London Assembly 
election. Consequently, the BNP failed to pose a strategic dilemma to mainstream parties 
before the 2005 general election. As already noted, Griffin’s modernisation programme 
sought to shift the BNP from a neo-Nazi type into an authoritarian xenophobic type (Carter, 
2005). Thus, anti-Semitism was replaced by criticism of Islam whilst opposition to 
immigration was justified on ethno-cultural grounds instead of the previous biological racism.  
Blair’s government adopted a two-pronged approach to immigration policy involving a 
laissez-faire approach towards HSI packaged alongside a highly restrictive approach to 
asylum. HSI expanded continuously reflecting Labour’s liberalism whilst asylum seeking 
was successfully reduced with indifference for conventions on human rights. The recognition 
of the right to long-term settlement and the laissez-faire approach to HIS suggest the presence 
of a client politics model on this type of immigration. Moreover, Blair framed the 
intensification HSI as a cost-free policy and placed the British state amongst the groups 
directly benefited from this type of immigration. In contrast, the guest-worker systems 
imposed on unskilled labour immigration suggest the adoption of an interest group politics 
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model. As the government’s term progressed, immigration became Blair’s top domestic 
priority reflecting his fixation on neutralising the Conservatives’ challenge on this topic. 
Subsequently, restrictions on asylum seeking were successively expanded in 2002 and 2004 
indicating the presence of a regulatory policy and entrepreneurial politics. Furthermore, this 
thesis has highlighted how the articulation of the ERPs’ frame of immigration was employed 
by Blunkett to legitimise the repressive measure of detaining asylum seekers’ dependents in 
detention centres in the context of an irrelevant ERP.  
The Labour government recognised free movement to the citizens from A-8 countries, 
indicating the adoption of a client politics model on the management of this type of 
immigration directly legitimised by the Prime Minister. Nonetheless, the emphasis on 
tackling abuse of the immigration system led to the curtailment of access to welfare benefits 
for A-8 citizens that reflected Blair’s reaction to the Conservative and tabloids’ campaign that 
demonised immigrants of Roma origin. Once again, mainstream discourse on immigration 
and its articulation as a threat to the British society was directly related to the imposition of 
immigrants’ unequal access to the welfare system in the context of a non-relevant ERP.  
Blair’s obsession with closing grounds with the Conservatives rather than the BNP’s electoral 
breakthrough at the local level led to the inclusion of high profile security measures in the 
2005 White Paper and the drop of the narrative of managed immigration before the 2005 
general election.  
Despite assertions in the literature (Schuster and Solomos, 2004; Sales, 2005; Copsey, 2009), 
this thesis has shown that the BNP lacked relevant impact on the development of immigration 
policy during Blair’s second term. The Labour government’s repressive approach to asylum 
reflected Blair’s obsession to close grounds with the Conservatives rather than BNP’s 
electoral breakthrough at local level. The BNP’s non-existent impact coincided with the low 
concern with immigration among the British electorate in 2001 and mainstream parties’ 
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isolation of the British ERP. Once more, the BNP’s insignificant electoral threat to 
mainstream parties at first-order-ballots was considered the most relevant factor hampering 
its impact on the development of British immigration policy during Labour’s second term.  
The adoption of a repressive approach to asylum throughout Blair’s second term was 
therefore developed in the context of an insignificant ERP.   
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Chapter 6 – The BNP impact on British immigration policy between 2005 and 
2009 
“We need a tougher immigration policy and we need to stop seeing it as a dilemma. 
It's not. It's easy. I'm going to do my best to help the British back to work.” 
Minister of Immigration, Phil Woolas, (2008)  
This chapter analyses BNP impact on the British immigration politics and policy between 
2005 and 2009. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the BNP lacked any impact on the three 
dimensions of immigration politics and policy at the 2001 general election and during Blair’s 
second term. Nevertheless, the BNP electoral breakthrough was still incorrectly associated 
with Labour’s government repressive approach to asylum. This chapter explores whether the 
BNP had a significant impact on inter-party competition on immigration and on public 
attitudes to this social phenomenon at the 2005 general election. It then surveys the BNP’s 
electoral development between 2005 and 2009 and its frame of immigration policy. Finally, 
this chapter’s last section examines whether the BNP had a relevant impact on the 
development of immigration policy during the Labour government’s third term.  
6.1 – The 2005 general election - Blair’s third victory 
The May 2005 general election developed in a different political context in comparison to the 
2001 ballot, as Blair’s position as Prime Minister was no longer unassailable. Under pressure 
from the Iraq War and both the Hutton and Butler inquires of 2003 and 2004, Blair’s 
popularity and credibility was low before the ballot (Butler and Kavannagh, 2005). In 
October 2004, Blair announced that the next general election would be his last, yet he could 
still attain a unique achievement for a Labour Prime Minister by securing three consecutive 
terms (Rawnsley, 2010). Interest in the 2005 general election amongst the British electorate 
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was modest with a turnout of 61.4 per cent, the second lowest turnout since 1918 (Butler and 
Kavannagh, 2005).  
6.1.1 – BNP impact on inter-party competition  
The research developed through Chapter 5 found that the BNP lacked impact on inter-party 
competition on immigration in 2001. Now, this thesis explores whether the BNP reinforced 
the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on immigration and the salience of 
this issue in their electoral manifestos at the 2005 general election. The salience of 
immigration policy increased substantially in 2005 and mainstream parties adopted 
increasingly restrictive positions. This was especially true of the Conservatives under 
Michael Howard’s leadership. Despite these observations, the BNP lacked any relevant 
impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy at the 2005 general elections. 
As seen below, the BNP inability to mount an electoral threat to mainstream parties by 2005: 
looked as the most relevant factor behind its lack of impact on this dimension of immigration 
politics (Table 2.1).    
6.1.1.1 – The BNP’s electoral campaign 
The BNP contested 119 constituencies in 2005, a fourfold growth in comparison to 2001 
(Table 6.1). Internal party documents suggested that the leadership’s objective was to identify 
potential voters in specific wards to increase the BNP effectiveness at the 2006 local elections 
(Copsey, 2009). The BNP’s political opportunities were marginally improved by the high 
salience of immigration and the party’s eligibility for mail shots across the UK, as well as a 
five-minute TV broadcast. Demonstrating the BNP’s radical xenophobia, the TV broadcast 
focused on the shortage of social housing caused allegedly by its allocation to asylum seekers 
and on the supposed failings of the Labour and Conservatives Parties on asylum (BNP, 
2005a). 
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As in the past, the BNP electoral strategists continued to associate cultural xenophobia with 
local grievances in particular constituencies to enhance the party’s respectability at the local 
level (John et al., 2006). In Barking and Dagenham, the shortage of cheap social housing was 
exploited by a BNP leaflet entitled “Africans for Essex Scheme”, which alleged that African 
immigrants received incentives from the local council to buy houses in Barking (Cruddas et 
al., 2005). In Keighley, West Yorkshire, the BNP tried to exploit a local campaign against 
schoolgirl prostitution by framing it as an issue of Asians’ grooming of white girls for sex. As 
in Oldham in 2001, Griffin was the BNP’s candidate in Keighley in a bid to exploit local 
tensions (Guardian, 2005a). The launch of the BNP electoral manifesto entitled “Hope not 
Hate” was ignored by the mainstream media, demonstrating Griffin’s feeble access to the 
British media. 
45
 At this event, Griffin declared that British troops should be pulled out of 
Iraq and deployed to patrol the “Channel Tunnel and Dover ports to keep out illegal 
immigrants and asylum seekers” (BBC, 2005).  
The BNP 2005 electoral manifesto integrated Griffin’s ideological reform with a new critique 
of multiculturalism (Copsey, 2009). The document devoted high salience to immigration 
policy with particular emphasis on irregular immigration (Figure 6.1, BNP 2005b). Arguing 
that “Britain’s existence is threatened by immigration”, the BNP demanded an immediate halt 
to all types of inflows (BNP, 2005b). By contrast to the absence of references to irregular 
immigration across mainstream parties’ discourse, a regularisation programme for irregular 
immigrants was proposed alongside the forced deportation of all irregular immigrants settled 
in the UK (BNP, 2005b). Respect for the 1951 Geneva Convention was acknowledged, but it 
was deemed that asylum seekers ought to find refuge in third states rather than in the UK 
(BNP, 2005b). Finally, the voluntary resettlement programme of ethnic minorities and 
immigrants was still proposed. The BNP’s agenda on immigration had a clear restrictive 
                                                 
45
 Apart from the BBC team, there were only three other reporters at the session (BBC, 2005). 
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character while its inherent ambiguity reflected Griffin’s aim to water down his party’s pariah 
status.  
Figure 6.1 – Salience of immigration policy in British parties’ electoral manifestos at the 
2005 general elections  
 
Source: BNP, 2005; Conservatives, 2005; Labour, 2005; Liberal Democrats, 2005 
6.1.1.2 – Conservatives’ “it is not racist to impose limits on immigration” 
The Conservative Party, under Howard’s leadership, quickly recognised its inability to 
challenge the government’s record on public services and the economy without dumping 
Thatcher’s unpopular legacy (Bale, 2010). Instead, Howard opted for a valence strategy on 
the only issue on which the Conservatives had a clear advantage over Labour – immigration 
(Whiteley et al., 2005). Thereby, “loss of control” of immigration and the “chaotic” asylum 
system dominated his speech made in September 2004 (Howard, 2004). References to his 
origin from a Jewish asylum seeker family preceded projections that “immigration will 
account for 85 per cent” of Britain’s future population growth and associated immigration 
with shortages of social housing in the UK (Howard, 2004, p. 4). Conservatives’ proposals 
159 
 
included a points-system inspired by the Australian experience and “pulling out of the 1951 
Refugee Convention” (Howard, 2004). The disrespect for such international conventions and 
human rights could lead to withdrawal from the EU and drove the Conservatives onto 
increasingly extremist grounds. 
The Conservatives’ emphasis on immigration was reinforced by the appointment of Lynton 
Crosby in October 2004 as campaign director. He was a marketing guru widely known for his 
dog-whistle strategy on immigration employed in Australian elections (Geddes and Tonge, 
2005). Instead of proposing positive and constructive policies, Howard opted for an 
aggressive and negative electoral campaign that involved playing the “race card” (Saggar, 
2001). This strategy targeted the Conservatives’ core voters and sought to tackle UKIP’s 
success at the 2004 EP election (Cowley and Green, 2005). Moreover, this choice was also 
ideological: Howard and his entourage were convinced in 2001 that Hague had the right 
issues at the wrong election whilst the Conservatives’ populism would resonate with the 
electorate in 2005 (Bale, 2010).  
A Conservative campaign poster with the slogan: “It is not racist to impose limits on 
immigration” received wide condemnation from ethnic minorities who considered it 
provocative and racist (Independent, 2005). In a speech in Telford in April 2005, which 
specifically focused on immigration, Howard justified the slogan as “plain common sense” 
(Howard, 2005, p. 2). “Bigots who preach racial hatred” (Howard, 2005, p. 2) would be 
assisted if the Conservatives failed to tackle the immigration issue. In addition to the 
proposals previously presented, Howard announced an annual limit to immigration approved 
by Parliament (including a quota on asylum seekers) and 24-hour security at all ports of 
entry. Despite the criticism of racial extremists, his speech ended with a strong populist 
statement that recalled the 1960s Smethwick election:  
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“Vote Conservative to limit and control immigration or vote Mr Blair or Liberal 
Democrats for no limits to immigration and an increase in the population by five 
million over the next three decades” (Howard, 2005, p. 4). 
Reflecting Howard’s populist campaign, the salience of immigration in the Conservatives’ 
2005 electoral manifesto expanded in comparison to the 2001 document (Figure 6.1). 
Benefits of economic migration were acknowledged in contrast to 2001 whilst asylum 
continued to be the most salient type of inflow (Conservatives, 2005). Two weeks before the 
election, Howard was forced to deny internal opposition to his political strategy after senior 
figures, such as Kenneth Clarke, urged him publicly to move on from immigration (Butler 
and Kavannagh, 2005). Later on, Howard justified his strategy on immigration by pointing to 
the need to tackle ERP growth at a time when the BNP electoral strength amounted to 21 city 
councillors by 2004 (Table 5.2). Instead, Howard’s playing of the “race card” reflected his 
valence issue strategy, based on ideological convictions, alongside his failure to challenge the 
government on other key issues.  
6.1.1.3 – Centre-left parties’ positions on immigration 
The Labour’s government immigration policy had been subordinated to Blair’s electoral 
strategy to neutralise the Conservatives’ challenge. Consequently, the 2005 White Paper 
integrated the points-system proposed by the opposition alongside the introduction of 
biometric ID cards and a reduction of protection granted to refugees (Home Office, 2005). 
The Labour 2005 electoral manifesto also doubled the salience granted to immigration policy, 
and framed the management of inflows as a security issue like the 2005 White Paper (Figure 
6.1). Effectively, irregular inflows were the most paramount type of immigration flows in the 
document (Labour, 2005). Yet, Labour refused to establish an annual cap on immigration as 
Conservatives demanded proving its strong liberalism towards labour inflows. By moving 
Labour’s position on immigration policy onto the centre-right grounds by co-opting the 
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opposition proposals, Blair pushed the Conservatives onto extremist grounds and forced them 
to present unfeasible proposals.  
In contrast to 2001, Blair addressed the topic of immigration through his electoral campaign 
and delivered a strong speech in Dover (Howard’s own constituency) in April 2005 (Butler 
and Kavannagh, 2005). For the first time, the Prime Minister directly challenged the 
Conservatives’ campaign on immigration by stating that: “It is an attempt deliberately to 
exploit people’s fears” and blamed Howard for leading a single issue party (Blair, 2005b, 
p.2). After defending his government’s record in contrast to Howard’s poor record as past 
Conservative Home Secretary, Blair labelled the Conservatives’ proposals as “incoherent 
babble” (Blair, 2005b, p. 2). Among other criticisms, Blair questioned the viability of 
Howard’s plan for 24-hours surveillance over the existing 650 ports of entry and airports and 
simultaneously halve the costs of the immigration service (Blair, 2005b, p. 9). The premier 
ended with a robust defence of immigration’s benefits to the UK. Instead of past convergence 
on the demonization of immigrants, Blair’s direct challenge to Howard’s campaign pictured 
the opposition as unrealistic and populist. 
Finally, the Liberal Democrats proposed the introduction of a quota system for labour inflows 
set by an independent panel (BBC, 2004). The Liberal Democrats’ manifesto devoted less 
salience to immigration policy and only addressed labour and asylum inflows (Figure 6.1, 
Liberal Democrats, 2005). Migration’s economic benefits were praised and a new 
governmental agency to deal only with asylum was proposed, as well as the suppression of 
refugees’ ineligibility to work (Liberal Democrats, 2005). Hence, the Liberal Democrats 
converged with the Conservatives on the establishment of a quota system for labour inflows. 
In short, the salience of immigration policy expanded considerably at the 2005 general 
election in comparison to 2001, and asylum and irregular inflows were the most salient types 
of inflows. A broad inter-party consensus was observed on the benefits of labour inflows 
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demonstrating the success of Labour’s narrative of managed migration in leading the political 
debate. Nonetheless, the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats converged on the proposal 
of a quota system for labour inflow while Labour and the Conservatives agreed on deploying 
high profile security measures to tackle the supposed widespread abuse of the immigration 
system.  
Despite the increasing salience of immigration and the more restrictive positions of British 
mainstream parties in comparison to 2001, the BNP had no impact on inter-party competition 
on immigration policy at the 2005 general election. Intense salience of immigration at the 
electoral campaign was an outcome of the intense inter-party competition between Labour 
and the Conservatives on this issue, observed since the early 2000s. The Conservatives’ 
valence issue strategy was designed to appeal to the wider electorate and tackle the success of 
UKIP, not the BNP. However, Blair’s occupation of the centre-right ground on immigration 
policy pushed Howard to increasingly extremist grounds, a trend reinforced by his failure to 
challenge the government’s record on other key areas. Once more, the Conservatives’ 
escalation of their populist approach to asylum and restrictive mainstream parties’ 
consensuses developed in a political context marked by a non-relevant ERP. It presaged the 
BNP’s electoral breakthrough at national level and cannot be conceived a response to the 
ERP’s moderate success at local elections before 2005.   
The BNP’s lack of impact on inter-party competition on immigration at the 2005 general 
election coincided with its insignificant electoral threat and with the agency of mainstream 
parties. In contrast, the expansion of immigration rates up to 2005 (mostly supported by the 
increase of grants of settlement for asylum and labour purposes; see Figure 5.2) and the high 
salience of immigration amongst the public opinion (Figure 6.2) failed to coincide with the 
preceding observation. The BNP’s failure to mount an electoral threat to mainstream parties 
was evident by its lack of electoral breakthrough at national level before 
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Figure 6.2 – Most important issue at the British 2005 general election (N=3,589) 
 
Source: BES 2005, Pre-election 
2005 (Table 5.1). Finally, British mainstream parties’ full isolation of the BNP at the fringes 
of the party system also diminished Griffin’s chances to influence the BNP’s competitors 
positions on immigration. Within the former context, the BNP non-relevant electoral threat to 
mainstream parties at the 2005 general election seemed the most important factor behind this 
party’s lack of impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
6.1.2 – BNP impact on public attitudes   
Whereas immigration was considered largely irrelevant by the British electorate in 2001, 
significant levels of hostility towards this social phenomenon had been observed across the 
electorate. Now, did the BNP intensify levels of concern and hostility towards immigration 
across British public opinion at the 2005 general election? Immigration became the top 
priority issue of British voters and this social phenomenon was associated mostly with 
employment concerns in 2005. Despite these observations, this research points to the BNP’s 
lack of impact on public attitudes to immigration. The British ERP’s irrelevant levels of 
16.8% 16.4% 
9.2% 
7.2% 
5.7% 5.7% 
3.6% 
2.8% 
1.8% 1.3% 
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
164 
 
electoral support at national level and its subsequent limited party organisation were 
considered the most relevant factors behind the preceding observation (Table 2.1).  
Surprisingly, immigration (in particular asylum) was the top priority of British voters at the 
2005 general election, above the NHS or law and order (Figure 6.2). This trend had not been 
observed in the UK since the late 1970s, when Thatcher informally co-opted the British NF 
discourse on immigration (Geddes and Tongue, 2005). The acute rise of concern with 
immigration in 2005 developed in the context a dramatic drop on asylum seeking into the UK 
and cannot be dissociated from the intense inter-party competition on immigration between 
Labour and the Conservatives through Blair’s second term (Figure 5.9). The Conservatives 
continued to be ranked as the best party to deal with immigration by voters most concerned 
with this issue, but the advantage over Labour was cut to eight percentage points (Figure 6.3). 
Furthermore, the BNP was considered a better party to deal with immigration by such voters 
than UKIP, and ranked at similar levels to the Liberal Democrats (Figure 6.3). This 
contrasted with its insignificance in 2001. Yet, the BNP was still very far from holding the 
issue ownership of opposition to immigration.   
British public attitudes to immigration at the 2005 general election were similar to those at 
the 2001 ballot. Immigration continued to be perceived mostly as a threat to employment by a 
majority of respondents to the BES 2005 pre-electoral survey (Figure 6.4). Immigration was 
also positively regarded as a source of new ideas and cultures to the UK by a majority of such 
respondents (Figure 6.5). Once more, separate analysis of BNP voters’ attitudes towards 
immigration is prevented by the residual sample of this party’s voters in the BES 2005.46 A 
majority of the respondents to an IPSOS-MORI poll in March 2005 also rejected the 
association between immigration and the growth of criminality in March 2005 (Figure 6.6).  
                                                 
46
 Only 7 respondents sympathised with the BNP out of an entire sample pool of 3,542 British respondents 
(BES, 2005). 
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Figure 6.3 – Best party to deal with asylum seekers among respondents who ranked 
immigration as top priority at the British 2005 general election (N = 603) 
 
Source – BES 2005 Pre-election 
Figure 6.4 – Public perception of immigration and employment at the British 2005 general 
election (N = 3,589) 
 
Source – BES 2005 Pre-election 
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Figure 6.5 – Public perception of immigration contribution to cultural enrichment at the 
British 2005 general election (N = 3,589) 
 
Source – BES 2005 Pre-election 
Figure 6.6 – Public perception of immigration and criminality at the British 2005 general 
election (N = 1, 004) 
 
Source – IPSOS-MORI Poll, 2005 
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Hostility to immigration at the 2005 general election persisted at similar levels to the 2001 
ballot despite the intense concern across the electorate. Therefore, the BNP failed to intensify 
resentment towards immigration amongst the British electorate increasing the responsibility 
of the British mainstream parties for the observed trends across public concern with 
immigration. Moreover, the expansion of concern exceeded the expansion of electoral 
support for the British ERP while the levels of hostility to immigration were similar to those 
observed in 2001. The trends in public attitudes to immigration observed in 2005 should be 
regarded as an outcome of the intense mainstream inter-party competition on immigration 
and the hegemony of widespread abuse of the immigration system in mainstream political 
elites’ discourse on immigration.  
Overall, the BNP lacked impact on public attitudes to immigration at the 2005 general 
election. This observation coincided with the BNP limited electoral support and with the 
agency of mainstream parties (Table 2.1). The opposite relationship was found with the 
expansion of immigration up to 2005, mainly supported by the growth of labour and intra-EU 
immigration flows (see Figure 5.2). The coincidence between the levels of immigration and 
the dramatic expansion of concern with immigration suggests that the increasing presence of 
immigrants might have influenced public attitudes to immigration, but this relationship is 
challenged by the observations across France and Italy in the second half of the 2000s (see 
Chapters 8; 10). 
The BNP’s tiny electoral organisation was illustrated by the absence of a breakthrough at 
national level and the number of constituencies contested at the 2005 general election (Table 
6.1). Finally, British mainstream parties’ isolation of the BNP, plus Howard’s direct attack, 
reinforced the BNP’s pariah status amongst the public opinion and deprived Griffin of 
exogenous support to have an impact on public views of immigration. The BNP’s  electoral 
support seems the most relevant factors behind its lack of impact on public attitudes in 2005 
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and the trends across public attitudes to immigration cannot be conceived as an outcome of 
the British ERP’s agency. Thus, responsibility for the high concern with immigration in 2005 
lay elsewhere than with the BNP, enhancing the profile of mainstream parties’ discourse over 
public attitudes to immigration. 
6.1.3 – Electoral results 
Blair collected his third consecutive victory at the 2005 ballot though with the lowest share of 
the vote for a single party-majority in the UK (Kavannagh and Butler; 2005). Labour’s share 
of the vote plummeted to 36.2 per cent whilst the Conservatives registered marginal gains 
with 32.3 per cent. Nevertheless, Labour enjoyed a 66 seats majority in Parliament due to the 
first-past-the-post electoral system (Norris, 2005). Once more, the Conservatives’ campaign 
failed to go beyond its core voters and Howard presented his resignation as party leader 
(Bale, 2010). The BNP observed a fourfold growth of its electoral share in comparison to 
2001 and saved deposits in 34 constituencies. Richard Barnbrook achieved a new BNP record 
in Barking with 16.9 per cent of the vote whilst Griffin collected a mere 9.2 per cent in 
Keighley (Copsey, 2009; Table 6.1). Data suggests that the BNP continued to perform most 
strongly among Labour’s disenfranchised working class than among Conservative voters 
(Wlezien and Norris, 2005).  
6.2 – The BNP development between 2005 and 2009 
This chapter’s second section explores the BNP’s discourse on immigration and its position 
within the British party system between 2005 and 2009. Did the BNP fully consolidate its 
ideological shift from a neo-Nazi ERP party model into an authoritarian xenophobic model 
through this period? At the broad level, Griffin’s leadership effectively repositioned the BNP 
as an authoritarian xenophobic ERP, yet doubts persist over the extent of this ideological   
169 
 
Table 6.1 – Votes for BNP at general, EP and London Assembly elections between 2005 and 
2009 
Year Election 
Number of 
votes 
Contested 
Constituencies 
Proportion of total  
on contested 
constituencies 
2005 General  192,850 119 4.3% 
2008 
London 
Assembly
1
 
130,714 – 5.42% 
2009 EP
2
 943,598 – 6.2% 
1
 Votes for London-wide Assembly Members – London totals 
2 Average of the vote across Britain 
Source: London Elects, 2008; Tetteh, 2009  
 
reform beyond the surface level. Whereas the BNP’s electoral support increased rapidly 
during Labour’s second term in office, did the BNP finally attain its long-awaited 
breakthrough into mainstream politics during Labour’s third term? After the deceleration of 
its electoral growth at the local level from 2006 onwards, the BNP finally broke the mould of 
British mainstream politics after the 2008 London Assembly election and the 2009 EP 
elections.  
6.2.1 – 2005 ideological reform 
New critical approaches to the British state and to multiculturalism were the two main 
benchmarks of Griffin’s ideological reform included in the 2005 electoral manifesto. The 
BNP was now the utmost defender of free speech both against the excessive powers of the 
British state and the “liberal elite” that haunted the party. Griffin sought to dilute the BNP’s 
strong Fascist image and simultaneously present the party as a victim of a liberal conspiracy 
responsible for the BNP’s judicial persecution (Copsey, 2009). The second innovation 
involved the opposition to multiculturalism on cultural xenophobic grounds, as observed in 
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Griffin’s articles published in 2003 (Griffin, 2003). Eugenic conceptions of the British race 
were replaced by the “genocide through integration” of immigrants of distinct cultures (BNP, 
2005, p. 20). Multiculturalism was no longer the outcome of a Semitic conspiracy but a 
product of the “blind economic force of global capitalism” (Griffin, 2003; BNP, 2005, p. 19). 
However, Griffin’s modernisation project faced increasing difficulties to appease his core 
voters and simultaneously expand the party’s electoral support (Eatwell, 2010).  
The 7/7 2005 terrorist attacks in London were quickly exploited by pamphlets with photos of 
the attack under a headline: “Maybe it’s time to start listening to the BNP” (Copsey, 2009). 
After the 2005 judicial investigation, Griffin was acquitted of charges of incitement to racial 
hatred by a jury in a court in Leeds in February 2006.
 47
  An exuberant Griffin stated that his 
party would continue to uphold the right to freedom of speech. Furthermore, he did not 
oppose asylum seeking but was against the “government for putting their people above our 
people” (Guardian, 2006a). The BNP anti-immigration positions were apparently refocused 
on the government rather on the immigrants themselves – a strategy the FN has pursued in 
the past. Nevertheless, doubts persisted over the depth of Griffin’s ideological shift and 
whether it was consolidated beyond the surface level by 2010 (Goodwin and Eatwell, 
2010).
48
 
6.2.2 – 2006 and 2007 local elections 
At the May 2006 local elections, the BNP obtained a further 33 local council seats bringing 
its total to 48 (Table 6.2). This success had been preceded by an attack by the newly elected 
Conservative leader, David Cameron, who denounced the BNP as an organisation that 
“thrives on hatred” (Independent, 2006). The BNP’s best result in Barking and Dagenham, 
                                                 
47
 In a later retrial in November 2006, the BNP leader and his counterparts were acquitted once more 
(Eatwell, 2010). 
48
 The promotion of Arthur Kemp – a white supremacist author of far right classics on the “white race and 
its destiny” – as Griffin’s aide reinforced such doubts (Gable and Ossowski, 2009). 
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where 12 local councillors were elected, was largely associated with a Labour Minister’s 
public interview before the ballot. Margaret Hodge (Dagenham MP) claimed that the “white 
working class” was deserting Labour because: “they can't get a home for their children, they 
see black and ethnic minority communities moving in and they are angry” (Daily Telegraph, 
2006). Endowed with far superior political capital than Griffin, Hodge provided visibility and 
legitimacy to the BNP’s “Africans for Essex” campaign (Koopmans and Muis, 2009). 
Subsequently, the BNP’s profile in the media was enhanced to unprecedented levels 
(Guardian, 2006b). 
Table 6.2 – BNP performance at local elections between 2005 and 2009 
Year Candidates Councils Votes Seats won 
Total of 
seats 
2005 41 18 21,775 0 21 
2006 363 78 229,389 33 48 
2007 744 148 292,911 10 50 
2008 612 159 240,968 15 55 
2009 428 - - 3 58 
Source: Tetteh, 2009 
Positive results at the 2006 local elections fuelled Griffin’s expectations for the short-term 
future and he sought to maintain the momentum at the 2007 local elections. The BNP 
continued to benefit from contagion effects of its welfare xenophobia and Griffin granted his 
support to Hodge’s proposal to prioritise British-born families’ access to council homes over 
immigrants (Guardian, 2007a).
 49
 The BNP doubled the number of candidates presented at the 
2007 ballots, yet it only won 10 more local seats (Table 6.2). This time, the BNP’s electoral 
                                                 
49
 A study carried for the Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) in 2009 found that only 1.8 per 
cent of social tenants were immigrants who had moved to the UK in the past 5 years. Furthermore, 87.8 
per cent were UK born. The report also mentioned that despite the lack of evidence of abuse of the system 
by immigration, “those perceptions were widespread in certain areas” (Guardian, 2009a). This social 
problem reflected the “failure to supply social housing to meet the demands of the population” (Guardian, 
2009a). 
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expansion developed at the expense of the Conservative Party, as the party faced increasing 
difficulties in Labour strongholds (five of the local seats were taken from the Conservative 
Party; Copsey, 2009). Overall results indicated a deceleration of the BNP’s rate of electoral 
growth, also evident at the 2008 local elections (Table 6.2).  
The BNP leader’s electoral strategy overstretched his party’s scarce resources without 
attaining success and deepened the BNP’s financial crisis evident since 2006 (Goodwin, 
2010). Furthermore, the BNP contested the Scottish and Welsh parliamentary elections 
without winning any seats, despite the use of PR in these ballots (Ford, 2010). Meanwhile, 
the high salience of immigration policy in British politics and the Labour’s government 
discursive realignment on immigration policy from mid-2007 onwards favoured the BNP’s 
political opportunities. However, an internal dispute led to several resignations and a purge in 
the party ranks after an unsuccessful leadership coup in December 2007. By the spring of 
2008, the dissidents launched an umbrella group named the “Voice of Change” that attacked 
Griffin’s leadership without disclosing any relevant policy differences (Miller et al., 2010). 
This event marked the return of the endemic internal instability, a trend that persisted up to 
2010 and threatened the BNP’s existence.  
6.2.3 – 2008 London Assembly elections and 2009 European elections 
In early March 2008, Griffin was invited for an interview on the BBC’s Newsnight 
programme entitled “White Season” focusing on the alleged under–representation of the 
British “White working class.” This series enhanced the visibility of the BNP’s long-standing 
campaign of “Rights for Whites” (Guardian, 2008). During his interview, Griffin accused 
Muslims of being responsible for Britain’s hard drugs problem in another demonstration of 
its xenophobia towards Islam and demonization of immigrants. This event also exposed his 
lack of charisma and limited media skills in comparison to Le Pen in France or Bossi in Italy 
(Eatwell, 2010). The BNP acquired its first high profile position in the British political 
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system at the 2008 London General Assembly election. Barnbrook was elected as a BNP 
representative in the Assembly with 5.4 per cent of the vote, a slight increase in comparison 
to 2004 (Table 6.3). Once more, the ballot results suggested the slowing of BNP electoral 
expansion but its breakthrough into mainstream politics was now closer.  
A vast MPs’ expenses scandal broke out in 2009 involving hundreds of MPs, publicly 
accused of abusing the system for reimbursement of expenses (Newell, 2010). The 
subsequent intense public distrust in mainstream parties, during a period of economic 
downturn, could provide fertile ground for the BNP capitalise at the ballot (Ford, 2010). The 
BNP campaigned for UK withdrawal from the EU, the halting of all further inflows and the 
protection of British jobs (BNP, 2009). Exploiting the Labour government’s discursive 
realignment on immigration, the BNP campaign included posters of Gordon Brown with the 
statement: “British jobs for British workers” underlined by a plea: “When we say it, we mean 
it” (Miller et. al., 2010). In a historic date for the British extreme-right, the BNP won 6.26 per 
cent of the vote in the EP elections of 2009 and elected two MEPs – Griffin for the North 
West and Andrew Brons for the Yorkshire and Humber electoral regions (Table 6.1; in 
contrast the UKIP elected 13 MEPs and was the second most voted for party). Whereas the 
BNP had fewer votes in both regions in 2009 than in 2004, the low turnout (only 34 per cent) 
meant it was able to win more seats under the proportional system (Carter et al., 2010).  
Consequently, the 2009 EP ballot was still a modest achievement considering the highly 
favourable context (Messina, 2011). Shortly afterwards, Griffin faced another judicial 
challenge from the EHRC’s decision that the BNP “whites only” membership policy 
breached the Race Relations Act, which excluded this party from receiving public funding 
(Millet et al., 2010). The BNP was subsequently forced to change its constitution and 
presented its first non-white party member (Guardian, 2009b). In late 2009, the BNP leader 
was invited onto BBC Question Time leading to widespread debate over the provision of a 
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platform to the ERP. Nonetheless, Griffin’s performance in the TV programme was weak 
once more (Guardian, 2009c). A YouGov poll conducted immediately after the programme 
revealed that two-thirds of the respondents definitely refused to vote for the BNP under any 
circumstances (Daily Telegraph, 2009). Consequently, there were still doubts about whether 
the BNP had successfully watered down its deep pariah status during the 2000s (Eatwell and 
Goodwin, 2010).  
In short, Griffin’s ideological reform effectively repositioned the BNP from a Neo–Nazi 
party into an authoritarian xenophobic ERP type at the surface level. The BNP’s overt anti–
Semitism was ditched in favour of cultural xenophobia against Muslims. The ascension of the 
“white working class” and its widespread uncritical use within the British political debate can 
be considered an outcome of the BNP’s rise. Electoral support was consolidated in a limited 
number of localities in local elections between 2005 and 2009. Whereas the BNP rate of 
electoral expansion decelerated significantly from 2006 onwards, its breakthrough into 
mainstream politics still materialised at the 2008 London Assembly election and the 2009 EP 
ballot. Thus, the BNP finally posed a relevant strategic dilemma to mainstream parties in 
second-order-elections beyond the local level by the late 2000s. Yet, this challenge failed to 
extend to the British general election due to the constraints imposed by the first-past-the-post 
system and the high turnouts.    
6.3 – The BNP impact on immigration policy under Labour’s third term 
This research has previously demonstrated that the BNP lacked impact on the development of 
British immigration policy between 2001 and 2005 (see Chapter 5). Now, did the BNP 
reinforce the restrictive character of the British immigration policy developed between 2005 
and 2009? Alternatively, the research also evaluates if the BNP continued to benefit from 
policy developments instead of driving them. Blair’s laissez-faire approach towards HSI was 
watered down in 2007 while the management of inflows was framed under an increasingly 
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security related approach instead of the ‘managed migration’ narrative. Whereas the BNP 
continued to lack impact on policy developments, salient contagion effects on the Labour 
government’s discourse on immigration were observed from 2007 onwards when Gordon 
Brown was Prime Minister with salient repercussions on public attitudes. The BNP’s weak 
electoral challenge posed to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots until the late 2000s was 
regarded as the most relevant factor behind its lack of impact on this dimension of 
immigration policy (Table 2.1).  
6.3.1 – A-8 immigration 
As a consequence of the Labour government’s decision to open the labour market to EU 
citizens from the A-8 states, between 2004 and 2007 there were 769,500 applicants to the 
Worker Registration Scheme, most from Poland (Home Office, 2008). Benefiting from free-
movement, there is evidence to suggest that most of these immigrants settled for short periods 
and the vast majority integrated into the lower tiers of the British labour market (Duvel, 2007; 
Home Office, 2008). The development of intense intra-EU inflows without adequate planning 
to manage their impact on the host society led to pressures on social services in some areas 
(Sales, 2007). As a result, criticisms emerged of the Labour’s government inability to 
anticipate the intensity of A-8 inflows. 
Nonetheless, the option to open the labour market to A-8 immigrants sought to appease high 
demand for workers to perform unskilled jobs in a context of low unemployment (Blair, 
2004). This objective had also been acknowledged in Parliament by the Home Secretary 
Charles Clarke: “We believe that the labour available from EU member states – old and new 
– should over time meet our national needs for low-skilled work”. 50 Consequently, Tier 3 of 
the proposed points-system for non-EU immigrants would not be activated suggesting that 
                                                 
50
 Hansard,7
th
 February 2005, No.430, Col. 1182 
176 
 
the previous redistributive policy model adopted in 2002 towards non-EU labour immigration 
was reversed for regulatory and entrepreneurial politics. This option reflected the political 
pressures from the intensity of A-8 immigration despite the distributive policy adopted 
involving recognition of right to long-term settlement. The politicisation of A-8 immigration 
suggests that the client politics model adopted by the Labour government failed to keep this 
type of immigration off the political radar as had been expected (Table 2.2) 
As Spencer (2007) noted, Labour’s decision to open its labour market to intra–EU inflows 
represented an indirect amnesty to A-8 immigrants irregularly settled in the UK before 2004. 
Another limited regularisation programme involved the concession of a discretionary “family 
amnesty” to all asylum seekers with a dependent minor since 2003 (16,870 families benefited 
from this action by 2006; Duvel, 2007, p. 349). In March 2006, the Home Secretary 
published his policy for a points-system whose primary aim was to enhance public 
confidence (Clarke, 2006, p.4). Henceforth, the government sought to “attract the brightest” 
and simultaneously be “more robust against abuse” packaging a positive approach to HSI 
with the tightening of security controls on immigrants to defuse concern over immigration 
(Clarke, 2006, p.4). This strategy was severely undermined by Clarke’s forced resignation 
after another crisis at the Home Office, involving the failure to deport 1,023 foreign convicts 
after they served their sentences. The opposition leader quickly exploited the government’s 
inefficiency with a new Conservative strategy refocused on government failures rather than 
on immigrants themselves (Smith, 2008).  
6.3.2 – Labour’s adoption of a security approach 
Clarke was replaced in March 2006 by John Reid. This appointment reinforced the hegemony 
of a security related approach to tackle abuse of immigration system over the previous 
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narrative of ‘managed immigration’. 51 A new plan to reform the Immigration and Nationality 
Directorate was published with the following primary objective: “Above all, we need a 
system which protects the security of this country” (Home Office, 2006b, p. 2). 52 Another 
Asylum and Immigration Act was introduced in 2006, the third in less than five years, 
indicating the uninterrupted salience of asylum on the British political agenda. The new bill 
reduced protection granted to refugees, and it was followed by a further drop of asylum 
seeking into the UK (Table 6.3; Figure 5.9). The recurrent association between immigration 
and security by the Labour government after the 2005 electoral campaign provided 
legitimacy to the 2007 UK Borders Bill, which established a new Borders and Immigration 
Agency with extended powers and biometric ID cards for non-EU nationals (Table 6.4).  
Labour’s emphasis on the deployment of biometric technology to root out abuse of the 
immigration system continued to reinforce the perception of widespread deviant behaviour 
amongst immigrants. Furthermore, Blair’s response to each crisis with the publication of a 
new bill or a new strategy eventually intensified public anxiety instead of defusing it 
(Spencer, 2007). Overturning Labour’s liberal policy to intra-EU inflows, Reid announced 
the closure of the British labour market to citizens of the new two-member states: Romania 
and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in January 2007 (Guardian, 2006c). The government’s 
decision was justified with reference to the intensity of A-8 immigration, despite the 
expectation that levels of immigration from the A-2 countries would be lower (Balch, 2009). 
 
                                                 
51
 In November 2008, the former Home Office Secretary John Reid commented in an interview that mass 
migration threatened Britain’s national security: “The great questions of mass migration, international 
crime and international terrorism were much higher than they were previously” (Daily Telegraph, 2008). 
52
 The new document was entitled “Fair, effective, transparent and trusted – Rebuilding confidence in our 
immigration system” pointed to the government’s emphasis on appeasing public opinion through another 
reform. 
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Table 6.3 – Modifications to British immigration policy by the 2006 Immigration and 
Asylum Act 
Primary 
inflows 
Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular inflows 
  Refugee status is granted on a temporary 
basis, reviewed after five years according 
to the safety of the origin country. Extends 
detention and electronic tagging of asylum 
seekers. Allows exclusion of protection 
for refuges associated to terrorism 
Increases penalties for 
hiring of irregular 
immigrants that can 
extend to 2 years 
imprisonment  
Table 6.4 – Modifications to British immigration policy by the 2007 UK Borders bill 
Primary 
inflows 
Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular inflows 
   Imposes compulsory biometric identity documents for non-
EU immigrants. Allows automatic deportation of 
individuals imprisoned for more than 1 year. Extends the 
powers of immigration officers.  
 
6.3.3 – “British jobs for British workers” and the 2008 points system  
In May 2007, Blair left No. 10 and was replaced by Gordon Brown, the Labour Chancellor 
who had long ambitions to become Prime Minister (Rawnsley, 2010). Consequently, Reid 
was replaced at the Home Office by Jacqui Smith, the third Home Secretary in less than three 
years. Facing a financial meltdown during the summer of 2007, the new Labour government 
watered down Blair’s past laissez-faire approach to HSI. In his first speech as Prime Minister 
at the Trade Unions Congress in September 2007, Brown announced his plan to provide “a 
British job on offer for every British worker” (Daily Telegraph, 2007). This programme 
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included the expansion of standards imposed for access to the HSMP
53
 and the subsequent 
association between immigration and employment suggested a crackdown on newcomers to 
increase job availability. Despite the maintenance of the client politics model, the decline of 
HSI observed from 2007 onwards confirmed the British government’s full ability to attain the 
proposed objectives (Figure 5.8). 
At the later Labour Party conference, the new Prime Minister restated his previous pledge: 
“to create British jobs for British workers” and went on to add: 
“let me be clear: any newcomer to Britain who is caught selling drugs or using guns 
will be thrown out. No-one who sells drugs to our children or uses guns has the right 
to stay in our country.” (Brown, 2007, p. 9) 
A first interdiscursive relationship was found between Brown’s framing of immigration as a 
threat to employment and the ERP’s frame of immigration, which helped to legitimise 
curtailed access to the HSMP. Hence, the CDA allowed the identification of another linkage 
between interdiscursive relationship and subsequent illiberal policy developments. 
Effectively, Brown’s speech was interpreted as an attempt to reconnect with the 
disenfranchised working class that had deserted Labour  Party for the BNP and a case of 
clothes-stealing that would later haunt him (Eatwell, 2010). His proposal lacked viability 
because, in relation to his labour argument, EU legislation imposed equal rights to EU 
citizens living and working in the UK. Furthermore, Brown’s rhetoric associated criminality 
with new arrivals implicitly suggesting that immigration could be a threat to law and order in 
the UK, in a period when rights-based EU immigration was particularly intense.
54
 A 
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 The new access criteria included English proficiency tests for HSI and was applied from September 
2007 onwards (Guardian, 2007b). 
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 David Cameron, the Conservative leader, pointed that the prime minister had borrowed a BNP slogan 
whilst Clarke urged his Labour counterpart to end “dog-whistle politics” (Independent, 2008a). 
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prominent Labour trade unionist, Jack Dromey, urged politicians to “stop demonising 
immigrants” (Dromey, 2007).  
A proposal for a limited regularisation programme
55
 presented by the Liberal Democrats was 
quickly rejected by Labour and the Conservatives demonstrating further convergence 
between these two parties (Smith, 2008). Independent studies carried out in 2009 estimated 
the presence of 725,000 irregular immigrants settled in the UK and pointed to the 
unfeasibility of removing such a large number of individuals from the country due to 
financial and human costs (IPPR, 2009). Despite the presence of this large contingent of 
irregular immigrants in the country, this type of immigration was kept off the mainstream 
political agenda.  
In 2008, the government implemented the points-system to reform the 80 different entry 
schemes into the UK. Labour’s policy towards HSI continued to conform to a general outline 
of a client politics model (Table 2.2), but the expansion of criteria to access the Tier 1 
reinforced the declining intensity of HSI (Sales, 2007).
 56
 Yet, the Minister for Borders and 
Immigration, Phil Woolas (Times, 2008), declared in an interview in October 2008 that 
employers favoured hiring immigrants over natives. Furthermore, the minister added that: 
 “In times of economic difficulties, racial stereotyping becomes stronger but also if 
you've got skills shortages you should, as a government, attempt to fill those skills 
shortages with your indigenous population” (Times, 2008).  
A further interdiscursive relationship was found between the Labour government’s discourse 
and the ERPs’ frame of immigration as a threat to the host society, in particular to 
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 Irregular Immigrants would be eligible for citizenship after 10 years if they had no criminal record, 
proved their commitment to the United Kingdom and passed an English and civics test (Independent, 
2007). A similar proposal was agreed by all mainstream candidates at the 2008 London Mayoral Election 
demonstrating the increasing salience of irregular inflows in the British political debate (Independent, 
2008b). 
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 Increase of access criteria to the Tier 1 of the 2008 points-system forced many workers to apply through 
Tier 2. 
181 
 
employment, which had been previously observed in Brown’s speeches in 2007. Therefore, 
the Labour government’s discourse on immigration derailed into extreme-right grounds, as 
the clothes stealing of the BNP’s frame of immigration sought to mobilise Labour’s working 
class and was followed by salient repercussions at a non-discursive level. In a period of 
economic crisis, a series of wildcat strikes erupted in February 2009. The disputes started at 
the Lindsey oil refinery, Lincolnshire, over the hiring of EU workers over British 
counterparts, and this quickly spilled over to a national level, with protesters holding banners 
with Brown’s pledge (Guardian, 2009d). 57 The Labour government’s clothes stealing of the 
ERP’s frame of immigration unintentionally legitimised and influenced anti-immigration 
mobilisations by industrial workers in 2009, months before the BNP’s electoral breakthrough 
at national level at the 2009 elections.
 Consequently, Labour’s employment of the ERP’s 
frame of immigration might have enhanced the BNP’s accomplishment in the late 2000s. 
Summarising, British immigration policy acquired an increasingly restrictive character after 
the 2005 general election, after Labour had shifted its position on immigration policy onto 
centre-right grounds. Henceforth, the narrative of managed migration was replaced by a 
security related approach, especially after Reid’s appointment in 2006. Asylum and intra-EU 
inflows were the most prominent types of inflows in the British political debate. Brown’s 
ascension to No.10 in a period of economic downturn was accompanied by the curb of Blair’s 
laissez-faire approach to HSI. The realignment of the Labour government’s discourse on 
immigration policy to the extreme-right grounds suggested that Blair’s cabinet had a more 
liberal approach to immigration than his successor, and was followed by significant public 
mobilisations against immigration. Notwithstanding the contagion effects observed on the 
Labour government’s discourse on immigration in the late 2000s, this thesis suggests that the 
BNP lacked a relevant impact on policy developments during Labour’s third term.  
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 Facing an awkward position, Brown expressed his understanding of people’s anxieties without 
condoning the industrial strike and pressed the unions to halt the protests (Guardian, 2009d).  
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The BNP’s lack of impact coincided with its weak strategic dilemma posed to mainstream 
parties and with the agency of the latter parties rather than with the expansion of immigration 
rates and issue salience in 2005 . Immigration rates expanded between 2005 and 2009, mainly 
supported by intra-EU inflows rather than by non-EU inflows (Figure 5.2). Acute public 
concern over immigration at the 2005 ballot also appears weakly related to the BNP’s 
irrelevant impact on policy developments (Figure 6.3). In contrast, the BNP’s failure to pose 
a substantial challenge to mainstream parties at the 2010 general election coincides with its 
lack of impact. This failure was demonstrated by its late electoral breakthrough into 
mainstream politics at the 2009 EP election whilst the first-past-the-post electoral system 
reduced the BNP’s threat at the general election (Table 6.1). Finally, mainstream parties’ 
non-engagement and ostracism of the British ERP also failed to provide exogenous support 
for the BNP to have an impact on policy developments. Overall, this research highlights the 
BNP’s insignificant electoral threat to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots as the most 
relevant factor behind its lack of impact on policy developments during Labour’s third term. 
6.4 – Conclusions 
Like in 2001, the BNP lacked impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy at the 
2005 general election. The higher salience of immigration was an outcome of intense 
competition between the mainstream parties on this issue rather than of BNP electoral 
successes at local level. Howard’s populist approach to immigration reflected his electoral 
strategy and inability to challenge the government’s record on other issues. Blair’s 
repositioning of Labour onto the centre-right grounds on immigration forced the 
Conservatives to extremist grounds. The Conservatives’ valence campaign on immigration 
was an outcome of the party’s leadership agency rather than a reflection of the BNP’s 
electoral breakthrough at local level. Effectively, the BNP lack of a substantial electoral 
threat to mainstream parties was considered the most relevant factors behind its lack of 
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contagion-effects on this dimension of immigration politics, in the context of expanding 
immigration and intense concern across public opinion.  
Immigration was the top priority issue of the British electorate at the 2005 general election, a 
trend not seen since the late 1970s despite the dramatic drop of asylum seeking into the UK. 
The Conservatives were regarded as the best party to deal with immigration, whilst the BNP 
was ranked at a similar level to the Liberal Democrats. This trend captures some BNP 
progress amongst the voters most concerned with immigration. Levels of hostility to 
immigration in 2005 remained at similar levels to the rates observed in 2001 and this social 
phenomenon continued to be mostly associated with unemployment. Overall, the acute 
expansion of concern and the persistence of levels of hostility to immigration were not 
considered an outcome of BNP’s agency. This ERP’s diminished electoral support and 
insignificant party network at national level was identified as the most relevant factor behind 
the British ERP lack of relevant impact on this dimension of immigration politics. Thus, 
responsibilities for the increasing concern with immigration lay elsewhere than with the BNP 
raising the profile of British mainstream parties’ influence on public attitudes to immigration.  
The 2005 general elections were marked by Griffin’s ideological reform that repositioned the 
BNP from a neo-Nazi to an authoritarian xenophobic type, at least at surface level. The BNP 
benefited from higher levels of media exposure and the ascension of the “White working 
class” on the political agenda was the outcome of the BNP’s agency. The BNP electoral 
inroads at the local level progressed between 2005 and 2009 but its rate of electoral 
expansion decelerated after 2006. Nonetheless, the long-awaited breakthrough at national 
level was finally achieved at the 2008 London Assembly elections and at the 2009 EP ballot. 
For the first time in British history, an ERP broke into British mainstream politics. 
Nonetheless, the BNP’s performance at the 2009 EP ballot was modest considering the highly 
favourable set of political opportunities.  
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During Labour’s third term, British immigration policy acquired an increasingly restrictive 
character framed as a security issue in place of the previous narrative of “managed 
migration”. This policy shift reflected Labour’s new priorities set before the 2005 general 
election to neutralise the Conservatives’ challenge on this issue and defuse public concern 
over immigration. The interest group model adopted for immigration from non-EU countries 
was replaced by an entrepreneurial politics model, reflecting the controversy over the adopted 
client politics model towards immigration from the A-8 countries. Further restrictions on 
asylum were deployed in 2006 indicating the continuity of an entrepreneurial politics model 
and high salience of this type of immigration in the British context. 
Blair’s laissez-faire approach to HSI was watered-down after Brown’s ascension to No. 10 in 
a context of economic downturn without dropping the adopted client politics model. The 
BNP’s contagion-effects on the Brown government’s discourse on immigration had salient 
repercussions on non-discursive events such as the anti-immigration mobilisations of 
industrial workers in 2009. Nonetheless, the BNP lacked impact on the development of the 
British immigration policy. This was because of the fact that the party posed a trivial threat to 
mainstream parties at the first-order-ballots and because the mainstream parties did not 
engage with the British ERP.  
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Chapter 7 – The FN impact on French immigration policy from 2002 to 2007 
“The wheel of legal immigration is entirely fed by inflows that we endure, as family 
reunion processes and asylum seekers”  
Minister of Interior, Nicholas Sarkozy (2003, p. 3) 
 
After the overview of the BNP’s impact on immigration politics and policy in the UK during 
the 2000s throughout the last two chapters, this seventh chapter explores the FN’s impact on 
French immigration politics and policy between 2002 and 2007. Regarded as the most 
prominent member of the ERP family in Western Europe, the FN was unable to hold cabinet 
seats as the LN had in Italy. Despite its isolation within the French party system, the FN is 
regarded as the main driving force behind French political debate on immigration since the 
early 1980s (Schain, 1994). A political earthquake occurred at the first round of the 2002 
presidential election when Le Pen progressed to the second round instead of the Socialist 
Lionel Jospin. Within this context, did the FN have a salient impact on inter-party 
competition, public attitudes, and the development of immigration policy?  
The first section focuses on the 2002 presidential election and addresses both: i) FN impact 
on inter-party competition on immigration policy, as well as ii) FN contagion effects on 
public attitudes to immigration. This research will point out that immigration policy was 
practically absent from mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns for the 2002 presidential 
election, which deprived the FN of contagion effects over its competitors’ proposals. In 
contrast, high levels of concern and widespread hostility to immigration across French public 
opinion were observed in 2002. This research will suggest that the FN had a very significant 
impact on public attitudes towards immigration in 2002 and reinforced the concern and 
hostility to immigration across the French electorate.  
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The FN development between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections is analysed through 
the chapter’s second section to assess the FN’s position within the French party system and 
Le Pen’s discourse on immigration. The 2002 presidential election constituted a Pyrrhic 
victory for Le Pen, yet the FN demonstrated solid levels of electoral resilience before the 
2007 presidential election. Cultural xenophobia continued to be a cornerstone of the FN’s 
approach to immigration until 2007, while Le Pen continuously demanded a halt to regular 
inflows into France. Finally, the third section probes FN impact on French immigration 
policy during Chirac’s final presidential term. The Interior Minister Nicholas Sarkozy 
became closely associated with the development of French immigration policy, especially 
after the policy shift to a “selective” immigration policy from 2005 onwards. This research 
will contend that the FN had an indirect and significant impact on policy developments, 
considered disproportional in light of its isolation within the domestic party system.  
7.1 – The 2002 presidential elections: a political earthquake 
The 2002 presidential election was perceived as a long-awaited duel between President 
Chirac and the socialist Prime Minister Jospin after five years of peaceful co-habitation. This 
trend diminished the public’s perception of the PS as being a genuine opposition party 
(Parodi, 2003). Furthermore, the announced pre-selection of the candidates of the two 
mainstream parties made it difficult to mobilise the electorate as demonstrated by the drop in 
turnout to 71.6 per cent (Sauger, 2009). The greatest novelty at this ballot was the great 
number of presidential candidates – 16 at the ballot, which was expected to promote a 
fragmentation of the vote (Perrineau and Ysmal, 2004).
58
 After this brief contextualisation of 
the 2002 presidential ballot, the FN contagion effects on inter-party competition policy is 
now examined.  
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 Fragmentation was expected to be higher amongst left-wing parties due to the candidature of Jospin’s 
former Interior Minister Jean Pierre Chevènement. 
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7.1.1 – FN impact on inter-party competition  
Did the FN reinforce the restrictive character of mainstream party positions on immigration 
policy and issue salience in their electoral manifestos? Immigration was irrelevant within the 
mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns at the 2002 presidential election in contrast to the 
high salience conceded by the FN. The research developed below argues that Le Pen’s party 
lacked any impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy at the 2002 
presidential ballot. The analysis highlights the agency of mainstream parties as the most 
relevant factor behind the FN’s lack of contagion effects on this dimension of immigration 
politics (Table 2.1).  
7.1.1.1 – French mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy 
In 2002, the electoral campaigns of the French mainstream parties were overwhelming 
regarded as dominated by a single-issue: insecurity associated with crime rates (Perrineau and 
Ysmal, 2004; Cole, 2002). Immigration policy was virtually absent from the electoral 
strategies of mainstream parties for the 2002 presidential election both in their electoral 
campaigns and party manifestos (Figure 7.1). Chirac’s electoral manifesto lacked a single 
reference to immigration policy whilst the only reference found in Jospin’s manifesto 
mentioned the creation of an EU police force to control member states’ borders (PS, 2002, 
p.12). The centrist UDF candidate Bayrou mentioned the creation of a common EU 
immigration and asylum policy (Le Monde, 2002a). 
This “conspiracy of silence” on immigration policy among French mainstream parties can be 
understood as an outcome of the Republican pact proposed by Jospin in 1998 and Chirac’s 
rejection to engage with the FN, as demonstrated at the 1998 regional elections (Kitschelt, 
1995; see Chapter 4). Overall, the RPR and PS electoral campaigns were regarded as a “rush 
to the centre” (Gerstlé, 2003). The absence of immigration policy from mainstream parties’ 
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electoral campaigns was surprising in light of the FN’s weight within the French party system 
through the 1990s. This observation also contrasts with the moderate salience of immigration 
at the electoral campaign for the British 2001 general elections (see Chapter 5).  
Figure 7.1 – Salience of immigration policy in French parties’ electoral manifestos at the 
2002 presidential elections  
 
Source: FN, 2001; PS, 2002. 
7.1.1.2 – The FN electoral campaign: the binomial “immigration-invasion”  
The French political context in 2002 provided a very favourable set of political opportunities 
for Le Pen’s candidacy.59 Chirac and Jospin’s long co-habitation favoured a ‘protest vote’ 
against the dominant parties (Perrineau, 2003). Additionally, Le Pen benefited from the 
hegemony of insecurity within the electoral campaigns of the mainstream parties since he 
was perceived as the best candidate on this issue (Cautrès, 2003). In the face of Chirac’s 
agenda, the veteran FN leader predicted that: “the lepenisation of minds will end up bringing 
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 Difficulties to collect the 500 required signatures to participate in the presidential ballot expanded the 
FN’s democratic legitimacy after support for Le Pen’s inclusion from usually unsympathetic quarters of 
the political system (Vedel, 2007). 
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politicians’ discourse closer to our own” (quoted from Perrineau, 2003, p.206). Finally, Le 
Pen also enjoyed high levels of media coverage during the pre-campaign period coupled with 
an indifferent treatment during the first round of the electoral campaign (Gérstle, 2003; 
Mercier, 2003).  
On immigration policy, Le Pen considered that: “the immigration-invasion of millions of 
foreigners dilutes the required identity of our people and dangerously aggravates criminality” 
(Le Pen, 2001). FN cultural xenophobia was also evident in Carl Lang’s60 statement that 
immigrants’ “integration leads to national disintegration” (quoted from Ivaldi, 2005, p. 20). 
The electoral manifesto for the 2002 presidential elections stated that: “The massive 
immigration that we [French] endure threatens our national identity and consequently 
France’s existence” (FN, 2001, p.26). Thus, the articulation of immigration as an illegitimate 
social phenomenon and a threat to French identity was overwhelming in the FN’s approach to 
immigration. 
The higher intensity of family inflows as compared to labour immigration was decried by the 
FN manifesto whilst the right to asylum and concession of long-term residence authorisations 
were the cause for the “savage” levels of immigration (FN, 2001, p. 18). Immigration policy 
had acute salience within the FN electoral manifesto, which addressed all its four distinct 
dimensions (Figure 7.1; FN, 2001). During the second round electoral campaign, Le Pen 
adopted the innocuous slogan of “reversing the current” and campaigned for the halt of all 
legal inflows coupled with an “imperative” repeal of the constitutional article protecting 
individuals’ right to conduct a family life (Le Monde, 2002b). The FN agenda therefore 
articulated immigration as a threat to French national identity and Le Pen focused his 
criticism on regular types of immigration like family reunion and asylum.  
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 The FN general secretary.  
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Overall, the FN failed to intensify the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions 
and the salience of immigration at the 2002 presidential election. Williams’ (2006, p. 201) 
assertion that Le Pen forced established parties to readjust their agendas to a necessary 
consensus on restricting immigration during the 1990s is therefore not observed in 2002. This 
trend indicates that such political process may have a more contingent nature than being an 
unconditional consequence of the FN’s political relevance. De facto, the FN’s lack of impact 
on inter-party competition appears weakly related to the first three factors (Table 2.1). The 
levels of immigration into France increased before 2002, mainly supported by the growth of 
family reunion processes (Figure 7.2), whilst this issue was also amongst the top four priority 
issues of the French electorate (Figure 7.3).  
As the preceding presidential elections demonstrated, the dynamic of these ballots favoured 
Le Pen’s profile and the FN posed a substantial obstacle to mainstream parties’ ambitions in 
2002 (Table 4.3). The refusal of mainstream parties to engage with the FN and their 
exclusion of immigration form their electoral campaigns deprived the FN from having 
contagion effects on inter-party competition. In short, the agency of mainstream parties was 
considered the most important factor behind the FN’s lack of impact on inter-party 
competition on immigration policy at the 2002 ballot. The “conspiracy of silence” on 
immigration demonstrated that mainstream political elites enjoy full autonomy to set their 
electoral strategies independently of the intensity of immigration flows, the salience of 
immigration and the dimension of the ERP’s electoral threat (Table 2.1).  
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Figure 7.2 – Grants of settlement by category of grant in France, excluding EEA and Swiss 
nationals between 2000 and 2009 
 
Source: SGCICI, 2007, 2011 
 
Figure 7.3 – Most important issue at the French 2002 presidential elections 
 
Source: PEF 2002, vague 1  
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7.1.2 – FN impact on public attitudes  
Did the FN intensify the anxiety and hostility towards immigration across French public 
opinion in 2002? Immigration was amongst French voters’ top priorities at the 2002 
presidential election and hostility towards immigration was widespread. This research 
suggests that the FN had a very significant impact on public attitudes to immigration at this 
2002 ballot and the “Lepenisation of minds” was acute across French public opinion. The FN 
level of electoral support is considered as the most relevant factor behind the widespread 
“Lepenisation of minds” (Table 2.1).   
Unemployment and delinquency were ranked as the most important issues by the French 
electorate in 2002, whilst immigration was ranked as the fourth priority (Figure 7.3). Voters 
most anxious about this issue considered Le Pen as the best candidate to deal with 
immigration. He has a 40 points advantage over Chirac (Figure 7.4). Thus, the FN enjoyed 
the issue ownership of opposition to immigration at the 2002 presidential election and led 
political debate. Despite its intense prominence at the 2002 electoral campaign, linkages 
between insecurity and immigration were low across the French electorate (Cautrès, 2003, p. 
106).  
Regarding general attitudes towards immigration, almost two thirds of the electorate agreed 
that there were too many immigrants in France, while the FN electorate overwhelmingly 
shared this perception (Figure 7.5). In addition, over half of the respondents expressed a 
strong sense of alienation in their own home country, while this sentiment was also higher 
across FN voters (Figure 7.6). As these trends suggest, the FN’s core electorate was still 
distinctive for its extreme xenophobia despite the general levels of hostility to immigration 
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Figure 7.4 – Best candidate to deal with immigration among voters who rank immigration as 
top priority at French 2002 presidential election (N = 268) 
 
Source – PEF 2002 Vague 1 
 
Figure 7.5 – Public perception of intensity of immigration at French 2002 presidential 
elections (N = 4,017; FN voters = 146) 
 
Source: PEF 2002 Vague 1  
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Figure 7.6 – Public perception of alienation in home country at French 2002 presidential 
elections (N = 4,017; FN voters = 146) 
 
Source: PEF 2002 Vague 1  
across French electorate (Mayer, 2002). The FN’s consolidated electoral support at national 
level and the subsequent broad electoral organisation enabled Le Pen to influence general 
public attitudes unlike the BNP in the UK and the LN in Italy (see Chapters 5 and 9). 
Effectively, the research suggests that the FN had a significant impact on public attitudes to 
immigration at the 2002 presidential ballot and intensified levels of concern and hostility to 
immigration across the national electorate. This classification captures Le Pen’s undisputed 
issue ownership of opposition to immigration and the high levels of hostility to immigration 
across the electorate. The FN’s significant impact on public attitudes in 2002 coincided with 
the expansion of levels of immigration into France and the FN’s substantial level of electoral 
support rather than with the agency of mainstream parties.  
As aforementioned, immigration rates had expanded before the 2002 presidential ballot 
(Figure 7.2). The FN enjoyed strong levels of electoral support at the presidential elections 
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(Table 4.3). Finally, the mainstream parties’ non-engagement  failed to enhance the 
legitimacy of its xenophobic discourse, but their “conspiracy of silence” on immigration left 
the hegemony of Le Pen’s xenophobic approach unchallenged and could have inadvertently 
enhanced surplus space for the “Lepenisation of minds”. Within this context, the FN’s level 
of electoral support and party network are considered the most relevant factors behind Le 
Pen’s impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2002. This trend apparently confirms 
Schain’s (2006) suggestion that the FN and its voters continued to have substantial influence 
on the remaining electorate, as well as Williams’ (2006) assertion that the FN succeeded in 
stirring anxiety and hostility across public opinion in 2002, as was the case in the 1990s.  
7.1.3 – Electoral outcome  
In the context of low turnout, Le Pen obtained 16.8 per cent of the vote and defeated Jospin 
who only collected 16.2 per cent (Table 7.1; Ysmal, 2004). Le Pen’s passage to the second 
round in place of Jospin at the 2002 Presidential elections provoked a political earthquake 
(Miguet, 2003). The incumbent President Chirac collected the lowest score of any outgoing 
President of the Fifth Republic with only 19.9 per cent (Cole, 2002). After the publication of 
the first round results, Chirac addressed French citizens on TV to declare that the electoral 
outcome was a profound attack on Republican values. All French left-wing parties advised a 
vote for Chirac and street mobilisations developed under the slogan of “better a crook than a 
fascist” (Berezin, 2009).  
The electoral campaign in the second round became a referendum on Le Pen and a rally for 
the Republic against extremism whilst Le Pen’s unanticipated success left him without a plan 
for the second round (Perrineau, 2003; Chombeau, 2007). Unsurprisingly, Chirac obtained 
82.2 per cent of the vote in the second round in contrast to Le Pen’s 17.8 per cent (Ysmal, 
2004). Le Pen’s share of the vote in the second round increased marginally by more than 
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700,000 votes, mostly derived from Mégret’s MNR supporters (Cole, 2002). The following 
section assesses explanations for the 2002 earthquake.  
Table 7.1 – Votes for the FN at presidential, parliamentary, regional and EP elections 
between 2002 and 2007 
Year Election Number of votes Per cent of total 
2002 presidential 4,804,713 16.9% 
2002 parliamentary 2,873,556 11.4% 
2004 regional 3,564,059 14.7% 
2004 EP 1,684,947 9.8% 
Source: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 2011 
7.2 – The FN: from the 2002 presidential elections to 2007 
This second section explores the FN’s position within the French party system and its 
discourse on immigration. To what extent did the FN still pose an electoral threat to 
mainstream parties at the 2007 presidential election? This research shows that the FN enjoyed 
a strong electoral resilience during the chain of second-order-ballots before 2007 
notwithstanding the acute internal divisions. The ascension of Marine Le Pen as Le Pen’s 
successor had important repercussions on the FN’s political strategy. Nonetheless, cultural 
xenophobia, alongside the defence of a zero-immigration policy, continued to be a 
cornerstone of the FN’s ideology until the preparations for the 2007 presidential campaign.  
7.2.1 – Explanations for the 2002 earthquake  
Whereas the first round of the 2002 presidential election marked the highest point in Le Pen’s 
political career, the second round revealed the limits of his success. Perrineau (2003) 
interpreted the first round result as a protest vote against the French political system and 
emphasised Le Pen’s capitalisation on the electorate’s disgruntlement with the Chirac-Jospin 
co-habitation (Parodi, 2002). However, comparison between Le Pen’s results at the 1995 and 
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2002 presidential ballots suggest a strong level of stability rather than a contingent upswing 
while the FN’s inability to expand its electoral share beyond the extreme-right fringe between 
rounds also diminishes the relevance of the protest thesis (Tables 4.3, 7.1; Neocleous and 
Startin, 2003; Ysmal, 2004). Le Pen’s success at the 2002 presidential election reflected 
Jospin’s disastrous electoral result61 and the recovery of the FN’s loyal electorate of the 
1990s (Jaffré, 2003; Duhamel, 2008; Shields, 2009). Finally, Le Pen’s failure to present an 
alternative to French mainstream parties at the second round led to the identification of an 
internal credibility deficit and a lack of a culture of government (Shields, 2007, p. 303).  
7.2.2 – The 2002 legislative elections and Le Pen’s succession 
A month after the 2002 presidential elections, the legislative elections occurred in a political 
context dominated by the French public’s rejection of another potential period of co-
habitation and by insecurity concerns (Perrineau, 2003). In the meantime, Chirac created a 
new presidential party – Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle (UMP) under the leadership 
of his loyal supporter Alan Juppé (Haegel, 2002). The UMP was a fusion of centre-right 
parties
62
 designed to dominate the right and respond to the FN threat of forcing triangular 
competitions at the legislative ballot (Shields, 2007). The re-elected French President also 
nominated an interim government under Jean-Pierre Raffarin’s leadership with Nicolas 
Sarkozy as Interior Minister aiming to prevent the FN from exploiting insecurity issues (Cole, 
2002). Sarkozy presented a vast range of policy initiatives with high levels of media coverage 
that were welcomed by extreme-right sympathisers. This overshadowed the PS and the FN’s 
electoral campaigns (Kuhn, 2004).  
In the first round of the 2002 legislative elections, the FN collected 11.4 per cent of votes and 
maintained 71 per cent of the vote obtained at the same round of the preceding presidential 
                                                 
61
 Only 47 per cent of PS sympathisers voted for Jospin in the first round of the 2002 presidential election 
(Duhamel, 2008). 
62
 These parties were the RPR, the Démocratie libérale and part of the UDF. 
198 
 
ballot (Table 7.1; Miguet, 2002). Similar divergences between results at presidential and 
legislative elections were observed in the past (Table 4.3). The FN presented candidates in 37 
second round contests against the 132 in 1997 and failed to elect any deputies (Ysmal, 
2004).
63
 FN results were hampered by high levels of abstention in its strongholds and 
widespread opposition to co-habitation, which enhanced the tactical vote for the UMP 
(Neocleous and Startin, 2003). Unsurprisingly, the UMP won the 2002 legislative election 
with 399 out of 577 seats in the National Assembly (Hollifield, 2004).   
In the aftermath of the 2002 ballots, questions over Le Pen’s succession mounted within the 
FN’s ranks. At the 2003 party congress in Nice, Le Pen promoted his younger daughter, 
Marine Le Pen, to the leadership to enhance her bid for his succession against other potential 
challengers Bruno Gollnisch or Carl Lang (Ivaldi, 2005).
 64
 Marine Le Pen was known for her 
hostility towards Islam and her defence for the FN’s “feminisation” and “modernisation”, 
which involved distancing herself from the traditional FN opposition to abortion and 
contraception (Chombeau, 2007). Her passage to the second round of the 2002 legislative 
elections in Lens (a former left-wing stronghold in Pas-de-Calais) strengthened her popularity 
within the FN (Shields, 2007). However, Marine’s excessive “republicanism” and soft image 
disturbed the FN Catholic faction that supported Gollnisch (Gautier, 2009). Consequently, an 
internal fracture between Marine Le Pen’s and Gollnisch’s factions became evident and the 
FN was unable to present similar levels of internal cohesion to those observed before 
Mégret’s departure in 1998.  
                                                 
63
 The FN’s best result was in Orange, where the FN mayor Jacques Bompard won 42.2 per cent of the 
vote in the second round (Ivaldi, 2005). 
64
 The party’s general deputy and general secretary respectively. 
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7.2.3 – The 2004 regional and EP elections 
A new electoral system
65
 was introduced for the 2004 regional elections clearly designed to 
prevent a repeat of the FN’s 1998 performance. This diminished the FN’s structure of 
political opportunities. In spite of the electoral reform and the isolation imposed by the UMP, 
the electoral support for the FN registered a new record at the 2004 regional elections with 
14.7 per cent of the vote in a context of a higher turnout (Table 7.1; Martin, 2004a). 
Triangular competition was forced by the FN in 17 regions and Le Pen elected 156 electoral 
councillors against 275 in 1998 (Hainsworth, 2005). Despite the decline of the FN’s political 
relevance, Le Pen still contributed to the UMP overall defeat at the 2004 regional elections 
and to the centre-left victory (Shields, 2007).  
During preparations for the 2004 EP election, Le Pen withdrew a prominent member of the 
FN Catholic faction – Marie-France Stirbois66 – from the list of candidates to downgrade the 
party’s “old fashioned image” (Chombeau, 2007). Gollnisch and the Catholic faction leader – 
Bernard Antony – criticised Le Pen’s decision and denounced his despotism in public. 
Moreover, Stirbois and Bompard led a rival summer school in Orange to the event promoted 
by the FN's leadership, which included extensive criticism of Le Pen’s leadership style and 
methods (Gautier, 2009). Whereas Le Pen reacted to Mégret’s challenge with the purge of his 
faction from the party, the possible disruptive effect of a similar action against the internal 
critics imposed caution on the autocratic FN leader (Shields, 2007). The cleavage within the 
FN over Le Pen’s succession persisted. 
                                                 
65
 Previous regional elections developed under a strict proportional system. The new electoral system for 
the regional elections imposed a 10 per cent threshold to access the second round, where coalitions were 
allowed to fuse with other lists that overcome a 5 per cent threshold. The victor of the second round 
collected a bonus of 25 per cent of the seats in the regional assembly with the remaining distributed on a 
proportional basis to party lists constituted on a departmental basis (Martin, 2004).  
66
 The widow of François Stirbois. 
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A new electoral system
67
  was also established at the 2004 EP elections that reduced the FN’s 
structure of political opportunities. The FN electoral manifesto for this ballot also conceded 
high salience to immigration. The EU immigration policy was framed as a threat to French 
sovereignty and the FN argued that: “labour migration does not explain the progression of 
immigration. Today, the engine of immigration is family reunion” (FN, 2004, p. 10). Thus, 
the halt to this type of immigration was at the forefront of Le Pen’s demands. Cultural 
xenophobia was also evident in the FN’s opposition to Turkish EU accession due to the 
subsequent risks to European and French identity (FN, 2004). This thesis is interested to 
evaluate potential interdiscursive relationships between the FN’s particular frame of 
immigration during the electoral campaigns and the French mainstream parties and 
governmental discourse on immigration (see Chapter 2). 
Results at the 2004 EP election were positive, as the FN won 9.81 per cent of the vote and 
obtained seven seats in the EP, which pointed to an electoral recovery after the 1999 setback 
(Table 7.1). The 2004 regional and EP elections demonstrated the FN’s electoral penetration 
across all French regions, as well as the recovery of its core electorate of the 1990s (Ivaldi, 
2005). Hegemony within the ERP family was evident after the successive victories over the 
Mégret’s MNR (which obtained only 0.31 per cent of the vote for the EP) in the two second-
order-ballots after 2002 (Chombeau, 2007). Nonetheless, the two million votes lost between 
the regional and EP ballots demonstrated the FN’s difficulties in mobilising its own electorate 
for the EP ballot and in capitalising on the government’s unpopularity (Minkenberg and 
Perrineau, 2007).
68
  
                                                 
67
 Seats in the EP had been allocated under a nationwide basis in past ballots, whereas the new 2004 
electoral system distributed seats according to eight inter-regional constituencies (Bréchon and Tebbakh, 
2004). 
68
 The high levels of abstention across the FN strongholds reflected internal divisions over both Le Pen’s 
radical approach on Europe and the succession quarrel (Shields, 2007). 
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7.2.4 – “De-demonization” strategy and the 2005 European Constitution referendum  
Months before the 2005 referendum on the EU Constitution, Le Pen’s extremism resurfaced 
once again when, in an interview to an extreme-right newspaper – the Rivarol in the spring of 
2005, he pronounced his attachments to the Vichy regime and expressed his doubts over the 
harshness of the German occupation of France (Le Monde, 2005). On a previous occasion, 
Gollnisch had also expressed his doubts about the Holocaust. These events caused 
apprehension among Marine and her supporters who accused the FN leaders of “demonizing” 
the party and widening its credibility deficit (Shields, 2007). In response, Le Pen revealed his 
doubts over his daughter’s political strategy: “Marine is affable but her strategy of “de-
demonization” has nothing to offer us. The media ignores us. A cordial FN is in nobody’s 
interest” (Le Monde, 2005). In her autobiography published in 2006, Marine expressed her 
inspiration from Fini’s transformation of the MSI into a government party in Italy, but by 
2005 she had not yet won her father over to her de-demonization strategy (Chombeau, 2007).  
During the campaign for the May 2005 referendum on the European Constitution, the FN 
adopted a low profile assuming that an early association with the “No” camp could be 
damaging due to its pariah status (Ivaldi, 2006). The FN electorate could decide the 
referendum outcome and a “No” victory would reinforce the party’s long-standing opposition 
to Europe (Berezin, 2009). Once more, the FN campaign represented the EU integration 
process and immigration as direct menaces to French sovereignty and national identity (Le 
Pen, 2005). The Bolkestein directive on liberalisation of services became a symbol of the 
“No” campaign with the image of the “Polish plumber” eager to swamp the labour market by 
working on substandard wages (Cole et al., 2008). The rejection of the European Constitution 
at the referendum allowed Le Pen to celebrate a rare victory (Hainsworth, 2006). 
Nevertheless, internal divisions over Le Pen’s succession mounted with Bompard abandoning 
the party in 2006 (Knapp and Sawicki, 2008). The succession debate ended up being 
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postponed by Le Pen’s announcement in August 2005 of his candidature for the presidency in 
2007 (Chombeau, 2007).  
In short, the FN recovered its loyal electorate from the 1990s in the succession of second-
order-ballots between the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections. This trend demonstrated the 
FN’s electoral entrenchment in the French party system despite its continuous isolation and 
intense intra-party conflicts over Le Pen’s succession. Triangular competitions were still 
imposed by the FN at the legislative and regional elections, though at a lower level than in the 
past. Thus, Le Pen continued to pose a threat to French mainstream parties’ ambitions at the 
2007 presidential election like the LN in Italy. Cultural xenophobia continued to be a 
cornerstone of FN ideology until the preparation for the 2007 first-order-ballot. Immigration 
was framed as an invasion and a threat to French national identity, whilst Le Pen 
continuously demanded the halt of regular inflows.  
7.3 – FN impact on immigration policy under Chirac’s presidential term 
Did the FN reinforce the restrictive character of immigration policy implemented during 
Chirac’s last presidential term according to its xenophobic agenda? Immigration policy was 
at the top of the French legislative agenda as demonstrated by the approval of two 
immigration laws and a reform of the asylum system in a single presidential term. 
Furthermore, this policy development became closely associated with Sarkozy, especially 
after the policy shift announced in 2005 to attain a stronger balance between “selected 
immigration” and “endured” inflows (Sarkozy, 2005). This thesis indicates that the FN had 
significant and indirect impact on the development of French immigration policy during 
Chirac’s last term. This trend was considered disproportional in light of the FN’s isolation 
within the French party system. As it is shown further on, the agency of mainstream parties 
was considered the most relevant factor behind the preceding observation (Table 2.1).  
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7.3.1 – Immigration law no 2003-1119 
The UMP victory at the 2002 legislative elections led to Chirac’s reconfirmation of 
Raffarin’s government with Sarkozy as Interior Minister. Notwithstanding the absence of 
immigration policy from mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns at the 2002 presidential 
election, this issue became a priority of the new government after 2002. Sarkozy immediately 
deployed his hyperactive style and closed the Sangatte camp in November 2002 (Schuster, 
2003). A reform of French immigration policy was then submitted to the National Assembly 
following a confidential report
69
 detailing abuses in procedures to access family reunification 
and a lack of screening of unfounded asylum claims (Gonneau and Defrance, 2006). In 
parliament, Sarkozy announced that zero-immigration policy was a “myth” thereby 
distancing himself from the FN’s discourse (Sarkozy, 2003, p.1).  
However, Sarkozy added that: “the wheel of legal immigration is entirely fed by inflows that 
we endure, as family reunion processes and asylum seekers” (Sarkozy, 2003, p. 3). The 
employment of CDA allows the identification of an interdiscursive relationship between the 
Interior Minister and the FN over the framing of particular types of regular immigration as 
illegitimate, which would have important future repercussions. The 2003 immigration law 
contained a two-pronged strategy: the abolition of the “double peine” 70 followed by the 
introduction of restrictions to inflows, particularly against irregular immigration (Lochak, 
2004; De Wenden, 2008). In contrast to his socialist predecessor, Sarkozy appeased 
immigrants’ associations by reforming the “double peine” and maintaining the mechanism of 
exceptional regularisation to neutralise demands for a new regularisation programme 
                                                 
69
 This confidential report had been elaborated by a civil servant named Jean Pierre Lafon. 
70
 Double-peine refers to the legal mechanism of double penalty that decrees the 
imprisonment/incarceration of foreign citizens followed by their automatic deportation after expiration of 
judicial sentences deployed by Pasqua in 1993 (Table 7.4) 
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(Guiraudon, 2005; Weil, 2005).
71
 In parallel, these measures concealed the introduction of 
restrictions on the development of primary, secondary and irregular inflows (Table 7.2; 
Schain, 2008).  
Table 7.2 – Modifications to French immigration policy by the 2003 immigration law72  
Primary inflows Family reunion Asylum Irregular inflows 
Probationary period 
required to access to 
long-term residence 
authorisations extend 
from 3 to 5 years. Access 
to residence permits in 
12 departments became 
dependent on signature 
of the CAI 
Extends powers of mayors to 
control marriages between 
nationals and foreigners, as well as 
housing conditions and financial 
resources to apply for family 
reunion visas. Authorities can 
withdraw residence permit for 4 
years after marriage Family 
members who enter France are 
granted temporary residence 
permits for first 3 years.  
 Criminalises 
marriages for 
convenience. 
Extends detention 
limits from 9 to 32 
days. Authorises 
collection of 
biometric data from 
all candidates 
granted entrance 
visas 
 
Due to “difficulties of integration”, proof of integration into French society was for “the first 
time a condition demanded to access long-term residence cards” following Sarkozy’s 
initiative (Sarkozy, 2003, p.1). Consequently, the logic of promoting immigrants’ integration 
through concession of long-term residence authorisations was reversed and the requirements 
demanded for immigrants’ settlement with a regular status were expanded (Verynaud, 2006). 
Moreover, an experimental compulsory Contract d’Accueil et Integration (CAI; contract of 
welcome and integration)
73
 was introduced by the 2003 immigration law, which presupposed 
                                                 
71
 On behalf of this regularisation mechanism, the French state regularised 28,390 irregular immigrants in 
2004; 31,650 in 2005; 32,001 in 2006; 27,511 in 2007 (SGCICI, 2008, p. 94). 
72
 Law n° 2003–1119 of 26th of November 2003 on control of immigration, settlement of foreigners in 
France and nationality.   
73
 This contract obliges foreigners to have language training and civic formation, which includes a 
presentation of French institutions and Republican values, especially on equality between genders and 
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the fusion of the management of immigration with integration policy. Since integration issues 
had been absent from mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns (Le Monde, 2002b), Sarkozy’s 
innovation reflected a new Republican inter-party consensus materialised in the aftermath of 
the 2002 political earthquake (Noiriel, 2008). This consensus entailed the defence of French 
sovereignty from the menace posed by particular immigrant communities, in particular those 
that “resisted to Republican integration with their practices of endogamy” as Sarkozy put it 
(2003, p.3).  
Consequently, another interdiscursive relationship was found between the Interior Minister’s 
discourse on particular types of immigration and the FN frame of immigrant integration as a 
threat to the host society. The employment of CDA allowed the linkages between the latter 
interdiscursive relationship and the legitimation of illiberal practices, such as the fusion of 
immigration and integration policies to be explored. The 2003 immigration law seemed like a 
balancing act that sought to appease both centre-left and right wing voters but the policy’s 
development was influenced by the shockwaves provoked by the 2002 presidential election 
suggesting that the FN had a moderate impact on policy developments. Meanwhile Sarkozy’s 
image of a statesman was strengthened and he was the preferred politician of right-wing 
voters with 91 per cent approval ratings by right-wing voters (IPSOS, 2004; Perrineau, 2008). 
The Interior Minister’s approach to immigration seemed therefore to appease the extreme-
right voters (Schain, 2008b). 
7.3.2 – Law no 2003–1176 of 10th December 2003 on asylum 
Further confirmation of the sudden prioritisation of immigration policy was provided by the 
asylum reform presented by the UMP government in 2003. Asylum seeking in France had 
risen since the approval of the 1998 Chevènement law, yet this type of immigration had been 
                                                                                                                                                        
secularity. This contract is valid for one year and mayors are responsible for supervising abidance with the 
contract. Failure to comply with the contract can lead to the rejection of renewal of residence authorisation.  
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irrelevant in Chirac’s 2002 electoral campaign. Nevertheless, President Chirac claimed in a 
TV interview on 14 of July that: “We must immediately reform asylum (...) Today, when 
someone asks for asylum, the decision takes eighteen months, it is absurd and serves no 
purpose” (RFI, 2002). In less than three months, Chirac had suddenly changed his mind and 
the reform of the asylum system became a top priority, as the FN had campaigned on the halt 
of all regular inflows.    
Doubts continued over the government’s objective to provide a fair and balanced legal 
procedure and simultaneously reduce periods necessary to process asylum claims to two 
months only as the Minister of Foreign Affairs Dominique de Villepin envisaged (de 
Villepin, 2003). In fact, the asylum reform had a clearly restrictive aim that sought to reduce 
asylum seeking in France (Table 7.3; Guiraudon, 2005; Weil, 2005). The most controversial 
modification was the introduction of an internal asylum status
74
 and the authorisation of 
detention of asylum seekers (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2005; Table 7.3). Henceforth, this practice 
became generalised by the UMP’s government and presupposed the criminalisation of 
asylum seekers, as had been the case in the UK from 2002 onwards (Bosworth, 2008). The 
expansion of regulations on asylum seeking suggests the adoption of a regulatory policy and 
an entrepreneurial politics model, like in the UK (Table 2.2). 
 
  
                                                 
74
 Internal asylum is granted to immigrants within protected zones in origin countries. These immigrants 
are ineligible to apply for asylum in France.  
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Table 7.3 – Modifications to French immigration policy by the 2003 asylum law75  
 Primary 
inflows 
Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular 
inflows 
  Abolishes concept of territorial asylum and introduces 
concept of subsidiary protection, annually renewable. 
Introduces notion of internal asylum. Establishes a list 
of “safe” countries. Centralises all asylum demands in 
the OPFRA office. Introduces accelerated procedures. 
Reduces right to appeal of asylum seekers 
  
 
Figure 7.7 – Asylum requests in France between 2000 and 2009 
 
Source: SGCICI, 2007, 2011 
  
                                                 
75
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The outcome of the 2003 asylum law included the reduction of timeframes to evaluate a 
claim to eight months and the dramatic drop of asylum seeking (Sarkozy, 2006, p. 42). The 
French government demonstrated its ability to reduce an undesirable inflow without facing 
insurmountable obstacles (Figure 7.7). The 2003 asylum reform provided further evidence of 
the political shockwaves of the 2002 presidential ballot and Chirac’s new political priorities 
suggesting that the FN had a moderate impact on policy developments. Asylum quickly faded 
from the French political agenda after the 2003 reform. This contrasted with the continuous 
salience of this type of immigration in the UK, after a similar decline of asylum seeking. 
Nonetheless, immigration policy continued to be at the forefront of French political agenda, 
as seen below.  
7.3.3 – The second reform of immigration policy 
By the mid-2000s, the struggle within the centre-right for Chirac’s succession mounted after 
his chances for re-election were overridden by his unpopularity and the UMP’s defeat at the 
2004 regional elections (Cole et al., 2008). By the end of March 2004, Chirac operated a 
second re-shuffle of Raffarin’s unpopular government and allocated the interior ministry to 
his protégé, de Villepin, who was his chosen successor for the UMP presidential nomination 
for the 2007 ballot.
76 Under Chirac’s direct pressure, in November 2004, de Villepin 
announced a plan to tackle the “mass of irregular inflows” framed as a “threat to the French 
Republic” echoing FN discourse on immigration (Corriere della Sera, 2004d). Eager to 
overcome his predecessor’s popularity, de Villepin attacked his predecessor’s legacy as too 
lax and appointed a public official named Maximme Tandonnet to elaborate a confidential 
                                                 
76
 Sarkozy was assigned the Finance Ministry and adopted a low-profile, focusing on winning the UMP 
leadership to launch his own presidential ambitions. Sarkozy’s subsequent victory at the UMP poll was 
followed by his resignation from cabinet, because of Chirac’s opposition to Sarkozy’s accumulation of the 
Finance Ministry alongside the UMP’s leadership (Jeudy and Vignone, 2007). 
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report on immigration policy. This document ranked immigration as a vital issue for the 
French Republic and proposed the introduction of ethnic quotas (Weil, 2007).  
However, Tandonnet’s proposals clashed with France’s Republican paradigm and de Villepin 
disregarded them as inefficient, inapplicable or unconstitutional (Weil, 2007). Furthermore, 
the deployment of ethnic quotas would constitute a huge U-turn by Chirac after his dramatic 
defence of the French Republic against Le Pen’s extremism in 2002. After the 2005 
referendum, Chirac operated his third governmental re-shuffle and appointed de Villepin as 
Prime Minister, whilst Sarkozy was reinstated to the Interior Ministry to boost the UMP 
government’s popularity (Jeudy and Vignone, 2007). The two mains competitors for the 
UMP candidacy to the French presidential election – Sarkozy and de Villepin – were reunited 
in the French executive and immigration policy became a centre of intra-party conflict 
(Schain, 2008b). As the UMP leader, Sarkozy had organised a series of UMP conventions on 
specific topics to launch his precocious electoral campaign and by-pass the President and 
Prime Minister’s agenda-setting powers (Vedel, 2007).  
7.3.3.1 – UMP convention “Selected immigration, ensured integration”  
At the June 2005 UMP convention entitled “Selected immigration, ensured integration”, 
Sarkozy announced that:  
“it was necessary to acknowledge government and parliament’s rights to select 
annually, category by category, the number of persons admitted to settle in French 
territory” (Sarkozy, 2005).  
Subsequently, a quota system was proposed by the Interior Minister but without specifying 
the proposed selection criteria. This shifted the UMP position to anti-equalitarian grounds 
close to the ERPs (Defrance and Gonneau, 2006; Ivaldi, 2008). Sarkozy’s objective was to 
“move from endured immigration to selected immigration” and attain a stronger balance 
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between “labour immigration” and “rights immigration” referring to secondary inflows 
(Sarkozy, 2005). Therefore, a positive approach to labour inflows was packaged with a 
negative approach to other regular inflows similar to the UK Labour government’s approach 
in the early 2000s. The intended intensification of the proportion of labour immigration 
clashed with the decreasing recruitment difficulties observed across the French labour market 
between 2004 and 2006.
77
 Furthermore, an interdiscursive relationship was found between 
the UMP leader’s rhetoric and the FN’s discourse in 2002 (see p. 189; Noiriel, 2008). This 
rhetoric reinforced public perceptions of particular types of immigration as illegitimate in a 
way that drew from the FN’s discourse. This process would have important repercussions at 
the policy development level in the short term.  
This UMP convention marked the subordination of French immigration policy to Sarkozy’s 
presidential ambitions. He adopted a two-pronged strategy to project a rupture with President 
Chirac and simultaneously attract the FN electorate towards his future candidature. First, the 
UMP leader’s awareness that detachment from Chirac’s unpopular figure was required to win 
the UMP presidential nomination led Sarkozy to promote his programme as a “rupture” with 
the President’s political and economic legacy (Perrineau, 2008). The proposal for a quota 
system was coldly received by Chirac, who rejected it in a presidential TV statement in 
November 2005 because of its unfairness, thereby watering-down the scope of FN impact on 
policy developments (Le Monde, 2005b). Effectively, the French domestic political system 
posed a significant constraint on the intensity of this political process. The disagreements 
between the President, Prime Minister and Sarkozy over immigration issues dominated the 
French political agenda (Schain, 2008b). The disputes reinforced Sarkozy’s image as an 
                                                 
77
 An annual survey undertaken in France pointed out that the proportion of employers that faced 
recruitment difficulties in 2004 was 46 per cent of the total of the respondents; 45 per cent in 2005; 44 per 
cent in 2006; and 46 per cent in 2007 (CREDOC, 2008). The research developed in 2005 highlighted the 
existence of recruitment difficulties with a structural character in: the construction sector (builders, 
plumbers), the health sector (nurses and care assistants) and the catering sector (CREDOC, 2005, p. 2). 
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outsider within the executive and created immunity from the government’s unpopularity 
whilst his political capital and image as a statesman were reinforced by holding the position 
of Interior Minister (Cole et al., 2008).
78
 
Secondly, Sarkozy had foreseen in 2002 that: “presidential elections will not be won at the 
centre. If the right does not do its job, it will leave a boulevard to the extreme-right” (quoted 
from Jeudy and Vigogne, 2007, p.58). This comment shed light on his electoral strategy for 
the 2007 ballot. The FN’s electoral resilience throughout the mid-2000s provided evidence of 
Le Pen’s continuous ability to split the right-wing electorate in 2007 (Table 7.1). To 
neutralise Le Pen’s threat, Sarkozy started to informally co-opt Le Pen’s discourse on 
immigration and seduce the FN electorate towards his potential candidacy at the first round of 
2007 presidential election (Marthaler, 2008; Cautrès with Cole, 2008). Therefore, the 
informal co-option of the FN agenda on the management of immigration by Sarkozy in 2005 
was employed to project a rupture with Chirac and attract the FN electorate.   
7.3.3.2 –The 2006 immigration Law 
Once reinstated as Interior Minister after the 2005 referendum, Sarkozy escalated his 
predecessor’s plan to tackle irregular inflows. The fight against irregular immigration was 
now ranked as a public policy priority, regional removal quotas were announced and a 
circular was issued to provide legal coverage of the intensification of public controls on 
irregular immigration (Gresh, 2005).
79
 Consequently, stop and searches of irregular 
immigrants rose from 44,545 in 2004 to 67,130 in 2006. But without a corresponding growth 
in forced removals, doubts were raised about the efficiency of Sarkozy’s repressive approach 
beyond the symbolic level (SGICI, 2010, p. 69). The gap between Sarkozy’s political 
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 By November 2006, Sarkozy continued to collect 91 per cent of favourable opinions from right-wing 
sympathisers (Ipsos, 2006). 
79
 Circular of 21st of February 2006 relative to stop and searches of irregular immigrants. It authorises 
stop and searches of suspected irregular immigrants in their private domicile and in public services. 
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objectives and reality was widened by the regularisation of 31,650 immigrants in 2005 and 
32,001 in 2006 as part of the regularisation mechanism included in the 2003 immigration law 
(SGCICI, 2008, p.94).  
Nevertheless, Sarkozy recognised his covert agenda on immigration policy by publicly 
acknowledging his intention to seek extreme-right voters “one by one” and that: 
 “if the FN has made headways, it is because we have not done our job. By refusing to 
talk about some subjects which Le Pen has taken ownership of, we have driven part of 
our electorate to despair” (Le Parisien, 2006).  
Reflecting Sarkozy’s presidential plans, a new reform of immigration policy was presented as 
a profound transformation of French immigration policy (Sarkozy, 2006, p.39). Celebrated as 
the re-opening of France to labour inflows (De Wenden, 2008), a new labour visa – the Carte 
de Competences et Talents (CCT; card of competences and skills)
80
 – was introduced by 
Sarkozy to promote HSI. Although it was left inoperative until late 2007, the CCT indicated a 
distributive policy and client politics model that involved the granting of right to long-term 
residence to HSI (Tables 2.2; 7.4). A general reform of the work visas for unskilled labour 
inflows from the A-8 Countries and non-EU states was operated under the model of a strict 
guest-worker system dependent on the publication of an available jobs list by the French state 
(Table 7.4; Freeman, 2006).
81
 The option for concession of temporary residence 
authorisations to A-8 citizens and unskilled labour from non-EU states indicates the presence 
of a redistributive policy and an interest group politics model (Table 2.2).  
                                                 
80
 The CCT is a labour permit, which authorises residence for periods of three years, with a renewable 
character, destined for immigrants able to participate in the economic development of France or to promote 
the intellectual, cultural or sports capacities of France or their origin countries. Right to family reunion is 
recognised to holders of this residence permit, as well as the access to long-term residence authorisations 
after six years. A commission was appointed to identify the priority areas. 
81
 The jobs list was published for the first time in 2007. 
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Against those who welcomed the reopening of the French labour market to immigrants (De 
Wenden, 2008), Sarkozy’s recognised in parliament that the overall opening of French labour 
market was not amongst his objectives (Sarkozy, 2006, p.46). His ambiguity on the 
promotion of labour immigration contrasted with Blair’s approach in the UK. Furthermore, 
the 2006 law was particularly distinctive for the scope of obstacles imposed on family 
reunion and the consolidation of the post-2002 integration consensus (Table 7.4). Disclosing 
his strong authoritarianism, Sarkozy considered that “it was the state’s responsibility to 
define in which conditions it (the constitutional right to family life) can be applied” (Sarkozy, 
2006, p. 42). Consequently, there was an increase in the conditions placed on immigrants’ 
access to family reunion to hinder this “endured inflow” (Table 7.4; Schain, 2008). The 
application of the CAI to all newcomers and to access to long-term residence authorisations 
deepened the fusion between the immigration and integration policy. It also placed further 
obstacles to immigrants’ long-term settlement with a legal status (Weil, 2007).  
The outcome of the 2006 immigration law was the curbing of secondary inflows whilst the 
intensity of labour inflows remained feeble (Figure 7.2). This trend confirmed the French 
government’s ability to restrain undesired inflows according to the proposed policy aims but 
failed to intensify desired inflows. French immigration policy during Chirac’s last term was 
characterised by a policy shift announced in 2005 that was materialised by the 2006 
immigration law. Therefore, the employment of CDA allowed for the identification of 
interdiscursive relationships between Sarkozy’s discourse and the FN’s frame of immigration 
in 2003 and 2005. It has also enabled the exploration of its linkages with non-discursive 
events such as the illiberal measures included in the 2006 immigration law. Overall, the 
expansion of restrictions on asylum and especially family reunion, the escalation of means 
deployed against irregular immigration and the fusion of immigration and integration policy 
provided  
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Table 7.4 – Modifications to French immigration policy by the 2006 immigration law82  
Primary inflows Secondary inflows Asylum Irregular inflows 
Introduces the CCT; opens 
access to labour visas 
according to shortages in 
designated areas. 
Establishes the carte salarié 
for job contracts of 12 
months or longer and the 
carte travailleur temporaire 
for contracts of less than 12 
months. Access to long-
term residence autorisations 
dependent on signature of 
CAI.  
Access to family reunion 
processes delayed from 12 to 
18 months of previous legal 
residence. Social benefits are 
excluded from calculation of 
financial resources of 
immigrants who apply for a 
family reunion process. 
Temporary residence 
autorisations for family 
purposes are only granted 
three months after arrival. 
Access to residence 
authorisation by foreign 
conjoint of French citizen is 
made dependent on 
probationary period of 3 
years and proof of 
Republican integration in 
French society.  
 Replacement of 
automatic 
regularisation of 
irregular immigrants 
after ten years of 
settlement by a 
mechanism of 
regularisation for 
humanitarian 
concerns.  
Authorises creation 
of database of 
French citizens who 
hold contacts with 
foreigners. 
 
evidence of the FN’s indirect and significant impact on policy developments during Chirac’s 
last presidential term. 
Le Pen’s success at the 2002 presidential election was followed by the formation of an 
integration consensus enshrined in the new immigration law and an asylum law reform 
established in 2003 that had a clear restrictive character. Nevertheless, FN impact on 
                                                 
82
 Law n° 2006–911 of 24th July 2006 over control of immigration, settlement of foreigners in France and 
nationality. 
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immigration policy grew substantially following Sarkozy’s reinstatement at the Interior 
Ministry from 2005 onwards and the harnessing of immigration policy to his electoral 
strategy. The subsequent policy shift to attain a better balance between “selected 
immigration” and “endured inflows” represented the start of Sarkozy’s informal co-option of 
the FN agenda on immigration, with significant spill-over effects on the 2006 immigration 
law. FN contagion effects on policy developments were disproportional in light of Le Pen’s 
isolation and exclusion from the policy-making process. This observation concurs with the 
past research that highlighted the FN ability to push for more restrictive immigration policies 
throughout the 1990s (Schain, 2002; Williams, 2006).  
The FN’s significant impact on policy development coincided with the high salience of 
immigration across the electorate; its substantial electoral challenge, and the agency of 
mainstream parties. A weak relationship was found with the decreasing levels of immigration 
from 2003 onwards (Figure 7.2). In contrast, French voters ranked immigration amongst their 
top priority issues at the 2002 presidential ballot (Figure 7.3). The FN also continued to pose 
a salient electoral challenge to mainstream parties’ objectives at the 2007 presidential 
election. This trend was confirmed by its strong performance in elections before 2007 even in 
a context of diminishing political opportunities (Table 7.1). Finally, Sarkozy’s strategy to 
engage with the FN through the informal co-option of its approach to immigration policy 
from 2005 onwards also coincides with the FN’s significant impact on policy developments. 
Moreover, the engagement of mainstream parties, especially the UMP, is the only factor 
whose behaviour coincided with the FN’s increasing impact during Chirac’s last term, and 
appears to be the most relevant factor.  
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7.4 – Conclusions 
The 2002 presidential elections were marked by the absence of immigration policy from 
mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns and by the high salience devoted to this issue by the 
FN. Cultural xenophobia and opposition to regular types of immigration were cornerstones of 
Le Pen’s discourse. The “conspiracy of silence” on immigration policy amongst French 
mainstream parties deprived the FN from holding contagion effects on inter-party 
competition on immigration at the 2002 presidential ballot. This observation diverged from 
the behaviour of the first three factors and only coincided with the agency of French 
mainstream parties. Therefore, mainstream parties’ isolation of the FN was considered the 
most relevant factor behind Le Pen’s lack of impact on this dimension of immigration 
politics. In parallel, French mainstream parties demonstrated their full autonomy to determine 
their electoral strategies independently of intense public concern over immigration and the 
FN’s prominent electoral challenge.  
Immigration was ranked amongst French voters’ top electoral priorities at the 2002 ballot and 
Le Pen enjoyed the undisputed issue ownership of opposition to immigration. Hostility to 
immigration was also widespread across the French electorate and overwhelmingly acute 
amongst the FN core electorate. These trends suggest that the FN had a very significant 
impact on public attitudes to immigration at the 2002 presidential election, which coincided 
with the growth of immigration before 2002 and the FN’s substantial levels of electoral 
support rather than with the agency of mainstream parties. Within this context, the FN 
consolidated support at the nationwide level, and the dimension of its party network 
alongside the ideological cohesion of its core voters were considered the most relevant 
factors behind Le Pen’s widespread impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2002.   
Le Pen’s passage to the second round of the 2002 presidential election reflected the recovery 
of his loyal electorate from the 1990s and Jospin’s poor result rather than a contingent 
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upswing in protest voting. The FN’s deep credibility deficit helped to understand Le Pen’s 
inability to extend his electoral share between the two presidential rounds. Nevertheless, the 
FN exhibited strong electoral resilience throughout the ballots taking place before the 2007 
presidential election and contributed to the “No” victory in the 2005 referendum. This 
electoral resilience persisted in a context of a diminishing set of political opportunities 
because of the party’s internal instability and the institutional constraints at the 2004 regional 
and EP ballots. Consequently, the FN continued to pose a prominent electoral threat to 
mainstream parties’ objectives at the 2007 presidential election. Cultural xenophobia 
persisted as a cornerstone of the FN ideology until 2007 and opposition to the development of 
regular inflows, such as family reunion or asylum were at the forefront of Le Pen’s criticism 
of French immigration policy.  
Reflecting the shockwaves of the 2002 presidential election, the 2003 immigration and 
asylum laws expanded restrictions on family reunion, asylum and irregular inflows. The 
fusion of immigration and integration policies with the experimental institution of the CAI in 
2003 also provided evidence of the concerns with immigrant integration that were an 
outcome of the 2002 ballot. Asylum seeking declined substantially henceforth and this type 
of immigration flow dropped from the French political agenda. Whereas the legislation 
approved in 2003 demonstrated that the FN had a moderate impact on French immigration 
policy until President Chirac’s mid-term, the reinstatement of Sarkozy as Interior Minister in 
2005 expanded the intensity of this political process. Sarkozy first pushed the UMP onto 
extremist grounds with the proposal for a quota system and his intention to promote selected 
immigration against “endured” inflows in 2005, as Le Pen had proposed in 2002. The 
escalation of a repressive approach to irregular inflows after Sarkozy’s reinstatement proved 
to be more effective at a symbolic level than in terms of actual outcomes.  
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The 2006 immigration law was particularly distinctive for the extension of restrictions on 
family reunion, which had been framed as an “endured inflow” and the consolidation of the 
fusion between immigration and integration policy. These trends suggest Sarkozy’s informal 
co-option of the FN’s agenda on immigration policy into the 2006 immigration law. 
Therefore, the FN had a significant and ascendant impact on the development of immigration 
policy during President Chirac’s final term, ranked as indirect and disproportional in light of 
the FN’s isolation within the French party system. The FN’s significant impact on policy 
developments coincided with the high salience of immigration amid French voters’ concerns 
in 2002, the prominence of the FN’s electoral challenge to mainstream parties, and lastly the 
agency of mainstream parties. Within this context, Sarkozy’s engagement with the FN 
through the informal co-option of Le Pen’s agenda on the management of inflows was 
considered the most relevant factor behind FN impact on immigration policy.  
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Chapter 8 – The FN impact on French immigration policy between 2007 and 
2009 
“I want to draw a clear link between future immigration and our identity to tell those 
who are going to be arriving that they have to respect these values, which they will 
enrich with their own identity and on which we are not prepared to compromise.” 
UMP candidate for French 2007 presidential elections, Nicholas Sarkozy, 2007  
 
This chapter examines the FN’s impact on French immigration policy and politics between 
2007 and 2009. Chapter 7 indicated that the FN had highly significant impact on public 
attitudes to immigration as well as a significant and disproportional impact on the 
development of French immigration policy. Surprisingly, the FN lacked impact on inter-party 
competition on immigration at the 2002 presidential election considering it was the most 
successful ERP in Europe. Now, was the FN able to maintain and reinforce its impact on 
immigration politics and policy at the 2007 presidential elections and the first two years of 
Sarkozy’s presidential term? 
8.1 – The 2007 presidential elections  
The presidential elections of 21 April and 5 May 2007 developed in a political context 
distinct from the 2002 ballot. In 2007, the French electorate believed that the election could 
produce a substantive change and the first round had an 83 per cent turnout (Sauger, 2009). 
There were fewer candidates than in 2002 but electoral fragmentation was still high with 
twelve candidates at the ballot (four from right wing and centre parties, eight from left-wing 
parties; Kuhn, 2007). The 2007 election had four leading candidates: Le Pen for the extreme-
right; Sarkozy on the centre-right (after winning the UMP presidential nomination with 98 
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per cent of the vote); François Bayrou for the centre-right UDF; and Ségolène Royal for the 
PS (Duhamel, 2008).  
8.1.1 – FN impact on inter-party competition  
Immigration had been completely ignored by French mainstream parties at the 2002 
presidential election and the FN lacked contagion effects on inter-party competition. Now, 
did the FN reinforce the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on immigration 
policy and the salience of this issue in their electoral manifestos? The salience of immigration 
policy expanded substantially at the 2007 presidential election, especially due to the UMP 
candidate’s informal co-option of the FN approach to immigration. Consequently, this 
analysis suggests that the FN had highly significant impact on mainstream parties’ positions 
on immigration in contrast to 2002. The agency of mainstream parties, particularly Sarkozy’s 
electoral strategy, was regarded as the most relevant factor enhancing the FN’s very 
significant impact on inter-party competition (Table 2.1).  
8.1.1.1 – The FN shift on immigration 
Demonstrating the reconciliation between Le Pen and his daughter, the FN electoral 
campaign for the 2007 ballot was launched from Valmy in September 2006, a symbol of the 
French revolution and Republic (Shields, 2007). The choice of this location projected the FN 
as a Republican force to reposition the party onto centre-right grounds. The FN’s struggle 
against globalisation, communalisation and uncontrolled immigration were the major themes 
of the FN leader’s discourse (Le Pen, 2006). Nonetheless, this speech was overwhelmingly 
noticed by Le Pen’s final appeal: “And you too, French of foreign origins, I invite you to join 
us” (Le Pen, 2006). Consequently, a broader conception of nationhood was embraced by Le 
Pen, in complete opposition to the FN’s past radicalism and cultural xenophobia. This new 
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phase reflected “republicanisation” and the de-demonization project of Marine Le Pen, who 
had been appointed as the strategic campaign director (Chombeau, 2007). 
Research demonstrates that the FN’s electoral campaign received significant media coverage, 
but adopted a rather passive strategy confident that “voters always prefer the original to the 
copy” (Gerstlé and Piar, 2008; Le Pen quoted from Ivaldi, 2008, p. 12). Le Pen, now 78 years 
old, adopted a more consensual style through the electoral campaign. Stronger moderation 
was evident in his proposals on negotiating the reinstatement of French borders with the EU 
or the reassurances that the struggle on “chaotic immigration” would respect Republican laws 
(Le Pen, 2007a). Against Sarkozy’s “selective immigration policy”, Le Pen counterattacked 
with two proposals: zero-immigration policy and welfare xenophobia. The first objective 
would be achieved “through the elimination of family reunification and a total halt to labour 
immigration” (Le Pen, 2007b). National preference programmes were justified as “a 
response, in the present and future, to uncontrolled immigration” (Le Pen, 2007a).  
The FN’s electoral manifesto devoted high salience to immigration policy and addressed all 
types of immigration flows (Figure 8.1; FN, 2007). Moreover, immigration was framed as an 
economic burden driven by employers’ interests in association with demands for welfare 
chauvinism (FN, 2007). References to the immigration threat to French national identity, 
predominant at the 2002 electoral campaign, were almost completely absent from Le Pen’s 
2007 rhetoric and electoral manifesto (Ivaldi, 2008). Marine Le Pen’s strategy presupposed 
overt detachment from previous overwhelming cultural xenophobia and a certain degree of 
ideological de-radicalisation. Nevertheless, Le Pen’s extremist outbursts undermined such 
strategy as was evident by his remarks that Sarkozy’s immigrant origins disqualified him 
from becoming a French President (Le Pen, 2007c). Consequently, strategic contradictions 
and internal divisions over Le Pen’s succession diminished the FN’s structure of political 
opportunities at the 2007 presidential election.  
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Figure 8.1– Salience of immigration policy in French parties’ electoral manifestos at the 
2007 presidential elections  
 
Source: FN, 2007; UMP, 2007; PS, 2007; UDF, 2007 
8.1.1.2 – Sarkozy’s informal co-option of identity politics 
The UMP position on immigration policy had shifted rightwards since the 2005 UMP 
convention when Sarkozy informally co-opted Le Pen’s opposition to legal or “endured” 
inflows. Nonetheless, the process of “clothes stealing” escalated as the electoral campaign for 
the 2007 presidential ballot developed. The second major theme
83
 of Sarkozy’s electoral 
campaign was that: “France is going through a moral crisis, (...) an identity crisis” (Sarkozy, 
2007a). Sarkozy then added that: 
“whoever enters France illegally, who makes no effort to integrate, that person should 
not expect to be granted the same rights as a French person (...) France's problem is 
that persistently, for far too long, it has asked nothing of anyone, not even respect of 
                                                 
83
 The first theme of Sarkozy electoral campaign was the consequences of May 1968 (Dargent and 
Barthélemy, 2009). 
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its values and laws and in this way has fed one of the most serious identity crises of its 
history. That is why we must control immigration.” (Sarkozy, 2007a).  
Henceforth, immigration was associated with a French identity crisis and subsequently 
framed as a threat, providing evidence of Sarkozy’s “clothes stealing” of the FN’s identity 
politics (Noiriel, 2008; Hainsworth, 2008). Le Pen had pioneered the cultural xenophobia 
strand of ERPs in the late 1970s that encompassed the defence of French cultural uniqueness 
and purity from the threat of immigration (see Chapter 4). In order to protect “France and its 
values,” Sarkozy proposed the deployment of a quota system, demanded previous proof of 
knowledge of the French language from all newcomers, and rejected the development of 
regularisation programmes (Sarkozy, 2007a). Four days later, Sarkozy announced in a TV 
interview his intention to establish a Ministry of immigration and national identity and to 
associate “future immigration to our national identity” (RFI, 2007).  
The proposal for the creation of an immigration and national identity ministry crystallised the 
UMP leader’s informal co-option of the FN approach to immigration and its cultural 
xenophobia and the shift to anti-equalitarian grounds implicit in the proposal of a quota 
system (Ivaldi, 2008). Furthermore, Sarkozy framed the 2007 presidential ballot as a choice:  
“between those attached to national identity and who want to defend it, and those who 
think that France lacks an existence and does not even have an identity” (Sarkozy, 
2007b).  
Immigration was the third most covered issue by the media in Sarkozy’s electoral campaign, 
after insecurity and social issues (Gerstlé and Piar, 2008). The UMP 2007 electoral manifesto 
devoted high salience to immigration policy and secondary inflows was the most dominant 
type of inflow (Figure 8.1; UMP, 2007). Additional proposals to hinder the development of 
this “endured inflow” were found in the UMP’s electoral manifesto (UMP, 2007). Sarkozy’s 
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informal co-option of the FN’s cultural xenophobia and agenda on immigration policy had 
the objective to aggregate all right-wing voters in the first round of the 2007 presidential 
election (Perrineau, 2008). 
8.1.1.3 –The UDF and the PS approach to immigration 
The centrist candidate for the 2007 presidential election François Bayrou proposed the 
delegation of regulation of immigration to the EU and advocated a more liberal approach to 
inflows from new EU member-states (Bayrou, 2006). His agreement with Sarkozy’s contract 
of integration and reception provided evidence of the hegemony of the post-2002 integration 
consensus (Bayrou, 2006, p.5; Geisser, 2007). The UDF’s electoral manifesto devoted less 
prominence to immigration than other mainstream parties did and was dominated by irregular 
inflows (Figure 8.1; UDF, 2007). Finally, the French PS had internal divisions on 
immigration policy and some realignment onto rightist grounds in a 2005 internal report 
drafted by a senior party member – Malek Boutih. This document proposed the deployment 
of a quota system and the repeal of immigrants’ automatic entitlement to family reunion as 
the FN had proposed in 2002 (Boutih, 2005).  
Nonetheless, the Socialist candidate Ségolène Royal dropped this report but adopted a 
cautious approach to immigration policy. Sarkozy’s association of immigration and national 
identity was criticised by Royal who also rejected regularisation programmes (Royal, 2007). 
The salience of immigration policy also increased in the PS’s electoral manifesto at the 2007 
presidential ballot, which focused mostly on irregular inflows (Figure 8.1). Hegemony of the 
post-2002 integration consensus was detected in the proposal to introduce selective 
regularisation processes of irregular immigrants according to integration criteria (PS, 2007). 
Despite some ambiguities, Royal refrained from articulating immigration as a threat, unlike 
Sarkozy (Noiriel, 2008). The socialist candidate’s criticisms of Sarkozy were nonetheless 
undermined by the absence of a distinct agenda on this topic. 
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In short, the salience of immigration policy during the electoral campaign for the 2007 
presidential election expanded substantially in comparison to 2002 (Figures 7.1, 8.1). 
Irregular inflows were the most dominant type of inflows in the French political debate and a 
broad mainstream inter-party consensus was observed over the rejection of regularisation 
programmes. An important interdiscursive relationship was found between mainstream 
parties’ proposals and the FN’s frame of immigrant integration as a threat to the host society. 
Moreover, Sarkozy informally co-opted the FN’s approach to immigration policy and its 
identity politics. Whereas Le Pen shifted the FN position on immigration policy onto centre-
right ground, mainstream parties’ positions, especially the UMP’s, drifted rightwards 
(Shields, 2007; Ivaldi, 2008). Therefore, the FN had a very significant impact on inter-party 
competition on immigration at the 2007 presidential election.  
This observation coincided with the FN’s substantial strategic dilemma to established parties 
and with the agency of mainstream parties. A weaker relationship was observed with the 
deceleration of rates of immigration before 2007 (mainly due to the lower intensity of 
secondary inflows; Figure 7.2) and the lower overall salience of immigration amongst the 
electorate in 2007 (Figure 8.2). In contrast, the FN’s electoral threat to mainstream parties 
was obvious in 2002 whilst the observed electoral resilience across the ballots taking place 
before the 2007 presidential election demonstrated its continuous ability to present a strong 
challenge to mainstream parties (Table 7.1). Finally, whereas Sarkozy lacked misgivings 
about informally co-opting the FN approach to immigration, former President Chirac had 
opted to ostracise the FN and to ignore immigration in 2002 in the face of a similar FN 
electoral threat. Within this context, the agency of mainstream parties, in particular 
Sarkozy’s, seems once more the most relevant factor enhancing the FN’s very significant 
impact on this dimension of immigration politics.   
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Figure 8.2 – Most important issue at the French 2007 presidential elections  
 
Source: PEF 2007, vague 1. 
 
8.1.2 – FN impact on public attitudes  
The research developed through Chapter 7 pointed to a widespread effect of the political 
process named “lepenization of minds” across the French electorate at the 2002 presidential 
election. Now, did the FN intensify the levels of concern and hostility to immigration across 
the French electorate at the 2007 presidential ballot? Concern with immigration and hostility 
to this social phenomenon declined at the overall level at the 2007 presidential election in 
comparison to the 2002 ballot. This analysis suggests that FN impact on public attitudes to 
immigration was significant in 2007 but was less intensive than in 2002. Nevertheless, the 
analysis fails to highlight a salient relationship between the lower level of FN impact in 2007 
and the behaviour of the selected factors (Table 2.1). 
Immigration dropped to sixth place amongst the most important issues of the French 
electorate at the  2007 presidential election despite a slight increase regarding the proportion 
25.2% 
13.3% 
10.9% 
9.6% 
7.9% 7.1% 7.1% 6.1% 
3.8% 2.7% 2.7% 
1.5% 1.2% 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
227 
 
of voters most concerned with immigration in comparison to 2002 (Figure 8.2). This trend 
deviated from the intense salience of immigration across French mainstream parties’ electoral 
campaigns for the 2007 presidential election and the dramatic expansion of salience of 
immigration at the British 2005 general election (Figures 8.1; 6.2).  Le Pen continued to be 
rated as the best candidate to deal with immigration by voters most concerned with 
immigration, but lost nine points in comparison to 2002 (Figure 8.3). Sarkozy was ranked as 
the best candidate to deal with immigration by almost one third of such voters. This 
contrasted with Chirac who had collected only 4 per cent of positive responses in 2002. The 
reduced gap between Le Pen and Sarkozy indicated the success of the UMP candidate’s 
strategy in disputing the FN’s ownership of opposition to immigration through the informal 
co-option of its agenda. However, the FN candidate still possessed the issue ownership, albeit 
at a lower level than in 2002.  
Regarding public attitudes to immigration, only half of the respondents to the PEF 2007 
survey agreed with there were too many immigrants in France against almost two thirds of 
the respondents who shared the same perception in 2002 (Figure 8.4). Furthermore, hostility 
to immigration also dropped both in terms of extent and in terms of intensity among FN 
sympathisers in comparison with 2002, yet it was still common across 90 per cent of such 
voters (Figure 8.4). A similar trend was observed as concerned the perceptions of alienation 
in their home country, as this opinion dropped almost seven points across the general 
respondents to the PEF 2007 survey and eleven points amongst FN voters in comparison to 
2002 (Figure 8.5). Finally, Sarkozy’s proposal to create an immigration and national identity 
ministry divided the electorate, yet the majority of the FN’s sympathisers welcomed it 
(Figure 8.6). This trend provides further evidence of the effects of Sarkozy’s informal co- 
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Figure 8.3 – Best candidate to deal with immigration among voters who rank immigration as 
top priority at French 2007 presidential election (N = 286) 
 
Source: PEF 2007 vague 1 
 
Figure 8.4 – Public perception of intensity of immigration at French 2007  presidential 
elections (N = 4,004; FN voters = 202) 
 
Source – PEF 2007 vague 1 
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Figure 8.5 – Public perception of alienation in home country at French 2007 presidential 
elections (N = 4,004; FN voters = 202) 
 
Source – PEF 2007 vague 1 
 
Figure 8.6 – Agreement with the creation of ministry of immigration and national identity (N 
= 4,004; FN voters = 202) 
 
Source – PEF 2007 vague 1 
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option of Le Pen’s agenda over the FN electorate. Summarising, salience of immigration and 
hostility to this social phenomenon across the French voters dropped at the 2007 presidential 
elections and the FN contagion effects seemed concentrated on its core electorate and voters 
most concerned with immigration. 
The trends across French public opinion in 2007 differed from the expansion of salience of 
immigration across the British electorate in 2005 (see Chapter 6). Jaffré (2008, p. 237) 
suggested that Le Pen had exhausted the FN’s electoral niche but a similar argument was 
made in the late 1990s and then challenged by the 2002 presidential ballot. The FN had a 
significant impact on public attitudes to immigration at the 2007 presidential election, but its 
ability to intensify levels of anxiety and hostility amongst the French electorate was at a 
lower level than in 2002. The FN’s significant impact on public attitudes to immigration was 
only positively related to the French ERPs’ electoral support, yet this relationship does not 
suggest a drop in the intensity of the FN’s impact on this dimension of immigration politics. 
The deceleration of levels of immigration before 2007 (Figure 7.2) failed to coincide with the 
level of FN’s impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2007. Despite the annual intake of 
more than 150,000 immigrants from 2002 to 2007, the significant drop of hostility to 
immigration in France challenges the validity of the “ethnic backlash” thesis (Mudde, 2007). 
It suggests that trends across public attitudes to immigration are less contingent on the 
intensity of immigration than on other political factors.   
In contrast, the FN’s strong electoral resilience throughout the elections before 2007 
coincided with the FN’s significant impact on public attitudes (Table 7.1). In parallel, Marine 
Le Pen’s “republicanisation” project might help to understand the lower intensity of hostility 
across the FN electorate. Finally, Sarkozy’s engagement with the FN through the informal 
co-option of Le Pen’s agenda on immigration helps to explain the FN’s lower ability to 
maintain the issue ownership of opposition to immigration. Overall, the FN’s electoral 
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support seemed the most relevant factor behind the insignificant impact on public attitudes to 
immigration in 2007, but does not help to understand the decline in the intensity of this 
political process in comparison to 2002. Therefore, the FN’s electoral support and party 
network did not seem to hold the same level of influence on the remaining electorate as 
Schain (2002, 2006, p.277) had identified in the past. Perhaps the lower intensity of FN 
impact on public attitudes in 2007 reflected the intense mobilisation against Le Pen’s success 
in 2002 that de-legitimised the FN xenophobic discourse across the electorate, as Marine Le 
Pen’s strategy seemed to acknowledge. 
8.1.3 – Electoral results 
The first round outcome of the 2007 presidential elections lacked surprises in contrast to 
2002, as the PS and the UMP candidates passed to the second round. Royal’s share of 25.8 
per cent of the vote represented the second best ever result by a Socialist candidate in a first 
round (Dupoirier, 2008). Bayrou collected 18.7 per cent of the vote and his voters would have 
a decisive role in determining the second round victor (Kuhn, 2007). The great winner was 
Sarkozy, who obtained the best result of a right-wing candidate in a presidential first round 
since 1974 with 31.2 per cent of the vote (Sauger, 2008).  
Le Pen scored his weakest score in a presidential election since the early 1980s with just 10.4 
per cent (Table 8.1), after not being able to secure one in two voters who had voted in his 
favour at the 2002 presidential election (Mayer, 2007). Unsurprisingly, Sarkozy was elected 
French President at the second round on the 6 of May 2007 with 53 per cent of the vote. The 
UMP leader profited from attracting more of Le Pen’s and Bayrou’s first round voters in the 
second round than Royal (Perrineau, 2007). Further explanations for the FN’s electoral 
setback in the 2007 presidential election are provided in the next section.  
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Table 8.1 – Votes for the FN at presidential, parliamentary, and EP elections between 2007 
and 2009 
Year Election Number of votes Per cent of total 
2007 presidential 3,834,530 10.4% 
2007 parliamentary 1,116,136 4.3 % 
2009 EP 1,091,691 6.3% 
 
8.2 – FN development from 2007 and 2009 
This chapter’s second section examines Le Pen’s discourse on immigration policy and the 
FN’s position within the French party system after the 2007 presidential election until 2009. 
Cultural xenophobia had been a cornerstone of the FN’s ideology until 2007, when Le Pen 
dropped identity politics for a more Republican conception of French citizenship. Now, did 
the FN continue to water down its past cultural xenophobia after the 2007 presidential 
election? Under Marine Le Pen’s influence, the FN emphasised welfare xenophobia 
alongside a zero-immigration policy but her de-radicalisation project continued to be 
undermined by her father’s extremist outbursts. The FN had enjoyed high levels of electoral 
resilience at the ballots before 2007, despite the diminishing structure of political 
opportunities. Was the FN able to recover from the set back of the 2007 presidential election 
at the subsequent second-order-ballots? The analysis presented below points to a significant 
electoral demobilisation of the FN electorate until 2009 prompting prospects of the FN’s 
terminal decline once more.   
8.2.1 – Explanations for the 2007 disaster  
FN difficulties at the 2007 presidential election reflected Le Pen’s lack of credibility in the 
face of a centre-right candidate who occupied his political space and was perceived as most 
efficient to implement his plans. Sarkozy’s emphasis on insecurity and particularly on 
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immigration, alongside his superior political capital accumulated from his experience in 
office, operated as a magnet for Le Pen’s 2002 voters. The two candidates campaigned on a 
similar agenda but Sarkozy was considered less radical than Le Pen (Fourquet, 2008) and 
enjoyed a much stronger credible image of a statesman than the FN candidate did (Mayer, 
2007). Consequently, 30 per cent of Le Pen’s 2002 voters rallied for Sarkozy in the first 
round of the 2007 presidential election while the transfer of votes in Sarkozy’s favour 
expanded to 67 per cent of Le Pen’s first round voters at the second round (Perrineau, 2008, 
p. 211). Sarkozy’s capture of FN voters confirmed the success of his informal co-option of 
the FN on immigration policy reflecting the UMP’s shift on immigration to extremist grounds 
and his stronger image of a statesman.  
Despite the latter trend, the FN’s still evidenced an ability to mobilise new voters as 32 per 
cent of Le Pen 2007 electors were first-time voters for the French ERP (Mayer, 2007). In a 
context of intense bipolarisation between the PS and the UMP, the FN only collected 4.3 per 
cent of the vote at the 2007 legislative elections (Table 8.1). The leakage of FN support to the 
UMP persisted and the high levels of abstention across its electorate hampered its electoral 
performance (Fourquet, 2008).
 84
  Unsurprisingly, the UMP won the second round ballot with 
a majority of 313 deputies out of 577 (Cole et al., 2008). As a result of the electoral disaster 
at the legislative elections, the FN faced a drop of 60 per cent in its share of public funds 
prompting an unprecedented financial crisis (Evans and Ivaldi, 2007).
 85
   
Overall, the 2007 presidential and legislative ballots marked Le Pen’s failure to attract 
centrist voters and move from the right-wing fringes. As Le Pen (2007, p. 2) recognised: 
“paradoxically winners on ideological grounds, we have temporarily lost in the electoral 
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 27 per cent of Le Pen’s first round voters at the 2007 presidential election shifted to the UMP at the 
legislative elections while 30 per cent abstained (Fourquet, 2008). 
85
 French state subventions to political parties are calculated on the basis of their performance in the first 
round of legislative elections (Evans and Ivaldi, 2007). 
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arena”. Despite the hegemony of the post-2002 integration consensus and Sarkozy’s informal 
co-option of the FN agenda on immigration, electoral results had been disastrous. The FN 
leader assumed full responsibility for the events but internal critics were directed to Marine 
Le Pen’s “republicanisation” project (Gautier, 2009). Notwithstanding Le Pen’s promise to 
abandon the FN leadership after the 2009 EP elections, his tenure as leader was extended 
until January 2011. In the meantime, Marine Le Pen’s position within the FN was 
strengthened by her performance at the 2007 legislative elections. Marine Le Pen qualified 
for the second round with 24.4 per cent in Hénin-Beaumont, a traditional left-wing bastion, 
enhancing her position vis-à-vis her competitor Gollnisch, who only obtained 6.95 per cent in 
Rhône (Chombeau, 2007). By January 2011, Marine Le Pen’s position as her father’s 
successor was unassailable.   
8.2.2 – The 2009 EP elections 
The electoral crisis evident in 2007 intensified after the 2009 EP election, reflecting the acute 
internal divisions over Le Pen’s succession and the UMP’s occupation of its ideological 
space (Gautier, 2009).
 86
 Marine Le Pen’s “de-demonization” project was challenged by Le 
Pen’s extremist outbursts. In the EP in March 2009, he once again argued that the Holocaust 
was a detail of history (Shields, 2010). The FN electoral campaign for the 2009 European 
ballot was based on opposition to immigration and globalisation promoted by stateless 
technocrats (Le Pen, 2009). Le Pen (2009, p.1) claimed that: “Europe was colonised by 
African and Asian immigrants” and continued to emphasise the FN’s welfare xenophobia and 
his “historical defence of national preference programmes” (Le Pen, 2009). The absence of 
associations between immigration and national identity confirmed Le Pen’s abandonment of 
identity politics without dropping his anti-immigration positions. 
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 Additionally, the number of French MEPs was reduced from 78 to 72 MEPs diminishing the FN’s 
structure of opportunities at the 2009 EP ballot. 
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Electoral results at the 2009 EP ballot were disappointing as the FN collected just 6.3 per cent 
of the vote (Table 8.1). Once more, Marine Le Pen was the most voted for candidate with 
10.18 per cent of the vote in the north-west region (Shields, 2010). The electoral decline 
between 2007 and 2009 strengthened predictions of the FN’s terminal. However, the fact that 
the FN’s ideology still resonated with a significant share of the French electorate challenged 
such expectations (Shields, 2010). By 2009, the FN continued to face three main challenges: 
ideological renewal, strategic positioning, and leadership (Evans and Ivaldi, 2007). The 
answer to these issues depended on the outcome of the leadership contest between Marine Le 
Pen and Gollnisch, which took place in January 2011. Marine Le Pen won the FN leadership 
with 68 per cent of favourable votes against 32 per cent for Gollnisch in the FN poll 
(Liberation, 2010). A later electoral recovery was evident from the results at the 2011 
cantonal elections after the FN collected 11.73 per cent of the vote (Le Monde, 2011).  
In short, the FN’s frame of immigration was now based on the proposal of “zero-
immigration” policy and welfare chauvinism whilst past cultural xenophobia has been 
effectively dropped from 2007 onwards. This ideological shift was an outcome of Marine Le 
Pen’s “republicanisation” project and of Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the FN’s identity 
politics. In contrast to the electoral resilience evidenced before the 2007 presidential 
elections, the FN’s position within the French party system waned considerably between 
2007 and 2009. After Sarkozy’s raid of Le Pen’s 2002 electorate, the FN leadership was 
unable to reverse the subsequent electoral decline in 2009 within a set of political 
opportunities severely diminished by the acute internal cleavage over the leadership’s 
succession. The prospects of terminal FN decline dissipated after Marine Le Pen’s succession 
to her father in January 2011 and after the results at the 2011 regional elections.  
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8.3 – The FN impact on immigration policy between 2007 and 2009 
This research suggested through Chapter 7 that a significant and disproportional FN impact 
on the development of immigration policy had been observed during Chirac’s last 
presidential term, especially from 2005 onwards. Now, did the FN reinforce the restrictive 
character of French immigration policy developed between 2007 and 2009? President 
Sarkozy  institutionalised the association between national identity and immigration with the 
creation of the Ministère d’Immigration, d’ Integration et d’Identité Nationale et Co-
Development (MIIINC)
87
 in 2007. Another immigration law was approved in 2007 including 
further measures to reduce the intensity of “endured” inflows whilst Sarkozy’s internal 
agenda on immigration was transposed to the EU level. Consequently, FN impact on policy 
developments is ranked as highly significant between 2007 and 2009 and even more 
disproportional than during Chirac’s last presidential term. The agency of mainstream parties, 
particularly Sarkozy’s informal engagement with the FN was regarded as the most relevant 
factor behind the preceding trend (Table 2.1).  
8.3.1 – The 2007 Immigration law 
After being invested as President, Sarkozy appointed a new UMP government under the 
leadership of Prime Minister François Fillon, a UMP member and a close aid of the new 
French president. As he had set out in his electoral campaign, the President created the 
MIIINC in May 2007 (Decree Law 2007-999 of 31 May 2007) under the guidance of Brice 
Hortefeux, Sarkozy’s loyal supporter. The interdiscursive relationship identified between 
Sarkozy’s electoral campaign with the FN’s frame of immigration as a threat to national 
identity was therefore related with an important non-discursive event: the creation of 
MIIINC. The President set two main objectives for Hortefeux:  “to reinforce and deepen the 
                                                 
87
Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity and Co-development. This ministry was later 
renamed Ministry of Immigration, Integration, National Identity Solidarity and Development in 2008 
instead of Co-Development. 
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selective immigration policy” and to develop a common EU policy alongside other member 
states (Sarkozy, 2007c, p.1). Annual caps on immigration were demanded by Sarkozy to 
increase labour inflows to half of the total of long-term residence authorisations granted in 
France, at a time when they only represented 7 per cent (Figure 7.2). This demonstrated the 
President’s voluntarism on the management of inflows (Sarkozy, 2007c).  
To attain these objectives, Hortefeux presented a new immigration law to the French National 
Assembly in July 2007, the third bill in less than five years (Table 8.2). The Minister 
announced the implementation of the CCT
88
 based on the French state’s discretionary 
consideration of the “added value” of hiring an immigrant, which could lead to a very 
restricted application (Hortefeux, 2007; Chaloff and Lemaitre, 2009). This channel for HSI 
was implemented in the context of low recruitment difficulties of highly skilled workers in 
the French economy in contrast to the high demand for skilled construction workers or nurses 
and care workers (CREDOC, 2008).
89
 Therefore, the criteria imposed to access the CCT was 
unfit to attain the desired intensification of labour immigration and provided evidence of 
President’s Sarkozy unwillingness to open the labour market to immigration.  
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 A commission set the highly discretionary access criteria to the CCT in December 2007 (CNCT, 2007). 
Apart from liberalising grant of residence authorisation to high-ranking employees of multinationals, the 
CNCT designated priority areas as: physics; chemistry, biology; maths; IT; agronomy; marketing; human 
resources; management; and finance (CNCT, 2007). Possession of a master’s degree or higher 
qualification was demanded whilst candidates without previous work experience were ineligible to apply 
(CNCT, 2008). 
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 The report on recruitment difficulties in the French economy noticed lower problems in hiring HSI as 
compared to 2006 whilst the opposite trend was observed across skilled construction and industry workers, 
drivers, nurses, midwives, cookers (CREDOC, 2008, p. 2).  
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Table 8.2 – Modifications to French immigration policy by the 2007 immigration and 
integration law 
Primary inflows Secondary inflows Asylum Irregular inflows 
Turns the CCT 
operational 
Candidates for family reunion 
must prove knowledge of 
French language and 
Republican values before 
entry. Increase of financial 
resources demanded to access 
right to family reunion. 
Introduces CAI for immigrant 
families. 
Introduced the right 
to appeal in cases of 
rejection of asylum 
request. Delegates 
supervision of 
OPFRA to the 
MIIINC  
Authorises 
regularisation of 
irregular 
immigrants in 
areas with labour 
market bottlenecks 
and after proof of 
work contract. 
    
 
To tackle the crisis of the integration system, the government demanded previous proof of 
integration from candidates applying for a visa for family reunion. This included proof of 
knowledge of the “French language and Republican values in the origin country and the 
signature of the CAI for newcomers benefiting from family reunion
90
 (Hortefeux, 2007, pp. 
5-6; Table 8.2).  Therefore, concerns with immigrant integration resulted in further obstacles 
on access to family reunion and the increasing fusion of immigration and integration policies 
(Table 8.2). The President’s electoral campaign of promoting a selective immigration policy 
legitimised the obstacles placed on foreign citizens’ right to conduct a normal family life and 
the destabilisation of their long-term legal settlement with the fusion of immigration and 
integration policies. Furthermore, a controversial amendment was proposed by a UMP 
deputy, Thierry Mariani, introducing the possibility of voluntary DNA tests to determine 
parental relationships to accelerate the screening of applications for family reunion (Loyer, 
                                                 
90
 This contract is signed by the foreigner and his parents or conjoint. Parents are obliged to engage in 
training in the rights and duties of parents in France and to respect obligatory school. Failure to abide by 
the contract can result in residency authorisations not being renewed by the local mayor (Lochak and 
Fouteau, 2008). 
239 
 
2008). This action contained a deep symbolic value reinforcing perceptions of widespread 
abuse of the immigration system and met widespread opposition from centre-left parties and 
immigrants’ associations. 
Overall, the 2007 immigration law had a clearly restrictive character, particularly towards 
family reunion (Table 8.2).
91
 Consequently, the interdiscursive relationship found between 
the UMP leader’s policy shift in 2005 and the FN’s frame of particular types of immigration 
flows as “endured” had further consequences at the non-discursive level with the 
promulgation of the 2007 immigration law (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, the employment of 
CDA provided further insights to the analysis of policy developments. The outcome of this 
legislation was the salient reduction of the proportion of family reunion, whilst labour inflows 
persisted with the same level of intensity as in the past (Figure 7.2). Sarkozy’s policy towards 
HSI failed to have an impact on the proportion of labour inflows as only 1,042 CCTs were 
granted by the French state between 2007 and 2009 (SGCICI, 2011, p. 49). The client politics 
model reflecting the granting of the right to long-term settlement to HSI by the French state 
was not followed by intense levels of this type immigration as expected and as observed in 
the UK. 
The promulgation of a “list of jobs under tension”92 in December 2007 reflected Sarkozy’s 
ambiguities towards labour inflows. Whereas 152 professions were made available for the 
citizens of A-8 countries, only 30 professions were open to non-EU immigrants (Lochak and 
Fouteau, 2008). Job availability was therefore contingent upon immigrants’ origins, 
suggesting the adoption of implicit geographical criteria by the UMP government. The 
redistributive policy associated with the guest-worker programme for unskilled workers from 
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 The liberal developments on asylum were a response to France’s condemnation by the European Court 
of Human Rights in 26 April 2007 for the lack of right to appeal to asylum seekers (Loyer, 2008). 
92
 Circular N° NOR : IMI/N/07/00011/C related to work permits granted to citizens from new EU member-
states throughout a transitional period and to citizens from third states and was based on a list of jobs under 
pressure.  
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A-8 countries and non-EU countries suggests the presence of a weak interest group model on 
these types of immigration, if not regulatory politics in contrast to the British laissez-faire 
approach to intra-EU inflows (Table 2.2). The low intensity of labour inflows into France 
between 2007 and 2009 reflects the ambiguities of the policymaker to increase the proportion 
of labour immigration without opening the French labour market, as well as the highly 
restrictive mechanisms to manage labour immigration. Apparently, Sarkozy’s attainment of a 
better balance between selected immigration and “endured” inflows resumed to the reduction 
of the latter types of immigration instead of the intensification of labour inflows.  
8.3.2 – Sarkozy’s quota system and the Mazeaud Commission  
Sarkozy’s informal co-option or the “clothes stealing” of the FN approach to immigration 
politics and its transposition into French legislation progressed after 2007. In January 2008, 
Hortefeux appointed a commission
93
 presided by Pierre Mazeaud
94
 (a centre-right personality 
close to Chirac) on the constitutional framework for a new immigration policy, at a time 
when an overall process of Constitutional reform was taking place in both the National 
Assembly and the Senate. The commission’s objectives were “to consider the necessary 
modifications to the definition of immigration quotas” including quotas by “areas of origin of 
migration flows” (Hortefeux, 2008). In a speech to the South African Parliament in February 
2008, Sarkozy announced the preparation of a global reform of the French immigration 
system, which encompassed an annual immigration quota. In the President’s words: “the caps 
would include sub-categories by motives of immigration – labour or family reunion” 
(Sarkozy, 2008). 
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 Commission sur le cadre constitutionnel de la nouvelle politique d’immigration (CCCNPI, Commission 
about the constitutional framework for a new immigration policy). 
94
 Former president of the National Assembly Law Commission between 1988 and 1989 and between 1993 
and 1997 and former President of the Constitutional Court. 
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Therefore, President Sarkozy recovered the quota system that had been vetoed by Chirac in 
2005 that proposed the categorisation of immigrants according to geographic origins or 
purposes of settlement and presupposed the subsequent reform of the French Republican 
paradigm. The UMP government adopted an overtly anti-egalitarian approach to the 
management of immigration flows, a distinctive ideological trait of ERPs (Ivaldi, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the Mazeaud commission concluded that “binding immigration quotas were 
impractical or without interest” and added that the French state “lacked discretionary powers 
to determine inflows relative to the two major sources of settlement: secondary and asylum 
inflows” (CCCNPI, 2008, p. 5). The Mazeaud commission thus vetoed the President’s plans 
and potential modification to the Constitutional text to accommodate ethnic discrimination of 
immigrants that would have institutionalised the rejection of equalitarianism as the FN 
proposed. Once more, the French domestic political system posed a very significant 
constraint on the intensity of the FN’s impact on policy developments during President 
Sarkozy’s term. 
8.3.3 – The EU immigration pact and the Return Directive 
After the preceding veto, Sarkozy focused the French EU presidency on immigration policy 
to advance his own political agenda. A European Pact on Immigration and Asylum was 
signed by the 27 member-states at an EU summit in October 2008 promoted by the French 
government, without legal binding force. References to selective immigration policy or to 
integration contracts were excluded from the final text, particularly due to Spain’s 
intervention (Collet, 2009). Yet, Hortefeux announced the final version of the pact on 
immigration and asylum as a great victory for the French EU presidency (Le Monde, 2009a). 
Following this event, the EP and the European Council adopted the directive 2008/115/EC on 
common standards and procedures in Member States for returning irregular immigrants, 
known as the Return directive. The two most controversial points of this Directive were the 
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extension of authorised detention periods for irregular immigrants to 18 months and a re-
entry ban on deported immigrants of 5 years (Baldaccini, 2010). Establishment of these 
measures at the EU level can be interpreted as a means for Sarkozy to evade domestic judicial 
constraints that similar measures could have raised if proposed to the French National 
Assembly (Guiraudon, 2002). 
Demonstrating the government’s objectives on immigration policy, Hortefeux congratulated 
himself for the removal of 29,786 irregular immigrants from French territory and for the fact 
that family reunion registered a “spectacular drop” of 10.6 per cent in January 2009 (Le 
Monde, 2009a). However, the growth of the rate of removals reflected the intensification of 
immigrants’ applications to the voluntary return programme, whilst forced removals 
effectively dropped from 19,885 in 2007 to 19,724 in 2008 (Le Monde, 2009b). As Weil 
(2009) noticed, the government masked the statistics to attain its political objectives and 
maintain the high salience of immigration on the political agenda to ensure a permanent 
mobilisation of right-wing voters. Furthermore, the new immigration minister – Eric Besson 
(appointed by Sarkozy in March 2009) – dropped the introduction of DNA tests because of 
legal difficulties in its implementation (Le Monde, 2009c). Alongside the proposed quota 
system, DNA tests were amongst the UMP unfeasible but highly symbolic proposals.  
President Sarkozy’s immigration policy during the first two years of his presidential term was 
marked by the institutionalisation of the association between national identity and 
immigration alongside an increasing gap between policy aims and subsequent outcomes on 
labour inflows. Thus, the outcome of the President’s selective immigration policy was the 
reduction of the rates of secondary inflows rather than the intensification of labour inflows 
(Figure 7.2). The institutionalisation of the FN’s identity politics through the creation of 
MIIINC in 2007 legitimised perceptions of immigration as a threat to national identity. 
Conflation of immigration and integration policy led to the deployment of further obstacles to 
243 
 
family reunion and destabilisation of immigrants’ long-term legal settlement in France. 
Reform of channels for labour inflows with a clear restrictive character help to understand the 
low intensity of labour inflows from 2007 to 2009.  Therefore, the FN had a very significant 
and indirect impact on the development of French immigration policy during the first two 
years of Sarkozy’s presidential term. This trend was considered disproportional in light of the 
FN’s isolation and the electoral crisis observed between the 2007 presidential and the 2009 
EP elections. 
The preceding observation coincided with the increase of levels of immigration in 2008, the 
FN’s still salient threat to mainstream parties, and the agency of mainstream parties. Whereas 
the rates of immigration increased slightly in 2008 due to the growth of humanitarian inflows 
(Figure 7.2), the salience of immigration was low at the 2007 presidential election and 
decreased in comparison to 2002 (Figure 8.2). FN’s electoral challenge to mainstream parties 
was neutralised in the 2007 presidential and legislative elections leading to prospects of this 
party’s terminal decline (Table 8.1). Yet, the FN’s electoral threat would recover to past 
levels after the conclusion of Le Pen’s succession, as the 2011 cantonal elections 
demonstrated. Like the dimension of the FN electoral threat, the agency of mainstream 
parties also coincided with the FN’s very significant impact. Whereas former President 
Chirac refused to engage with the FN, President Sarkozy informally co-opted the FN’s 
agenda on immigration policy into the French legislation. In the former context and 
comparing to President Chirac’s term, the agency of mainstream parties, especially President 
Sarkozy’s strategy, was considered the most relevant factor enhancing the level of FN’s 
impact on French immigration policy between 2007 and 2009.   
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8.4 – Conclusions 
The salience of immigration policy expanded significantly at the electoral campaign for the 
2007 presidential election and compared to 2002, and family reunion and irregular inflows 
were the most prominent types of immigration in the political debate. Whereas the FN shifted 
its stance on immigration onto centre-right ground, French mainstream parties’ (particularly 
the UMP) shifted their positions rightwards. The post-2002 integration consensus was 
observed across all mainstream parties’ proposals whilst the UMP informally co-opted the 
FN’s frame of immigration, particularly the frame of family reunion and asylum as “endured” 
and the Le Pen’s identity politics. Therefore, this ERP’s impact on inter-party competition on 
immigration policy at the 2007 presidential election was considered very significant. The 
major difference found in the behaviour of the proposed factors in 2007 compared to 2002 
was the lower salience of immigration across public opinion and Sarkozy’s willingness to 
engage at the informal level with the FN whereas Chirac had refused. Thus, the agency of 
mainstream parties, in particular Sarkozy’s electoral strategy, was considered the most 
relevant factor behind the FN’s impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
Salience of immigration across the French electorate at the 2007 presidential election was 
lower than it had been in 2002. This contrasts with the situation in the UK where salience of 
this issue had risen substantially between 2001 and 2005. Le Pen maintained the issue 
ownership of opposition to immigration but was directly challenged by Sarkozy’s informal 
co-option of the FN agenda on this topic. General levels of hostility to immigration declined 
substantially across the overall electorate and amongst the FN’s voters as well. Therefore, the 
FN had a significant impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2007 but at a lower level 
than in 2002. The dimension of the FN’s electoral support and its party organisation were 
considered the most relevant factor enhancing its significant impact on public attitudes in 
2007. However, this factor still fails to account for the overall decline of hostility to 
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immigration. Further research is required to understand the decline of concern and hostility to 
immigration across the French electorate during the 2000s. 
Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the FN’s frame of immigration succeeded at the 2007 
presidential election after the capture of a large share of Le Pen’s 2002 vote. The success of 
this political process reflected the UMP candidate’s adoption of a similar agenda to Le Pen’s 
alongside his superior political capital accumulated from being former Interior Minister. The 
FN’s electoral disaster at the 2007 presidential election extended to the subsequent second-
order-ballots taking place until 2009. The internal cleavage between Marine Le Pen and 
Gollnisch over Le Pen’s succession diminished the FN’s structure of political opportunities 
between 2007 and 2009. Nonetheless, the prospects of the FN’s terminal decline were 
dissipated after Marine Le Pen’s victory at the FN ballot in 2011 and after elections that 
followed. Marine Le Pen’s “republicanisation” project presupposed the watering-down of the 
FN’s cultural xenophobia in favour of zero-immigration policy and welfare chauvinism. 
However, Le Pen’s xenophobic outbursts undermined this electoral strategy and damaged the 
FN’s structure of political opportunities. 
President Sarkozy’s term was marked by the institutionalisation of the association between 
immigration and national identity through the creation of the MIIINC. The 2007 immigration 
and integration law deepened the selective immigration policy with further obstacles to 
reduce “endured” inflows, such as family reunion. Despite the granting of the right to long-
term settlement, the implementation of the CCT failed to intensify labour immigration 
between 2007 and 2009 indicating that the client politics model was not followed by the 
subsequent expansion of HSI. The limited scope of the guest-worker programmes towards A-
8 countries and non-EU unskilled immigration suggested the presence of a weak interest 
politics model. Sarkozy’s political priorities were focused on restricting “endured” inflows 
rather than intensifying labour immigration. Consequently, a gap between Sarkozy’s policy 
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objective to increase the proportion of labour inflows and subsequent policy outcomes was 
identified between 2007 and 2009.  
Challenging the French Republican paradigm, Sarkozy failed to put forward a quota system 
to manage inflows based on geographical origin or purpose of immigration. The French 
President also transposed his agenda on immigration to the EU level in 2008 apparently to 
evade possible domestic judicial constraints and to seek the mobilisation of the FN electorate 
in favour of the UMP. Consequently, the FN had a highly significant and indirect impact on 
policy developments during the first two years of Sarkozy’s presidential term. This trend was 
considered disproportional in light of the FN’s decline within the French party system. The 
preceding observation coincided with the slight increase of levels of immigration, the FN’s 
substantial threat to mainstream parties, and the agency mainstream parties. In the former 
context, Sarkozy’s willingness to informally co-opt the FN agenda was the most relevant 
factor enhancing the FN’s highly significant impact on the development of French 
immigration policy between 2007 and 2009. 
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Chapter 9 – The LN impact on Italian immigration policy from 2001 to 2006  
“Padanians did not work the land for thousands of years to give it away to Bingo 
Bongo
95
 and the Chinese” 
Minister of Devolution, Umberto Bossi, 2003  
 
This chapter analyses the LN’s impact on the Italian immigration politics and policy between 
2001 and 2006. After being the leading party in northern regions at the 1994 general election, 
the LN’s electoral support dropped dramatically in the late 1990s demonstrating the 
dissatisfaction with its secessionist project in its regional strongholds. Consequently, Bossi 
abandoned “Padania’s” independence project in favour of “la devolution” and adopted a 
cultural xenophobic discourse towards immigration. Benefiting from the vital lifeline 
provided by Berlusconi’s invitation to join the CdL, the LN obtained access to national office 
after the CdL’s victory at the 2001 general election raising expectations over the LN’s 
potential impact on Italian immigration policy. Within this context, the chapter explores 
whether the LN had a significant impact on the three selected dimensions of immigration 
politics and policy.  
The chapter’s first overall section addresses the Italian 2001 general election and analyses: i) 
the LN’s impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy during the electoral 
campaign and; ii) the LN’s contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration. Immigration 
policy was a salient issue within the 2001 electoral campaign and irregular inflows were the 
most prominent type of immigration flow. This research will suggest that the LN had a 
significant impact on the mainstream parties’ proposals, particularly of the centre-right 
                                                 
95
 Bossi was inspired by an American song of the 1940s, translated to Italian, named Civilisation that 
included reference to “bingo bongo are only well in Congo” (Passalacqua, 2009, p. 179). 
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coalition. As the first section also shows, immigration was a top priority issue of Italian 
voters at the 2001 general election and this social phenomenon was overwhelmingly 
associated with insecurity. Despite these observations, this research will contend that the 
LN’s ability to intensify concern and hostility towards immigration seemed limited and 
irrelevant at the national level in 2001.  
The chapter’s second section analyses the LN’s development between 2001 and 2006, a 
period characterised by the reversal of the LN’s electoral decline, which was evident at the 
2001 general election. In contrast to the expected de-radicalisation reflecting its participation 
in government, the LN’s cultural xenophobia was exacerbated during this period. The third 
and final section evaluates the LN’s impact on the development of Italian immigration policy 
during Berlusconi’s term. An increasing gap between the highly restrictive objectives set 
during the electoral campaign and the subsequent acute intensity of immigration flows 
outcomes throughout Berlusconi’s term was observed. Nevertheless, this research will 
suggest that the LN had a direct and moderate impact on the policy developments, regarded 
as disproportional considering its position within the governmental coalition.  
9.1 – The Italian general election of 13 May 2001 
The 2001 general election followed the end of a full term government led by the centre-left 
Ulivo coalition that had three different Presidents of the Council of Ministers (Romano Prodi, 
Massimo D’Alema, and Giuliano Amato). Incumbency advantages were not evident as the 
Ulivo’s candidate Francesco Rutelli (Mayor of Rome) had not been a member of the 
preceding government (Pasquino, 2002). The Ulivo’s troubles mounted with the failure to 
reach an electoral agreement with the left-wing Rifondazione Comunista (RC) and with 
centre-left Antonio Di Pietro’s L’Italia dei valori (Donovan, 2002). By contrast, Berlusconi 
was the undisputed leader of a vast electoral coalition aggregating the FI, AN, LN, 
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Biancofiore
96
 and the new Socialist Party into the CdL (Fabbrini and Gilbert, 2002). Italian 
voters showed strong interest in the 2001 general election as the 81 per cent turnout 
demonstrated (Newell, 2002).  
9.1.1 – LN impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy  
Did the LN reinforce the restrictive character of Italian mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration policy and the salience attached to it in their electoral manifestos? Immigration 
policy was a salient issue within the 2001 electoral campaign, which was dominated by 
irregular inflows. As seen below, this research argues that the LN had a significant impact on 
the inter-party competition on immigration policy at the 2001 ballot, particularly amongst the 
centre-right parties. Analysis of relationships between the preceding observation and the 
proposed hypotheses points to the agency of mainstream parties, especially the FI leader, as 
the most relevant factor behind the LN’s impact on this dimension of immigration politics 
(Table 2.1).  
9.1.1.1 – The CdL’s position on immigration policy 
Supported by a vast electoral campaign, Berlusconi successfully set a distinct political agenda 
with a strong emphasis on crime, insecurity and immigration (Belluci and Bull, 2002). The 
salience of immigration reflected Bossi’s demand to make it a key issue in the CdL’s formal 
electoral pact
97
  signed with Berlusconi in exchange for the LN’s guarantee of full support for 
the government (Corriere della Sera, 2001a). This formal electoral pact ensured that the CdL 
was formally bound to Bossi’s electoral priorities and that Berlusconi could be held 
accountable throughout the term (Corriere della Sera, 2001b). Consequently, Berlusconi 
integrated the LN’s approach to immigration into the CdL’s 2001 electoral strategy. The 
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 Alliance between the Christian Democrat parties, Centro Cristiano Democratico (CCD) and Cristiani 
Democratici Uniti (CDU). 
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 The four key issues of the formal electoral pact were: family, development, devolution, security and 
immigration (Corriere, 2001a). 
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weakness of the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law and the Ulivo’s alleged excessive tolerance of 
irregular inflows were recurrent themes of Berlusconi’s electoral campaign (Colombo and 
Sciortino, 2003). In parallel, the AN campaigned for the criminalisation of irregular 
immigrants as proposed by the 1999 Fini-Landi proposal (Geddes, 2008). Immigration was 
subsequently articulated as a law and order issue rather than a labour market problem.   
As Zincone (2002, p. 61) noted the centre-right parties were unwilling to cede the monopoly 
of opposition to immigration to the LN despite their electoral coalition. Immigration policy 
was included within the CdL’s long electoral manifesto that focused mostly on irregular 
inflows, framed as a question of law and order with overt association to growing criminality
98
 
(Figure 9.1; CdL, 2001). Alternatively, a guest-worker programme was proposed to manage 
labour inflows revealing a utilitarian approach to labour inflows and ignoring the intense 
demand for foreign labour in the domestic labour market (CdL, 2001). The CdL discourse 
stigmatised irregular immigrants as a deviant criminal group and framed the management of 
inflows immigration under a “wanted, but not welcome” approach. 
9.1.1.1.1 – LN electoral campaign 
In a fragile position within the CdL coalition, the LN refrained from issuing its own 
manifesto to prevent conflicts with its coalition partners. To overcome its weak media 
coverage, the LN developed an electoral campaign close to northern voters (Legnante and 
Sani, 2002). This strategy encompassed the organisation of several street parades against 
immigration (Corriere della Sera, 2001c) under slogans such as “entry for labour purposes 
only and not for delinquency” evidencing an interdiscursive relationship between the LN’s 
frame of immigration as a law and order issue and the mainstream parties’ discourse. Bossi 
proposed the construction of a net over the Slovenian border and argued that irregular 
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 “Regulate immigration: cause of criminality” (CdL, 2001, p. 50). 
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immigrants “once entitled to vote, would provide 2.5 million additional votes for left parties 
in five years” (Corriere della Sera, 2001d). The fusion of anti-immigration stances with the 
old anti-establishment discourse was the new formula found to mobilise the LN’s core 
electorate after the end of the secessionist project (Fella and Ruzza, 2009).  
Figure 9.1 – Salience of immigration policy in Italian party coalitions’ electoral manifestos at 
the 2001 general election 
 
Source: Ulivo, 2001; CdL, 2001 
9.1.1.2 – Ulivo’s position on immigration policy 
According to Colombo and Sciortino (2004), the centre-left coalition lacked any efforts to 
defend the 1998 Turco-Napolitano law and even failed to explore faults within the CdL 
campaign on immigration. In an alternative to Berlusconi’s slogan of “better control of 
immigration”, Rutelli proposed “the end of the racket of irregular immigrants” without 
challenging the CdL approach (Corriere della Sera, 2001f). The Ulivo’s electoral manifesto 
conceded higher salience to immigration policy than the CdL’s and irregular immigration 
dominated the centre-left proposals (Figure 9.1; Ulivo, 2001). Most of the proposed 
objectives focused on the containment of irregular inflows whilst a quota system was also 
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proposed (Ulivo, 2001, p.34). The only point distinguishing the two coalitions was the 
Ulivo’s vague proposal to concede long-term residence authorisations to all legal immigrants 
(Ulivo, 2001, p.36). Therefore, the centre-left coalition converged with the CdL’s frame of 
immigration and favoured the perception of immigration as a question of police control rather 
than a labour market issue.  
In short, immigration policy was a salient issue at the 2001 electoral campaign and 
mainstream parties’ strongly focused on irregular inflows. Two mainstream inter-party 
consensuses were found on immigration policy involving its framing as a law and order issue 
and on the adoption of guest-worker systems to manage labour inflows. The LN had a 
significant impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy, particularly amongst the 
centre-right coalition. Bossi’s formal electoral pact with Berlusconi presupposed the CdL 
adoption of the LN’s frame of immigration as a law and order issue and under a temporary 
approach. The Ulivo’s convergence with the CdL approach strengthened the LN’s impact on 
inter-party competition, as the high salience of immigration within the Ulivo’s electoral 
manifesto suggests and as Colombo and Sciortino (2004) argued too. The LN significant 
impact on inter-party competition was positively related to the behaviour of the four proposed 
factors (Table 2.1). 
The growth of the foreign population settled in Italy with a regular status and the dimension 
of the 2002 regularisation process suggest an increase of levels of immigration before 2001 
(Figure 9.2). Immigration was a top priority amongst the Italian voters most important issues 
in 2001 (Figure 9.3). Despite its electoral decline before 2001, the LN continued to pose a 
substantial strategic dilemma to mainstream parties. Due to the dynamics imposed by the 
Italian electoral system, an independent LN candidacy and its ability to win seats under the 
majoritarian tier could still hinder the CdL’s overall victory as observed at the 1996 general  
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Figure 9.2 – Foreign population with legal residence authorisation in Italy between 1997 and 
2001  
 
 
Source: ISTAT, 2005 
 
Figure 9.3 – Most important issue at the 2001 general election (N= 3,173) 
 
Source: ITANES, 2001 
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election (Table 4.5). Finally, the CdL’s formal engagement with the LN and the signature of 
the formal electoral pact also coincided with the LN’s significant impact on inter-party 
competition. Within this context, Berlusconi’s close relationship with Bossi consummated by 
the electoral agreement was considered the most relevant factor enhancing the LN’s 
significant impact on this dimension of immigration politics. 
9.1.2 – The LN’s impact on public attitudes to immigration  
Did the LN intensify levels of concern and hostility towards immigration amongst the Italian 
electorate in 2001? Immigration was ranked amongst the top priority issues of the Italian 
electorate at the 2001 ballot and was mainly associated with insecurity issues. Despite intense 
anxiety and levels of hostility, this thesis argues that the LN lacked relevant contagion effects 
on public attitudes to immigration at the national level. The analysis developed further on 
suggests that the LN’s limited electoral support and concentrated party network looked as the 
most relevant factor behind its lack of impact on this dimension of immigration politics 
(Table 2.1).  
Unemployment and criminality were the two top priority issues of Italian voters at the 2001 
ballot, whilst immigration was ranked as the sixth highest priority (Figure 9.3). However, the 
salience of immigration was actually likely to be higher due to the strong association between 
criminality and irregular inflows amongst the electorate in contrast to its irrelevance at the 
1996 ballot (Legnante and Sani, 2002, p.50). The CdL’s electoral strategy resonated with the 
electorate and it was considered the best coalition to deal with immigration, enjoying a lead 
of almost twenty points over the Ulivo (Itanes, 2001, p. 162). Data from Itanes (2001) 
indicated that the voters most concerned with immigration ranked Bossi negatively and at a 
lower level than Fini, Berlusconi and even Rutelli (Figure 9.4). This trend suggests that the 
perception of Bossi as the best candidate to deal with immigration by voters most concerned 
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with this issue should have been low in 2001. Therefore, the LN was far from holding the 
issue ownership of opposition to immigration unlike the French FN in 2002 (see Chapter 7).  
In terms of public attitudes to immigration, perceptions of threat to employment were low 
amongst the electorate, but higher among LN voters (Figure 9.5). Perceptions of immigration 
as a threat to national identity were very low at national level in contrast to the consensus 
found among LN voters (Figure 9.6). Finally, the association between immigration and 
insecurity was high across the Italian electorate and overwhelming amid the LN’s voters 
(Figure 9.7). Curiously, the British electorate exhibited the opposite perceptions of 
immigration at the 2001 general election (see Chapter 5).  Public perceptions were confirmed 
by the continuous rising proportion of foreign citizens amongst individuals denounced for a 
crime and sentenced since the early 1990s. However, the share of irregular immigrants 
among the total of convicted foreign citizens dropped between 1988 and 2006 (Barbagli, 
2008). Attitudes to immigration of the LN’s voters confirmed the effects of Bossi’s 
xenophobic approach to immigration but the Italian ERP’s contagion effects did not expend 
to the national level.
99
 Bossi’s low ranking across voters most concerned with immigration, 
the LN’s concentrated territorial dimension, and its limited media coverage suggest that the 
LN lacked a relevant impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2001.  
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 Nonetheless, levels of hostility towards immigration among the LN electorate were still at a lower level 
than among the French FN voters in the 2002 presidential elections.  
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Figure 9.4 – Ranking of Bossi, Fini, Berlusconi and Rutelli amongst respondents most 
concerned with immigration at the 2001 general election (N= 148) 
 
Source – ITANES, 2001 
 
Figure 9.5 – Public perception of immigrants as a threat to employment at Italian 2001 
general election? (N = 3,121; LN voters = 40) 
 
Source: ITANES, 2001 
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Figure 9.6 – Public perception of immigrants as a threat to culture and identity at Italian 
2001 general election (N = 3,130; LN voters = 38) 
 
Source: ITANES, 2001 
 
Figure 9.7 – Public perception of immigrants as a threat to security and public order at Italian 
2001 general election (N = 3,155; LN voters = 40) 
 
Source: ITANES, 2001   
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This observation was weakly related to the expansion of levels of immigration rates before 
2001 and to the agency of mainstream parties, but it coincided with the levels of LN’s 
electoral support. As noted, immigration rates into Italy expanded before the 2001 general 
election as evidence by an increase in the foreign population legally settled in Italy and by the 
dimension of the 2002 regularisation programme (Figure 9.2). The formal engagement 
between Italian mainstream centre-right parties and the LN legitimised Bossi’s xenophobic 
discourse but this trend failed to expand the LN’s contagion effects to the national level. In 
contrast, the concentration of the LN’s electoral support exclusively on northern regions in a 
context of electoral decline coincided with Bossi’s inability to influence the national 
electorate (Table 4.5). Within this context, this last factor seems the most relevant behind its 
lack of impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2001. Consequently, responsibility for 
the intense anxiety and hostility to immigration across the Italian electorate lay elsewhere 
than the LN, a trend that subsequently enhances the profile of mainstream parties and other 
political actors.  
9.1.3 – 2001 Electoral outcome 
The CdL was the victorious coalition at the 2001 general election after securing 45.4 per cent 
of the vote for the Chamber of Deputies against Ulivo’s 35 per cent (Newell and Bull, 2002, 
p. 631). At the Senate elections, the CdL obtained 42.7 per cent of the vote against 38.7 per 
cent won by the Ulivo allowing Berlusconi to enjoy a comfortable majority in both chambers. 
Berlusconi’s victory was enhanced by the fact that the FI was the leading party and enjoyed a 
redistribution of votes within the centre-right coalition to its advantage (Pasquino, 2002). 
Consequently, the FI only depended on support from the AN to maintain a majority rather 
than on the LN or the Christian-Democrat parties (Chiaramonte, 2002).  
The LN’s share of the vote decreased to 3.9 per cent (Table 9.1) and the electoral decline 
extended to the northern strongholds: whereas the LN had been the leading party in the 
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Veneto region in 1996, it dropped to fourth place in 2001 (Giordano, 2003). Consequently, 
the LN was the single coalition party that failed to overcome the 4 per cent threshold under 
the proportional tier, but the electoral agreement provided 47 seats in the Chamber of 
Deputies (Fabbrini and Gilbert, 2002). The coalition was still decisive for the CdL’s victory 
as it recovered 35 seats lost to independent LN candidates in 1996 (Newell and Bull, 2002, p. 
631). Berlusconi rewarded Bossi with LN overrepresentation within the Cabinet by allotting 
three cabinet posts to his party
100
 to counterbalance the weight of the remaining coalition 
parties (Donovan, 2004).  
Table 9.1 – Votes for LN in Italian general and EP elections between 2001 and 2006 
Year Election 
Number of 
Votes 
Proportion of total Seats 
2001 general 1,464,301 3.9% – 
2004 EP 1,613,506 4.96% 4 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno, 2010 
 
9.2 – LN trajectory 2001-2006  
Extremist parties like the LN are regarded as highly successful in opposition but usually 
confront “insurmountable” difficulties once they reach public office (Heinisch, 2003). These 
obstacles encompass the pressures to de-radicalise their political agenda, their inexperience in 
policy-making and confrontational posture. These pose difficulties in accommodation within 
coalition governments, and they risk alienating their core voters’ support in consequence of 
adaptation (Minkenberg, 2001; Heinisch, 2003, p.12). Within the context of an electoral 
crisis, was Bossi’s leadership capable of inverting the LN’s electoral downturn before the 
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 Bossi was appointed as Minister for Reform responsible for promoting devolution; Roberto Maroni 
became the Minister for Welfare and Roberto Castelli was appointed Minister of Justice.  
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2006 general election? Effectively, the LN started a period of electoral recovery from the 
2004 EP elections onwards despite Bossi’s forced absence. Furthermore and contrary to 
initial expectations, the LN actually intensified its cultural xenophobia with a strong focus on 
Islamic immigration and criticised the CdL government’s management of immigration flows. 
9.2.1 – The LN’s position within the Italian party system and in Berlusconi’s executive  
In the aftershock of the 2001 electoral election, Bossi’s alliance with Berlusconi and the LN’s 
subsequent integration into a “Roman” government provoked widespread internal 
dissatisfaction (Passalacqua, 2009). The office-seeking strategy was justified by Bossi who 
argued that it was impossible to push for reforms such as devolution from outside 
government (Bossi, 2001a). To overcome internal unrest, Bossi concentrated his party on 
immigration policy reform (analysed in depth in this chapter’s third section) and on 
devolution. In August 2001, a proposal for devolution was approved by the Council of 
Ministers but was left pending until 2003 due to opposition from the southern AN and the 
Biancofiore parties (Cotta, 2002). These delays infuriated Bossi who threatened to pull out of 
the government, but this threat never materialised because it would lead to terminal isolation 
within the Italian party system. Henceforth, Bossi diverted the LN’s internal agenda from 
devolution to opposition to Europe and immigration (Passalacqua, 2009).  
As the weakest coalition partner, the LN was expected to hold weak agenda setting powers 
(Cotta, 2002). Nonetheless, a ‘northern axis’ formed by Berlusconi, Bossi and the Milanese 
Finance Minister – Giulio Tremonti – was widely regarded as dominant within the 
government by 2003 provoking the dissatisfaction of the other coalition partners (Diamanti, 
2007).
101
 In exchange for favouring Bossi, Berlusconi received unconditional LN support in 
cabinet (Diamanti and Lello, 2005). The post of Minister of Justice was assigned to Roberto 
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 The resignation of the pro-European FI Foreign Minister, Renato Ruggiero in early 2002 was fostered 
by Bossi’s extensive criticism of the EU integration process and the lack of support by Berlusconi 
(Donovan, 2004). 
261 
 
Castelli demonstrating the Prime Minister’s confidence in the LN on issues of key personal 
interest, such as judicial reform and media regulation (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). 
Recovery from the 2001 electoral disaster was evident at the 2003 administrative elections, as 
the LN maintained its strongholds in small northern cities such as Treviso and Vicenza 
(Signore and Trocino, 2008). The geographic concentration of the LN electoral support 
provided a decisive contribution to its structure of electoral opportunities at local elections. 
Divisions within the coalition resurfaced after a defeat at the 2003 administrative ballot, with 
the AN and Christian-Democrat parties blaming the ‘northern axis’ for poor results. Relations 
between Fini and Bossi were classified as mutual competition throughout the entire 
legislature, whilst Berlusconi was regarded as a broker between the two opposing parties’ 
interests (Hopkin and Ignazi, 2008).  
Disagreement about devolution reform was finally overcome in August 2003 and a “road 
map” agreed within the coalition government. 102 Bossi employed a two-pronged strategy in 
office by adopting a radical discourse to the outside and simultaneously remaining open to 
cooperation with governmental partners (Parenzo and Romano, 2008). Hence, the LN was the 
opposition party within the executive and simultaneously accumulated political capital from 
holding cabinet seats (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005). The hegemony of the ‘northern 
axis’ within government through the first half of Berlusconi’s term ensured disproportional 
influence to Bossi over the legislative agenda despite the 2001 electoral setback. 
Nevertheless, the attainment of the LN’s objectives demanded extensive negotiations with 
coalition partners within the context of strained relations with the AN and the Biancofiore 
parties.  
                                                 
102
 The agreement saw devolution of power to regions over health, education and policing exchanged for 
the reinforcement of the Prime Minister’s executive powers as Fini demanded (Bull and Newell, 2009). 
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9.2.2 – Bossi’s stroke in 2004 
A crisis erupted within the LN in March 2004 following Bossi’s hospitalisation after a stroke 
(Fella and Ruzza, 2009). Calderoli became the Minister for Constitutional Reform whilst the 
party’s leadership and organisation of the 2004 EP electoral campaign were left to a directory 
formed by Giancarlo Giorgetti
103
, Maroni, Calderoli and Castelli (Bendicenti, 2006). This 
electoral campaign was based on opposition to European integration considered responsible 
for the homogenisation of member-states’ immigration policies and imposition of a multi-
racial society (LN, 2004). Consonant with its cultural xenophobia, opposition to Turkey’s 
admission into the EU was justified by its “national-Islamic” identity and subsequent threat to 
European identity (LN, 2004). LN results at the 2004 EP election were unexpectedly positive 
as its electoral share exceeded the 4 per cent threshold (Table 9.1). In contrast, whereas 
support for Berlusconi’s FI dropped, the AN and Union di Centro104 (UdC) vote shares 
increased reinforcing their ambitions to have a stronger profile within the governmental 
coalition (Diamanti, 2007). 
A crisis within the coalition followed the CdL’s heavy defeat to the Ulivo at the 2004 
administrative elections (Donovan, 2004). Consequently, Berlusconi’s leadership was overtly 
contested and Tremonti was forced to resign whilst Fini was promoted to Foreign Minister 
(Diamanti and Lello, 2005). This recalibration of forces among the coalition partners and the 
“northern axis’’ disappearance led to a substantial drop in LN influence on the political 
agenda (Fella and Ruzza, 2009). Nonetheless, the devolution bill passed in the Senate on 23 
March 2005, representing a symbolic victory for the LN (Bendicenti, 2006). In turn, the LN 
won 5.6 per cent of the national vote at the 2005 regional elections and contributed to CdL 
victories in the Lombardy and Veneto regions (Jori, 2009). The LN proved its ability to 
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 Giorgetti was a LN MP since 1996 and National Secretary of Lega Lombarda-Lega Nord since 2001. 
104
 Union di Centro resulted from the fusion of Christian Democrat parties CCD and CDU.  
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succeed without Bossi and its electoral expansion affronted the antagonistic coalition partners 
that faced an electoral decline (Passalacqua, 2009).  
Bossi returned to politics gradually from 2005 onwards without re-entering Berlusconi’s 
government. His return was marked by the reinforcement of LN opposition to the EU 
integration process now responsible for favouring bankers and multinationals (Passalacqua, 
2009). The LN’s defence of Italians’ interests against big business marked Bossi’s shift to a 
left-wing spectrum on economic policy alongside his previous economic protectionism. This 
action resembled the FN’s shift to “left-lepénism” during the 1990s. By the mid-2000s, the 
LN ideology conformed to the model of an authoritarian xenophobic ERP in contrast to 
previous neoliberal classification. Whereas the LN’s anti-system properties related to its 
threat to Italian state unity were downgraded after abandoning the secessionist project, the 
LN can still be considered an anti-system party insofar as equality between people is 
considered a pillar of liberal democracy.  
Meanwhile, the LN devolution bill was subjected to a referendum after the centre-left parties 
voted in bloc against it at the final parliamentary vote on 16 November 2005 (Bull and 
Newell, 2009). Despite the referendum, the LN’s hard-core members expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the watered down proposal since it fell short of secessionist ambitions 
and recognised Rome as the capital (Signore and Trocino, 2008). In response to internal 
disarray, Bossi quickly restated both the federalist path and the coalition with Berlusconi for 
the 2006 general election. By the end of Berlusconi’s second term in office, Bossi and the LN 
had succeeded in passing their two top priority issues that suggests an overall success against 
the expected difficulties (Heinisch, 2003).  
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9.2.3 – The LN’s position on immigration 
Participation in government was expected to tame the LN’s radical ideology in favour of a 
pragmatic approach but this was not the case (Minkenberg, 2001). The 9/11 attacks only 
exacerbated LN cultural racism towards Islam (Parenzo and Romano, 2008), which was 
legitimised at public level by other centre-right political figures in 2000.
 105
 Berlusconi 
himself claimed in the aftermath of the attacks that: “The West must be aware of its 
civilization’s superiority” (La Reppublica, 2001). Accusations of racism were denied by 
Bossi, yet an end to the “invasion and erasure of our culture” was simultaneously demanded 
(Bossi, 2001b). One of Bossi’s techniques to re-acquire prominence was to deliver 
xenophobic outbursts as after the 2003 administrative election (Geddes, 2008). In the 
meantime, Fini decided to distance the AN from the LN’s xenophobia in 2003 by defending 
immigrants’ right to vote in administrative elections and provoking Bossi’s public fury 
(Corriere della Sera, 2003a).  
Welfare chauvinism previously observed during Bossi’s construction of the ‘Padanian’ myth 
also resurfaced from 2003 onwards (Fella and Ruzza, 2009). Centre-left unions were accused 
of harming Italian families as they “argue that we must give housing to immigrants before 
our own youth and workers” (Bossi, 2003, p. 19). An ideological innovation introduced by 
Bossi was the conflation of economic protectionism with cultural xenophobia as “imports and 
immigrants are two faces of the same problem”, demanding the deployment of strict quotas 
so as to avoid “social chaos” (Corriere della Sera, 2003b). The LN’s anti-immigration 
position was also evident from Calderoli’s comments on a report on immigration published in 
2005: “we welcome zero-growth. We face a true invasion that envisages the progressive 
replacement of our people by them”. He added that his party would continue to fight “those 
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 The famous Italian political scientist named Giovanni Sartori theorised opposition to multiculturalism 
by focusing particularly on Muslim immigration (Calavita, 2004). 
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who seek to cancel our identity” (Corriere della Sera, 2005). Calderoli was forced to resign 
from government following his TV appearance with a t–shirt depicting the Danish cartoon of 
the Prophet Mohammed considered blasphemous (Fella and Ruzza, 2007). Lastly, the LN 
successfully watered down the anti-racist law (Legge Mancino) in 2006, broadening the 
impunity for incitement of racial hatred (Corriere della Sera, 2006a).
106
 Therefore, the LN’s 
cultural xenophobia and welfare chauvinism were reinforced during the term (Bouilland, 
2007).  
Summarising, the LN’s electoral recovery developed slowly from the 2001 general election 
onwards in the context of its coalition partners’ electoral decline. Against initial expectations, 
Bossi had disproportionate influence on the policy agenda until the dissolution of the 
‘northern axis’ in 2004 that reflected the special relationship between Berlusconi and Bossi. 
The LN’s tactic in office was to present itself as opposition to the government without 
provoking a rupture with its coalition partners. Participation in government failed to pose 
constraints on LN extremism, as cultural and welfare xenophobia were reinforced during the 
term with particular emphasis on irregular inflows and Islam (Bouilland, 2007). Furthermore, 
cultural xenophobia became a cornerstone of the LN’s new political identity in disregard of 
previous ethnic “Padanian” identity (Bendicenti, 2006).  
9.3 – LN impact on immigration policy during Berlusconi’s term  
Did the LN reinforce the restrictive character of Italian immigration policy between 2001 and 
2006 according to its xenophobic agenda? Immigration policy was quickly set as a 
governmental priority leading to the approval of the 2002 Bossi-Fini law with a clear 
restrictive character. Berlusconi’s term was characterised by an extensive policy gap between 
restrictive policy aims set at the 2001 electoral campaign and the subsequent policy outcomes 
                                                 
106
 The Mancino law was causing unrest within the LN because of the judicial processes imposed on party-
members for public incitement of racism, as the case of Calderoli (Einaudi, 2007). 
266 
 
throughout the second half of the term. This research argues that the LN had a direct and 
significant impact on the development of immigration policy during Berlusconi’s term, which 
was disproportional in view of the LN’s position as the weakest coalition partner. The agency 
of mainstream parties seemed the most relevant factor behind the LN’s moderate impact on 
the Italian immigration policy (Table 2.1).  
9.3.1 – The Bossi Fini-Law  
In contrast to Berlusconi’s first term, the CdL government quickly prioritised reform of 
immigration policy (Geddes, 2008). Seeking to lead intra-coalition negotiations, the LN 
Welfare minister Maroni proposed the introduction of a “contract of residence” to replace the 
1998 “guarantor” permit, which had been a LN proposal since the parliamentary debate on 
the 1990 Martelli Law (Einaudi, 2007). This “contract of residence” subordinated 
immigrants’ legal entrance in Italy to prior acquisition of a valid job contract, the employer’s 
insurance of proper accommodation and financial means to cover costs of return after 
expiration of the job contract (Caponio, 2007). Initial negotiations between Fini and Bossi 
culminated in a highly restrictive proposal including the contract of residence, regional 
quotas and the criminalisation of irregular immigration. Nevertheless, the UdC’s opposition 
led to its rejection (Einaudi, 2007).  
Prioritising pragmatism over ideology and to antagonise his rival Fini, Bossi dropped the AN 
proposal for the criminalisation of irregular immigrants preferring to keep it an administrative 
offence for pragmatic purposes.
107
 A watered down version of the initial proposal was 
approved by the Council of Ministers in August 2001 including the LN’s contract of 
residence. The UdC presented a parliamentary amendment proposing a regularisation 
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 In Bossi’s own words: “if we opt for the judicial path, we will have tens of thousands of non-EU 
immigrants that commit a crime, because between removal and appeal, they will manage to hide within the 
country. Instead, if it is an administrative offence they can be automatically removed to their home 
countries and they can appeal at our consulates, if they want to” (Corriere della Sera, 2001g). This 
reflection would be completely forgotten when the LN returned to government in 2008.   
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programme restricted to domestic workers and carers (Colombo and Sciortino, 2003). In 
parallel, the employers’ organisations demanded a general amnesty for all active irregular 
immigrants. Northern employers’ associations criticised the negative impact of the “contract 
of residence” and claimed that the LN did not represent their interests (Zaslove, 2006).   
Opposition to a general amnesty by the LN, which only accepted the regularisation of 
domestic workers and carers, was overturned following negotiations with coalition partners 
(Einaudi, 2007). Awareness of his party’s inability to veto its coalition partners and Italian 
employers’ demands led Bossi to demand the introduction of additional high profile security 
related measures to appease his own voters (Geddes, 2008). Consequently, the collection of 
biometric data from all regular immigrants who applied for access/renewal of residence 
authorisations was imposed, which stigmatised immigrants as a deviant population.
108
 The 
interdiscursive relationships identified between the LN’s association of irregular immigration 
and criminality and Italian mainstream parties’ discourse at the 2001 electoral campaign 
legitimised the unequal treatment of immigrants in comparison to national citizens.  
Furthermore, immigrants’ entitlement to child benefits was also suppressed by a LN 
parliamentary initiative demonstrating the party’s welfare chauvinism (Zincone, 2002). In 
return for the coalition partners’ acceptance of LN demands, Bossi compromised with the 
approval of a separate law enlarging the amnesty to all irregular immigrants (Decree-Law no. 
9 of 7 September 2002).  
A final draft of the Bossi-Fini law was approved in July 2002 extending restrictions on all 
types of inflows (Table 9.2). Consequently, the 1998 quota system was maintained but the 
bureaucratisation of channels for labour immigration prevented the deployment of an active 
entry policy (Table 9.2). Furthermore, rigid association between residence permits and work 
contracts hindered immigrants’ renewal of their residence authorisations and consequently 
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 By 2004, 700 000 data units had been collected by the Italian authorities (Barbagli, 2008). 
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destabilised their long-term legal settlement in the country. Access to family reunion by 
immigrants was also limited and a restrictive reform of the asylum system was deployed 
(Table 9.2). However, asylum continued to hold a weak salience in Italian political debate 
demonstrated by the absence of separate legislation on asylum in spite of an increase in 
asylum seeking (Figure 9.8). The lack of a right to appeal for failed asylum seekers in 
disregard of the EU directive no. 9 of 2003 led to later criticism by the EU Commission 
(Quaglia and Radaelli, 2007). Finally, measures to tackle irregular inflows were reinforced 
whilst the criminalisation of irregular immigrants was restricted to those found with an 
irregular status for a second time (Table 9.2).  
Table 9.2 – Modifications to Italian immigration policy introduced by the 2002 Bossi-Fini 
Law 
Primary inflows Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular 
inflows 
Suppresses sponsored entry visa. 
Prospective employers forced to 
ensure accommodation and 
financial means to cover return 
costs after end of work contract. 
Residence authorisation 
dependent on contract duration, 
valid for maximum of 2 years, 
and remains valid for 6 months 
after loss of employment. 
Probationary period to access 
permanent residence extended to 
6 years. Introduced exceptional 
quotas for immigrants of Italian 
origin and countries who signed 
readmission agreements.  
Family reunion 
was limited 
and only 
recognised to 
conjugal and 
minor 
dependents. 
Removes 
access to child 
benefits for 
immigrant 
families.  
   
Instituted seven 
“territorial 
commissions” to 
examine asylum 
requests. Introduced 
identification centres 
for asylum seekers. 
Established two 
distinct procedures 
(simplified or 
ordinary) for asylum 
seekers depending 
on their permanence 
in identification 
centres   
Detention limit 
expanded to 60 
days. 
Reinforces 
sanctions on 
employers of 
irregular 
immigrants.  
Reforms 
deportation 
procedures 
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Figure 9.8 – Asylum requests in Italy between 2001 and 2009 
 
Source: Ministero Dell’Interno, 2010 
 
9.3.2 – 2002 regularisation programme 
The development of the 2002 regularisation process demonstrated the acute demand for 
foreign workers to perform unskilled labour. By the end of 2002, 705,000 requests for 
regularisation were presented to Italian authorities and 645,000 residence authorisations were 
granted (ISTAT, 2005). This outcome exceeded the sum of all previous amnesties and 
represented the largest regularisation programme ever in Europe (Bonifazi, 2010). A 
substantial growth of the number of Eastern European citizens (especially Romanians, 
Ukrainian and Albanians citizens) among regularised citizens was observed, intensifying the 
already highly diverse foreign population legally settled in Italy (Zucchetti, 2004). Finally, a 
majority of the regularised immigrants (316,000) worked in the domestic sector, thereby 
enabling Italian families to hire private domestic assistance in a context of 18 million retired 
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Italians and a crisis of welfare provision (Pugliese, 2010).
 109
 The structural dependence of 
the domestic sector on foreign labour would have significant repercussions in the future. 
Migrant workers fill low-skilled and low productivity jobs usually shunned by Italians, a 
trend that helps to understand the public’s weak perception of immigration as a threat to 
employment (Reyneri, 2007). The demand for HSI was irrelevant in Italy as the country 
continued to lose human capital to other industrialised countries (Becker et al., 2003).  
The amnesty was presented by Berlusconi himself as a great success due to the emergence of 
thousands of workers from the underground economy, thereby ignoring the rhetoric used 
during the 2001 electoral campaign and the divisions within the coalition government 
(Einaudi, 2007). Thus, a gap between the restrictive policy aims set in 2001 and the liberal 
outcome of the 2002 regularisation process can be identified (Pugliese, 2010). 
Notwithstanding this liberal outcome, the LN had a significant impact on the 2002 
immigration law with the inclusion of the residence contract, the restrictions on immigrants’ 
access to welfare benefits and the imposition of biometric controls on non-EU citizens. 
Against those authors who regarded the LN contagion effects on immigration policy as 
limited (Fella and Ruzza, 2007), the LN’s impact also extended to the management of the 
quota system, as is seen below. 
9.3.3 – Maroni’s management of the quota system 
The Provisional Ministerial decrees issued between 2001 and 2003 setting the official caps on 
labour inflows were supervised by the LN Welfare Minister Roberto Maroni (Geddes, 2008). 
Under pressures to supply immigrant labour to agriculture and tourism, Maroni raised the 
2001 cap (Figure 9.9). This action proved that the LN could not ignore demands for foreign 
                                                 
109
 The remaining regularised immigrants were concentrated in industrial sectors whilst only a small 
number of regularised migrants were active in agriculture or were seasonal workers. The geographic 
distribution of regularised immigration indicated a concentration in northern regions, where chances of 
employment were stronger (Farsini, 2008).  
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labour from the Italian economy (Zincone, 2006; Geddes, 2008). However and as Einaudi 
(2007) noticed, the LN accepted immigration under a strict utilitarian approach with limited 
access to social rights (temporary immigrants were granted a short term residence permit of a 
maximum duration of 9 months and were ineligible for family reunion). These short-term 
residence authorisations provided few legal guarantees to immigrants against the 
vulnerability of arbitrary forced removal and prevented their long-term legal settlement in 
Italy. Bossi’s legitimised the management of immigration under this strictly utilitarian 
approach as the CdL proposed in 2001 by stating:  
“who comes into our country should enter by the front door, holding a work contract 
whose duration should not exceed three years. During such period, the worker’s 
performance can be evaluated and he can remain if his contribution is positive or else 
be removed from the country” (Corriere della Sera, 2001g) 
Therefore, the disproportional dimension of temporary quotas over permanent quotas was 
reinforced during 2002 and 2003 under Maroni’s guidance (Figure 9.9), suggesting that the 
interdiscursive relationship found in 2001 had a subsequent linkage to policy developments.  
The hegemony of the LN’s political priorities over economic concerns was evident by the gap  
between the intense domestic demand for foreign workers and the limited supply of labour 
visas by the Italian state, particularly between 2001 and 2003 (Reyneri, 2007).
110
 In short, the 
LN sought to deploy a strict guest-worker system to manage labour inflows similar to the 
interest groups politics model (Table 2.2). This approach strengthened the potential growth of 
irregular immigration due to the inherent difficulties in enforcing the return of immigrants 
after expiration of work contracts (Castles, 2006). However, the Italian quota system 
regularised immigrants already settled in the country instead of being an active channel for   
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 Reyneri (2007, p.7) reported that Italian companies forecasted hiring an annual minimum of 105,000 
non-seasonal immigrants between 2001 and 2005 (this forecast did not include domestic labour demand), a 
number much superior to the annual caps on labour inflows decreed until 2005 (Figure 9.9). 
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Figure 9.9 – Italian quotas for labour inflows between 1998 and 2009 
 
Source: Caponio and Colombo, 2007; Flows Decrees, 2008; 2009 
regular labour inflows (Colombo and Martini, 2007). In this respect, the LN’s impact only 
reinforced the Italian state inability to manage labour inflows according to the domestic 
demand (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009). Nonetheless, the LN’s profile on immigration policy 
dropped after 2004 reflecting the recalibration of forces within the coalition.  
9.3.4 – Judicial intervention and the A-8 countries 
Declining LN influence on immigration policy from 2004 onwards mirrored a conjugation of 
distinct factors: i) judicial intervention; ii) intra-coalition dynamics; iii) and the new EU 
member-states’ accession. First, the Constitutional Court in 2004 questioned the legitimacy 
of the Bossi-Fini law on the deportation of irregular immigrants (Ghersi, 2005).
111
 A 
compromise between the coalition partners led to the acceptance of the court’s 
recommendations and the promulgation of a corrective decree (Statute 271/2004) watering 
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 In particular, the generalisation of escorted forced removals and imprisonment of individuals for 
commitment of an administrative offense (Ghersi, 2005). 
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down the repressive components of the 2002 immigration law (Bouillaud, 2007). The judicial 
intervention apparently circumscribed LN impact on legislation, but the expulsion rates had 
topped 45,185 forced removals in 2002 and were declining ever since (Barbagli, 2008, p. 
121). Secondly, decision making on the quota system became a more formal and consensual 
process from 2003 onwards as supervision passed from Maroni to the FI Interior Minister, 
Giuseppe Pisanu (Einaudi, 2007).  
Intense disagreements over Maroni’s supervision of the Flows Decrees had been observed 
within the coalition. Notwithstanding his authorship of legislation, Fini stated that the AN 
would: “not exclude in the future, not in years but in a few months, the option of removing 
the quota mechanism of entry” (Corriere della Sera, 2003a). Similar dissatisfaction was 
shared by the UdC that represented the employers’ interests in intensifying labour inflows 
(Corriere della Sera, 2004a). Finally, Berlusconi’s government had to deal with the new-
member states’ accession to the EU as Italy had opted to deploy a transitional period on the 
right of citizens from A-8 countries to access the Italian labour market (Colombo and 
Martini, 2007). Thus, separate quotas for these foreign citizens were deployed by the 2004 
Flows Decree increasing the number of labour visas granted by the Italian state against LN 
objections (Figure 9.9). Berlusconi’s government adopted a guest-worker system for labour 
migrants from both non-EU member-states and A-8 countries, suggesting the presence of 
interest-group models as observed in France (Freeman, 2006).   
9.3.5 – U-turn on inflows management 
A policy shift was observed after the dissolution of the ‘northern axis’ and Fini’s ascension 
within the government in 2004 (Einaudi, 2007). Reflecting the new correlation of forces 
within the governmental coalition, Pisanu proposed a revision of the Bossi-Fini law joking 
“that if there were not immigrants, we could not even milk a Padanian cow” (Corriere della 
Sera, 2004b) and the 2004 consolidation act of the Bossi-Fini law increased the quota 
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system’s flexibility (Colombo and Martini, 2007).112 Consequently, the cap on A-8 countries 
was doubled whilst the quota on non-EU inflows was also substantially raised in 2005 
(Figure 9.9). In the absence of Bossi, the LN opposition was spearheaded by Calderoli who 
declared that: “immigration quotas would only be raised over his dead body” (Corriere della 
Sera, 2004c). However, the erosion of LN influence within the cabinet in a period when the 
devolution bill was under parliamentary debate forced the LN to adopt a consensual approach 
to not jeopardise the approval of this project. As a result of intra-coalition dynamics, the LN 
was compelled to accept the coalition partners’ demands, as also occurred with the 2002 
regularisation.  
The covert policy U-turn became consolidated after the overall cap on labour inflows was 
increased to a maximum of 340,000 labour visas in 2006 (Figure 9.9), the largest number 
ever issued by Italian authorities. The government recognised the intention to regularise 
immigrants already settled in the country, implicitly admitting the failure of legal channels 
deployed for labour inflows (Colombo and Martini; 2007). Consequently, the 2006 Flows 
Decree became an implicit amnesty for irregular immigrants (Pastore et al; 2010) and was 
followed by the presentation of 520,000 demands for regularisation.
113
 Increasing concession 
of non-temporary residence authorisations by the coalition government suggests the adoption 
of a policy model closer to the client politics model than the previous interest group politics 
model (Freeman, 2006).
114
 Whereas the 2002 regularisation programme was developed under 
pressures from the UdC, the covert U-turn on the management of the quota system reflected 
Fini’s realignment alongside the UdC and employers’ associations against his past 
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 Before, the maximum number of entry permits granted by the Flows Decrees had to be similar to the 
cap established in the preceding year. 
113
 In the face of the number of requests for regularisation, the Prodi government elected at the 2006 
general election issued a second Flows Decree in 2006 to absorb the 350,000 supplementary requests in 
excess of the cap set by the first 2006 Flows Decree approved by Berlusconi’s government (Corriere della 
Sera, 2006b).  
114
 Nevertheless, labour migrants continued to fill unskilled rather than skilled jobs and the Italian 
government did not present the option for non-temporary residence permits as a cost-free policy. 
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collaboration with Bossi. Therefore, intra-coalition dynamics had a substantial influence on 
the policy developments observed between 2001 and 2006 (Geddes, 2008). 
Italian immigration policy during Berlusconi’s second term was marked by a gap between the 
restrictive objectives set at the electoral campaign and the subsequent more liberal policy 
outcomes arising from the 2002 regularisation process and the expansive character of the 
caps set by the Flows Decrees (Pugliese, 2009). Labour and irregular inflows were the most 
prominent types of immigration in Italy during the selected period while the 2002 Bossi–Fini 
law extended restrictions on all types of inflows. The management of the quota system was 
highly inconsistent during Berlusconi’s term, initially managed as a strict guest-worker 
system under the LN’s guidance. The LN framing of immigration under a strict utilitarian 
approach legitimised the restricted access to social rights and the short-term character of the 
residence authorisations granted to labour immigrants. A covert U-turn on Italian 
immigration was observed from 2004 onwards materialised by the expansion of caps on 
labour inflows and the intensification of non-temporary immigration. 
Analysis of Italian immigration policy suggests a watering-down effect by centrist parties and 
judicial intervention on the LN initial significant impact on policy developments (Zincone, 
2006). Nonetheless, the introduction of the residence contract, the restrictions on immigrants’ 
access to the welfare state and the biometric controls persisted untouched within the Bossi-
Fini law. Additionally, the privileging of temporary over non-temporary immigration by the 
Flows Decrees set under Maroni’s supervision provided further evidence of LN direct 
significant impact until 2004. The LN’s inability to veto the development of the 2002 
regularisation process and the covert U-turn on the management of the quota system reflected 
its fragile position within the executive. Therefore, the LN had a moderate and direct impact 
on the development of Italian immigration policy between 2001 and 2006. This political 
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process was regarded as disproportional, especially between 2001 and 2003, and coincided 
with the behaviour of the four proposed factors (Table 2.1).  
Levels of immigration into Italy expanded between 2001 and 2006, mainly supported by the 
increase of irregular inflows (see p. 269; Figure 9.10) whilst immigration was ranked 
amongst Italian voters’ top priorities at the 2001 general election (see p. 254). The LN’s 
electoral recovery up to the 2006 general election strengthened this ERP’s electoral challenge 
to mainstream parties, especially in the context of the centre-right parties’ electoral decline. 
CdL’s formal engagement with the LN as well as Berlusconi’s personal favouring of Bossi 
also coincided with the LN’s contagion effects on policy development. Moreover, Fini’s 
initial cooperation with the LN coincided this ERP’s initial significant impact until the AN’s 
leader repositioning alongside the CdU and the Italian employers’ associations in 2003. 
Within the overall context, the agency of mainstream parties seems to hold a stronger 
relationship with the LN’s declining impact on policy developments during Berlusconi’s term 
than the other factors. 
Figure 9.10 – Grants of settlement by category of grant in Italy between 2005 and 2008 
 
Source: Istat, 2009 
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9.4 – Conclusions 
Immigration policy was highly salient in mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns for the 
2001 general election. Irregular immigration dominated the political debate. An inter-party 
consensus was found between the two mainstream coalitions over the framing of immigration 
under a law and order approach rather than as a labour market issue. This research indicated 
that the LN had a significant impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy 
at the 2001 ballot, especially within the centre-right coalition as a result of the salience of 
immigration in the electoral agreement made between the LN and the CdL. The LN’s 
significant impact was positively related to the behaviour of the four factors (Table 2.1). The 
CdL’s formal co-option of the LN into the coalition neutralised the LN’s electoral challenge 
at the expense of the centre-right alignment with Bossi’s approach to immigration. 
Henceforth, the agency of mainstream parties, in particular FI, was the most relevant factor 
enhancing LN impact on this dimension of immigration politics at the 2001 ballot.  
Immigration ranked amongst Italian voters’ top electoral priorities at the 2001 ballot but the 
LN’s ability to drive the attitudes of voters most concerned with immigration was weak as 
these voters had a negative perception of Bossi. Association between immigration and 
security was acute across the general electorate whilst perceptions of being a threat to 
employment and national identity were low amongst the general electorate but not across the 
LN core voters. Nevertheless, LN contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration 
seemed diminished by the negative judgment of Bossi by voters most concerned with this 
issue, the party’s weak media coverage and its concentrated electoral support in northern 
regions. Therefore, LN impact on public attitudes to immigration was considered irrelevant at 
the 2001 general election, which raised the profile of other mainstream political actors behind 
Italian public attitudes to immigration. The LN’s non-significant impact was positively 
related to the levels of LN’s electoral support rather than with the expansion of levels of 
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immigration or the agency of mainstream parties. The geographic concentration of LN 
electoral support in a context of electoral decline seemed the most relevant factor behind its 
limited impact on this dimension of immigration politics.   
Despite the electoral setback at the 2001 general election, Bossi integrated the “northern axis” 
alongside Berlusconi and Tremonti that dominated the legislative agenda until 2004. The LN 
agenda setting powers were watered down after the dissolution of the “northern axis” in 2006 
due to Bossi’s forced absence and the stronger profile of the AN and the CdU within the 
cabinet. Against the expected de-radicalisation process from accommodation within the 
executive, the LN reinforced its cultural and welfare xenophobia between 2001 and 2006. 
The LN electoral decline evident in 2001 was slowly reversed before the 2006 general 
election after obtaining positive results at the 2004 EP elections and at the 2005 regional 
elections.  Furthermore, the LN proved its ability to succeed without Bossi’s charismatic 
leadership and overcome the obstacles posed by accommodation into the national cabinet.  
Italian immigration policy during Berlusconi’s second term was marked by a growing gap 
between the restrictive rhetoric employed through the electoral campaign and the subsequent 
liberal outcomes both of the 2002 regularisation programme and the quota system from 2004 
onwards. The 2002 Bossi-Fini law extended restrictions on all types of immigration flows but 
labour and especially irregular inflows dominated the political debate. The LN successfully 
promoted the inclusion of the “contract of residence”, restricted immigrants’ access to 
welfare and deployed biometric controls on immigration from non-EU countries. The LN 
frame of immigration under a strict utilitarian approach and its association with criminality 
legitimised the former policy developments.  LN impact on Italian immigration policy then 
extended to the management of the quota system as a strict guest-worker system until 2004 
despite the intense demand for foreign labour and the dissatisfaction of other coalition 
partners.  
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This trend supported the high intensity of irregular inflows leading to the development of a 
covert regularisation programme with the 2006 Flows Decree. Bossi’s inability to veto the 
development of the 2002 regularisation programme and the covert U-turn on the management 
of the quota system was unsurprising considering the LN position as the weakest party in the 
government coalition. At the absolute level, the LN had a direct and moderate impact on the 
development of Italian immigration policy between 2001 and 2006. The LN impact was 
considered disproportional between 2001 and 2003, in light of its position within the 
government. LN impact on immigration policy during Berlusconi’s term coincided with the 
behaviour of the four proposed factors. Overall, the agency of mainstream parties seemed the 
most relevant factor in enhancing this political process as the intra-coalition dynamics helped 
to understand the LN declining impact on immigration policy during Berlusconi’s term. 
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Chapter 10 – The LN impact on Italian immigration policy between 2008 and 
2009 
“Two visions should be made clear. The left and its precedent government opened the 
doors to everyone from all countries. The left’s idea was of a multi-ethnic society. 
That is not our idea.”  
President of Council of Ministers, Silvio Berlusconi, 2009 
 
This chapter evaluates the LN’s impact on Italian immigration politics and policy between 
the 2008 general election and the end of 2009. Chapter 9 showed that the LN had significant 
contagion effects on inter-party competition at the 2001 general election and a moderate 
impact on the development of Italian immigration during Berlusconi’s term. In contrast, the 
research indicated that the LN lacked impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2001. This 
chapter now assesses if the LN had a significant impact on the distinct dimensions of Italian 
immigration politics and policy between 2008 and 2009. 
10.1 – The 2008 general elections 
The April 2008 general elections followed the resignation of the centre-left coalition 
government led by Romano Prodi that had been elected in 2006.
 115
 Prodi’s term lasted only 
618 days after losing a vote of confidence in the Senate on 24 January 2008. Meanwhile, a 
new party named Partito Democratico (PD)
116
 was formed under the leadership of Walter 
Veltroni (the Mayor of Rome) in place of the Ulivo. The PD refused to form a coalition with 
the remaining left-wing parties in 2008 apart from the centrist Antonio Di Pietro’s Italia dei 
                                                 
115
 The electoral system had been changed by Berlusconi in 2005 introducing a majority bonus by region at 
the Senate. Prodi won the Chamber of Deputies’ ballot only by 24,755 votes whilst Berlusconi won the 
Senate with 400,000 votes more than the centre-left coalition. However, Prodi obtained a majority of two 
seats through the majority bonuses at the Senate (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007). 
116
 The PD merged the centre-left parties Sinistra Democratica and the Margherita. 
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Valori.  In response, Berlusconi created a new unified centre-right party – Partito della 
Libertá (PdL) that merged his FI with Fini’s AN. Strong prospects of a PdL victory allowed 
Berlusconi to remove the CdU from the PdL whilst the LN formed a coalition with the PdL 
as an autonomous party.
 117
 The 2008 general election developed under a context dominated 
by insecurity after the murder of Francesca Reggiani by a Romanian citizen in October 2007. 
This event received wide media coverage and intra-EU immigration (particularly from 
Romania) became highly salient in Italian political debate (Baldini and Cento Bull, 2009).
 118
 
10.1.1 – LN impact on inter-party competition  
This research has shown that the LN had significant contagion effects on inter-party 
competition on immigration at the 2001 general election. Now, did the LN reinforce the 
restrictive character of mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy in 2008? 
Immigration policy was a prominent issue at the 2008 electoral campaign while irregular 
inflows continued to dominate the Italian political agenda. This first-order-ballot was marked 
by a “security crisis” closely associated to the intensity of intra-EU inflows, in particular of 
EU citizens of Roma origin (Pastore, 2007).
119
 Like in 2001, the LN had a significant impact 
on inter-party competition at the 2008 general election. This research will indicate that the 
agency of mainstream parties was regarded as the most relevant factor behind the LN’s 
contagion effects on immigration politics in 2008. 
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 Berlusconi’s coalition also included the Movimento per l’Autonomia of Rafael Lombardo in Sicily 
(Biorcio, 2010). 
118
 Romania and Bulgaria were incorporated into the EU in January 2007 and benefited from the right to 
free movement of EU citizens. The Prodi’s government decision to abolish immigration quotas for citizens 
of the new member states provided Romanian citizens with free access to the Italian labour market. 
Romanian citizens became the largest foreign community settled in Italy with 625,278 citizens in 2008, 
followed by Albania with 401,949 citizens, and Morocco with 365,909 individuals (Istat, 2009). 
119
 Criminality became widely associated with Romanian immigration, although the statistics refute the 
supposed extraordinary growth of crimes committed by Romanians (Barbagli, 2008, p. 153). 
282 
 
10.1.1.1 – The LN’s position on immigration 
Immigration was a paramount theme of the LN’s campaign and this time, Bossi sought to 
distance the LN from the PdL. As Matteo Salvini
120
 pointed out: “FI and the AN are soft on 
security and immigration. Instead our electoral campaign will hammer these issues” 
(Corriere della Sera, 2008a). LN’s opposition to immigration was spearheaded by its mayors 
in small northern cities. In November 2007, Cittadella (Padova) approved an ordinance 
demanding previous proof of minimum annual earnings for EU citizens seeking a residence 
authorisation to capitalise on public hostility towards Romanian inflows (Corriere della Sera, 
2007a). In Caravaggio (Lombardy), weddings between irregular immigrants and national 
citizens were refused as the LN’s mayor demanded previous proof of legal residence 
authorisation to promote security (Corriere della Sera, 2007b). These events received wide 
and noncritical
121
 coverage in the media increasing this ERP’s visibility in the media (Itanes, 
2008; Ignazi, 2009).  
Similar resolutions were later subscribed by the 200 LN’s mayors whilst Maroni demanded 
the expansion of mayors’ powers to expel nomad camps formed by EU citizens of Roma 
origin (Corriere della Sera, 2007c). The LN’s resolution on immigration approved in March 
2008 established that: “the northern regions are affected by an increase in crime caused by a 
massive, uncontrolled illegal immigration” (LN, 2008b). Insecurity was therefore associated 
with irregular immigration or the nomad camps, reinforcing the stigmatisation of Romanian 
immigrants of Roma origin as a deviant population. In December 2007, the LN organised a 
large march in Milan headed by the LN mayors’ movement against insecurity and irregular 
immigration. Bossi accused Prodi’s government of opening the borders to foreigners and 
providing them with social housing to obtain their vote. The relationship between 
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 The LN deputy leader in the Chamber of Deputies. 
121
 Ignazi (2009, p.438) questioned how positions considered unacceptable in other European countries 
were “easily digested” in Italy. 
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immigration and the economy was not ignored, but Bossi conflated employment of foreign 
labour with low-productivity economic sectors that faced “unfair Chinese competition” (La 
Padania, 2008). In conformity with the electoral campaign, the LN’s short electoral 
manifesto devoted high salience to immigration policy and proposed the “reinforcement of 
mayors’ powers against the illegal and savage immigration” (Figure 10.1; LN, 2008a).  
Figure 10.1 – Salience of immigration policy in Italian party coalitions’ and the LN’s 
electoral manifestos at the 2008 general election 
 
Source: LN, 2008; PdL, 2008; PD, 2008 
10.1.1.2 – The PdL’s position on immigration policy  
Berlusconi had expressed his personal opposition to Italy’s transformation into a 
“multicultural, multi-ethnic society” before the 2006 general election (Corriere della Sera, 
2006c). Once more, Berlusconi’s full cooperation with Bossi granted the LN a chance to co-
write the PdL’s electoral manifesto enabling  Bossi to hold his coalition partner accountable 
to the overt compromises (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010). Nonetheless, divisions between 
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Bossi and Berlusconi resurfaced as the PdL leader complained about the lack of invitation to 
the LN’s march in December 2007. In response, the PdL Milan regional coordinator 
commented that: “We will not hunt down immigrants as the LN would like” (Corriere della 
Sera, 2007d). During the 2008 electoral campaign, Berlusconi continued to associate 
insecurity with irregular immigration as in 2001 as the Prodi’s government had “opened up 
the borders to irregular immigration decreasing public safety and increasing criminality” 
(Berlusconi quoted in Altinier, 2008). An interdiscursive relationship occurred between the 
LN’s framing of immigration and Berlusconi’s articulation of irregular inflows as a threat to 
law and order.  
Fini had also expressed his strong xenophobia towards EU citizens of Roma origin in mid-
2007 when accusing them of: “having no scruples about kidnapping children or using their 
own children for begging” (Corriere della Sera, 2007f). The proposal for the criminalisation 
of “irregular entry” was revived through the AN’s campaign in the LN’s strongholds (Signore 
and Trocino, 2008). The PdL’s 2008 electoral manifesto granted high salience to 
immigration, mostly focused on labour and irregular inflows (Figure 10.1). Proposals on 
immigration policy were framed under the security section providing evidence of the framing 
of management of inflows as a law and order issue like the LN proposed (PdL, 2008). 
Therefore, an intense dispute over the issue ownership of opposition to immigration was 
observed between the PdL and the LN like in 2001.   
10.1.1.3 – The PD’s position on immigration 
The previous centre-left government presented the Amato-Ferrero proposal for a reform of 
Italian citizenship and immigration law in March 2007 but the collapse of Prodi’s 
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government prevented its completion (Paolucci and Newell, 2008)
122
. Veltroni failed to 
explore the merits of the Amato-Ferrero proposal despite his emphasis on the disaster 
provoked by the Bossi-Fini law as a cause of irregularity amongst immigrants. Veltroni also 
articulated immigration, in particular by EU citizens of Roma origin, as a threat to law and 
order in way similar to ERP discourse, after stating as Rome’s Mayor that: “before Romania 
entered the EU, Rome was the safest capital in the world (...). It is necessary to resume 
deportations” (quoted from Sigona, 2010, p. 145). During the electoral campaign, Veltroni 
added that:  
“we must welcome people who want to work here. But those who come here to do 
other things, to rob, to exploit prostitution, to sell drugs must be stopped from doing 
harm and pay what they must pay” (Corriere della Sera, 2008b).  
Therefore, a convergence was observed between the PdL and the PD’s approaches to the 
management of inflows as a law and order issue (Signore and Trocino, 2008). By contrast, 
Italy’s long tradition of emigration was absent in the centre-left discourse on immigration.  
The PD’s 2008 electoral manifesto devoted less salience to immigration policy than the 
centre-right parties did and labour immigration was the most prominent type of immigration 
(Figure 10.1; PD, 2008). Under a title of “governing immigration so as to not endure it”, the 
PD’s manifesto proposed the reintroduction of sponsored entry visa and the extension of the 
duration of residence authorisations, as well as a “Citizenship Pact” based on a system of 
“rights and duties” (PD, 2008, p.22). The resemblances between the PD’s proposals and the 
French President’s immigration policy (see Chapter 8) indicate a stronger realignment of the 
Italian centre-left’s position on immigration policy to the right than at the 2001 general 
election.    
                                                 
122
 The re-introduction of sponsored labour permit, introduction of triennial labour quotas and the 
favouring of skilled immigration were some of the proposals presented (Bigot and Fella, 2008). 
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Immigration policy was highly prominent during the 2008 electoral campaign and its 
importance increased in comparison to 2001, but irregular immigration continued to be the 
most dominant type of inflow. Mainstream inter-party consensuses was found on the frame of 
the management of inflows as a temporary social phenomenon and irregular immigration as a 
law and order issue providing evidence of the LN’s impact on the political debate (Ignazi, 
2009). Consequently, the LN had a significant impact on inter-party competition on 
immigration policy at the 2008 general election, especially on centre-right parties. This trend 
coincided with the expansion of levels of immigration, the LN’s significant threat to 
mainstream parties, and the agency of mainstream parties (Table 2.1).  
The available data on the grant of residence authorisations between 2005 and 2008 in Italy 
suggest that the levels of immigration expanded, supported by the intensification of labour 
and secondary inflows (Figure 9.10). In contrast to 2001, the salience of immigration across 
public opinion was low in 2008 and diverged from the LN’s significant contagion effects on 
inter-party competition (Figure 10.2). The LN retained its ability to win a substantial portion 
of seats under the majoritarian tier in its northern strongholds, especially after overcoming its 
past electoral decline from 2004 onwards (Tables 9.1; 10.1). Effectively, the LN’s results at 
the 2007 administrative elections reinforced this ERP’s electoral threat to mainstream parties.  
Finally, Berlusconi’s full collaboration with Bossi led to the LN’s participation in the draft of 
the PdL’s electoral manifesto, providing the chance for the Italian ERP to bind the centre-
right coalition to its own agenda on immigration policy. Within the former context, the PdL’s 
formal engagement with the Italian ERP seems the most relevant factor behind the LN’s 
significant impact on inter-party competition in 2008.  
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Figure 10.2 – Most important issue at the Italian 2008 general election (N=3,000) 
 
Source: Itanes, 2008 
10.1.2 – LN impact on public attitudes  
This research has shown that the LN lacked impact on public attitudes to immigration at the 
2001 general election, despite the intense concern with this issue and its overwhelming 
association with delinquency. Now did the LN reinforce anxiety and hostility to immigration 
across the electorate at the 2008 general election? Concern with immigration across Italian 
voters persisted at the same level in 2008 but was followed by the decline of levels of public 
hostility to this social phenomenon. In contrast to 2001, the LN had a moderate impact on 
public attitudes to immigration in 2008, apparently stronger amongst voters most concerned 
with immigration and its core electorate than amongst the general electorate. The LN’s 
electoral support alongside the agency of mainstream parties was identified as the most 
relevant factor enhancing the Italian ERP’s impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
Economic concerns were at the top of most important issues of Italian voters at the 2008 
general election unlike insecurity related with criminality like in 2001 (Figure 10.2; Legnante 
and Sani, 2002 ). The salience of immigration increased slightly at the overall level in 2008 in 
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comparison to 2001 but the proportion of voters most concerned with immigration remained 
unchanged (Figure 10.2).
123
 As in 2001, the PdL led by Berlusconi enjoyed a 28-percentage 
points advantage over the PD as the best party to deal with immigration (Itanes, 2008). 
Voters most concerned with immigration ranked Berlusconi as their favourite party leader, 
closely followed by Fini and Bossi (Figure 10.3). The LN’s leader improvement among the 
former group of voters suggests that the LN was now disputing the issue ownership of 
opposition to immigration but was still far from holding its monopoly notwithstanding 
Albertazzi and MacDonnell’s (2010) contrary suggestion.  
 
Figure 10.3 – Evaluation  of Bossi, Fini, Berlusconi and Veltroni amongst respondents most 
concerned with immigration at the Italian 2008 general election (N = 132) 
 
Source – Itanes, 2008 
                                                 
123
 The combination of immigration with delinquency raised this issue to the third most important concern 
amongst the Italian electorate, still behind economic development and unemployment (Figure 10.2) 
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Figure 10.4 – Public perception of immigration and employment at the Italian 2008 general 
election (N = 3,000; LN Voters = 133) 
 
Source – Itanes, 2008 
Figure 10.5 – Public perception of immigration and national identity at the Italian 2008 
general election (N = 3,000; LN Voters = 133) 
 
Source: Itanes, 2008 
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The preceding observation on the LN’s impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2008 
concurs with research conducted by Cavazza et al. (2009, p. 164). This study indicated that 
whereas the LN collected 16.4 per cent of the votes of respondents
124
 anxious with 
“insecurity caused by immigration”, the PdL collected 60.8 per cent and the PD 12.3 per cent. 
Therefore, the LN seemed to have stronger ability to lead the debate on immigration amongst 
voters most anxious with this topic, yet it did not hold the issue ownership of opposition to 
immigration.  
Furthermore, public hostility to immigration declined at the 2008 general election in 
comparison to 2001. The majority of Italians rejected the association between immigration 
and a threat to employment whilst the bulk of the LN’s core electorate has the opposite 
perception (Figure 10.4). Furthermore, general voters continued to disregard immigration as a 
danger to their culture in contrast to LN’s voters (Figure 10.5).125 The traits of cultural 
xenophobia increased among the LN’s core voters whilst it simultaneously declined across 
the general electorate. Therefore, the LN’s cultural xenophobia was gradually reflected in its 
voters’ attitudes but its contagion effects failed to go beyond its own party constituency.  
In short, Bossi improved his image amongst voters most concerned with immigration but the 
data suggests that the LN was still far from holding issue ownership of opposition to 
immigration. Moreover, the LN was unable to increase the concern and hostility to 
immigration across the overall electorate in 2008. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the 
LN’s impact on public attitudes to immigration should be ranked as moderate at the 2008 
general election. The Italian ERPs’ moderate impact on public attitudes to immigration 
coincided with the levels of immigration, the dimension of LN’s electoral support, and the 
                                                 
124
 Individuals who verbalised their responses about the issue they considered most important in the Itanes 
2008 study. 
125
 Unlike the Itanes 2001 study, the 2008 study did not include a question on voters’ perception of 
immigration as a threat to security. 
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agency of mainstream parties. As mentioned above, the intensity of immigration into Italy 
increased before 2008, supported by growth of labour immigration and family reunion 
(Figure 9.10). Against the thesis of “ethnic backlash”, the drop of levels of hostility followed 
the dramatic expansion of immigration before 2008 challenging linkages between xenophobia 
and the increasing presence of immigrants in the host societies. Like in France, hostility to 
immigration seems less contingent on intensity of immigration than on other political factors 
such as mainstream parties’ discourse on immigration.  
The LN’s electoral support expanded from the 2001 general election onwards, and especially 
after the 2006 general election, whilst its core electorate demonstrated higher levels of 
xenophobia (Table 10.1; Figure 10.5). Nonetheless, the LN’s party network continued to be 
concentrated in northern regions. Finally, the PdL’s formal engagement with the LN provided 
exogenous support to the Italian ERP to overcome its regional character by reinforcing the 
legitimacy of the LN’s cultural xenophobia whilst the past participation in government 
expanded its political capital. Summarising, the LN’s electoral support and the PdL’s 
engagement at a formal level with the LN were considered the most relevant factors behind 
the LN’s moderate impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2008. However, these factors 
fail to help to understand the decline of hostility to immigration and further analysis on ERP 
impact on public attitudes is required to understand general trends across the electorate. 
Moreover, the LN’s electoral growth throughout the 2000s (Tables 9.1; 10.1) was not 
followed by widespread contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration at national level 
in 2008, which were apparently limited to its core electorate and voters most concerned with 
immigration (Mudde, 2007). 
10.1.3 – Electoral outcome  
Berlusconi won his third term in office on April 2008 after the PdL collected 37.4 per cent of 
the vote in the Chamber of Deputies and 38 per cent in the Senate against Veltroni’s 33.2 per 
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cent and 37.9 per cent respectively (Chiaramonte, 2009). The LN doubled its electoral share 
and number of seats almost recovering to the levels observed in 1996 with 8.3 per cent at the 
Chamber of Deputies and 7.9 per cent at the Senate (Table 10.1). Therefore, Berlusconi and 
the PdL enjoyed a solid majority in both Chambers, including 171 seats in the Senate, which 
ensured the government’s stability. However, the PdL was dependent on the LN’s support to 
maintain the majorities in the assemblies providing stronger agenda setting and veto powers 
for the Italian ERP in contrast to 2001 (Pasquino, 2008).  
Despite its stronger performance in 2008 than in 2001, the LN obtained the same number of 
ministries but with a stronger political profile. Maroni was appointed Minister of Interior, 
Bossi was designated Minister of Federal reform, Luca Zaia became Minister of Agriculture, 
and Roberto Calderoli Minister for Legislative Simplification (Parenzo and Romano, 2008). 
Moreover, the LN benefited from the exclusion of the CdU from the coalition whilst 
Berlusconi counted on Bossi’s cooperation to confront Fini (Baldini and Cento Bull, 2009). 
The correlation of forces within the cabinet favoured the LN and Bossi had finally assumed a 
decisive position within the Italian party system, one of his long-term objectives 
(Passalacqua, 2009). 
Table 10.1 – Votes for LN in Italian general and EP elections between 2006 and 2009 
Year Election 
Number of 
Votes 
Proportion of total Seats 
2006 general 1,747,730 4.58% 26 
2008 general 3,024,543 8.30% 60 
2009 EP 3,126,181 10.2% 9 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno, 2010 
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10.2 – The LN’s development between 2006 and 2009 
During Berlusconi’s second term, the LN successfully advanced its two main electoral 
themes: immigration and devolution. Accommodation in office had been accompanied by the 
LN’s radicalisation and electoral recovery, despite Bossi’s enforced post-stroke absence. 
Now, this research assesses the dimension of the strategic dilemma posed by the LN to 
mainstream parties between 2006 and 2009. Disappointing results at the 2006 general 
election were followed by a defeat at the 2006 referendum on devolution. However, the LN’s 
electoral fortunes improved considerably in 2007 and it obtained its best result in a national 
ballot at the 2009 EP election. In parallel, this second section examines the LN’s discourse on 
immigration policy and if the LN’s participation in Berlusconi’s government was 
accompanied by a de-radicalisation effect (Minkenberg, 2001). This thesis shows that cultural 
xenophobia continued to be a cornerstone of the LN’s ideology whilst the access to office 
seats at local level was employed to launch an anti-immigration campaign, as seen below.  
10.2.1 – The LN at the 2006 general elections and fiscal federalism 
Electoral results at the 2006 general election were unsatisfactory as Bossi publicly recognised 
(Table 10.1; Corriere della Sera, 2006d). Moreover, the LN’s political project was 
completely shattered after the 2006 referendum on devolution. With a turnout of 52 per cent 
of the electorate, 61.3 per cent voted against the devolution proposal and the “Yes” campaign 
only won in the LN’s heartlands as Lombardia and Veneto (Cento Bull, 2009). This event 
forced Bossi to accept the necessity to involve centre-left parties in constitutional reform 
instead of alienating their potential support (Passalacqua, 2009). Defeat at the 2006 
referendum was followed by a period of intense opposition to Bossi enhancing the risk of 
internal implosion (Signore and Trocino, 2008). In a speech at Cá San Marco, the LN’s leader 
was forced to intervene to curb demands for secessionism from the audience. Bossi had to 
restate his compromise with the Lombardia, Veneto and Piemonte citizens to: “seek all 
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democratic paths towards the liberation of the north” (Bossi, 2006a). Nonetheless, a new plan 
was urgently required to mobilise the LN’s core electorate.   
In September 2006, Bossi announced a new phase within the LN: federalism involving 
regional autonomy and fiscal federalism
126
 (Bossi, 2006b; Jori, 2009). In a speech in Veneto, 
the LN announced the new goal: “it is necessary to pass federalism, otherwise we will remain 
in the old system of ‘Roma ladrona’ ” (Bossi, 2006b). Therefore, federalism was the new 
venue to obtain the liberation of Padania allowing the LN to continue to explore the Italian 
north-south cleavage without alienating coalition partners or eventual centre-left support for 
constitutional reform (Passalacqua, 2009). The LN was now the northern “lobby” in Rome 
and restated the consensual style adopted in the early 2000s (Diamanti, 2009). Coalition with 
Berlusconi was justified by a narrative of the necessity of a democratic compromise to attain 
liberation (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2010). Finally, Bossi replied to a possible leadership 
challenge by stating: “The Lega is me, if I fall everybody goes home” (La Stampa, 2006).   
10.2.2 – The new rise of the LN  
In the aftermath of the 2006 referendum, the LN prioritized insecurity in its political agenda 
and recovered the Padanian guard or the “green shirts” of the 1990s, now named “local 
vigilantes” to reinforce security in the LN’s localities (Avanza, 2010). Initially deployed in 
the small town of Chiarano (Treviso), this phenomenon of supposedly peaceful paramilitary 
groups spread through other localities dominated by the LN and were institutionalised by the 
2009 Security law (Passalacqua, 2009). Demands for the employment of “vigilante” groups 
to control the “nomad camps” established on the Milan outskirts formed mostly of Romanian 
citizens reinforced the demonization of this immigrant group (Corriere della Sera, 2007h). 
As Diamanti (2009) noted, the LN transformed itself from a party of “small northern 
                                                 
126
 An agreement was announced with the CdL President of the Lombardia and Veneto regions to demand 
the application of the Constitution (the 2001 constitutional reform introduced the principle of “fiscal 
federalism” in the Constitution). 
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producers” into the “security party”. At the 2007 provincial elections, the LN registered the 
greatest electoral growth amongst the centre-right coalition in the context of a centre-left 
disaster (Mannheimer, 2007). Furthermore, its hegemony in small northern cities was 
consolidated at the 2007 partial administrative elections (Signore and Trocini, 2008). The 
electoral growth from 2007 onwards strengthened the significant strategic dilemma posed by 
the LN to Italian mainstream parties. 
At the 2008 general election, the LN benefited from the highest rate of voters’ loyalty across 
the Italian parties alongside an increasing ability to attract voters from competing parties, 
particularly across the centre-right (Table 10.1; Carbone and Newell, 2008). Another surprise 
was the LN’s inroads in the region of Emilia-Romagna, a centre-left stronghold, where it 
obtained 7 per cent of the vote (Jori, 2009).
 127
 Unlike 1996, the LN was now expanding its 
vote beyond its northern heartlands. In government, Bossi pushed for fiscal federalism but 
Berlusconi prioritised security and judicial reform (Marangoni, 2009). Fiscal federalism was 
approved on 30 April 2009 and converted into Law no. 42 of 5 May 2009. As in the past, the 
final proposal was a watered down version of the LN’s initial objectives in the 2008 electoral 
programme, because they threatened the unity of the Italian state (Albertazzi and McDonnell, 
2010). 
However, implementation of fiscal federalism came to a standstill because of a lack of 
agreement between the coalition partners on the most contentious points (Keating and 
Wilson, 2010).
128
 The LN’s overall strategy in office continued to encompass extremist 
rhetoric at the public level alongside a consensual approach towards its coalition partners. 
This tactic also enabled Bossi to position himself as the leader of the opposition to the 
                                                 
127
 This development was interpreted as an outcome of the PCI integration into the centrist PD and the 
growth of criminality in this region (Diamanti, 2009b). 
128
 The most contentious point was over the mechanism to compensate the regions with less financial 
resources to maintain a uniform distribution of public services through the territory (Marangoni, 2009). 
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governmental majority (Jori, 2009). At the May 2008 administrative elections, the LN was 
the first party in 800 cities, mostly of small population density, but also extended its control 
over northern cities more densely populated such as Verona, Treviso and Varese (Diamanti, 
2008). The LN’s electoral insertion in the northern strongholds continued to provide a wide 
access to local office positions, in contrast to the British and French ERPs. 
Opposition to the European Constitution and to Turkey’s EU accession dominated the LN’s 
electoral campaign for the 2009 EP election (LN, 2009; Bressanelli et al., 2010). Its electoral 
manifesto indicated that the LN accepted immigration but with “flows regulated according to 
a non-economic basis, by taking in account the cultural and social consequences of this 
phenomenon” (LN, 2009, p. 2) demonstrating its cultural xenophobia. The LN’s 10.2 per cent 
of the vote obtained at the 2009 EP ballot represented its best electoral result ever in Italian 
national ballots (Table 10.1). Therefore, the LN’s strategic dilemma to mainstream parties 
expanded between 2006 and 2009 and achieved its greatest magnitude in 2009, when the LN 
was a member of Berlusconi’s government. Accommodation in office failed to pose 
constraints of the LN’s electoral performance, as expected of radical parties that hold office 
positions (Heinisch, 2003).  
10.2.3 – The LN position on immigration 
In the aftermath of the 2006 referendum, Bossi quickly reasserted opposition to immigration 
as a cornerstone of LN’s ideology. At Cá San Marco in August 2006, Bossi stated that the LN 
refused to grant citizenship to non-EU citizens because “we want to be masters in our own 
house” (Bossi, 2006b). Furthermore, Bossi added that:  
“I have made an immigration law to curb immigration, to send a clear message to the 
entire world: we did not want people to come into our house” (Bossi, 2006b) 
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The centre-left government was accused of opening the borders leading to alienation that “we 
citizens, feel the country is less ours” (Bossi, 2006b) presupposing that immigration 
represented a threat to national cohesion and identity. Bossi’s discourse revealed the 
ambiguity of the LN’s position on the management of inflows, which leaned to zero-
immigration policy instead of acknowledging the need for foreign workers. Former minister 
Calderoli denounced Prodi’s proposal to reform the immigration law as a “crime against the 
people and its identity” providing further evidence of the LN’s cultural xenophobia (Corriere 
della Sera, 2007i). Hence, the LN organised a new petition for a referendum to repeal the 
government’s proposal like in 2000 (Corriere della Sera, 2006e).  
Accommodation in office after 2008 was not followed by the expected ideological de-
radicalisation, like during Berlusconi’s second term (Minkenberg, 2001). At the first 
parliamentary session, Bossi declared that “we must hunt immigrants and develop fiscal 
federalism with all the available means” (Radio Canarias7, 2008). Cultural xenophobia also 
featured prominently in the LN’s electoral campaign for the 2009 EP election with Bossi’s 
personal commitment:  
“as always, to the fight against the invasion by non-EU citizens without rules, 
supported by those who desire a multi-ethnic society that would cancel our history 
and future” (LN, 2009, p.1).  
Opposition to the EU was blended with the LN’s cultural xenophobia as the EU bureaucrats 
were accused of preferring “mosques to cathedrals, which opens doors to Islam and removes 
crucifixes from walls” (LN, 2009, p.1). Curiously, Calderoli welcomed Berlusconi’s 
friendship treaty with Gaddafi signed in 2008 and expressed regret for his previous racism 
towards Islam in a demonstration of “realpolitik” (Corriere della Sera, 2009a). Before the 
end of 2009, the LN’s mayor of Coccaglio (Lombardia) launched a campaign to purge the 
city of non-EU immigrants with an irregular status dubbed “white Christmas” (Independent, 
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2009c). Therefore, the LN’s penetration at local level continued to be mobilised to strengthen 
its image as the “security party”. 
Summarising, the LN accumulated setbacks throughout 2006: first at the general election, and 
then at the referendum on devolution. These events prompted an internal crisis and forced 
Bossi to devise a new plan to liberate “Padania” involving regional autonomy and fiscal 
federalism. Cultural xenophobia continued to be a cornerstone of the LN’s ideology and a de-
radicalisation process was not observed, even after this ERP’s accommodation in office for 
Berlusconi’s third term. The LN progressively shifted its image of a party of small northern 
producers to the security party, as was illustrated by the organisation of “vigilante” patrols in 
northern localities. Its electoral expansion after 2007 posed an increasing strategic dilemma 
to mainstream parties’ objectives at the first-order-ballots, such as at the 2008 general 
election. Now, the third and final overall section examines the LN’s impact on policy 
developments during the first two years of Berlusconi’s term.  
10.3 – The LN impact on immigration policy between 2008 and 2009  
This research has shown that the LN had a moderate impact on the development of Italian 
immigration policy between 2001 and 2006. Now, did the LN reinforce the restrictive 
character of policy developments taking place between 2008 and 2009? The two first years of 
Berlusconi’s term were marked by an increasing policy gap involving the escalation of the 
repressive approach to the management of inflows and the simultaneous regularisation of 
irregular immigrants settled in the country. Furthermore, intra-EU inflows became highly 
controversial in the political debate whilst EU citizens of Roma origin were particularly 
targeted by the Italian state. This thesis argues that the LN had a significant impact on the 
development of Italian immigration policy in the selected timeframe but less disproportional 
than during Berlusconi’s second term. The agency of mainstream parties will be identified as 
the most relevant factor enhancing the LN’s impact on immigration policy (Table 2.1).  
299 
 
10.3.1 – The 2008 Security decrees and the fingerprinting of Romanian immigrants 
Once again, immigration policy was quickly prioritised within the legislative agenda after the 
2008 general election. Instead of an overall reform of the 2002 Bossi-Fini law, the 
government opted to issue legislative decrees in the context of the “security crisis”. 
Consequently, a security package was presented under the guidance of the Interior Minister, 
less than a year after the approval of a similar bill by the preceding centre-left government. 
This accompanied the declaration of state of emergency related to the settlement of nomad 
camps in three Italian regions.
129
 As observed in the UK (Chapter 6), the adoption of a client 
politics model including the granting of the right to long-term settlement to citizens of A-10 
countries failed to prevent the politicisation of this type of immigration, in particular of EU 
citizens with Roma origin (Table 2.2). The package contained draft decree-laws concerning 
public security, family reunion, asylum, and the free movement of EU citizens (later 
withdrawn after the veto of the EU Commission) (Nalleto, 2009).  
Effectively, the Interior Minister admitted that the first two priorities were: “the management 
of the fight against illegal immigration followed by the management of relations with EU 
countries (in particular Romania) on the basis of the EU directive which allows for the 
repatriation of EU citizens who have no income or exhibit delinquent behaviour” (Corriere 
della Sera, 2008e). In the context of widespread articulation of immigration as a threat to 
security, significant attacks against immigrants were observed in Napoli in May 2008, two 
weeks before the approval of the security package (Independent, 2008). These popular 
mobilisations and the institutionalisation of legal discrimination of foreign citizens suggest a 
linkage between these non-discursive events and the hegemony of the LN’s frame of 
immigration during the April 2008 electoral campaign. Therefore, the interdiscursive 
                                                 
129
 In 31 October 2007, the Council of Ministers led by Prodi approved the Decree-law 181/2007 that 
allowed police forces to deport EU citizens and their family members from Italian soil if they were 
considered to be a danger to public order (Pastore, 2007). 
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relationship found between mainstream parties’ discourse and the LN’s frame of immigration 
at the 2008 electoral campaign through the employment of CDA was related to non-
discursive events such as the promulgation of the 2008 security package and anti-immigration 
mobilisations.  
In consequence of the conflation of immigration with law and order, the 2008 security decree 
contained provisions related with the management of inflows (Table 10.2). The Italian state’s 
initiative to reduce immigrants’ rights in the context of general social insecurity directly 
associated their presence as the cause of instability and presented forced removals as a 
solution to delinquency (Pastore, 2007; Nalleto, 2009). Nevertheless, the approval of the 
2008 security decree reinforced the sense of security amongst the electorate (according to 
polls) (Ambrosini, 2009).
130
 Further restrictions on immigration were introduced through 
separate legislative decrees on family reunion and asylum.
131
 Restrictions on secondary 
inflows forced members of immigrant families to apply for regularisation through the Flows 
Decrees that were supposed to channel regular labour immigration (Colombo and Martini, 
2007). Finally, provisions were also introduced to limit foreign citizens’ access to welfare 
benefits (Nalletto, 2009, p. 107), providing evidence of the contagion effects of the LN’s 
welfare chauvinism.
132
  
  
                                                 
130
 Statistics pointed that the number of homicides had reached its lowest level in the last 32 years in 2006 
while theft had been increasing since 2002 and progressively over the last 40 years (Colombo, 2009).   
131
 Legislative decree  no. 160/08 of 3 of October of 2008 made the right to family reunion limited to 
immigrants’ direct dependents and parents over age 65. Candidates may be required to pass a DNA test at 
their expense. The deadline for examination of requests for family reunion extended from 90 to 180 days. 
This piece of legislation also changed the asylum system, since it introduced restrictions to the right of free 
movement for asylum seekers. Asylum seekers issued with an expulsion order could now be detained in 
identification and expulsion centres for a period up to 18 months. 
132
 Law No. 133 of 6 August 2008. 
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Table 10.2 – Modifications to Italian immigration policy by the Law no. 125 of 24th of July 
2008 
Primary 
inflows 
Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular inflows 
   Status of irregular immigration became an aggravating 
circumstance of any committed offense. Authorises 
deportation of non-EU and EU citizens condemned to 
more than two years imprisonment. Reinforces sanctions 
on landlords who rent a property to irregular immigrants   
 
Another security law was drafted by the LN Interior Minister that included a LN’s proposal 
for the criminalisation of irregular immigration, who could be punished with six months to 
four years of effective imprisonment. Bossi announced the creation of an “external wall” 
against irregular immigration even though he had opposed a similar proposal presented by 
Fini in 2002 (Corriere della Sera, 2008c; see p.266). Whereas the efficiency of this measure 
as a deterrent to further irregular inflows was doubtful, it was of a high symbolic value and 
reinforced the LN’s image as the security party (Pugliese, 2010). Nevertheless, Berlusconi 
dropped the LN proposal after meeting French President Sarkozy, just before the approval of 
the EU directive on irregular immigration (Corriere della Sera, 2008d).  
Maroni expressed his surprise at Berlusconi’s change of mind (Corriere della Sera, 2008d). 
Shortly after this U-turn, the Interior Minister launched a programme of mapping the 
“nomads” camps and collecting biometric data from their residents (Sigona, 2010). In 
parliament, Maroni overtly recognised: 
“We will collect fingerprints of children, against the actual norms, to prevent begging. 
It will not be an ethnic survey but a proper census to guarantee who has the right to 
live [in Italy] and subsist in decent conditions” (Maroni, 2008) 
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Initially justified as an exceptional measure to guarantee children’s welfare, Maroni clearly 
articulated immigration, in particular of EU citizens of Roma origin, as a threat to the Italian 
society. Polls indicated that 67 per cent of respondents agreed with the fingerprinting 
programme (92 per cent of LN voters, 80 per cent of PdL and 44 per cent of PD voters) 
(Mannheimer, 2008). The implementation of Maroni’s plan was de-railed after the 
intervention by the EP on 8 July 2008 because it constituted a “discriminatory act based on 
race and ethnic origin” (Corriere della Sera, 2008f). Foreign rather than domestic judicial 
intervention tamed the LN’s initial plans and constrained the fingerprint plan.133 The 
stigmatisation of EU citizens of Roma origin had been initially observed in the tabloids and 
Conservatives’ campaign in the UK in 2003 but as a cause of abuse of the welfare system 
rather than as a source of criminality (see p.145).  
10.3.2 – Repatriation of irregular immigrants to Libya  
Notwithstanding the government’s repressive approach to intra-EU inflows and irregular 
immigration, the number of irregular immigrants arriving by boat expanded from 20,455 in 
2007 to 36,955 in 2008, most of them, landing on the island of Lampedusa (Ministero 
dell’Interno, 2009). The appointment of Calderoli as Minister of Legislative Simplification 
had been coldly received by the Libyan regime, which consequently halted its cooperation 
agreement to protect the Italian southern coast from irregular immigration (Corriere della 
Sera, 2008g). In a political context dominated by the strong association between security and 
immigration, the boat landings received wide coverage in the media. Statistics show that at 
least a third of the immigrants arrived by sea in 2007 applied for asylum protection and 
around a fifth obtained some form of protection (Ambrosini, 2009). Moreover, these 
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 By 22 October 2008, 167 nomad camps had been mapped, 12,346 foreigners has been fingerprinted 
including 5,436 children (Ministero dell’Interno, 2009).  
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immigrants form only a fraction of the irregular population settled in Italy, which is mostly 
composed of over-stayers.
134
 
In response to the boat landings, Berlusconi and Libya’s President Muammar Gaddafi signed 
a Friendship Pact in August 2008 involving the exchange of Italy’s compensation for its 
colonial past for “less clandestine  [irregular] immigrants and more gas” in Berlusconi’s own 
words (Corriere della Sera, 2008h). The agreement was implemented from January 2009 
onwards when Maroni already faced accusations by local mayors of racism and creating a 
“Guantanamo” prison for irregular immigrants on Lampedusa (Corriere della Sera, 2009b). 
NGOs complained of the very poor conditions in which 1,300 immigrants were held.
135
 
Maroni responded that those “who arrived at Lampedusa would remain there until 
repatriation” demonstrating the Italian state’s repressive approach (Corriere della Sera, 
2009d).  
In May 2009, 223 immigrants were rescued on a damaged ship in the Mediterranean Sea and 
automatically deported to Libya. Maroni celebrated this event as an “historical event in the 
struggle against irregular immigration” that represented the externalisation of Italian border 
controls to the Libyan authorities (Corriere della Sera, 2009e).
136
 However, the behaviour of 
Italian authorities received wide condemnation from the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNCHR), which demanded the rescue of those lost at sea and respect for 
international conventions on asylum (UNCHR, 2009).
 137
 Confronting widespread critics, 
Berlusconi justified the removals to Libya with his rejection of a multi-ethnic society and to 
“open the door to everyone as the left did” providing evidence of another interdiscursive 
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 Non-EU citizens who enter in Italy with legal short-term visas, then overstay and thus assume an 
irregular status. 
135
 Berlusconi compared the detention centres to concentration camps in a later visit (Corriere della Sera, 
2009c). 
136
 During 2009, nine operations of automatic repatriation to Libya were reported by the Italian authorities 
involving 834 immigrants (Corriere della Sera, 2010a).  
137
 The 1951 Geneva Convention demands that member-states provide a fair and balanced audition to 
asylum requests made by immigrants at their borders. 
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relationship between the PdL’s leader and the LN’s anti-immigration positions (Corriere 
della Sera, 2009f). Berlusconi also emphasised the ownership of Gaddafi’s agreement 
demonstrating his preference to compete with the LN for the issue ownership of opposition to 
immigration rather than to downgrade the government’s repressive approach (Corriere della 
Sera, 2009g). 
Due to continuous external pressures, Maroni later proposed to create a structure in Libya to 
process the asylum requests instead of assessing them in Italy despite the country’s poor 
record on human rights (Corriere della Sera, 2009d).
 138
 The small number of immigrants 
automatically removed to Libya was considered evidence of a gap between the LN’s political 
rhetoric and outcomes (Cento Bull, 2009). Nevertheless, this judgment is challenged by the 
74 per cent decline in the number of irregular immigrants arriving by boat in 2009 in 
comparison to 2008, while the repatriation programme was suspended in 2010 (Ministero 
dell’Interno, 2009; Paoletti and Pastore, 2010). This trend provided evidence that the LN 
attained the desired aims notwithstanding the low number of deported irregular immigrants. 
However, the intensity of irregular immigration into Italy would persist supported by its 
extensive informal economy and the acute demand for foreign labour (Finotelli and Sciortino, 
2009).  
10.3.3 – The Decree-Law 92/2009  
An amendment to the security bill proposed by the PdL replaced the LN’s proposal for the 
imprisonment of irregular immigrants by a fine or automatic deportation. Additional 
amendments were presented by the LN including: a residence authorisation based on a 
points-system; a halt to the publication of Flows Decrees for two years; the inclusion of a 
provision forcing doctors to denounce irregular immigrants; and a barrier to irregular 
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 A similar project had been proposed by Blair in 2003 to externalise the reception and analysis of 
asylum requests to third countries outside the EU.  
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immigrants’ children access to Italian schools (Cento-Bull, 2009). The LN proposals were 
rejected by the coalition partners and excluded from the 94/2009 law. As Albertazzi and 
McDonnell (2010) noticed, this strategy enabled the LN to dominate the political agenda on 
immigration and security. Besides, it maintained its core electorate mobilised in the context 
of the stalemate on fiscal federalism, while the coalition partners’ vetoes reinforced the LN’s 
image of opposition within the government.
 139
  
The July 2009 security law expanded the repressive components of Italian immigration 
policy, particularly towards irregular immigration without addressing the ineffective channels 
for labour migration from non-EU countries (Finotelli and Sciortino, 2009; Table 10.3). The 
government’s frame of immigration as a law and order issue legitimised the criminalisation 
of irregular immigrants but its legislative proposals faced domestic and international judicial 
interference. Whereas the Constitutional Court rejected the aggravation of criminal sentences 
due to irregular immigration in 2010 (Corriere della Sera, 2010b), the European Court of 
Justice later condemned the imprisonment of irregular immigrants in 2011 (Corriere della 
Sera, 2011). A policy gap was therefore identified in the Italian government’s approach to 
immigration as a law and order issue and the subsequent policy developments. Moreover, 
these events demonstrate that the scope of the LN’s impact on policy development was 
effectively constrained by endogenous and exogenous judicial intervention, in contrast to past 
negligence of constraints on ERP impact in the political literature. 
  
                                                 
139
 This strategy had similarities to Sarkozy’s approach to immigration in France, initially employed to 
distance himself from Chirac. Moreover, Sarkozy also launched unfeasible proposals on immigration 
policy, such as the quota system. 
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Table 10.3 – Modifications to Italian immigration policy by the Law no. 94/2009 of 15th of 
July 2009 
Primary inflows Secondary 
inflows 
Asylum Irregular inflows 
Access to long-term 
residence authorisations is 
made dependent on language 
test. Introduces an 
integration contract on 
access to residence 
authorisations (whose 
regulation was postponed). 
  Introduces the crime of irregular 
immigration punished with a fine or 
automatic repatriation. Residence 
authorisation demanded to access 
public services (except access to 
urgent health care and public 
schools). Detainment of irregular 
immigrants within detention centres 
extended from 60 to 180 days. 
 
Cracks also emerged within the coalition government over the shape of Italian immigration 
policy. After the initial cooperation within the cabinet, Fini commented that the government’s 
policy was “short-sighted” and “based only on a security approach” whilst the former FI 
Interior Minister Pisanu pointed to the LN’s excessive profile in the government (Corriere 
della Sera, 2009h, 2009i). The LN’s prominence on immigration policy reflected its stronger 
position within the cabinet in the face of exclusion of the CdU from the electoral coalition as 
well as its 2008 electoral performance. Moreover, further divisions between the PdL and the 
LN were later observed over the development of a regularisation programme for domestic 
and care workers, which was initially rejected by the Italian ERP (Corriere della Sera, 
2009j).  
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10.3.4 – The 2008 and 2009 Flows Decrees and the regularisation of domestic and care 
workers 
In the text of the 2008 Flows Decree, the Italian government acknowledged the intense 
demand for labour visas as a consequence of the 2007 Flows Decrees, especially from 
irregular immigrants working in the private assistance sector.
 140
 Consequently, the 2008 
inflows set a cap of 150,000 labour authorisations of which 100,500 were reserved for 
domestic and care workers (Figure 9.9).
 
As the government acknowledged, the Flows 
Decrees continued to regularise immigrants already settled in the country, instead of 
channelling labour immigration through legal means from origin countries (Ambrosini, 
2011). This trend indicated the inability of Berlusconi’s government to manage labour 
inflows according to the domestic structural dependence on foreign labour. After intense 
negotiations between the PdL’s Welfare and the LN’s Interior Ministers, Maroni presented 
the government’s initiative to regularise domestic and care workers as a measure to tackle the 
large informal economic sector (Colombo, 2009).  
As in 2002, the LN operated a U-turn and bowed to its coalition partners’ demands. Adopting 
an adversarial attitude on this limited regularisation programme could jeopardise relations 
with the PdL and reduce the LN’s chances to advance its project for fiscal federalism. A 
circular approved by the government in August 2009 set the rigid access criteria
141
 to the 
regularisation programme, leading to the presentation of 295,000 applications by September 
2009. This number was low considering that the Interior Minister had expected up to 750,000 
requests (Pasquinelli, 2009). The regularisation process ended up being considered a failure 
                                                 
140
 The 2007 flows decree set by Prodi’s government established a cap of 170.000 labour permits to be 
granted to non-EU workers: 65.000 for domestic and care workers, 14.2000 for construction workers, 500 
for transport workers, and 200 for fishermen. However, the government received 741.000 requests for 
labour visas (Sopemi, 2009). 
141
 Italian families that applied for regularisation of domestic or care workers had to pay 500 Euros for 
each application, provide evidence of holding annual earnings of 20,000 to 25,000 Euros, and meet other 
criteria (Colombo, 2009).   
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because of the rigid criteria imposed by the Italian state under Maroni’s guidance (Colombo, 
2009). In a stronger position within the cabinet in 2008 in comparison to 2002, the LN 
managed to influence the outcome of the 2009 regularisation programme and limit its scope. 
Nonetheless, a policy gap was identified between the PdL government’s repressive approach 
to irregular immigration at rhetoric level and the development of regularisation programmes, 
which reflected the domestic structural dependence on foreign labour.  
The non-publication of the 2009 Flows Decrees for non-temporary immigration suggests that 
Berlusconi sought to appease Bossi for the later regularisation programme providing further 
evidence of the LN’s impact (Figure 9.9).142 Summarising, the Italian immigration policy 
under Berlusconi’s third term was marked by an expansion of repressive components of the 
legislation towards intra-EU inflows and irregular immigration, which dominated the Italian 
political agenda. Restrictions to the development of secondary and asylum inflows were 
observed alongside restraints to foreign citizens’ access to the welfare system.  As observed 
throughout Berlusconi’s second term, a policy gap was identified between the government’s 
political objectives to tackle irregular immigration and the development of the 2009 
regularisation programme. Another policy gap was previously observed across the adoption 
of repressive measures towards irregular immigration and the subsequent policy outcomes 
reflecting the judicial vetoes of the government’s proposals.  
According to Finotelli and Sciortino (2009, p.136), “the LN had not a very relevant influence 
on the making of Italian immigration policies at least at the legislative level”. However, the 
campaign against the Roma camps, the extension of restrictions to secondary and asylum 
inflows, the repressive approach to the boat landings and the failure of the 2009 
regularisation process suggest that the LN had a significant impact on policy developments 
                                                 
142
 In 2008, the LN had demanded the halt of the publication of the Flows Decrees for two years (Corriere 
della Sera, 2008i) 
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from 2008 to 2009, at a higher level than during Berlusconi’s second term. This political 
process has not provoked a rupture with Italy’s past policy, but the LN’s political agency has 
actively contributed for the failure to manage labour inflows according to domestic demand 
and the intensification of the repressive components of the Italian immigration policy. 
Considering the LN’s stronger position within the Italian executive, its significant impact on 
policy developments between 2008 and 2009 is considered as less disproportional than during 
the Berlusconi’s second term.  
The LN’s significant impact on policy developments between 2008 and 2009 coincided with 
the levels of immigration, the dimension of the LN’s electoral threat, and the agency of 
mainstream parties. Immigration rates expanded in 2007 and 2008, mainly supported by the 
intensification of labour inflows and family reunion, and coincided with the LN’s impact on 
policy developments (Figure 9.10). In contrast, the overall low salience of immigration in 
public opinion seemed weakly related (Figure 10.2). The LN’s electoral threat to mainstream 
electoral parties expanded continuously between 2008 and 2009 and the party obtained its 
best score in a national ballot at the 2009 EP ballot (Table 10.3).  Finally, the PdL’s formal 
engagement with the LN and Berlusconi’s full collaboration with Bossi between 2008 and 
2009 led to the appointment of Maroni as the Interior Minister. In this overall context, the 
Italian ERP’s electoral threat and the agency of mainstream parties was regarded as the most 
important factor enhancing the LN’s significant impact on policy developments, in the 
context of increasing levels of immigration.  
10.4 – Conclusions 
Immigration policy was highly prominent at the 2008 electoral campaign with irregular 
immigration and intra-EU inflows, particularly from Romania, being the most dominant types 
of immigration in the political debate. Broad inter-party consensuses were found between the 
Italian ERP and mainstream parties over the frame of management of irregular inflows as a 
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threat to security and the demonization of EU immigrants of Roma origin. Moreover, 
mainstream parties failed to acknowledge the domestic structural dependence on foreign 
labour. The LN’s impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy at the 2008 
general election was considered significant. This political process coincided with the 
expansion of immigration before 2008, the LN’s substantial electoral threat, and the 
engagement of mainstream parties with the Italian ERP. Within this context, the PdL’s 
engagement with the LN at the formal level was considered the most relevant factor 
enhancing the LN impact.  
Italian voters’ concern with immigration remained steady, despite the tenuous increase of its 
salience at the 2008 general election. Still the levels of hostility to immigration dropped at the 
overall level (but not among core LN voters). This social phenomenon was weakly associated 
with employment and with national identity by general voters whilst such perceptions were 
dominant among the LN’s voters. Bossi’s improved standing amongst voters most anxious 
with immigration indicated that the LN was disputing ownership of opposition to 
immigration with centre-right parties. Nevertheless, the LN proved unable to reverse the 
decline of hostility to immigration across the general electorate. Overall, the LN’s impact on 
public attitudes was moderate at the 2008 general election whilst its levels of electoral 
support alongside the engagement strategy of mainstream parties were regarded the most 
relevant factors enhancing the preceding observation. The significant expansion of the LN’s 
electoral support in 2008 was not accompanied by significant impact on mass attitudes, and 
the Italian ERP’s contagion effects seemed stronger across voters most concerned with 
immigration and its core electorate than on general attitudes to immigration.  
The accumulated setbacks at both the 2006 general election and the referendum on 
devolution provoked an internal crisis within the LN. Bossi was forced to devise a new plan 
to liberate “Padania” to mobilise its core electorate that now encompassed regional autonomy 
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and fiscal federalism. In the meantime, the LN constructed its profile of the ‘security party’ 
through the organisation of security patrols in northern regions and employed its insertion at 
local level to launch a campaign against immigration spearheaded by the LN mayors. 
Electoral support for the Italian ERP’s improved substantially between 2007 and 2009 and 
the LN achieved its best score at national level at the 2009 EP elections. Hence, the strategic 
dilemma posed by the LN to mainstream parties was reinforced between 2006 and 2009. 
Cultural xenophobia and the defence of zero-immigration policy characterised the LN’s 
discourse on immigration. Once again, the expected de-radicalisation process did not follow 
the LN’s accommodation in office after 2008.  
Italian immigration policy between 2008 and 2009 was developed under a repressive 
approach most concerned with tackling intra-EU inflows and irregular immigration than with 
managing labour inflows in the context of acute demand for foreign labour. The conflation of 
law and order with the management of inflows was demonstrated by the inclusion of 
measures on immigration policy in the 2008 security decree and 2009 security law. The 
PdL’s government resistance to accepting immigration could be discerned in the restrictions 
on secondary and asylum inflows, as well as on immigrants’ access to the welfare system. 
The first two years of Berlusconi’s term were particularly dominated by the stigmatisation of 
EU citizens of Roma origin by the Interior Minister. Domestic and exogenous pressures 
watered down the Berlusconi government’s repressive approach to immigration, including 
the attempted criminalisation of irregular immigration or automatic deportations to Libya. 
This created a policy gap between the set objectives and the subsequent policy outcomes.  
Finally, the Italian government’s management of immigration flows caused divisions within 
the PdL. The LN was unable to veto its coalition partners’ demands for another regularisation 
programme for domestic workers and carers in 2009, yet the strict criteria instituted by the 
Interior Minister were responsible for its overall failure. An additional policy gap can be 
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identified on the highly restrictive aims set by the PdL government on irregular immigration 
and the development of the 2009 regularisation programme. Therefore, the LN’s impact on 
the development of Italian immigration policy between 2008 and 2009 was considered 
significant at the absolute level and proportional to its stronger position within the 
governmental coalition. The preceding trend coincided with the expansion of immigration 
before 2009, substantial LN electoral threat, and the engagement of mainstream parties with 
the Italian ERP. Within this context, the PdL’s formal engagement with the LN and 
Berlusconi’s full collaboration with Bossi were considered the most relevant factor enhancing 
the LN’s impact on immigration policy.  
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Chapter 11 – Comparative synthesis of ERPs’ impact on immigration policy 
during the first half of the 2000s 
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the selected ERPs’ impact on immigration 
politics and policy in the UK, France, and Italy during the first half of the 2000s. It contains 
three main objectives: first, it aims to compare the salience of immigration on inter-party 
competition, public attitudes to immigration and policy developments in each three cases. 
Second, it asks whether the three selected ERPs had a relevant impact on the three 
dimensions of immigration politics and policy and compares the intensity of these political 
processes. Finally, this chapter includes a comparative assessment of the relationships found 
between the levels of the selected ERPs’ impact on immigration politics and policy and the 
proposed hypotheses to highlight those factors that seem to increase the likelihood of ERP 
contagion effects (Table 2.1).  
11.1 – ERPs’ impact on inter-party competition 
Did the three selected ERPs have a significant impact on inter-party competition on 
immigration policy at first-order-ballots in the first half of the 2000s? Immigration policy was 
particularly salient at the 2001 Italian general election, dominated by irregular inflows and 
extensive associations to insecurity and delinquency. It was moderately salient at the British 
2001 general election due to the Conservatives’ populist campaign on asylum (Figures 5.1; 
6.1). In contrast, French mainstream parties excluded immigration from their electoral 
campaigns for the 2002 presidential ballot in opposition to the high salience granted to this 
issue by the FN (Figure 8.1). The research highlighted that only the LN had a significant 
impact on this dimension of immigration politics at the Italian 2001 general election whilst 
the BNP and the FN were deprived of contagion-effects at the 2001 and 2002 first-order-
ballots.  
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The observed trends in inter-party competition on immigration policy in the Italian 2001 
ballot were seen as a result of the LN’s inclusion within the CdL and the formalisation of an 
electoral agreement that tied the centre-right coalition to Bossi’s priority issues in the context 
of intense intra-coalition competition for issue ownership of opposition to immigration. In 
contrast, the BNP lacked any contagion effects on British mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration in 2001. A similar trend was observed at the French 2002 presidential election, 
where the “conspiracy of silence” of mainstream parties pre-empted FN impact on inter-party 
competition. 
Consequently, research suggesting that mainstream parties were more likely to adjust their 
positions to the ERPs in election years in France, Germany and Austria are challenged by the 
observations made in this thesis concerning inter-party competition on immigration policy in 
first-order-ballots in the UK, France and Italy (Williams, 2006). This trend suggests that ERP 
impact on this dimension of immigration politics is more contingent than suggested by past 
research. Therefore, mainstream parties possess autonomous capacity to select their battles 
even in the face of a salient ERP’s electoral threat at a first-order-ballot, as observed in 
France. Mainstream inter-party consensus of a restrictive character was observed in party 
systems with relevant and non-relevant ERPs, such as Italy or the UK.  
These trends indicate that the levels of politicisation and the character of mainstream parties’ 
positions towards the different types of inflows are not dependent on the existence of a 
relevant ERP. Furthermore, the Conservative leader’s populist campaign on asylum 
developed in the context of an insignificant BNP and presaged rather than responded to an 
ERP electoral breakthrough. The Conservatives’ strategy potentially benefited future BNP 
electoral success. It is thus argued that mainstream inter-party consensus on immigration 
restriction or the adoption of populist approaches to immigration can be an outcome of 
political judgements of mainstream elites in the absence of a salient ERP.  
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11.1.1 – Understanding ERP impact on inter-party competition  
This subsection seeks to understand ERP impact on inter-party competition by comparing the 
relationships found between the identified levels of the ERP impact on inter-party 
competition on immigration and the behaviour of the proposed factors to understand the 
occurrence of this political process (Table 2.1).  
1) Levels of immigration 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy 
coincide with the growth of levels of immigration? The foreign population legally settled in 
Italy increased steadily before 2001 and there were intense irregular inflows before 2001 as 
demonstrated by the 2002 regularisation process (Figures 11,1; 9.2). In contrast, immigration 
into the UK declined between 2000 and 2001 mostly due to the decrease of asylum seeking 
(Figures 11.1; 5.2). Immigration into France expanded before the 2002 presidential election 
supported by the expansion of secondary inflows (Figures 11.1; 7.2). Levels of immigration 
into Italy and the UK coincided with different levels of impact by the LN and the BNP on 
inter-party competition on immigration at the 2001 elections, whilst a negative linkage was 
observed at the French 2002 presidential election. Thus, the relationship between ERP impact 
on inter-party competition and levels of immigration seems incoherent.  
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Source: BES, 2001; PEF, 2002; ITANES, 2001 
Source: Home Office, 2010; SGCICI, 2011; ISTAT, 2010 
Figure 11.1 – Annual number of residence authorisations issued in the UK, France and Italy 
between 2000 and 2009
143
 
 
 
Figure 11.2 – Ranking of importance of unemployment, taxes, immigration, delinquency, 
education, and health services among issues at the British and Italian 2001 general elections 
and at the French 2002 presidential election 
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 There is no available data on the granting of residence authorisations in Italy between 2000 and 2001, 
as well as between 2003 and 2005. 
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2) Role of public opinion  
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on inter-party competition on immigration coincide with 
intense public concern with immigration? The Italian and French electorates ranked 
immigration policy among their top electoral priorities at the 2001 general election (note that 
immigration was closely associated with insecurity in Italy which increased the overall 
salience of this issue; Legnante and Sani, 2002, p.50) and the 2002 presidential election, 
whilst British voters overlooked immigration as a salient issue in 2001 (Figure 11.2). 
Therefore, the LN’s significant impact and the BNP’s lack of contagion effects coincided 
with the distinctive levels of concern with immigration across the Italian and British 
electorates in the 2001 Italian and British general elections. Nonetheless, the FN’s lack of 
impact differed from the intense concern with immigration amongst French voters in 2002. 
Therefore, the relationship between ERP impact on inter-party competition and the salience 
of immigration across the electorate is problematic.  
3) ERPs’ electoral challenge 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy coincide 
with ERPs’ electoral challenge to mainstream parties at first-order-ballots? In Italy, the LN 
posed a serious challenge to Italian mainstream parties’ electoral prospects at the 2001 
general election, which coincided with its significant impact on this dimension of 
immigration politics (Table 4.5). The BNP’s irrelevance after collecting 1 per cent of the vote 
at the 1999 EP ballot and contesting 33 constituencies at the 2001 general election also 
coincided with its lack of impact on inter-party competition (Tables 4.2; 5.1). The FN was the 
strongest ERP in Western Europe and Le Pen fared well at presidential ballots before 2002 
(Table 4.3), yet this trend diverged from the absence of the FN’s contagion effects on the 
position of mainstream parties on immigration at the electoral campaign for the 2002 
presidential ballot. Consequently, the positive relationship between the ERPs’ electoral 
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threats to mainstream parties and their impact on inter-party competition in Italy and the UK 
is undermined by the French case, which diminishes the overall relevance of this factor.  
4) Mainstream parties’ agency  
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on this dimension of immigration politics coincide with the 
engagement of mainstream parties (formal/informal) with the ERPs? The LN’s formal co-
option into the CdL following Berlusconi’s pact with Bossi coincided with the LN’s 
significant impact on inter-party competition in 2001. In the UK, the British mainstream 
parties’ isolation of the BNP fits with its lack of impact on inter-party competition on 
immigration in 2001. In contrast to Berlusconi’s full cooperation with the LN in Italy, the FN 
remained highly isolated within the French party system, particularly due to President 
Chirac’s refusal to engage with the FN, and coincided with the FN’s lack of contagion effects 
on this dimension of immigration politics. Consequently, the divergent strategies of 
mainstream parties towards ERPs coincide with the ERPs’ different levels of impact on inter-
party competition on immigration.  
Overall, the agency of mainstream parties is the only factor whose behaviour coincides with 
the variable levels of ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration policy in the 
three cases. Public concern with immigration and the dimension of ERPs’ electoral threat to 
mainstream parties also exhibited salient relationships with the observed levels of the ERPs’ 
impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration, but their relevance were undermined 
by the French case study. Thus, the agency of mainstream parties appears to be the most 
relevant factor in understanding the ERPs’ contagion effects on inter-party competition at 
first-order-ballots taking place in the first half of the 2000s. French mainstream parties’ 
exclusion of immigration policy from their electoral campaigns despite intense concern 
across public opinion and the FN’s substantial threat indicates that mainstream political elites 
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enjoy full autonomy to set their political priorities. This in turn enhances the profile of the 
mainstream parties’ leaderships for the salience of immigration in their electoral strategies.  
11.2 – ERPs’ impact on public attitudes 
Did the BNP, FN and LN intensify concern and hostility towards immigration at the first-
order-ballots taking place in the first half of the 2000s? Immigration was ranked amongst the 
top priority issues of the Italian and French voters in 2001 and in 2002 in contrast to its 
absence from the British electorate’s top priority issues in 2001 (Figure 11.2; see p. 254). 
Nevertheless, hostility to immigration was still visible in the UK in 2001 particularly towards 
asylum but still at a lower level than in France in 2002, which was surprising considering the 
absence of a prominent British ERP (Figures 5.4; 7.5). Salient levels of hostility to 
immigration have therefore presaged the BNP’s electoral breakthrough at local level in 2002.  
Additionally, public perceptions of immigration also varied across the three case studies. In 
Italy unlike in the UK and France, immigration was mostly associated with law and order 
issues (Figures 9.7, 5.6; Cautrès, 2003). Connections between employment and immigration 
were higher amongst the British voters than across the Italian electorate in 2001 (Figures 5.5, 
9.5). These variations within the three cases suggest that public attitudes to immigration are 
not a reflection of the idiosyncrasies of immigrants or other structural regularities. Instead, 
public perceptions should be regarded as an outcome of the interplay between the 
development of immigration flows and contingent domestic factors. Moreover, the 
coincidence between the mainstream parties’ distinctive frames of HSI and asylum with the 
British voters’ attitudes to these two types of immigration flows highlights the profile of 
mainstream parties’ influence on public opinion.  
This research suggested that the FN was the only ERP that had a significant impact on public 
attitudes to immigration at the 2002 presidential election whereas both the LN and the BNP 
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lacked contagion effects on this dimension of immigration politics at the 2001 general 
elections. Le Pen monopolised issue ownership of opposition to immigration in 2002 and the 
“lepenisation” of minds was acute across the electorate, as high levels of concern and 
hostility to immigration demonstrated (Figures 7.4, 7.5, 7.6, 7.7). In contrast, available data 
for Italy suggests that the LN did not seize ownership over the issue of opposition to 
immigration, and thus did not drive the debate on immigration in 2001 (Figure 9.4). Public 
hostility to immigration in Italy was not as widespread as it was among French voters or the 
FN’s electorate in 2002 (Figures 9.5, 9.6, 9.7).  
Analysis of public attitudes at the British 2001 general election suggested that the BNP failed 
to reinforce concern or hostility to immigration. The Italian and the British ERPs’ inability to 
reinforce concern and hostility to immigration at the 2001 general elections challenges past 
observation of ERPs’ significant impact on public attitudes to immigration in France, 
Germany and Austria during the 1990s (Williams, 2006). Furthermore, salient levels of 
hostility towards immigration were observed in the UK in 2001, suggesting that those public 
attitudes to immigration can also be observed in the context of a non-relevant ERP which has 
yet to breakthrough at national level. 
11.2.1 – Understanding ERP impact on public attitudes 
This final section seeks to understand the levels of ERP impact on public attitudes by 
comparing the relationship between the intensity of political processes and the behaviour of 
the proposed factors on this dimension (Table 2.1).  
1) Levels of immigration 
Did ERPs’ (lack of) impact on the electorate’s anxiety and hostility to immigration coincide 
with the growth of immigration before the first-order-ballots? As mentioned earlier, 
immigration in Italy and France expanded before the 2001 general election and the 2002 
321 
 
presidential elections, supported by the growth of family reunion and irregular immigration 
(Figure 11.1). In contrast, immigration into the UK declined between 2000 and 2001 
following a drop in the number of asylum seekers entering the country (Figure 11.1). Thus, 
the different levels of immigration into the UK and France coincided with distinctive levels 
of impact of the FN and the BNP on public attitudes, but the expansion of immigration in 
Italy diverges from the LN’s lack of impact in 2001. Consequently, the linkage between 
increase of immigration and the ERPs’ ability to reinforce anxiety and hostility to 
immigration is doubtful.  
2) Levels of the ERPs’ electoral support  
Did ERPs’ (lack of) impact on public attitudes to immigration coincide with their extensive 
electoral support at national level? The 33 contested constituencies at the 2001 general 
election demonstrated the BNP’s incipient electoral support and party network (Table 4.2). 
The LN’s electoral support and party organisation was geographically concentrated in the 
northern Italian regions in a period of electoral decline as the 1999 EP ballot indicated (Table 
4.5). Furthermore, the LN’s electorate did not display the extreme levels of xenophobia 
observed across the FN’s electorate. In contrast to the two latter ERPs, the FN enjoyed 
consistent electoral support at the national level, as the results during the 1990s demonstrated, 
while its core electorate was distinctive for its xenophobic attitudes (Table 4.3). Whereas the 
BNP’s and the LN’s restricted electoral support and the attitudes of its core voters coincided 
with their lack of impact on public attitudes to immigration, a positive relationship was 
observed between the FN’s strong electoral support and the ideological uniformity of its core 
electorate and its  significant contagion effects in 2002 (Table 10.2). Thus, this factor is 
positively related to the three ERPs’ levels of impact on public attitudes. 
3) The agency of mainstream parties 
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Did ERPs’ (lack of) impact on public attitudes to immigration coincide with the mainstream 
party engagement (both formal and informal) with ERPs? British and French mainstream 
parties opted for a strategy of non-engagement with the BNP and the FN at the 2001 general 
elections and 2002 presidential elections. In contrast, the formal co-option of the LN into the 
CdL enhanced the respectability of Bossi’s xenophobic discourse providing exogenous 
support to the Italian ERP and potentially increasing impact on public attitudes to 
immigration. Consequently, the behaviour of this factor only holds a salient relationship with 
the BNP’s irrelevant impact on public attitudes whilst a weaker linkage was found towards 
ERP impact in Italy and France in 2001 and 2002. 
Overall, the variable levels of ERPs’ electoral support and the ideological characteristics of 
their core electorate were apparently the most relevant factors behind ERP impact on public 
attitudes to immigration in the first half of the 2000s (Table 10.2). Therefore, the dimension 
of FN’s electoral support and the subsequent party network, alongside the extreme 
xenophobia of its core electorate, continued to hold significant contagion effects on the 
attitudes of the general public to immigration in the early 2000s, as had been observed during 
the 1990s (Schain, 2006, p. 277). The analysis now provides a comparative synthesis of 
findings on the development of immigration policy in Italy, the UK and France in the first 
half of the 2000s. 
11.3 – ERPs’ impact on development of immigration policy  
The third and final overall section compares ERP impact on the development of immigration 
policies. First, immigration policies in the UK, France and Italy are compared to assess their 
potential convergence and the relevance of the types of migration policy models (Freeman, 
2006; Table 2.2). Secondly, the levels of ERP impact on policy developments are directly 
compared to assess if the three ERPs had a significant impact on immigration politics during 
the terms taking place in the first half of the 2000. The third and final section seeks to 
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understand these political processes by assessing the relationship between the observed levels 
of ERP impact on policy developments and the proposed factors at cross-national level 
(Table 2.1).  
11.3.1 – Comparing policy developments  
Did policies towards the different types of immigration flows converge in the three cases 
during the terms started in the first half of the 2000s? Policy stability on the management of 
inflows was stronger in Italy than in the UK and France, where two immigration laws were 
approved during the Labour government’s and President Chirac’s terms, reflecting policy 
shifts in these two cases. The 2002 Bossi-Fini law remained unchanged throughout 
Berlusconi’s term whilst a policy shift occurred in British immigration policy in 2002 and 
involved the narrative of “managed migration”, which emphasised the purported benefits of 
labour immigration against the supposed costs of asylum. The Labour government intended 
to appease domestic demand for foreign labour as well as neutralise the Conservatives’ 
challenge on immigration. In France, another policy shift was announced by the UMP leader 
at the 2005 UMP convention involving the promotion of a stronger balance between selected 
immigration, such as labour migration, and “endured” inflows, referring to regular types of 
immigration including family reunion and asylum.  
The policy departure in France reflected Sarkozy’s plans to project a rupture with President 
Chirac’s unpopular legacy in order to win the UMP presidential nomination and to attract the 
FN electorate at the 2007 presidential election. Therefore, the two observed policy shifts in 
the UK and France legitimised a hierarchy on the conditions set for the entry and settlement 
of immigrants according to utilitarian principles and reinforced the perception of particular 
categories as illegitimate. Moreover, these policy shifts reflected a common aim by the 
British Labour government and the French Interior Minister to neutralise a challenge from an 
opposition centre-right party and an ERP on immigration, such as the Conservatives in the 
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UK and the FN in France respectively. After this overview of the policy shifts in the UK and 
France, analysis of the development of immigration policy by types of flows is developed 
below.  
Labour immigration was particularly intense in Italy and the UK and less so in France during 
the first half of the 2000s (Figure 11.3). Looking at the different types of labour immigration, 
HSI was irrelevant in the Italian context whilst both the UK and France recognised the right 
to long-term residence to HSI through the HSMP in 2002 and the CCT in 2006. This trend 
suggests the presence of a distributive policy and similar client politics models in the two 
cases’ policies towards HSI (Table 2.2). Nonetheless, the common observation of a client 
politics model is challenged by the distinctive intensity of this type of immigration into the 
two countries and the convergence was limited to policy inputs. Whereas Blair sought to 
intensify this type of immigration through a points-system, Sarkozy left the CCT inoperative 
until the end of 2007. The client politics model was particularly useful to analyse the British 
policy towards HSI as the Labour government adopted a laissez-faire approach to appease 
domestic demand for foreign labour and support investment in public services. Effectively, 
Blair framed this type of immigration flow as a cost-free policy and the intensity of HSI 
confirmed the observation of this type of politics model.  
Similar guest-worker programmes were deployed for unskilled labour immigration from non-
EU countries across the three cases, suggesting the adoption of similar interest-group politics 
(Table 2.2). Yet strong variation was found in the overall intensity of labour immigration into 
the three countries and throughout Berlusconi’s term challenging the validity of a common 
grouping of the three countries. Italy received the largest intake of unskilled immigration 
from non-EU countries, as the dimension of the 2002 regularisation process and the Flows 
Decrees after 2004 demonstrated. Moreover, the LN Welfare Minister first managed the 
Italian quota system under a straight temporary approach and caps were set below 
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domestic demand for foreign labour, causing dissatisfaction among the government’s 
coalition partners. This approach was watered-down after 2004 when the Flows Decrees was 
supervised by the FI Interior Minister Pisanu, leading to the expansion of non-temporary 
quotas for labour immigration (Figure 9.9).   
Divergences were also found in the three countries’ responses to the accession of the A-8 
countries into the EU. The UK opted for the concession of the right to long-term settlement to 
these immigrants suggesting the observation of another client politics model in the UK (Table 
2.2). Immigration from A-8 countries was publicly welcomed by Blair to legitimise the 
Labour government’s laissez-faire approach, yet it was coupled with some restriction on 
these immigrants’ access to welfare. The French and Italian governments imposed 
transitional periods on the right of A-8 citizens to access their labour markets. This common 
trend suggested the adoption of similar interest groups politics model towards intra-EU 
inflows. Nevertheless, similar policy inputs were still followed by divergent outcomes on the 
intensity of this type of immigration into the two countries, as the Italians set independent 
quotas for A-8 citizens in 2004 whilst the French quota system was only implemented from 
2007 onwards. Finally, France was the only case where signature of the CAI was imposed on 
labour immigrants indicating a fusion between immigration and integration policies.  
Secondary inflows had stronger intensity in France than in the UK and Italy during the first 
half of the 2000s (Figure 11.4). Restrictions on this type of immigration were introduced in 
Italy by the 2002 Bossi-Fini law and were even stronger in France by the 2003 and 2006 
immigration laws. Consequently, secondary inflows into France fell after the promulgation of 
the 2006 law demonstrating the French state’s ability to restrict an undesired inflow and 
attain its objectives (Figure 11.4). The politicisation of family reunion in France unlike the 
other two cases reflected Sarkozy’s policy shift to promote selected immigration against 
“endured” inflows mirroring the FN’s 2002 campaign demands. Recognition of right to long-
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term settlement to family members in the UK indicate the observation of a client politics 
model, whereas the restrictions imposed on access to family reunion in Italy and particularly 
in France fit into an entrepreneurial politics model (Table 2.2). 
Asylum was particularly prominent during Blair’s second term in contrast to its lower 
salience in France and Italy. Blair aimed to reduce asylum inflows regardless of potential 
stresses on human rights, believing it would lead to a decline in public concerns over 
immigration. Nonetheless, a strong degree of convergence was observed in the extension of 
restrictions on asylum in the three cases and this enactment of legislation was followed by 
substantial reductions of asylum in the UK and France. The increase of regulations on asylum 
suggests a common presence of entrepreneurial politics models (Table 2.2). Nevertheless, 
whereas the salience of this type of immigration decreased in the French political debate from  
Figure 11.3 – Residence authorisations issued for labour purposes in the UK, France and 
Italy between 2000 and 2009
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Sources: Home Office, 2010; SGCICI, 2011; ISTAT, 2010 
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Figure 11.4 - Residence authorisations issued for family reunion purposes in the UK, France 
and Italy between 2000 and 2009 
 
Source: Home Office, 2010; SGCICI, 2011; ISTAT, 2010 
Figure 11.5 – Asylum requests in the UK, France and Italy between 2000 and 2009 
 
Sources: Home Office, 2010; SGCICI, 2007, 2011; Ministero Dell’Interno, 2010.  
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2003 onwards, asylum continued to be highly contentious in the UK despite a similar drop in 
asylum requests (Figure 11.5). 
Expansions of restrictions to the development of irregular immigration were also apparent 
across the three cases, but this type of inflow was particularly politicised in Italy. This 
country was distinctive for the intensity of irregular immigration and the subsequent 
development of the 2002 regularisation process. This particularity was driven by the Italian 
state’s inability to manage regular labour inflows, domestic structural dependence on foreign 
labour and the existence of a large informal economic sector. A policy gap was identified in 
Italy over the restrictive objectives set at the 2001 electoral campaign and the liberal outcome 
arising from the 2002 regularisation programme. Another policy gap was identified over the 
Sarkozy’s deployment of a repressive approach against irregular immigration in 2005 and 
subsequent policy outcomes. Furthermore, the French state continued to regularise irregular 
immigrants between 2005 and 2007 under the regularisation mechanism left intact by the 
2003 law.  
The expected convergence amongst the immigration policies of Italy, the UK and France was 
stronger on the deployment of restriction on asylum and irregular inflows than on labour 
immigration and family reunion throughout the first half of the 2000s (Cornelius et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, the similar distribution of costs and benefits presupposed by the different types 
of migration policy across the three cases also failed to result in stronger levels of 
convergence amongst the three cases’ immigration policies. The proposed categories of 
migration policy exhibited a strong degree of internal variation on the intensity of the 
subsequent types of immigration flows or their different levels of politicisation within the 
British, French and Italian political systems.  
Therefore, this research indicates that immigration studies should not presuppose that policy 
inputs must necessarily lead to predetermined policy outputs, as seen in the case of HSI in 
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France. By contrast, the tracing of immigration policy as a political process that reflects the 
interplay between structure and agency enhances the understanding of policy inputs and 
outputs. Whereas there was significant structural demand for foreign labour in the British and 
Italian labour markets, this trend was weaker in France. In the context of intense domestic 
demand for foreign labour and the government’s vested interest in promoting HSI, the British 
Labour government liberalised the criteria to access the HSMP to intensify labour 
immigration. The extensive restrictions on asylum reflected Blair’s political strategy for the 
2005 general election.  
In France, Sarkozy subordinated immigration policy to his political strategy for the 2007 
presidential election with his emphasis on promoting labour immigration against “endured” 
inflows as the FN proposed in 2002, notwithstanding the low recruitment difficulties 
observed in the French labour market. In Italy, the CdL government’s response to the 
structural demand for foreign labour was incoherent reflecting the coalition dynamics within 
the government. This analysis suggests that policy outcomes, particularly on labour inflows, 
reflected the interplay between structural factors of the domestic labour markets and the 
political objectives of the national governments or the parties within the coalition. Therefore, 
the thesis has demonstrated how political factors such as: inter-party competition between 
Labour and the Conservatives or the UMP and the FN, intra-party conflicts within the UMP 
for the presidential nomination, and the intra-coalition dynamics within the CdL government, 
have influenced subsequent policy developments observed during the first half of the 2000s.  
The employment of CDA allowed the identification of interdiscursive relationships between 
the discourse of mainstream parties and the frame of immigration by ERPs and the thesis 
explored how the identified linkages have legitimated non-discursive practices with a 
restrictive character. In the UK, the Home Secretary David Blunkett articulated the ERP’s 
frame of immigration to legitimise the detainment of asylum seekers’ children in 2002 whilst 
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the Conservative and tabloids’ campaign on gypsy “benefit tourists” and the subsequent 
articulation of immigration as a threat to the welfare system in 2003 were followed by 
restrictions on A-8 citizens’ access to welfare benefits. Furthermore, these events were 
observed in the context of an insignificant ERP and might have supported the BNP’s short-
term electoral expansion.  
In France, the FN’s frame of immigrant integration as a threat to the French society was 
observed in Sarkozy’s justification of the experimental introduction of CAI in the 2003 
immigration law, whose application was generalised by the 2006 law that destabilised 
immigrants’ legal long-term settlement. A further interdiscursive linkage was identified 
between the Interior Minister’s policy shift to attain a better balance between selected 
immigration and “endured” inflows and the FN’s frame of immigration at the 2002 
presidential election. The transposition of this paradigm for the 2006 immigration law was 
followed by a decline in the intensity of family reunion reflecting the obstacles placed on 
immigrants’ right to conduct a normal family life, although President Chirac vetoed the quota 
system. 
In Italy, the LN’s frame of immigration under straight utilitarian principles and as a threat to 
security helped to legitimise the introduction of the “residence contract” that destabilised 
immigrants’ long-term regular settlement, and the initial management of the quota system 
under a strict utilitarian approach until 2004. Hence, this analysis has found salient 
interdiscursive relationships between the ERPs’ frame of immigration and mainstream 
parties’ discourse across the three cases and even in the context of a non-relevant ERP, as 
was the case in the UK. The articulation by mainstream political elites of immigration as a 
threat can therefore be seen as a reflection of their agency and employed in order to legitimise 
restrictive policy developments instead of being a necessary repercussion of ERP impact.  
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11.3.2 – ERP impact on immigration policy 
Did the BNP, FN and LN reinforce the restrictive character of immigration policies during 
the first half of the 2000s? The FN was the ERP with the strongest level of impact on the 
development of immigration policy between 2002 and 2007 followed by the LN’s moderate 
impact during Berlusconi’s second term. In contrast, the BNP lacked any relevant contagion 
effects on British immigration policy throughout the Labour government’s second term. After 
the 2002 presidential election, immigration policy was quickly prioritised in President 
Chirac’s legislative agenda despite its irrelevance during the mainstream parties’ electoral 
campaigns. Consequently, the 2003 immigration and asylum laws expanded restrictions on 
family reunion, asylum and irregular immigration flows whilst the experimental introduction 
of CAI provided evidence of the post-2002 integration consensus. The FN’s impact increased 
to a significant level after a policy shift to a selective immigration policy against “endured” 
inflows announced by Sarkozy in 2005. This was transposed into the 2006 immigration law 
with substantial restrictions on family reunion and with the generalisation of the CAI to all 
newcomers in the context of an integration crisis.  
In Italy, the introduction of a “contract of residence”, restrictions on immigrants’ access to 
the welfare system and deployment of biometric controls on immigration in the 2002 Bossi-
Fini law provided evidence of the LN impact on policy developments. Moreover, the LN’s 
impact extended to the management of the quota system on labour inflows according to a 
strict guest-worker system despite the intense domestic demand for unskilled workers until 
2004. Unlike the FN and LN, the BNP lacked relevant impact on the development of the 
British immigration policy during Blair’s second term. Its electoral breakthrough at the local 
level in 2002 was incorrectly associated by British political scientists with the Labour 
government’s repressive approach to asylum (Shuster and Solomos, 2004; Sales, 2005; 
Copsey, 2009). Whereas this policy shift reflected Blair’s strategy of neutralising the 
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Conservative challenge on asylum, the BNP’s electoral breakthrough coincided with that 
political process but had no influence on it.  
Observations from the British case suggests that ERPs’ electoral breakthroughs at the local 
level might not always have the consequences past research on ERP impact suggested 
(Schain, 2002). By contrast, the politicisation of immigration and introduction of restrictive 
policy developments might expand the ERPs’ structure of political opportunities, as happened 
in the UK. The preceding analysis of the selected ERPs’ impact on immigration policy during 
the first half of the 2000s challenges the perception of ERP ability to reinforce the restrictive 
character of their national immigration policies, which had been previously observed in 
Austria, Germany and France during the 1990s (Williams, 2006).  
This thesis also identified substantial variations in the content of ERP impact on policy 
developments beside the promotion of common restrictions on family reunion and asylum. 
The FN’s impact in France led to a fusion of immigration and integration policies whilst LN 
contagion effects in Italy were observed on the management of the quota system. The FN’s 
and the LN’s levels of impact were considered disproportional in light of the French ERP 
isolation within the party system and the Italian ERP’s position as the weakest coalition 
partner within the CdL government. Furthermore, the LN’s participation in Berlusconi’s 
government was still accompanied by a lower level of impact than the FN had in France. This 
trend indicates that the intensity of ERPs’ impact on policy development is not contingent on 
the ERPs’ number of seats in the executive.   
11.3.3 – Understanding ERPs’ impact on immigration policy 
This final subsection seeks to understand ERP impact on development of immigration policy 
by comparing the relationships found between the selected ERPs’ levels of contagion effects 
on this dimension of immigration policy and the proposed hypotheses (Table 2.1).  
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1) Intensity of levels of immigration 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on policy developments coincide with the expansion of levels 
of immigration during the periods analysed? Immigration into Italy intensified during the 
CdL’s term, supported by labour and irregular inflows in virtue of the 2002 regularisation 
programme (Figure 11.1). Levels of immigration into the UK also expanded during Labour’s 
second term driven by the intensification of labour inflows (Figure 11.1). Immigration rates 
into France decreased from 2004 onwards, due to a decrease in secondary and asylum inflows 
(Figure 11.1). Whereas the LN’s significant impact coincided with the expansion of 
immigration into Italy, the BNP’s and the FN’s opposite levels of impact on policy 
developments in the UK and France suggest a weak relationship between the ERPs’ impact 
on policy developments and the intensity of immigration.  
2) Role of public opinion 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on policy developments coincide with the high salience of 
this issue amongst the electorate? Immigration was a top priority issue for the Italian and 
French electorates at the 2001 general election and at the 2002 presidential elections, while 
British voters overlooked this issue as a priority in 2001 (Figure 11.2). Therefore, the salience 
of immigration across the Italian, British and French electorates coincided with the distinct 
levels of the ERPs’ impact on the development of their national immigration policies.  
3) ERPs’ electoral challenge 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) reinforcement of the restrictive character of immigration policy 
coincide with the ERPs’ substantial electoral threat to mainstream parties? The LN continued 
to pose a serious challenge to Italian mainstream parties at the 2006 general election, after its 
electoral recovery from the 2001 setback whilst its territorial dimension enhanced its 
advantage in the plurality tier (Table 9.1). In contrast, the BNP failed to make an electoral 
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breakthrough at the national level before the 2005 general election and failed to pose a 
serious challenge to established parties (Table 5.1). The FN maintained its electoral resilience 
throughout the elections before the 2007 presidential election despite its diminishing political 
opportunities, and continued to pose a substantial challenge to French mainstream parties 
(Table 7.1). Hence, the LN’s and the FN’s prominent electoral challenges to mainstream 
parties at the first-order-ballots were positively related to their significant impact on the 
development of immigration policy whilst the opposite linkage was observed in the UK.  
4)  Role of mainstream parties’ agency 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on immigration policy coincide with mainstream parties’ 
engagement (both formal and informal) with the ERPs? In Italy, the CdL’s formal 
engagement with the LN and its inclusion in the government coincided with its moderate 
impact. In contrast, the British mainstream parties’ isolation of the BNP was followed by this 
ERP’s lack of impact on policy developments. Finally, whereas Chirac opted to ostracise the 
FN, Sarkozy engaged with the FN through the informal co-option of Le Pen’s agenda on 
immigration from 2005 onwards. Thus, the strategies of mainstream parties towards the ERPs 
also related strongly to the ERPs’ impact on immigration policy in the three cases. 
Furthermore, the agency of mainstream parties had a salient relationship with the LN’s and 
the FN’s opposite levels of impact on policy developments since the intra-coalition dynamics 
within Berlusconi’s government coincided with the LN’s lessening impact while Sarkozy’s 
reinstatement as Interior Minister in 2005 was followed by increasing impact of the FN.  
In short, the ERPs’ significant levels of impact on policy developments coincided with 
several factors: salience of immigration at first-order-ballots, the ERPs’ substantial electoral 
challenges to mainstream parties, and the engagement strategies of mainstream parties 
towards the ERPs. This research also highlight that the last factor had a consistent 
relationship with the LN’s declining and the FN’s increasing impact on policy development 
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during the selected timeframes, which enhances the importance of the strategies of 
mainstream parties in affecting the intensity of the ERPs’ impact on policy developments. 
Furthermore, the thesis suggests that ERP impact on policy developments is highly 
contingent on the reaction of mainstream parties, which also enhances the responsibility of 
mainstream political elites for ERPs’ contagion effects.  
11.4 – Conclusions 
This research suggests that the LN was the only ERP that had a significant impact on inter-
party competition in the area of immigration during the first-order-ballots taking place in the 
UK, France and Italy in the first half of the 2000s. The Conservatives’ adoption of a populist 
approach to asylum in the UK presaged the BNP’s electoral breakthrough at local level in 
2002 and was not a repercussion of BNP impact. The observed trends challenge the previous 
observation of ERPs’ ability to hold significant contagion effects on mainstream proposals 
throughout the 1990s (Williams, 2006). Whereas the LN impact on inter-party competition in 
Italy was positively related to the four proposed factors, the only difference found in 
comparison to France was the non-engagement of mainstream parties with the FN. Within 
this overall context, the political agency of mainstream parties was considered as the most 
relevant factor affecting ERP impact on inter-party competition. The French mainstream 
parties disregard towards immigration in their electoral campaigns demonstrated their full 
autonomy to set their political priorities. Furthermore, the British case demonstrated that 
mainstream parties can adopt populist frames on immigration in the context of a non-relevant 
ERP.  
The only ERP to hold salient contagion effects on public attitudes to immigration was the FN 
whilst both the LN and the BNP lacked a significant impact at the national level in the first 
half of the 2000s. Consequently, the research challenges the previous observation of ERPs’ 
reinforcement of xenophobia across their national electorates throughout the 1990s 
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(Williams, 2006). Le Pen’s issue ownership of opposition to immigration and widespread 
levels of hostility to this social phenomenon demonstrated the FN’s impact on the national 
electorate. The FN’s strong electoral support at the national level, its subsequent party 
network, and the xenophobia of its core voters were identified as the most relevant factors 
behind this ERP’s impact on public attitudes. So far, the research seems to confirm Schain’s 
(2002, 2006) observation that the FN’s electoral support and the subsequent dimension of its 
party organisation provided strong leverage to influence public attitudes on immigration at 
the national level.  
The FN and the LN had, respectively, significant and moderate levels of impact on the 
development of French and Italian immigration policies during the terms started in the 
selected timeframe. Nevertheless, the BNP lacked relevant contagion effects on policy 
developments in the UK questioning the common ERPs’ capability to push for more 
restrictive immigration policies identified during the 1990s (Williams, 2006). Both the 
French and Italian ERPs had disproportional levels of impact considering their positions 
within their domestic party systems. Nonetheless, the higher indirect impact of the FN in 
comparison to the LN’s direct contagion effects on policy developments suggest that its 
intensity is not contingent on access to office seats. The ERPs’ significant impact in France 
and moderate impact in Italy coincided with intense public concern with immigration, the 
substantial dimension of the FN’s and LN’s electoral threats, and the strategies of mainstream 
parties. Within this overall context, the consistent relationship found between the agency of 
the French and Italian mainstream parties and the ascending impact of the FN and the 
descending impact of the LN raises the importance of this last factor in comparison to 
salience of immigration and the ERPs’ electoral threat.  
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Chapter 12 – Comparative synthesis of ERPs’ impact on immigration policy 
during the second half of the 2000s 
This chapter provides a cross-national synthesis of observations extracted from each case 
throughout the second half of the 2000s and contains three aims. First, it compares the 
salience of immigration in terms of inter-party competition, public attitudes to immigration 
and policy developments observed across the three cases. Second, the levels of ERPs’ impact 
on the three dimensions of immigration politics and policy during the selected timeframe are 
compared. Third, this cross-national analysis seeks to understand the occurrence of ERP 
impact on immigration politics and policy by examining the relationships found between the 
proposed hypotheses and the different degrees of the selected ERPs’ contagion effects in the 
UK, France and Italy (Table 2.1).  
12.1 – ERPs’ impact on inter-party competition 
Did the three selected ERPs reinforce the restrictive character of mainstream parties’ 
positions on immigration policy? This research indicates that the salience of immigration 
policy expanded in the selected first-order-ballots taking place in the second half of the 2000s 
(Figures 7.1, 8.1, 9.1). Asylum was the most dominant type of immigration flow discussed in 
the electoral campaigns for the British 2005 general election, whilst irregular immigration 
dominated the French and Italian political agendas at the 2007 presidential election and the 
2008 general election, respectively. This thesis suggested that both the FN and the LN had a 
significant impact on the mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy at the first-
order-ballots taking place during the second half of the 2000s. In contrast, the BNP lacked 
relevant contagion effects on inter-party competition in immigration policy in 2005.  
Besides the high salience of immigration at the electoral campaign for the 2007 presidential 
election, the inter-party consensus on the fusion of immigration and integration policies 
provided evidence of French mainstream parties’ shift to extreme-right grounds at a time 
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when the FN was moving into centre-right grounds. Nonetheless, the FN’s impact was 
strengthened by the UMP candidate’s informal co-option of Le Pen’s agenda on immigration 
and his identity politics. In Italy, the hegemonic frame of immigration as a law and order 
issue and the high salience of this issue across mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns were 
considered an outcome of the LN’s significant impact on inter-party competition at the 2008 
general election. In the UK, the Conservative leader adopted a populist approach to 
immigration, reflecting a valence politics strategy at the 2005 general election, which de-
railed into ERPs’ grounds in the face of Blair’s occupation of the centre-right. British 
mainstream parties’ shift of their positions to the right and the high salience of immigration 
were considered an outcome of the intense inter-party competition between Labour and the 
Conservatives rather than a repercussion of the BNP’s political agency.  
Despite the significant levels of ERPs’ impact in two cases, the BNP’s lack of impact on 
inter-party competition at the British 2005 general election challenges the past observation 
that mainstream parties’ adjust their positions closer to the ERPs in electoral periods because 
of their political agency (Williams, 2006). Effectively, the British 2005 election demonstrates 
that mainstream parties such as the Conservatives can adopt positions on immigration policy 
bordering the extreme-right as a consequence of their own agency and in the context of a 
non-relevant ERP. Furthermore, ERPs’ electoral expansion, such as the BNP’s inroads at the 
local level before 2005, may coincide with potential political shifts of mainstream parties on 
immigration policy without causing the shift. Ultimately, the mainstream parties’ positions on 
immigration at first-order-ballots, even if bordering the extreme-right, should also be 
conceived as a potential outcome of their own political agency, devoid of ERPs’ contagion 
effects, to not overstate the occurrence of this political process.  
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12.1.1 – Understanding ERP impact on inter-party competition 
This subsection seeks to understand ERP impact on inter-party competition on immigration 
during the second half of the 2000s by comparing the relationship between the preceding 
observations and the behaviour of the proposed factors across the three cases (Table 2.1).  
1) Levels of immigration  
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration coincide 
with the expansion of immigration before the first-order-ballots? Immigration into the UK 
and Italy increased considerably before the 2005 and 2008 general elections, mainly because 
of labour and intra-EU inflows (Figure 11.1). In opposition, immigration into France declined 
before the 2007 presidential election, reflecting the deceleration of family reunion (Figure 
11.1). Therefore, the expansion of levels of immigration coincided with the LN’s significant 
impact on inter-party competition at the Italian 2008 general election, but not with the BNP’s 
and the FN’s opposite levels of impact at the 2005 and 2007 ballots. Thus, the relationship 
between intensity of immigration and ERP impact on inter-party competition seems weak. 
2) Salience of immigration amongst public opinion 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) reinforcement of mainstream parties’ restrictive positions on 
immigration coincide with intense public concern with immigration? This issue was the top 
priority of the British electorate at the 2005 general election while the overall salience of 
immigration decreased at the French 2007 presidential election (Figure 12.1). Unlike in 
France, the salience of immigration among the Italian voters with immigration increased 
slightly at the 2008 general election (Figure 12.1). Whereas the LN significant impact on 
inter-party competition was linked to the tenuous increase of the salience of immigration, the 
FN and the BNP’s opposite levels of contagion effects on inter-party competition on 
immigration differed from the opposite trends observed over the salience of immigration in 
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Sources: BES, 2005; PEF, 2007, ITANES, 2008 
their national electorates. Thus, this factor also seems to hold a fragile relationship with the 
ERPs’ impact on inter-party competition on immigration.   
Figure 12.1 – Ranking of unemployment, taxes, immigration, delinquency, education, and 
health system in the UK, France and Italy amongst most important issues at the British 2005 
general elections, the French 2007 presidential election and the Italian 2008 general election 
 
 
3) ERP electoral challenge 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on mainstream parties’ positions on immigration policy 
coincide with the ERPs’ electoral challenge at first-order-ballots? The BNP failed to pose a 
strategic dilemma to British mainstream parties at the 2005 general election after the lack of 
an electoral breakthrough at the national level in 2004 ballots (Table 5.1). In contrast, the FN 
posed a very significant challenge to French mainstream parties at the 2007 presidential 
election, as the 2002 ballot and the FN’s electoral resilience before 2007 demonstrated (Table 
7.1). Lastly, the LN’s electoral recovery from 2001 onwards, alongside its ability to expand 
its support at the expense of its coalition partners before the 2008 general election, confirmed 
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the significant dimension of the Italian ERP’s electoral threat to mainstream parties (Table 
9.1). Whereas the BNP’s irrelevant strategic dilemma to British mainstream parties coincided 
with its irrelevant impact on inter-party competition, the FN’s and the LN’s extensive 
electoral threats fit with their significant levels of impact in France and Italy. Thus, a 
consistent relationship can be found between the dimension of the selected ERPs’ electoral 
threat to mainstream parties and their impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
4)  Agency of mainstream parties 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on inter-party competition in immigration coincide with the 
mainstream parties’ engagement with the ERPs? The British mainstream parties continued to 
ostracise the BNP at the 2005 general elections, whilst Howard’s direct attacks reinforced its 
pariah status. Whereas Chirac had employed a similar strategy at the 2002 presidential 
election, Sarkozy opted to engage with the FN by informally co-opting Le Pen’s agenda on 
immigration and identity politics in 2007. Berlusconi and the PdL also engaged with the LN 
but at a formal level through its co-option into the electoral coalition celebrated with the 
signature of an electoral pact that bound the PdL to the LN’s priority issues. Whereas French 
and Italian mainstream parties’ engagement with the ERPs coincided with the FN’s and the 
LN’s significant impact on inter-party competition at the 2007 presidential elections and the 
2008 general elections, the non-engagement strategy in the UK was followed by the opposite 
outcome. Therefore, a consistent relationship between the levels of ERPs’ impact and the 
agency of mainstream parties was also found.  
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In short, the dimension of ERPs’ electoral threats to mainstream parties and the agency of 
mainstream parties were the two factors that were positively related with both the FN’s and 
the LN’s significant impact on inter-party competition at the 2007 presidential election and 
2008 general election. In contrast, the levels of immigration before the first-order-ballots and 
this issue’s salience exhibited a weaker relationship with the observed level of ERP impact, 
undermining their relevance in understanding ERP impact on mainstream parties’ positions 
on immigration. Comparing these observations with the relationships identified in Chapter 
11, the distinct strategies of Sarkozy and Chirac towards the FN in France were the most 
relevant variations on the behaviour of the proposed factors. Therefore, the agency of 
mainstream parties was considered the most relevant factor enhancing ERPs’ impact on inter-
party competition, within the context of their broad electoral challenge to mainstream parties. 
This trend suggests that ERP contagion effects are ultimately contingent on the agency of 
mainstream parties. 
12.2 – ERPs’ impact on public attitudes to immigration 
Did the BNP, the FN and the LN intensify anxiety and hostility to immigration across their 
national electorates? Whereas immigration became the top priority issue of British voters at 
the 2005 general election, the salience of immigration across the French electorate declined in 
the 2007 presidential election despite the tenuous increase of the proportion of voters most 
concerned with this issue (Figure 12.1). In contrast, the ranking of immigration increased 
slightly in Italy despite the stability observed on the proportion of respondents that 
highlighted this issue at their top priority in the 2008 general election (Figure 12.1). 
Likewise, hostility to immigration dropped considerably in France and on a lower level in 
Italy, whilst such attitudes remained stable across the British electorate. These variations 
suggest that concern with immigration fluctuates across different countries or within 
countries independently of the relevance of ERPs. This research indicated that the FN had a 
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significant impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2007, followed by moderate impact 
of the LN in 2008. In contrast, the BNP lacked impact on this dimension of immigration 
politics in 2005.  
Nevertheless, the FN had a lower level of impact on public attitudes in 2007 than in 2002. 
Sarkozy disputed the issue ownership of opposition to immigration from Le Pen in 2007, 
whilst the FN proved unable to reverse the substantial decline of hostility to immigration 
across the general electorate (Figures 8.3, 8.4, 8.5). The LN exhibited a moderate impact on 
public attitudes in 2008 in opposition to 2001 and this time disputed the issue ownership of 
opposition to immigration with the Italian centre-right coalition parties, yet it was unable to 
intensify hostility to immigration across the overall electorate (Figures 10.3, 10.4, 10.5). 
Despite the higher levels of ERP impact on this dimension of immigration politics, the BNP’s 
failure to hold contagion effects on public attitudes in 2005 deviates from the past 
observation of ERPs’ common ability to increase levels of xenophobia in Austria, Germany 
and France throughout the 1990s (Williams, 2006).  
Furthermore, this research demonstrates that the expansion of concern and hostility to 
immigration can develop in the context of a non-relevant ERP as observed in the UK. 
Secondly, anxiety and resentment to this social phenomenon can decline in the context of 
relevant ERPs, as was the case in France. Past suggestions that ERP electoral success can be 
accompanied by a significant impact on mass attitudes is challenged by the LN’s electoral 
success in 2008 and its inability to counter the decline of Italian voters’ anxiety and hostility 
to immigration (Mudde, 2007). Nonetheless, the improvement of Bossi’s ranking among 
voters most concerned with immigration and the expansion of xenophobic traits across the 
LN’s core electorate provides evidence of the LN moderate impact. This trend suggests that 
ERP impact on public attitudes might be more intense across the former cluster of voters and 
the ERP’s core electorate than on mass attitudes.   
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Thirdly, the analysis points to a gap between the increasing salience of immigration across 
the mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns in 2007 and 2008 and diminishing concern and 
hostility to immigration among French and Italian voters. If the observed trends across the 
French and Italian public attitudes to immigration are interpreted as an outcome of the higher 
salience of immigration at the level of inter-party competition or restrictive immigration 
policies, the problem is to understand public behaviour in the UK. Notwithstanding the acute 
mainstream inter-party competition on immigration since 2001 alongside the drop in asylum 
seeking before the 2005 general election, public concern with immigration expanded 
dramatically whilst the levels of hostility to this social phenomenon remained stable in 
comparison to 2001. Therefore, ERP literature must acknowledge that growth of anxiety and 
hostility to immigration can coincide with an electoral breakthrough of an ERP at local level 
without being a response to the latter political process. This statement prevents the potential 
overstatement of ERP impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
12.2.1 – Understanding ERP impact on public attitudes 
This final subsection compares the relationships identified between the levels of ERP impact 
on public attitudes to immigration and the behaviour of the proposed factors to seek to 
understand the occurrence of the former political processes (Table 2.1).  
1) Levels of immigration 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on public attitudes to immigration coincide with the 
expansion of levels of immigration before the first-order-ballots? Immigration increased into 
the UK before 2005, supported by intensification of labour and intra-EU inflows from A-8 
countries (Figure 11.1). Immigration into Italy expanded continuously up to the 2008 general 
election, supported by the growth of secondary inflows (Figure 11.1). In contrast, the rate of 
inflows into France declined before 2007 due to the reduction of family reunion (Figures 
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11.1). Whereas the growth of immigration coincided with the LN’s moderate impact on 
public attitudes to immigration in 2008, opposite levels of immigration into the UK and 
France differed from the FN’s and the BNP’s distinctive levels of impact. The thesis that 
increased presence of immigrants fosters xenophobic attitudes might be helpful to understand 
the trends across British public opinion but not across the French and Italian electorates. 
Despite the continuous annual intake of large number of immigrants into Italy and France, the 
decline of hostility to immigration suggests that public attitudes to immigration are less 
contingent on the intensity of inflows than the proponents of the ethnic backlash thesis 
presuppose it is.  
2) ERPs’ electoral support 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on public concern and hostility to immigration coincide with 
the ERPs’ levels of electoral support? The BNP’s nationwide electoral support was still 
negligible as demonstrated by the failure to obtain an electoral breakthrough at national level 
before 2005 (Tables 5.1). In contrast, the FN demonstrated high electoral resilience between 
the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections in a context of diminishing political opportunities 
(Table 7.1). Finally, the LN performed a steady electoral recovery from 2001 onwards and 
benefited from considerable electoral expansion in the 2007 administrative elections, but its 
party network and core electorate were still concentrated in northern regions (Table 9.1). 
Consequently, the BNP’s lack of impact coincided with its lack of widespread electoral 
support, whilst the levels of the FN’s and the LN’s impact on public attitudes coincided with 
these ERPs’ different levels of electoral support before 2007 and 2008. Nevertheless, these 
factors were unable to halt the substantial decline of overall concern with and hostility to 
immigration in France and Italy, raising doubts over this factor’s relevance.  
3) The agency of mainstream parties 
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Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on public attitudes to immigration coincide with the 
engagement of mainstream parties with the ERPs? British mainstream parties continued to 
ostracise the BNP whilst the Conservative leader’s direct attacks reinforced its pariah status. 
In France, the UMP’s strategy for engagement with the FN by informally co-opting Le Pen’s 
agenda on immigration might have enhanced the legitimacy of the FN’s xenophobic 
discourse, as well as challenge FN issue ownership of opposition to immigration. The LN 
benefited from the legitimacy provided by formal engagement with the PdL and the political 
capital accumulated while in office to overcome its geographically concentrated electoral 
support. Therefore, the engagement of mainstream parties with the ERPs at formal or 
informal levels coincided with the LN’s and the FN’s salient levels of impact, whilst the 
BNP’s lack of contagion effects coincided with its ostracism in the British party system. This 
factor seems to hold a consistent relationship with the ERPs’ impact on public attitudes to 
immigration throughout the second half of the 2000s.  
Overall, ERP levels of electoral support and the agency of mainstream parties coincided with 
different levels of ERP impact on this dimension of immigration politics in the second half of 
the 2000s, unlike the levels of immigration. Comparing the observations extracted through 
the first and second half of the 2000s, the most salient differences concerned the LN’s 
moderate impact and different strategies of the French mainstream parties (Tables 11.2; 
12.2). Nevertheless, the UMP’s informal co-option of the FN’s agenda on immigration failed 
to intensify the French ERP’s impact on immigration policy, which enhances the relevance of 
the ERP’s electoral support and the subsequent dimension of party networks alongside the 
attitudes of the ERPs’ core electorates.  
Nevertheless, the FN’s electoral resilience between 2002 and 2007 and the LN’s electoral 
expansion before 2008 was still unable to reverse the substantial decline of overall concern 
with and hostility to immigration across French and Italian public opinion. Therefore, the 
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ERPs’ electoral organisation and the attitudes of its core voters were unable to influence the 
overall electorate as had been observed at the French 2002 presidential elections and 
throughout the 1990s (Schain, 2002, 2006). This trend suggests that the role of this factor 
might have lost its overall relevance in enhancing ERP impact on public attitudes, or was 
overstated in previous research. Consequently, further analysis is recommended to understand 
the shifts amongst public attitudes to immigration, in particular the expansion of public 
concern in the UK despite the BNP’s non-relevance and the decline of anxiety and hostility in 
France and Italy in the context of relevant ERPs’ impact on this dimension of immigration 
politics.  
12.3 – ERPs’ impact on the development of immigration policy  
The third and final section compares ERP impact on the development of immigration policy 
during the second half of the 2000s and contains three aims. First, this section compares 
policy developments observed across the three cases to assess possible convergence amongst 
the British, French and Italian immigration policies. Secondly, the section compares ERPs’ 
impact on the development of immigration policy to evaluate if the three selected ERPs had 
significant contagion effects on policy developments. Thirdly, the section seeks to understand 
the development of the latter political processes by comparing the relationships between the 
levels of ERPs’ impact on immigration policy with the behaviour of the proposed factors in at 
a cross-national level (Table 2.1).   
12.3.1 – Comparing policy developments 
Did policies towards the distinct types of immigration flows converge in the three cases at an 
overall level during the second half of the 2000s? The enactment of the British 2006 
immigration and asylum act and the French 2007 immigration law – in contrast to the 
stability evidenced by the 2002 Bossi-Fini law in Italy – suggests that policy stability was 
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higher in Italy than in the UK and France. A policy shift was observed in the UK, as the 
narrative of “managed immigration” was dropped after the 2005 general election in favour of 
framing immigration under a security-related approach that emphasised the deployment of 
biometric controls on immigrants and reinforcement of border controls to tackle abuse of the 
immigration system. In France, President Sarkozy implemented his new paradigm for 
selected immigration whilst the Italian centre-right coalition continued to frame the 
management of labour immigration as a temporary social phenomenon and irregular 
immigration as a law and order issue.  
Labour immigration was particularly intense in Italy, followed by the UK and less in France 
(Figure 11.3). HSI continued to be irrelevant in the Italian context whilst its low intensity into 
France reflected President Sarkozy’s ambiguous intentions and weak recruitment difficulties 
of highly skilled workers in the labour market. In contrast, the UK continued to receive 
intense levels of HSI despite its deceleration after the enactment of employment package 
aimed to provide “British jobs for British workers” by the Labour government in 2007. The 
three cases adopted guest-worker systems to manage unskilled labour immigration from non-
EU countries but Italy continued to receive the largest intake of these immigrants whilst the 
UK and France adopted restrictive regulations on these immigrants’ access to their labour 
markets.  
Finally, substantial variations were also observed in the policies in the three cases towards 
immigration from new EU member-states. The British laissez-faire approach to intra-EU 
immigration was now justified by the Labour government with the aim to halt unskilled 
labour immigration from non-EU countries. Reflecting the intense politicisation of intra-EU 
immigration and a more restrictive approach, the Labour government deferred the right for 
Romanian and Bulgarian citizens to access the British labour market in 2006. In consequence 
of the centre-left government’s decision, Italy adopted a client politics model to immigration 
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from all the new EU member-states in 2006 and received large intakes of these immigrants. 
Nevertheless, this type of immigration also became highly politicised in Italy and the centre-
right government led a repressive approach towards EU citizens of Roma origin. 
France published a limited number of jobs available for A-8 citizens, leading to an overall 
policy gap between President Sarkozy’s overt aim to increase the proportion of labour 
immigration and subsequent policy outcomes between 2007 and 2009 (Figures 11.3). This 
political process reflected the French state’s inability to expand labour immigration because 
of President Sarkozy’s unwillingness to open the French labour market to immigration and 
the restrictive channels deployed for labour immigration, even for economic sectors with 
acute recruitment difficulties.  
Family reunion was particularly intense in the Italian and the French contexts, more so than 
in the UK (Figure 11.4). Despite the expansion of this type of immigration into the three 
countries, restrictions on the development of secondary inflows were observed in Italy, and 
particularly in France. The acute politicisation of this type of inflow in France was an 
outcome of President Sarkozy’s overt aim to curb “endured” immigration, effectively attained 
between 2007 and 2009. Furthermore, France was the only country wherein access to family 
reunion visas and residence authorisations was dependent on previous proof of integration 
into French society, reflecting the fusion between immigration and integration policies 
promoted by President Sarkozy.   
Asylum inflows continued to decline in the UK for most of the second half of the 2000s, but 
were still highly prominent on the British political agenda, as the 2006 act demonstrated, 
unlike in France and Italy. The salience of asylum increased in Italy towards the end of the 
2000s, in the context of boat landings and the centre-right government’s resistance in 
respecting those immigrants’ right to apply for humanitarian protection. The growth of 
asylum in France from 2007 onwards was not followed by an intensification of the political 
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salience of this type of immigration in contrast to the trend observed after the 2002 
presidential election (Figure 11.5). Nevertheless, the common detainment of asylum seekers 
across the three cases reinforced the perception of this type of immigrants as illegitimate and 
a potential threat to the host societies.    
Finally, irregular inflows were highly prominent in Italy and to a lesser extent in France 
(more so than in the UK) and restrictions on their development were commonly observed 
across the selected cases. Paradoxically, the settlement of a large contingent of irregular 
immigrants in the UK by 2008 did not spark the intense politicisation of this type of 
immigration, in contrast to France and Italy. The Italian centre-right executive adopted a 
particularly repressive approach to irregular inflows, illustrated by the attempted 
criminalisation of irregular immigration, which was subsequently vetoed due to judicial 
intervention. Alongside this policy gap, a second gap was found between the Italian 
government’s overt aim to halt irregular inflows and the development of a regularisation 
programme for domestic and care workers in 2009. Nevertheless, direct or indirect 
regularisation of irregular immigrants was observed in both the UK and France during the 
second half of the 2000s, suggesting that Italy is not an exceptional case, even if 
regularisations in Italy were more widespread. 
Once more, convergence between the British, French and Italian immigration policies in the 
second half of the 2000s was stronger on the common deployment of restrictive measures on 
irregular inflows than on labour immigration, family reunion and even asylum (Cornelius et 
al., 2004). Moreover, the expected convergence presupposed by the similar distribution of 
costs and benefits from the different types of migration policy was not observed during the 
second half of the 2000s (Table 2.2). Like in the first half of the 2000s, policy gaps were 
observed across the French and Italian immigration policies. The proposed categories for 
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policy models contained acute variation in terms of politicisation of each type of immigration 
flow and their intensity into the three cases (Table 2.2).  
For example, the observation of a common client politics model with reference to the British 
and French policies towards HSI was followed by acute variations in its intensity, whilst the 
identification of this policy model with reference to the British and Italian policies towards 
intra-EU inflows failed to prevent the politicisation of this type of immigration in the two 
countries. The variations in the politicisation of particular types of inflows across the three 
cases highlight the contingency of these political processes. Asylum was particularly 
prominent in the UK in contrast to its low salience in the other two cases; family reunion was 
prominent in France unlike the UK and Italy; and irregular inflows were common in Italy and 
France but were irrelevant in the UK. These divergent trends suggest that the levels of 
politicisation of each type of inflow should not be a mere reflection of structural regularities.  
The understanding of immigration policy during the second half of the 2000s is enhanced by 
probing the relationship between structure and agency in each country. Significant demand 
for foreign labour was observed in the UK and in Italy during the 2000s while recruitment 
difficulties were lower in France. The restrictive channels deployed for labour immigration 
and its low intensity into France suggested that the French government opted to curb 
“endured” inflows rather than intensify labour migration, reflecting Sarkozy’s informal co-
option of the FN’s agenda. In the UK, the politicisation of the “laissez-faire” approach to A-8 
immigration after the 2005 general election led to the closure of channels for unskilled 
immigration from non-EU countries and the A-2 countries in 2006. Decline of economic 
growth and Brown’s association of immigration with employment were accompanied by the 
introduction of restrictive amendments in the HSMP.  
The inconsistent management of Italian immigration policy by the PdL government, in the 
context of acute demand for unskilled foreign workers, reflected the coalition parties’ 
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different political interests alongside the overall attempt to acknowledge the structural 
dependence on labour immigration. As observed in Chapter 11, this research has highlighted 
that comprehensive understanding of the immigration policies in the three cases cannot be 
disentangled from immigration politics at the domestic level and political factors such as 
inter-party competition in the UK and France or intra-coalition dynamics in Italy. 
Consequently, the research challenges that “the entry of highly qualified workers, either 
temporarily or for settlement, has generally been decided administratively, by decision-
makers who are relatively insulated from the political process” in the UK and France (Schain, 
2008, p. 282). By contrast, the two countries’ policies towards HSI during the 2000s reflected 
the national political contexts and the distinct political objectives of the Labour and UMP 
governments in different economic backgrounds.  
This research has also pointed out that the gap between the LN’s political aims and 
subsequent policy outcomes during Berlusconi’s third term, a political strategy named as 
“simulative politics” (Cento Bull, 2009), was a political process also observed in France. The 
gaps between President Sarkozy’s overt objectives to escalate the rate of forced removals of 
irregular immigrants, intensify labour immigration, and proposal of a quota system, and the 
subsequent policy outcomes demonstrate that “simulative politics” were not exclusively 
observed in Italy. This thesis identified salient interdiscursive relationships between the 
national governments’ discourse on immigration and the ERPs’ framing of this social 
phenomenon in the three cases. Furthermore, the research explored how those linkages 
legitimised non-discursive developments through the introduction of particular illiberal 
measures or anti-immigration mobilisations.  
Whereas Blair’s discourse on immigration was marked by the absence of ERP contagion 
effects at the discourse level, his successor government’s framing of immigration derailed 
into ERP grounds in 2007 with an emphasis on providing “British jobs for British workers,” 
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implicitly suggesting that immigrants took jobs away from natives. Besides the restrictions on 
the criteria to access the HSMP in 2007, Brown’s articulation of immigration as a threat to 
employment was used to legitimise the anti-immigration rallies of industrial workers in 2009. 
This trend suggested that mainstream political elites’ frame of immigration effectively affects 
particular groups’ perceptions of immigration and can be employed to justify hostility to 
immigration by sectors of the public.  
In France, Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the FN’s identity politics and framing of 
immigration as a threat to national identity was employed to legitimise the legislative 
developments that restricted immigrants’ access to family reunion and their legal long-term 
settlement in France. The widespread articulation of immigration as a threat to law and order 
in Italy legitimised the attempted criminalisation of irregular immigration, the Interior 
Minister’s campaign against the nomad camps, and the curtailment of immigrants’ human 
rights in the context of the boat landings on the southern shores. The approval of the security 
decrees in a period of intense salience of immigration and the subsequent official association 
of immigration with law and order was also followed by important anti-immigration 
demonstrations in Italy.  
Moreover, the research pointed to similar processes of stigmatisation of EU citizens of Roma 
origin with different levels of intensity in the UK and Italy (later observed in France in 2010), 
involving the frame of these immigrants as a threat to the British welfare system and Italian 
security. The observed variation suggests that the development of this political process in 
each case reflects the interaction between immigration flows and the grievances found in the 
host societies, which can be explored either by ERPs or by mainstream political elites. Thus, 
the thesis has concluded that mainstream parties’ articulation of ERP’s framing of 
immigration may not be exclusively observed in party systems with relevant ERPs. The next 
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section compares the ERPs’ impact on policy developments during the second half of the 
2000s.  
12.3.2 – ERP impact on policy developments 
Did the BNP, the FN and the LN reinforce the restrictive character of national immigration 
policies during the second half of the 2000s? The FN had a significant impact on the 
development of French immigration policy from 2007 to 2009, followed by the LN’s similar 
level of impact in Italy between 2008 and 2009. In contrast, the BNP lacked salient contagion 
effects on the development of immigration policy in the UK despite the BNP’s 
aforementioned impact on Brown’s discourse on immigration. The creation of MIIINC and 
the institutionalisation of association between immigration and national identity provided 
initial evidence of the transposition of the FN’s agenda into national legislation. The 
deepening of the policy for selected immigration against “endured” inflows in the 2007 
immigration law as Le Pen proposed in 2002, as well as the fusion between immigration and 
integration policies, strengthened the FN’s significant impact up to 2009. President Sarkozy 
rejected a proposal for a quota system based on geography, which provided further evidence 
of the deep anti-egalitarianism that the UMP President shared closely with the French ERP 
before the 2007 ballot.  
In Italy, the LN’s significant contagion effects were evident in the attempted criminalisation 
of irregular immigration, restrictions on asylum and secondary inflows, the Interior 
Minister’s campaign against “nomad” camps and the repressive approach to the boat 
landings. Once again, the LN failed to veto the regularisation programme for domestic and 
care workers demanded by its coalition partners in 2009, yet the Interior Minister limited the 
success of this programme in contrast to 2002. The research has demonstrated that the 
restrictive policy shift observed in the UK was an outcome of intense mainstream inter-party 
competition on immigration rather than a response to the BNP’s electoral inroads at the local 
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level. The BNP’s breakthrough at the national level in 2009 coincided with the intense 
salience of immigration on the British political agenda, which suggests that this political 
trend might have enhanced the British ERP’s electoral accomplishment.  
The BNP’s lack of impact on policy developments during Labour’s third term challenges the 
identified common ability of ERPs’ to push for more restrictive immigration policies in 
Austria, Germany and France during the 1990s (Williams, 2006). Hence, restrictive policy 
shifts can coincide with ERPs’ electoral breakthroughs at the national level without being a 
response to such a political process. Whereas the FN’s significant impact on French 
immigration policy between 2007 and 2009 was considered highly disproportional to its 
position in the French party system, the LN’s significant contagion effects on policy 
developments were more proportional to its position within the Berlusconi government. The 
similar levels of ERP impact on immigration policy in France and Italy during the second 
half of the 2000s suggest that the intensity of this political process is not contingent on ERP 
participation in coalition governments.  
This research suggests that ERP impact on policy developments in France and Italy had the 
common outline of pushing for policies that are more restrictive but there were substantial 
divergences in terms of its outcomes. Effectively, the FN’s contagion effects were followed 
by the overall decline of immigration whilst the LN’s substantial impact was still unable to 
reverse the high intensity of immigration. Whereas the LN impact was demonstrated by the 
stigmatisation of a particular type of immigration and a repressive approach to irregular 
inflows, the FN contagion effects were most salient on the institutionalisation of association 
between immigration and national identity and the fusion of immigration and integration 
policies. Therefore, studies on ERP impact should examine its contingency and complexity of 
this political process rather than expect similar outcomes across different countries. 
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12.3.3 – Understanding ERP impact on immigration policy 
This final subsection seeks to understand the development of these political processes by 
comparing the relationships found between the levels of the ERPs’ impact on policy 
developments during the second half of the 2000s and the proposed hypotheses (Table 2.1).  
1) Levels of immigration  
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on the development of immigration policy coincide with 
expansion of levels of immigration? The grants of settlement for non-EU citizens in the UK 
expanded from 2007 onwards alongside the high intensity of intra-EU inflows since 2004 
(Figure 11.1). Immigration into Italy also expanded in 2008 mainly due to the growth of 
labour inflows from both EU member-states and non-EU countries (Figure 11.1). 
Immigration into France decreased at an overall level between 2007 and 2009 because of a 
drop in family reunion (Figure 11.1). Therefore, the expansion of immigration coincided with 
the LN’s significant impact on policy developments in Italy but the overall relevance of this 
factor is diminished by the weak relationships established in the UK and France.  
2) Salience of immigration amongst public opinion 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on policy developments coincide with high concern with 
immigration amongst the electorate? Immigration was the top priority issue for the British 
electorate in the 2005 general election, moderately salient in the Italian 2008 general election 
whilst its salience dropped for French voters in the 2007 presidential election (Figure 12.1). 
Thus, the extreme salience of immigration across the British electorate was weakly related to 
the BNP’s impact on policy developments and a similar weak relationship was found in 
France, unlike in Italy. Therefore, the relevance of this factor in understanding ERP impact 
on policy developments seems doubtful.  
3) ERP electoral challenge 
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Did the ERPs’ (lack of) impact on immigration policy coincide with the ERPs’ substantial 
electoral threat to mainstream parties? In the UK, the BNP only had a major electoral 
breakthrough at the national level in the 2009 EP election (Table 6.1). Despite this 
accomplishment, the BNP failed to pose a significant challenge at the 2010 general election 
because of the electoral constraints imposed by the first-past-the-post system. In France, the 
FN’s electoral support decreased between the 2007 presidential elections and the 2009 EP 
ballot, which fostered expectations of the FN’s terminal decline (Table 8.1), but its menace 
was still substantial at an overall level and recovered to past levels after 2011. In contrast, the 
LN’s electoral threat to mainstream parties expanded from 2008 to the 2009 EP ballot, when 
it obtained its best result at the national level (Table 10.1). Therefore, the dimension of the 
ERPs’ electoral challenges coincided with the BNP’s lack of impact on policy developments 
in the UK and with the FN’s and LN’s opposite effects in France and Italy.  
4) Mainstream parties’ strategies 
Did the ERPs’ (lack of) reinforcement of the restrictive character of immigration policy 
coincide with mainstream parties’ (formal or informal) engagement towards the ERPs? The 
British mainstream parties continued to ostracise the BNP up to 2009, while the Conservative 
leader’s direct attacks on the BNP in 2006 reinforced its pariah status. In France, the UMP 
leader and candidate opted for engagement with the FN by informally co-opting the FN’s 
agenda on immigration and Le Pen’s identity politics. Berlusconi’s rapport with Bossi and the 
PdL’s engagement with the LN led to the integration of the Italian ERP into the coalition 
government and the appointment of Maroni as the Interior Minister. Consequently, the 
different engagement strategies of the French and Italian mainstream parties coincided with 
the FN’s and LN’s significant impact on policy developments whilst the opposite linkage was 
observed in the UK, enhancing the relevance of this factor.  
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In summary, the levels of immigration in the three cases had a weak relationship with the 
variable levels of ERP impact on policy developments during the second half of the 2000s. 
Likewise, public concern with immigration in the UK, France and Italy also diverged with the 
identified levels of ERP impact on immigration policy, unlike the linkages observed during 
the first half of the 2000s. By contrast, the different dimensions of the ERPs’ electoral threat 
to mainstream parties and these parties’ different strategies with the ERPs continued to have a 
high level of coincidence with the FN’s and LN’s significant impact on immigration policy 
and the absence of a similar political process in the UK. Thus, the latter two factors are 
considered the most relevant factors in enhancing the ERPs’ impact on the development of 
immigration policies in the three cases.  
12.4 – Conclusions 
This research indicates that both the FN and the LN had significant levels of impact on inter-
party competition at the 2007 presidential elections and the 2008 general elections, unlike the 
BNP at the 2005 general elections. Unlike the 1990s, this thesis failed to observe a common 
ability of ERPs to push mainstream parties’ positions closer to their own in the selected first-
order-ballots under study (Williams, 2006). As the British case demonstrates, mainstream 
parties’ shift towards restrictions on immigration presaged the BNP’s breakthrough at the 
national level. Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the FN’s agenda on immigration and its 
identity politics proved successful at the ballot. He collected a significant share of Le Pen’s 
2002 voters at the 2007 presidential election,  and benefited from his strong image as a 
statesman. The dimension of the ERPs’ electoral challenges alongside the engagement 
strategies of mainstream parties towards ERPs were considered the most relevant factors in 
enhancing the FN’s and the LN’s impact on this dimension of immigration politics.  
This research suggests that the FN had a significant impact on public attitudes to immigration 
at the 2007 presidential elections, followed by the LN’s moderate contagion effects at the 
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2008 general elections, in contrast to the BNP’s lack of impact at the 2005 general elections. 
Therefore, there is little evidence to support the idea that ERPs have an unconditional 
capability to expand xenophobia across their national electorates in contrast to past 
observations within ERP literature (Williams, 2006). Simultaneously, the research highlights 
the fact that concern with immigration expanded dramatically across British voters in 2005 in 
the context of non-relevant ERPs raising the profile of mainstream parties for the observed 
trends in this case.  
The levels of ERP electoral support, alongside the attitudes of its core voters and the agency 
of mainstream parties, coincided with the FN’s and the LN’s salient levels of impact during 
the second half of the 2000s. Nevertheless, these factors were unable to account for the 
decline of hostility towards immigration in France and Italy. This trend suggests that the 
ERP’s electoral support and party network were no longer able to influence the overall 
French electorate as was observed in the past, or that ERP impact on public attitudes might 
have been overstated and the relevance of other potential factors should be further explored. 
Furthermore, the LN’s significant electoral expansion at the 2008 general election failed to 
have an impact on mass attitudes and was most salient for voters most concerned with 
immigration and its core voters. This thesis suggests that ERP direct impact on public 
attitudes to immigration might be more concentrated among the ERPs’ core electorate and 
voters most concerned with immigration rather than on the general electorate.   
As observed in inter-party competition, both the FN and the LN had a significant impact on 
the development of their national immigration policies between 2007 and 2009 in France as 
well as in Italy from 2008 to 2009. Notwithstanding the derailment of Brown’s discourse on 
immigration and the restrictive character of policy developments, the BNP lacked contagion 
effects on policy-making or its implementation during Labour government’s third term. This 
trend challenges past observation of a common ERP ability to push for immigration policies 
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that were more restrictive throughout the 1990s whilst the British case indicates that this 
policy outcome might be observed without being a repercussion of an ERP’s agency. This 
research highlights the salient variations on the contents of ERPs’ impact in France and Italy, 
suggesting that the observation of this political process in different political contexts should 
not presuppose uniform outcomes. The FN’s indirect impact on policy development was 
regarded as more disproportional than the LN direct impact in Italy. ERPs’ significant impact 
on policy developments in France and Italy coincided with the dimension of the ERPs’ 
electoral threats and the engagement strategies of mainstream parties rather than with the 
intensity and salience of immigration. 
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Chapter 13 – Conclusions 
This research focused on a political process, the study of which has been routinely neglected 
by political scientists: the formal or informal co-option of ERPs by mainstream parties. This 
political process was frequently associated with immigration policy and has been identified in 
the past in the UK and France. Co-option was interpreted as a bi-dimensional political 
phenomenon: primarily, as a demonstration of a challenger party’s impact on a political 
system, and secondly, as a strategic option employed by mainstream parties’ to neutralise the 
challenger party. Consequently, the research sought to identify the ERPs’ impact on 
immigration politics and policy and to understand the latter political processes by comparing 
the relevance of the proposed hypotheses (Table 2.1).  
This final chapter summarises the empirical observations, the analytical inferences and their 
implications. It is shown that ERP impact on any of the three dimensions of immigration 
politics and policy is more contingent than presupposed by previous comparative research. 
ERP impact on interparty competition and policy developments in the three cases was 
apparently dependent on the dimension of ERPs’ electoral threats and particularly, on the 
agency of mainstream parties. The findings from the analysis on ERP impact on public 
attitudes to immigration suggested that this political process might have been overstated in 
the past and further analysis is advised to understand trends across public opinion.  
13.1 – ERPs’ impact on inter-party competition  
This research has highlighted the increasing salience of immigration on inter-party 
competition at the first-order-ballots throughout the second half of the 2000s in the context of 
relevant and non-relevant ERPs. Therefore, immigration has become increasingly important 
in the political debate in the three cases. Variations were found on the levels of politicisation 
of the different types of immigration flows across the three countries, as asylum was highly 
prominent in the UK, unlike in France and Italy, whilst irregular inflows were most dominant 
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on the French and Italian political agendas. These fluctuations suggest that the salience of the 
different types of immigration is a contingent political process and an outcome of the 
interaction between the development of immigration and contingent factors in the host 
societies, such as immigration politics, rather than a reflection of structural regularities 
inherent to immigrants or types of immigration. 
Whereas the BNP lacked relevant impact on inter-party competition in immigration policy 
during the 2000s, the LN exhibited significant impact on this dimension of immigration 
politics in the Italian 2001 and 2008 general elections. The LN evidenced a consistent ability 
to push for the hegemonic framing of immigration as a temporary social phenomenon and 
irregular immigration as a law and order issue throughout the 2000s. The Italian ERP’s 
contagion effects were not restricted to the centre-right coalition, as demonstrated by the 
PD’s positions on immigration in the 2008 general election. Unlike the LN, the FN only had a 
significant impact on inter-party competition in the French 2007 presidential elections unlike 
in 2002. The exclusion of immigration from mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns for the 
2002 presidential election prevented the FN from having contagion effects on immigration 
politics.  
Nonetheless, the French ERP’s impact expanded dramatically at the 2007 presidential 
election with the fusion of immigration and integration policies across mainstream parties’ 
proposals and the UMP’s informal co-option of the FN’s identity politics and agenda on 
immigration. Effectively, Sarkozy’s electoral strategy paid off at the first round of the 2007 
presidential election when he captured a large share of Le Pen’s 2002 voters, enabling him to 
achieve the best result of a centre-right candidate since the late 1970s. This accomplishment 
mirrored the UMP’s presentation of a similar agenda to the FN and Sarkozy’s enjoyment of 
far deeper political capital than Le Pen, which led former FN voters to choose the most 
effective candidate to implement similar plans on immigration. Consequently, this research 
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has pointed out that the success of informal co-option of ERPs reflects the established parties’ 
appropriation of the ERP’s political agenda, alongside the higher credibility of the 
mainstream candidate to execute such agenda in comparison to the ERP competitor. The 
success of “clothes stealing” is therefore contingent on the levels of credibility and the 
proximity of the agendas proposed by the mainstream parties’ and ERPs’ candidates. 
In contrast, the British case revealed that mainstream parties’ adoption of populist approaches 
to a particular type of immigration flow can presage rather than respond to an ERP electoral 
breakthrough. This was the case with Hague’s strategy on asylum at the 2001 general 
election. British mainstream parties’ general shift to increasingly restrictive positions on 
immigration and the Conservative leader’s valence politics on immigration, which 
approached far-right grounds in 2005, were an outcome of intense mainstream inter-party 
competition on this issue. Consequently, the general realignment of the position of 
mainstream parties for more restrictive immigration policies or particular derailments into 
far-right grounds can be observed in party systems with non-relevant ERPs and may not be a 
necessary consequence of ERP agency, like the BNP’s. Mainstream parties can distance 
themselves from the ERPs and simultaneously adopt positions close to the anti-immigration 
proposals of ERPs, like the Conservatives under Michael Howard’s leadership. It must 
therefore be acknowledged that mainstream parties can adopt increasingly restrictive or 
extremist positions as a result of their own political agency to downgrade the potential risk of 
overstating the levels of ERP impact on this analytical dimension.   
The identified levels of ERPs’ impact on inter-party competition in the three cases during the 
2000s challenge the supposed common ERP ability to push mainstream parties’ positions 
closer to their own in critical electoral periods, which had been observed throughout the 
1990s (Williams, 2006). Hence, the contagion effects of ERPs on inter-party competition are 
more contingent than previously supposed by the ERP literature. Moreover, salient disparities 
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across the content of the LN’s and the FN’s impact on inter-party competition were found in 
France and Italy during the second half of the 2000s, as the LN pushed for the framing of 
irregular immigration as a law and order issue, whilst the FN promoted the hegemony of 
identity politics across the French UMP. These variations provide further indication of the 
inherent contingency of this political process, and the use of qualitative research methods 
have proved to be the most suitable to grasp its complexity.  
Comparative analysis between the levels of ERP impact on inter-party competition suggested 
that this political process should be conceived as an outcome of the interaction between 
factors: the electoral challenge of ERPs and the agency of mainstream parties. First, the ERPs 
must pose a substantial electoral threat to established parties in order to potentially force the 
mainstream parties to react to their challenge. Nevertheless, the observation of this factor 
might not lead to salient ERP contagion effects on inter-party competition. Mainstream 
parties continue to exhibit full autonomy in determining their electoral strategies and can 
decide to exclude immigration from their electoral campaigns, as observed in the French 
2002 presidential election. Consequently, the ERPs’ electoral challenge is a salient but not 
determinant factor behind their contagion effects on this dimension of immigration politics.  
Furthermore, the significant impact of the ERPs on inter-party competition in immigration 
was observed in the context of mainstream parties’ engagement with the ERPs at formal and 
informal levels in Italy in 2001 and 2008 and in France in 2007. This trend and the 
observations extracted from the French 2002 presidential elections suggest that the intensity 
of ERP impact on this dimension is more contingent on the agency of mainstream parties 
than on their dimension of their electoral threat.  The responsibility of mainstream parties for 
the ERPs’ contagion effects on immigration politics at critical electoral periods is therefore 
enhanced. Mainstream parties mediate the impact of ERPs on their positions on immigration 
policy and these parties’ elites ultimately decide the intensity of this political process. 
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Moreover, the research also suggested that the proposals of mainstream parties on this topic 
can derail into extremist grounds in the context of a non-relevant ERP, which enhances the 
profile of mainstream political elites for the salience granted to immigration and the content 
of their proposals. 
13.2 – ERPs’ impact on public attitudes  
Salience of immigration and hostility to his social phenomenon were particularly intense in 
the French and Italian first-order-ballots taking place in the first half of the 2000s unlike the 
low apprehension observed across the British electorate in the 2001 general election. By 
contrast, salience of immigration increased dramatically in the UK in the 2005 general 
election and tenuously in Italy in the 2008 general election. The opposite trend was observed 
in France in the 2007 presidential elections despite the stronger dimension of the French ERP 
than the BNP in the UK or the LN in Italy. Consequently, studies on ERP impact on public 
attitudes must recognise that salience of immigration can expand dramatically or to decline 
independently of the ERPs’ levels of electoral support to prevent the potential overstatement 
of ERP impact on public attitudes. 
Fluctuations in public perceptions of immigration across the three cases were also highlighted 
by this thesis. Whereas Italian voters overwhelmingly associated immigration with 
criminality in Italy in 2001, this perception of immigration was low amongst the British and 
French electorates in 2001 and 2002. By contrast, association between immigration and 
employment were stronger amongst British voters than amongst Italian voters in the first half 
of the 2000s. These oscillations in public perceptions of immigration suggest that this 
political process is an outcome of the interplay between the development of immigration and 
contingent factors in host societies rather than a reflection of structural regularities inherent to 
the types of immigration flows. Additionally, the linkages found between British public 
attitudes to HSI and asylum prior to the 2001 general election and mainstream inter-party 
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consensuses enhance the profile of mainstream parties in the public perception of the 
different types of immigration flows. 
Moreover, decline of hostility to immigration was observed in the two latter countries unlike 
the stability observed across British public attitudes to immigration in the second half of the 
2000s. Decline in the salience of immigration and absolute levels of hostility to immigration 
in France in the second half of the 2000s differs from the increasing salience of this issue in 
the mainstream parties’ electoral campaigns for the first-order-ballots. If the trends across the 
French electorate were considered an outcome of the restrictive immigration policies of the 
UMP government before 2007 or the intense salience of this issue at inter-party competition 
level in 2007, the problem was to understand the dramatic expansion of concern with 
immigration in the UK in 2005.  
This research demonstrated that the BNP lacked impact on public attitudes to immigration 
during the 2000s despite the aforementioned trends amongst British voters. By contrast, the 
FN exhibited significant levels of impact on public attitudes to immigration in 2002 and 2007 
despite its declining intensity demonstrated by the reduction of overall concern with 
immigration and the substantial drop of absolute values of hostility to immigration. In Italy, 
the LN improved its level of contagion effects from a non-relevant to a moderate level from 
the 2001 to the 2008 general elections but was still far from holding the issue ownership of 
opposition to immigration notwithstanding opposite statements within ERP literature. Hence, 
the analysis failed to observe a common ability of ERPs to intensify xenophobia across the 
British, French and Italian electorates throughout the 2000s like in the 1990s across Austria, 
Germany and France (Williams, 2006). The cross-national analysis of the levels of the ERPs’ 
impact on public attitudes and the proposed hypotheses highlighted the dimension of the 
ERPs’ electoral support alongside the ideological characteristics of their core electorates as 
the most important factors enhancing the occurrence of this political process.  
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Nevertheless, the decline of hostility to immigration across public opinion in France and Italy 
diverged from the FN’s robust electoral resilience up to 2007 and the LN’s electoral 
expansion in 2008 or the expansion of the foreign population in these two cases. The past 
ability of the FN’s electoral organisation and the attitudes of its core electorate to influence 
the French electorate at an extraordinary level during the 1990s failed to be observed during 
the second half of the 2000s (Schain, 2002; 2006). The research suggests that the ERP’s party 
network and the ideological characteristics of its core electorate were no longer able to 
influence overall public attitudes to immigration as they has in the past, or there might have 
been an overstatement of its overall impact in the past.  
Furthermore, the growth of the LN’s electoral support between 2001 and 2008 was unable to 
halt the decline on the levels of public resentment to immigration in Italy. The content of the 
Italian ERP’s impact in 2008 was most visible amongst voters most concerned with 
immigration than amongst the general electorate. Likewise the FN’s impact at the 2007 
presidential election seemed stronger on voters that ranked immigration as their top priority 
and the party’s own core voters. These two cases suggest that ERP impact on public attitudes 
might not extent to the mass public and might be more restrained than previously 
presupposed by ERP literature. Finally, the continuous development of immigration into 
France and Italy before 2007 and 2008 also differed from the trends observed on public 
attitudes questioning the validity of the “ethnic backlash” thesis. This trend suggests that 
public attitudes to immigration are less contingent on the number of immigrants than on other 
political factors. Therefore, the research suggests that other factors should be explored to 
understand public attitudes to immigration, in particular the discourse of mainstream parties 
on this topic. 
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13.3 – ERPs’ impact on development of immigration policy  
Policy stability was higher across Italian immigration policy than in the UK and France 
during the 2000s, where it was possible to observe general policy shifts. The adoption of a 
narrative of “managed immigration” in 2002 was dropped after the 2005 general election in 
favour of a security related approach focused on tackling abuse of immigration system. In 
France, the UMP leader and Interior Minister announced a policy shift to attain a better 
balance between selected immigration and “endured” inflows that was then transposed into 
the 2006 and 2007 immigration laws. The analysis of the British, French and Italian 
immigration policies throughout the 2000s suggest that the UK adopted the most liberal 
approach towards labour inflows followed by Italy. Consequently, both the UK and Italy 
received the largest intakes of labour migration in contrast to its low intensity into France.   
Intense immigration flows of HSI were observed into the UK rather than into France and 
Italy during the 2000s. The second half of this decade was marked by the intense 
politicisation of intra-EU inflows in opposition to the past political consensus on this type of 
immigration in the UK and Italy, after intense levels of immigration from the new EU 
member-states. Unskilled labour immigration from non-EU countries was also highly intense 
into the Southern European country in contrast to the two other cases. Family reunion was 
extremely politicised in France unlike the two other cases whilst asylum was more dominant 
in the British political agenda than in France and Italy. Finally, irregular inflows were 
particularly important in Italy and less in France than in the UK, where there was also a large 
contingent of irregular immigrants settled in the country.  
Convergence between the three cases’ immigration policies was stronger on the scope of 
restrictive measures deployed to limit the development of irregular and asylum than on labour 
immigration and family reunion. Policy gaps were identified in France and Italy regarding 
Sarkozy’s escalation of the repressive approach to irregular inflows, the aimed expansion of 
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the proportion of labour immigration and its low intensity between 2007 and 2009, and the 
deployment of a quota system vetoed by the Mazeaud Commission. In Italy, a recurrent 
policy gap was observed on the restrictive objectives set on irregular immigration and the 
posterior development of regularisation programmes. By contrast, the UK exhibited a 
stronger ability to match the proposed objectives with the subsequent policy outputs. These 
policy gaps suggest that policy outcomes must be examined alongside the policy inputs rather 
than induced from the objectives set by the national governments at rhetoric level, which can 
lead to distorted judgments. The analysis of the British, French and Italian immigration 
policies challenged the validity of the proposed typology of migration policies despite the 
particular usefulness of the client politics model to understand the British policy towards HSI.  
The proposed categories based on the distribution of costs and benefits presupposed by each 
type of migration policy contained acute variations both in the intensity of the immigration 
flows and their corresponding levels of politicisation throughout the 2000s in the UK, France 
and Italy (Table 2.2). Alternatively, probing the relationship between structure and agency in 
each case helped to understand the variations across the policy developments in a single 
country and at a cross-national level. In the context of low unemployment and massive 
investment on public services, the British Labour government had a stake in promoting 
labour inflows to support its political objectives and economic growth. In contrast, the 
reduction of family reunion instead of the overall intensification of labour inflows reflected 
the low recruitment difficulties in France alongside Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the FN at 
the 2007 presidential election. Finally, the incoherent management of immigration flows in 
Italy reflected the different aims of the members of the Italian coalition government in the 
context of domestic structural dependence on foreign labour.  
Therefore, this thesis has showed how the development of immigration policy cannot be 
disentangled from the immigration politics in each domestic context. Effectively, the three 
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countries’ immigration policies were influenced by political factors such as national 
governments’ political objectives (the Labour government’s modernisation of public 
services); inter-party competition (between both Labour and the Conservatives, as well as the 
UMP and the FN); intra-coalition dynamics (amongst the coalition partners in the Italian 
government); or intra-party politics (within the UMP for the nomination as presidential 
candidate). In opposition to the growing irrelevance of political parties within immigration 
studies, this research has shown that immigration politics has a key role behind the 
politicisation of particular types of immigration policy and the subsequent shape of national 
immigration policies. Furthermore, the thesis related the patterns of domestic immigration 
politics with subsequent developments at the EU level during President Sarkozy’s term and 
the French EU presidency in 2008. This trend suggests that developments on immigration 
policy at the EU level are also intertwined with domestic politics.  
Finally, the employment of CDA allowed the identification of interdiscursive relationships 
between the ERP’s frame of immigration and mainstream parties’ discourse during the 
analysis of ERP impact at the inter-party competition level and on policy developments. 
These linkages were identified both in party systems with relevant and non-relevant ERPs 
suggesting that this political process is not exclusively observed in the former countries. 
Furthermore, the identified interdiscursive relationships were linked to specific non-
discursive events such as anti-immigration mobilisations in the UK and Italy or the adoption 
of particular highly restrictive measures that destabilised immigrants’ regular settlement in 
the host countries and potentially damaged their human rights across the three cases.  
The common development of stigmatisation of EU citizens of Roman origin was identified 
both in the UK and Italy. The observed variation across the processes of stigmatisation of this 
type of immigrants in different countries reflects the interplay between development of 
immigration flows and contingent factors in host societies, like the agency of mainstream 
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parties. Hence, immigration politics seems more important in explaining the aforementioned 
fluctuations than the idiosyncrasies of immigrants. Once again, the stigmatisation of EU 
citizens of Roma origin was observed in party systems with relevant and non-relevant ERPs 
suggesting that these political processes can be observed independently of ERP’s agency 
raising the profile of mainstream political elites for the discourse on immigration.  
Regarding ERP impact on policy developments, the FN was the ERP with strongest levels of 
impact on policy developments during the 2000s, followed by the LN in Italy. The LN 
enjoyed a moderate impact on the development of Italian immigration policy during 
Berlusconi’s second term that increased to a significant level between 2008 and 2009. Lastly, 
the BNP lacked relevant impact on policy developments in the UK during the 2000s despite 
the contagion effects on the Labour government’s discourse on immigration in the second 
half of this decade. Therefore, the conclusions from the research on ERP impact during the 
2000s challenge the past observation that ERPs pushed for more restrictive immigration 
policies in Austria, Germany and France during the 1990s (Williams, 2006). The FN had a 
more disproportional impact on the policy developments than the LN suggesting that the 
intensity of the ERP impact on immigration policy is not contingent on access to executive 
positions. 
Moreover, the BNP’s electoral breakthrough at local level was incorrectly associated with the 
Labour government’s repressive approach to asylum inflows in 2002 in immigration and ERP 
studies, when it was an outcome of the intense inter-party competition between Labour and 
the Conservatives and the government’s strategy to neutralise the opposition party. Thus, it 
must be acknowledged that ERPs’ electoral accomplishments may coincide without causing 
the preceding political processes. This possibility must complement past observation that 
ERPs’ electoral breakthroughs influenced the political agenda to prevent potential 
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overstatements of ERP impact on policy developments, as observed in the UK in the early 
2000s.   
Beside the common extension of restrictions to particular types of immigration, such as 
family reunion or asylum, the thesis has also highlighted important variations in the contents 
of the selected ERPs’ impact on policy developments in France and Italy. Whereas the FN 
pushed for the fusion of immigration and integration policies alongside the 
institutionalisation of its identity politics with the creation of MIIINC, the LN forced the 
introduction of the “residence contract”, the initial management of labour flows under a 
temporary approach or the attempted criminalisation of irregular immigrants. Moreover, the 
informal co-option of the FN’s agenda on immigration in the 1990s differed from the outline 
of this political process at the 2007 presidential election. Whereas the former Interior 
Minister Charles Pasqua informally co-opted the FN’s “zero-immigration policy”, Sarkozy 
adopted the FN’s frame of particular types of immigration flows as “endured” and Le Pen’s 
identity politics in 2007. Consequently, it must be acknowledged that ERP impact has a 
contingent character within a single country and across different countries. Like the ERP 
impact on inter-party competition, qualitative methods of analysis are most suited to grasp the 
idiosyncrasies of ERP contagion effects on policy developments.  
As expected, ERP impact on policy developments in France and Italy met important 
constraints that restrained the intensity of this political policy. The adoption of the quota 
system was vetoed twice in the 2000s by the domestic political constraints in France. In Italy, 
the management of immigration as a strictly temporary social phenomenon was undermined 
by the macro-economic domestic context while the fingerprinting programme or the 
criminalisation of irregular immigrants were vetoed by domestic and exogenous judicial 
powers. Effectively, ERP direct or indirect contagion effects on the development of 
immigration policy met the same level of constraints than the scope of options on the 
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management of inflows available to national governments, which prevent the implementation 
of “zero-immigration policies”. This trend points to the necessary moderation of expectations 
on ERP impact on policy developments to prevent potential underestimations of its 
occurrence in liberal democracies.  
The comparative analysis of relationships between the levels of ERPs’ impact on immigration 
policy and the proposed factors highlighted the weak relevance of expansion of immigration 
and high public concern with immigration to understand the occurrence of this political 
process. By contrast, the dimension of ERPs’ electoral challenge and the agency of 
mainstream parties were positively related to the observed levels of ERP impact on policy 
developments in France and Italy. Like the ERP impact on inter-party competition, ERPs 
must first pose a substantial electoral threat to mainstream parties to force the national 
governments to react to their demands. Secondly, the agency of mainstream parties mediated 
the intensity of ERP impact on policy developments in France and Italy, particularly during 
the terms started during the first half of the 2000s.  
Whereas Chirac had refused to engage with the FN, Sarkozy’s informal co-option of the Le 
Pen’s agenda from 2005 onwards was accompanied by the FN’s ascendant impact on French 
immigration policy. The intra-coalition dynamics also moderated the LN’s impact on policy 
developments during Berlusconi’s second term and were associated with the Italian ERP’s 
descendant impact on this dimension between 2001 and 2006. Hence, the ERPs’ impact on 
immigration policy is dependent on two factors but the intensity of this political process is 
intertwined with the agency of mainstream parties. Until the day comes when ERPs obtain 
single-party majorities on first-order-ballots, mainstream political elites must mediate their 
impact on immigration policy according to their own strategic calculations.  
The thesis has demonstrated that both the FN and the LN achieved consistent levels of impact 
on the three dimensions of immigration politics and policy in contrast to the first half of the 
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2000s. Nonetheless, the research has pointed out that holding impact on one of those 
dimensions of immigration does not necessarily imply holding contagion effects on the other 
two categories. Overall, the ERPs’ impact on immigration politics and policy is a more 
contingent political process than previously presupposed. ERP contagion effects on the three 
dimensions of immigration politics and policy superseded the mere impact on cultural level 
or discourse level that had been previously admitted by ERP literature (Minkenberg, 2002; 
Mudde, 2007).  
ERP impact on policy developments was observed beyond the mere tightening of the 
conditions set for the entry and settlement of foreign citizens. Effectively the French and 
Italian ERPs provided an original contribution to the observed policy developments, like the 
creation of the MIIINC in France or the “residence contract” in Italy. The thesis sought to 
develop a balanced evaluation of the ERP impact on the three selected analytical dimensions 
to overcome past zero-sum evaluations of these political processes. Previous overstatements 
of the BNP’s impact on immigration policy in the UK and the LN’s contagion effects on 
public attitudes in Italy were also challenged by this research.   
Similar to the observation of common interdiscursive relationships between ERP’s frame of 
immigration and mainstream parties’ discourse, the adoption of repressive approaches to 
particular types of immigration was commonly observed either in the UK or in Italy. At the 
inter-party competition level, the British 2005 general election showed how mainstream 
parties can shift their positions in favour of further restrictions on the management of 
immigration and even derail into extremist grounds in the absence of a relevant ERP. 
Dramatic expansion of public concern with immigration in the UK contrasted with the overall 
decline in France and Italy.  
These observations do not water-down the levels of ERP impact in France and Italy but 
highlight that similar general outcomes can be observed in party systems deprived of a 
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relevant ERP. The acknowledgement of this potential trend is essential to develop an accurate 
evaluation of ERP impact to prevent overstatements of this political process. Potential 
inclinations to lay the responsibility for the highly restrictive observations on immigration 
politics and policy onto the ERPs and subsequently exonerate mainstream parties of their 
blame necessarily leads to erroneous analysis of ERP impact. Furthermore, this research 
showed that ERP impact on inter-party competition and policy developments was closely 
intertwined with the agency of mainstream parties preventing potential detachments between 
extremist parties and established parties from their responsibility for the levels of ERP impact 
on immigration politics and policy.  
Finally, the overall differences between the selected cases (see Chapter 4) had some degree of 
relevance behind the variable levels of ERP impact on immigration politics and policy. In 
particular, the different electoral systems had a direct influence on the dimension of the 
ERPs’ electoral threats to the mainstream parties and subsequently on the intensity of ERPs’ 
impact on immigration politics and policy. In the UK, the first-past-the-post system tamed the 
BNP’s electoral threat even after its electoral breakthrough at national level in the 2009 EP 
elections. In France, the dual ballot system prevented the FN from holding access to the 
office seats but its electoral challenge to French mainstream parties was still substantial, 
particularly towards the centre-right parties. Finally, the Italian scorporo provided the LN 
with a strong leverage to exploit its territorial dimension, unlike the British and French ERPs, 
and extract concessions from its centre-right coalition partners. 
The immigration paradigms of the selected cases also had a moderating effect on the ERPs’ 
levels of impact on immigration politics and policy, in particular on the FN’s contagion 
effects on policy developments. The intensity of this political process was curtailed by the 
vetoes on Sarkozy’s successive proposals for a quota system, which were indirectly 
legitimised by the French Republican tradition. By contrast, the different immigration 
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experiences of the UK, France and Italy did not have an effect on ERP impact. Regularisation 
of irregular immigrants was observed across the three cases with different levels of intensity, 
especially in Italy. Therefore, the supposed “exceptionalism” of Italy was questioned by this 
research apart from Italy’s inability to channel regular labour migration according to 
domestic demand. Now, topics that merit further analysis are explored in further depth in the 
next final section.   
13.4 – Future research 
This thesis developed an analytical framework to evaluate ERP impact on immigration 
politics and policy that can travel to different political contexts with salient ERPs and levels 
of immigration like the Netherlands or Denmark. Some of the conclusions extracted from the 
UK, France and Italy should be subjected to additional analysis to examine their validity 
beyond the selected cases. Further research can examine whether the success of the informal 
co-option of ERPs is dependent on the appropriation of the far-right political agenda by the 
established parties and the higher credibility of the mainstream party’s candidate to 
implement their plans. The analysis also suggested that ERP impact on public attitudes might 
be constrained to the voters most concerned with immigration and their core voters rather 
than on mass attitudes. This should be assessed by supplementary research on pubic 
behaviour.  
Salient paradoxes have been identified in the three countries that merit further analysis. 
Forthcoming research should explore the dramatic rise in concern with immigration in the 
UK in contrast to the drop in public concern in France in the context of a relevant ERP. 
Moreover, investigations should be developed to understand the overall decline of hostility to 
immigration in France unlike the UK. The increasing importance of immigration on inter-
party competition at the selected first-order-ballots taking place in the 2000s differed from 
the drop in public concern with this issue in France. Consequently, further analysis should 
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assess whether the gap between the salience of immigration in political agendas and public 
attitudes persisted in France or if it can be observed across other Western European countries.  
A potential factor that might help to understand the expanding importance of immigration is 
the development of the Europeanisation process, which has been weakly observed in this area 
of public policy in comparison to other fields such as the macro-economic policies of EU 
member-states. Mair (2008) argues that the development of this political process at the inter-
governmental level has led to the de-politicisation of important areas of public policy and the 
subsequent contraction of the sphere for political conflict between member-states. Thus, 
whether the increasing politicisation of immigration in European party systems is a potential 
collateral consequence of the EU integration process is an issue that deserves supplementary 
analysis.  
The intense levels of ERP impact on immigration politics and policy were regarded as closely 
intertwined with the agency of mainstream parties. One potential line of research is to explore 
why some mainstream political leaders have a stronger propensity to engage with the ERPs 
than others do. In parallel, future research should also analyse whether it is possible to 
identify more cases where mainstream parties’ positions on immigration de-rail to the far-
right grounds in the context of non-relevant ERPs and to evaluate the potential causes behind 
this political process. The second half of the 2000s was marked by the common expansion of 
restrictions to most types of immigration flows in the three selected cases despite the 
declining concern with this issue in France and Italy. Whether this gap will increase or 
decrease in the future is also an interesting topic for future analysis. Finally, the research 
argued for the evaluation of immigration policy from a structure and agency perspective that 
emphasises the interplay between structural regularities and the agency of the actors involved 
in the policy-making process, especially political parties. This method of analysis should be 
employed to understand the development of immigration policy in other political contexts. 
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